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Abstract
Televangelism or the use of satellite television/YouTube to preach religion has 
become one important media phenomenon, inter alia, among Muslim communities in 
minority contexts such as the United Kingdom and the United States of America (e.g. see 
Echchaibi, 2011). In a similar way to public figures, televangelists have become “media 
celebrities” with hundreds of thousands of fans and followers on YouTube and social 
media networks.
The aim of the PhD thesis is twofold: first, to provide an explanatory framework 
for the rise of the phenomenon of televangelism, explore the broader dynamics it relates 
to and its characteristic features; second, to examine three case studies of American 
Muslim televangelists popular in the West, who belong to three different generations, 
namely Yusuf Estes (born 1944), Hamza Yusuf (born 1958) and Baba Ali (born 1977). 
The “celebrity status” that these televangelists have acquired (see Chapter 1 of the study) 
raises the question of what self-presentation strategies televangelists draw upon (e.g. see 
Goffman 1959), i.e. what identities they present for themselves and what multi-modal 
features they use to construct their identities and appeal to their audiences. Further, the 
post 9-11 context, which has witnessed the rise of anti-semitic and anti-Muslim rhetoric 
raises the question of how the three televangelists, that have achieved popularity among 
Muslim communities in the West, represent Muslim identities in their sermons, for 
example, if they draw on particular legitimation strategies to respond to anti-Muslim 
rhetoric.
In fact, over the past few decades, many scholars in different disciplines (e.g. 
psychology, sociology and linguistics) have explored the concept of identities’ 
construction (e.g. see Triandafyllidou and Wodak 2003 and Anderson 2006). Discourse- 
language in use- can be one domain for constructing identities (e.g. Hall 1996: 17 and
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Wodak et al 2009:22). Through discourse, individuals can instruct others and be 
instructed as to who they think they are, with whom they should align, and from whom to 
distance themselves; from that perspective, identity is a discursive construction (e.g. 
Wodak et al 2009:22). From this perspective, this study seeks to: a) explore the multi­
modal and discursive strategies televangelists use to self-represent their identities and b) 
construct Muslim identities in their sermons.
Given the nature of the topic of the study and the many features that are related to 
this phenomenon (e.g. use of entertainment, use of websites and social networks), a 
Critical Discourse Studies (thereafter, CDS) approach is well-suited for the study. CDS 
can be briefly defined as an approach towards exploring complex social phenomena that 
pays particular attention to the relationship between language, ideology and power (e.g. 
Wodak and Meyer 2009; Angouri and Wodak 2014). A critical approach will enable us to 
go beyond perceiving televangelism as a “novel” phenomenon towards raising the 
question of what might be at stake in televangelism and what might be the wider 
interactions that have contributed to the shaping of this phenomenon and maintaining its 
existence.
This study employs an innovative synergy of the Discourse Historical Approach 
and the theory of Visual Grammar to deconstruct the layers of contexts surrounding the 
phenomenon of televangelism and to explore televangelists’ discourses. I argue that 
televangelism is a complex phenomenon that can be seen within the contextual prism of 
media power, transnationalism, info-tainment and rise of digital Islam, among other 
aspects (Chapters 1-4). The study makes general and more specific claims about 
televangelism and the discourses of the three American Muslim televangelists under 
investigation. First, the study illustrates that televangelists' sermons and YouTube excerpts 
represent hybrid multi-modal fields in which televangelists navigate through different 
discourses and modes to self-represent their (multiple) identities, and gain wider
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constituencies of audiences, which testifies to the understanding of this type of religious 
celebrity who can play multiple roles (see Chapter 6). Second, one finding of the study is 
that the three televangelists are -in varied ways- addressing the socio-historical context of 
Muslims in the West (e.g. awareness of misrepresentation in mass media), which could be 
one reason for their popularity.
In terms of the representation of Muslim identities in televangelists' sermons, 
using the DHA, I explore the nomination, predication and argumentation strategies, 
among other aspects and explain that one feature of the sermons of the three televangelists 
is that they are also addressing non-Muslims, attempting to bring about change of 
attitudes towards the perception of Islam. The study also reveals that, when Islam and the 
West are frequently imagined as incompatible entities in media discourses (see Baker et al 
2013), the three televangelists have adopted different degrees of inclusivity towards the 
West, which is imagined differently in televangelists' sermons. Furthermore, 
argumentation strategies are used to give legitimacy to Islam/Muslims against a 
background of the rise of anti-Muslim rhetoric. Relevant to the representation of Muslim 
identities is that televangelists' sermons are a highly hybrid fabric that is open to many 
(contemporary) discourse topics and historical/religious references. Thus, the study 
illustrates that these important discursive aspects have two interrelated functions: a) to 
create distinct representations of Muslims b) to give legitimacy to televangelists' claims 
about Islam and Muslims.
The study, thus, takes up the critical challenge of exploring what might be the 
wider interactions that have led to the emergence and the continuation of televangelism. I 
identify and explore some of the broader interactions (e.g. rise of info-tainment society, 
emergence of transnational Islam). In this way, I extend the application of the DHA to 
religious discourse which has been little examined from a critical perspective (Chilton 
2004: xii). I explore the discursive strategies and the multi-modal means the three
American Muslim televangelists use to represent their identities and to construct identities 
for Muslims in their sermons and examine televangelists' use of online spaces and analyze 
user-generated content of televangelists' fans. The study concludes that it is not only the 
three televangelists who are imagining a Muslim community. Rather, the accessibility of 
new media appears to have made it possible for some Muslims to (re-)imagine a global 
Muslim community. I attempt to unravel the development of this phenomenon, how it 
embraces many different styles, and what it means to the representation of religion 
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It all started on a hot day!
It was in 2003 when I first realized that televangelism has become an important 
and complex phenomenon. I was on a trip to El Gifton, a small island in the Red 
Sea; a female accountant o f my age told me that she found more meaning to her 
life after watching the programmes o f the televangelist Amr Khaled: “one can be 
modem, successful and religious” . She reiterated enthusiastically as we moved 
steadily in the Red Sea. Amr Khaled was the last thing we discussed before we got 
off board. El Gifton is a nature reserve, which literally meant that we had to climb 
down metal stairs in the sea! Somewhere close to the shore. Glittering water, the 
adventure o f reaching the sea shore, and the cheers o f men and women remained 
vivid scenes in my memory. So were the genuine and enthusiastic words o f the 
young woman about Khaled's programmes.
For readers who are not familiar with Khaled's name, it is worth giving a 
brief synopsis o f  him, which will testify to the novelty o f televangelism and its 
development. Unlike formally educated scholars who graduated from Al-Azhar 
University, Am r Khaled graduated from Cairo University in 1988 with a degree in 
Accounting (Campbell 2010: 89- 95). In the late 1990s, Khaled started preaching 
in private houses and social clubs, and became a well-known name. In 2001, 
Khaled appeared on the Egyptian satellite network Dream TV; his popularity grew 
and he continued to draw on a repertoire o f media tools including books, CDs, 
audio-tapes and websites (ibid.). In 2008, for example, Khaled's media outputs
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achieved the highest record in the International Book Fair, one o f the largest book 
fairs in the Middle East (Lotfy 2009: 10-13).
One significant aspect about Khaled is that he has helped shape a new 
phenomenon in Egypt and elsewhere- in what came to be known as televangelism. 
In line with Khaled's informal style and use o f colloquial language, many new 
preachers have appeared in Egypt such as Moez Masoud and Khaled El who were 
able to attract audiences (Zayed 2007: 1-16). Televangelism soon became popular 
in other Muslim majority contexts such as Malaysia and Indonesia. For example, 
the televangelist Aa Gym in Indonesia was able to attract millions o f viewers to his 
weekly show (e.g. see Hoesterey, 2008).
There are many features that render televangelism a distinct phenomenon. 
First, unlike formally educated scholars who wear garb and speak in formal 
language, televangelists use informal language and relate their sermons to the 
everyday life o f Muslims. Second, televangelism appears to be particularly 
appealing to young people; many o f whom have perceived televangelism as a new 
approach to religious messages that addresses the everyday life o f Muslims and 
focuses on individual relationships and goals (e.g. Howell 2008 and Wise 2003). 
For example, in his programme “Words from the heart”, Khaled draws on the 
religious narrative o f the Prophet's life and his companions to focus on the 
importance o f adopting an upright life in which young people choose good friends, 
eschew the use o f drugs and keep good relations with their parents. The 
televangelist Hamza Yusuf, whose discourse is examined in much detail in this 
PhD thesis, asks his audiences to take the responsibility o f reconciling between 
Muslims and non-M uslims and to denounce terrorism. Third, televangelism
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embraces entertainment features, for example, sound effects, dramatic elements 
and camera movement techniques. The televangelist Ali Ardekani (Baba Ali), for 
example, draws on the use o f songs, inserting images, gestures and acting in his 
video-blogs. Fourth, televangelists have digital proficiency; as they use a repertoire 
o f new media tools such as websites and social media networks (see Chapter 4).
It is worth noting that televangelists' sermons are a discursive space in 
which particular representations o f Muslims are constructed; for instance, Muslims 
are instructed as to what they should aspire to, particular historical eras are 
foregrounded, and discursive strategies o f inclusion and exclusion are used to 
delineate who belongs to “us” and who are the other/s.
While the deconstruction o f identities from a discursive point o f view has 
gained some scholarly attention since the publication o f The Discursive Instruction 
o f  National Identity (Wodak et al 2009; e.g. Unger 2013; and Schnurr and Zayts 
2012), the study o f religious identities has been given less attention. As Chilton 
(2004: xii) rightly observes, discourse on religion seems to be “a neglected area o f 
research, as (it) has its overlap with politics”.
There are many reasons why this study focuses on Muslim identities' 
construction by Muslim televangelists in the West. First, while research (e.g. 
Campbell, 2010; 2012 and Howell, 2008) has given much attention to 
televangelism in majority contexts such as Egypt and Indonesia, what has been 
glossed over is the emergence o f “home-made” televangelists in Western contexts 
such as the U.S. and the United Kingdom, who live in the West, give their speeches 
in English, primarily addressing English-speaking audiences (e.g. Schmidt, 2005;
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Abdo, 2008 on the televangelist Hamza Yusuf). Hence, little is known about the 
discursive and rhetorical strategies these televangelists use to appeal to their 
audiences, which allow insights about televangelism as a new phenomenon and a 
new type o f religious celebrity.
Second, within the context o f misrepresentation o f Islam (e.g. see 
Richardson, 2004 and Baker et al, 2013), one question that arises is: how will the 
three American Muslim televangelists, mentioned-above, who are primarily 
addressing English-speaking audiences, create a representation o f Islam/Muslims. 
For instance, what arguments will Muslim televangelists use to justify that
Muslims can live in the West without facing misrepresentation? In addition, as
movement across past/present/future is one characteristic feature o f televangelists' 
sermons, what historical eras will they invoke and for what purpose? What topics 
(and discourses) will their sermons integrate and elaborate? Further, in what 
aspects, if  any, is there similarity o f patterns o f representation in televangelists' 
sermons online?
In fact, the novelty o f televangelism (e.g. use o f songs in sermons) and its 
popularity call for employing a critical approach that can enable us to understand 
why televangelism has gained popularity among some Muslim audiences, what 
broader dynamics it relates to and what this phenomenon means to the 
representation o f Islam in the twenty first century.
I was ready to travel (again) in January 2011, this time not in Egypt but to
the hub o f Critical Discourse Studies at Lancaster University, to explore
televangelism and televangelists' discourses. Using an innovative integration o f the
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Discourse Historical Approach with multi-modal analysis, I have examined a range 
o f data and genres including televangelists' sermons on YouTube, their online 
spaces and the practices o f their fans and followers. The following chapters, thus, 
recount my PhD journey and my exploration o f the intricate relationship between 
televangelism, what it reveals about the power-structures o f the twenty first 
century and the representation o f Muslim identities.




Television or the use of television in religious preaching is not an 
innovation; it goes back to the 1940s and 1950s when religious institutions 
sponsored radio and television programmes for the dissemination of religious 
information (e.g. Bruce, 1990, pp. 29-48). However, in the 1980s, in the US, a new 
form of religious programme appeared. Fast-paced and entertaining, programmes 
constituted of a series of segments that included songs, talk shows, interviews, film 
clips and sermons. The programmes achieved huge popularity as a result of 
figures such as Oral Roberts and Pat Robertson; the phenomenon came to be 
known as televangelism (e.g. Bruce 1990).
By the end of the 1990s, televangelism became a phenomenon in Muslim 
majority contexts such as Egypt and Indonesia. Research (e.g. Lotfy, 2009 and 
Zayed, 2007) has given us some insights into the reasons of the popularity of this 
phenomenon in these contexts. In his award-winning book on televangelism in 
Egypt, Lotfy (2009) argues that televangelism has particularly attracted middle 
and upper-middle classes in Egypt; since these social strands have perceived 
televangelists' messages on personal development, working hard and gaining 
wealth as “a prescription for social mobility” (ibid. p. 55). In the same vein, in 
their research on televangelism in Indonesia, Howell (2008) and Hoestrey (2007) 
have suggested that one feature that grants televangelists a wider reach is that they
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straddle many spheres. The Indonesian televangelist Aa Gym, in a similar way to 
Khaled in Egypt, is not only a preacher, but also a mentor who gives religious 
advices together with advices on time management. In other instances Aa Gym 
self-represents himself as a "rugged adventurer" (Hoestrey, 2007, p. 100); as some 
of his videos feature him riding horses, scuba diving and sky diving (ibid.)
While literature (e.g. Campbell, 2011 and Howell, 2008) has given much 
attention to televangelism in majority contexts such as Egypt and Indonesia (see 
Chapter 2), the emergence of televangelism in Western contexts such as the US and 
the United Kingdom has been given little attention. Home-made televangelists 
such as Hamza Yusuf, Yusuf Estes and Baba Ali have been able to gain visibility; 
these are American Muslim televangelists who give their speeches in English, 
primarily addressing English-speaking audiences.
This study seeks to gain further insights into the phenomenon of 
televangelism by exploring the discourses (e.g. sermons and websites) of the three 
Muslim televangelists mentioned above, i.e. Yusuf Estes, Hamza Yusuf and Baba 
Ali. The aim here is twofold: I seek to get an in-depth understanding of 
televangelism and the broader dynamics that have shaped and sustained this 
phenomenon; second, I explore how the three Muslim televangelists represent their 
identities and construct identities for Muslims in their sermons. Thus, I approach 
televangelism critically by probing into the power structures and dynamics that 
have sustained its existence; and by exploring what the sermons and online 
visibility o f the three televangelists can reveal about Islam/Muslims in the West in 
the twenty first century.
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I would like to elaborate here on the notion o f identity as a discursive 
construction, which I will further clarify in Chapter 3 of the thesis. Wodak et al 
(2009: 11) point out that identity is never a static phenomenon, but is always 
evolving and is continuously shaped. Discourse-language in use- is one domain for 
constructing identities (e.g. Hall, 1996 and Wodak et al, 2009:22). Thus, through 
discourse, individuals can demarcate the boundaries that separate them from 
others; for example, positively describing certain individuals/people, thus 
constructing them as an in-group, while describing other groups negatively, as an 
out-group.
I would also like to discuss why identities' construction in televangelists' 
sermons are worth exploring. First, with the increasing popularity of televangelists 
(e.g. Cesari, 2007:58; Echchaibi, 2011; Gilliat-Ray, 2010:166) and with the 
influence of new media on social reality (e.g. see Wamick, 2007: 7), several 
questions arises as to: how televangelists have gained their popularity and 
authority and what kind of identities televangelists are attempting to represent and 
construct in their sermons? The question seems to gain more importance in relation 
to Muslims in the West who have limited resources to getting religious knowledge 
and use the Internet as a primary source for seeking religious information (e.g. 
Mandaville, 2007:325; El Nawawy and Khamis, 2009:118 and Gilliat-Ray, 2010: 
162-166 on the British context). Second, the post 9-11 context gives an added layer 
o f emphasis to the importance o f televangelists and their deemed importance in 
influencing their audiences. As I pointed out in the Preface, in mass media, 
Islam/Muslims are frequently represented as the Other (e.g. see Richardson, 2004).
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Right-wing parties in Europe have based their political agendas and propaganda on 
anti-Muslim, anti-semitic and xenophobic rhetoric aiming to stop immigration of 
Muslims or to get Islam "out"; the British National Party in England (BNP), the 
Danish People's Party (DPP) and Pirn Fortuyn List (LPF) in Netherlands are 
examples; for example, see Allen 2004: 139 on right-wing parties in Europe and 
Richardson and Wodak (2009a; b), Wodak et al (2013) and Wodak (2015) on 
textual analysis of rhetoric of right-wing parties in Europe. Writings by acclaimed 
journalists and intellectuals (e.g. Oriana Fallaci, 2002, Michel Houellebecq, 2003 
and Christopher Caldwell, 2009) have argued that Islam and the West are 
incompatible; that Europe is succumbing to an “Islamic culture” (Cesari, 2009:2). 
Muslims are frequently misrepresented in newspapers as an “essentialized 
caricature” (Richardson 2004:5 on the British context). One consequence is that 
most Muslims have become aware of “othering” and “misrepresentation” (e.g. see 
El Nawawy and Khamis, 2009: 4).
It is against this background that some televangelists have gained popularity 
among Muslims in the West, attempting to shape Muslim identities. The fact that 
the three case studies, under investigation, are both Americans and Muslims gives 
rise to some salient questions. For example, within this context o f awareness o f 
misrepresentation, how would these televangelists represent the West? Will the 
West be the Other? If not, who will be? In addition, what arguments will they use 
to justify that they have the right to be “there”, in “the West”. In addition, as 
movement across past/present/future is one characteristic feature o f televangelists' 
sermons, what historical eras/times will they evoke and for what purposes? What 
topics (and discourses) will their sermons include? In other words, how do the
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televangelists imagine and discursively construct "Us Muslims"? And in what 
aspects there may be conformity of patterns of representation that can make up a 
discursive construction of an imagined Muslim community that is perpetuated in 
televangelists' sermons online?
Given the nature of this phenomenon, its complexity and the topic of the 
thesis, an approach that is well-suited for my study is Critical Discourse Studies 
(CDS). The latter can be defined as an interdisciplinary approach to language and 
communication that explores the relationship between language, power and 
ideology (e.g. see Wodak and Meyer, 2009 and Angouri and Wodak, 2014: 546- 
548; see Chapter 5). By adopting a critical perspective towards televangelism, I 
will deconstruct the intricate and frequently untransparent relationship between 
televangelism and the processes that may have contributed to the rise o f this 
phenomenon (see Chapters 2 and 3 on globalization and the rise of 
transnationalism). More specifically, the study employs the Discourse Historical 
Approach to Critical Discourse Studies to explore an important dimension that is 
glossed over in literature on televangelism, e.g. televangelists' sermons as 
performance. Thus, I also employ Visual Grammar (e.g. Kress and Van Leeuwen, 
1996) to allow an insight into aspects such as the video-edition o f televangelists' 
sermons and their use of dress code which all contribute to the processes of 
meaning-making. Thus, to recapitulate, this study has two aims: first, to adopt an 
innovative approach towards understanding televangelism, using Critical 
Discourse Studies as a framework. I ask what this phenomenon may reveal about 
the power structures o f everyday life and the representation o f Islam online. 
Second, I explore Muslim identities' construction in televangelists' sermons and 
what the patterns of representation (e.g. use of pronouns and argumentation
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strategies) could reveal about the broader socio-political contexts of Muslims in 
the West, being the main target audience of televangelists' sermons. In the 
following section, I outline the main research question of the study.
1.2. Research Questions
There are three main research questions in the thesis:
1) How do three Muslim televangelists, popular in the West, construct and 
represent their identities in their sermons? What discursive and multi-modal 
strategies do they draw upon to construct their authorities?
2) How do three Muslim televangelists, popular in the West, represent Muslim 
identities in their sermons?
To answer this research question, I focus on four sub-questions:
2.1. How are Islam and the West referred to, named and predicated?
2.2. What topics, genres, texts and discourses do the selected televangelists 
draw upon and to what effect?
2.3. What historical eras (religious and non-religious) do televangelists 
evoke and recontextualize in their sermons?
2.4. What arguments do the selected televangelists use in their 
sermons to justify the existence o f Islam in the West?
3) In what aspects are the three televangelists similar and/or different in their 
patterns of representations?
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Since the PhD thesis employs a Critical Discourse Studies approach, I 
would like first to clarify some relevant terms that I will draw upon in the thesis 
(Wodak and Meyer, 2009; Reisigl and Wodak, 2009). From the point of view of 
media communication, a genre can be defined as "a way of communicating or 
interacting"; news programmes and websites are examples (Fairclough 2006:3). A 
“text” is “a specific and unique realization of a discourse” (Richardson and Wodak: 
2009b:46), whereas discourse is "socially constituted and socially constitutive, 
related to a macro-topic and linked to the argumentation about validity claims such 
as truth and normative validity involving several social actors who have different 
points of view" (Reisigl and Wodak, 2001:89). Discourses, therefore, are "realized 
in both genres and texts" (Wodak, 2001: 66). A "sermon" can be defined as "a 
genre apart, serving a homiletic and didactic function, whereby human addressees 
receive doctrinal teaching and are exhorted to follow prescribed moral codes" 
(FIoward-Malverde, 1998:570).
Flaving outlined the research context of the study and the definition of a few 
important terms, in the following section, I delineate aspects of the research 
design, including the use of Internet as a medium of data collection and the case 
studies' selection criteria.
1.3. The Internet as a Medium of Data Collection
Like many domains (e.g. politics, sports), religion is represented on the 
Internet. Helland (2004:23), for instance, has shown that both official and non­
official Christian organizations have online presence. In a similar way to the
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propagation o f Christian faith online (Helland ibid.), Bunt (2004:124) shows that 
Islamic faith is propagated online in many ways such as chat rooms, forums and 
multi-media recitation of the Qur'an. Televangelists' sermons are not an exception 
in this regard; their sermons are generously available on websites, including blogs, 
forums and social media networks. There are numerous websites through which 
users can download/watch televangelists' sermons, e.g. Islamcity.Com, 
Islamicmedia.com.au and radicalmiddleway.org. This is besides religious channels
1 9available online such as Islam Channel and Umma Channel where televangelists' 
programmes are broadcast. Social media networks play an important role in the 
online visibility of the three selected televangelists; televangelists have hundreds 
of thousands o f fans and followers who apparently follow televangelists' posts, 
statuses/tweets and updates (see Criteria of Case Studies’ Selection).
YouTube emerges as an important platform for the mediation of 
televangelists' programmes (e.g. Echchaibi, 2011). This can be contextualized in 
the popularity o f YouTube itself as an online platform (e.g. Burgess and Green, 
2009 and Keen, 2007). It is one of the most rapidly growing video-sharing 
websites on the Internet: there is no limit to the number of YouTube videos that a 
user can create and download; it also has some "community" features, for instance, 
creating/following particular YouTube channels, and commenting on videos posted
Link to the channel: http://wvvw.islamchannel.tv/ Last accessed 6th April 2015 
Link to the channel: http://wvvvv.ummahchannel.tv/ Last accessed 6th April 2015
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by other users (e.g. see Burgess and Green, 2009, pp. 1-6 and Keen, 2007, pp. 10- 
14 on the features of YouTube).
YouTube shares with other media genres on the Internet (e.g. blogs, forums, 
social media networks) a salient aspect related to the process of meaning making, 
relevant to identities' construction i.e. interactivity (Warnick 2007:70-90). Myers 
(2010 b: 264) for instance demonstrates that the blogsphere is a space for the 
expression of opinion and stance making; it allows for two way communications as 
users can comment on posts or even create their own blogs. In the same vein, 
Kirkpatrick (2010:304) remarks that Facebook is "an identity-based platform to 
communicate with people you know offline" and Boyd (2008:119) explains that 
social media networks "provide ... a space to work out identity and status and 
make sense of cultural cues and negotiate public life".
From one perspective, therefore, YouTube is related to processes of stance 
making and opinion expression, relevant to identities' construction. For example, 
one video-blog by the televangelist Baba Ali, with a hit record of around half a 
million views is re-mediated by different users in slightly different names: Who 
hijacked Islam? http://www.voutube.com/watch7v-pDhGxRNrF 11; who hijacked 
my religion? http://www.voutube.com/watch?v=uOnxnYEVp4U. One may wonder 
why a user would re-mediate a particular YouTube video that already has about 
half a million hits. Apparently, s/he would not only like to attach that link to his 
own online personal space or YouTube channel, but also to widen its territory, to 
further publicize it so that other users may click it or see it, to further extend its 
influence.
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Most relevant here is the possibility o f breaking the hegemony exercised by 
traditional media including television and print media. This is because YouTube 
gives users the possibility to create their own videos that can challenge dominant 
opinions/views/discourses (e.g. Chun and Walters, 2011 and Wamick, 2007, pp. 
98-101 on online parody and satire).
The above elements are important aspects that have informed my choice of 
YouTube as a medium of data collection in terms of its popularity and its 
importance as a video-sharing website that can allow for counter-views. In 
addition, on YouTube, we can identify the number o f views for a particular 
YouTube video, which is a criterion I took into account in data selection.
1.4. Case Studies' Selection Criteria
Because the aim of the PhD thesis is to examine televangelists' sermons 
being one influence that can impact Muslims' world views and opinions, the 
popularity of the televangelists to be selected was an important criterion. For this 
purpose, two criteria were used for case studies' selection:
a) Televangelists' search records on YouTube and number o f fans/followers in 
social media networks
b) Relevant literature written about televangelists (e.g. The 500 Most Influential 
Muslims by Esposito and Kalin 2009).
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The reason for using both criteria is that there is scant literature on Muslim 
televangelism in the West. The procedures of case studies' selection started by 
examining televangelists featured in two websites: Radical Middle Way and Halal 
Tube. Formed after the 7/7 London bombings, Radical Middle Way3 is a resource 
of literature and audio-visual material of Muslim scholars and media figures 
(Chapman et al 2012: 188). In addition, Halal Tube, http://www.halaltube.com/ 
provides a list o f contemporary Muslim televangelists, allowing users to listen 
to/download some o f their sermons. Both websites were used as reference points 
enabling me to identify and select the most popular contemporary televangelists in 
the West. Comparisons were made between possible case studies with reference to 
YouTube search results, and televangelists' followers/fans in social media 
networks. Out of a pool of approximately fifteen televangelists, the three that were 
found to be most popular were included; each belongs to a different generation, 
allowing for a wider contextual lens of analysis in terms of the use o f a variety o f 
discursive features (e.g. use of slang and humor by Baba Ali). Records of 
televangelists' YouTube search results and the number of subscribers on social 
media networks are shown below.
Tablet. 1. YouTube Search Results, Fans and Followers of the Selected Case 
Studies4
Link to the website: http://w w\v.radica 1 middIewav.o rg/ Last accessed 6th April 2015
Last updated on 6th April 2015
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Name o f  the YouTube Facebook likes Twitter followers
televangelist hits
Yusuf Estes No official channel; 527, 321 likes5 ca. 15, 000
b. 1944 however, You Tube followers6
American search leads to 166,
000 results
Hamza Yusuf No "official" channel; 419, 909 likes7 ca.
b. 1958 however, You Tube 87,000 followers8
American search leads to about
215,000 results.
BabaAli b. 1975 75,237 subscribers ca 37, 000
American 15,646,234 views9 20,737 likes10 followers11
In the following, I present the bio-information of the selected case studies:
5 hItps://wwvv.facebook.com/v.cstes Last accessed 6th April 2015
6 https://twitter.com/vusufestes Last accessed 6th April 2015
7 https://www.facebook.eom/ShaykhHam/.aYusuf Last accessed 6th April 2015
8 https://twitter.com/hamzavusuf Last accessed 6th April 2015
9 https://www.voutube.com/user/ummahfilms/featured Last accessed 6th April 2015
10 https://vvww.facebook.com/ummahfilms Last accessed 6th April 2015
11 https://twitter.com/ummahfilms Last accessed 6th April 2015
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Yusuf Estes
Born in 1944 in the US and a convert to Islam 
in 1991(I2), he is one of the televangelists of the oldest 
generation. He is described in The 500 Most Influential 
Muslims by Esposito and Kalin (2009:101) as "a well- 
known Muslim preacher who lectures all over the 
world. He is the former national Muslim chaplain for the US Bureau of Prisons and 
uses technology, such as uploading lectures on the Internet and appearing on 
television to spread Islam in an easily understood manner. His website has close to 
seven million unique hits".
An overview of the sermons by Yusuf Estes shows that Estes not only 
addresses Muslims but also non-Muslims. Quite often, he starts his sermons by 
asking: "How many non-Muslims are there? Raise up your hand", which indicates 
his missionary agenda of identifying non-Muslims as target audience. His personal 
website1-3, one among many, has a picture of him as a young man before turning to 
Islam and has a reply he has written to a journalist explaining how he, being an ex- 
Christian preacher, has converted to Islam. Trying to convert an Egyptian Muslim 
man from Cairo, whom he saw as an "infidel", yet apparently was impressed by his 
"good morals", he engaged in debates after which he decided to "embrace" Islam 14. 
In his sermons, he repeatedly refers to his "conversion story". His website has links
12 See his F acebook  page: h ttp ://w w w .faeebook .eom /# l/islam new sroom
1J Y u suf E stes" w ebsite: h ttp ://vusu festes.com / Last accessed  6th A pril 2015
14 h ttp ://w w w .v o u tu b e.co m /w atch ?v = ev 7 7 6 N E ercY & fea tu re= re lm fu  Last accessed  6th April 2015
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to video and audio-excerpts accompanied by a caption: "Watch/hear Sheik Yusuf 
Estes help 1000 enter Islam around the world". In short, his main interest seems to 
pass information to non-Muslims about Islam (shall we say invite, convert?), 
which he repeatedly says is an important objective for a M uslim15. He is featured 
on many TV channels (e.g. Peace TV, Guide US TV and Huda TV) and his 
programmes are widely accessible on YouTube and other Islamic channels (e.g. 
Halal Tube). In addition, some of his sermons, mediated on YouTube, are given in 
varied Muslim contexts: in the United Kingdom, the United States, India and 
Dubai. Judging by his fans on Facebook, one can deduce that Yusuf Estes enjoys 
relatively wide popularity with approximately 527,000 fans that apparently follow 
his news including updates of his tours, pictures and fund raising projects.
H am za Yusuf
Born in 1958 in the United States of 
America and a convert to Islam in 1977, Hamza 
Yusuf carries the title of an "Islamic scholar" 
and "an intellectual"16. According to the book 
by Esposito and Kalin referred to above 
(2009:78), Yusuf is "the Western world's most
15 For instance, in one serm on, entitled  "W ake up", he argues that it is im portan t that M uslim s are involved 
in "gu id ing" o ther non-be lievers to  Islam .
16 For instance, see G illia t-R ay  2010:166  on H am za Yusuf. I define  the  in te llectual here as a person  o f  
reco g n ized  in te llectual a tta inm en ts w ho speaks out in the pub lic  arena, genera lly  in w ays that call 
e stab lished  society  or d o m inan t ideo log ies to  account in the  nam e o f  p rincip le  or on b e h a lf  o f  the 
o p p re ssed ” (H ew itt, 2003:145).
33
influential Islamic scholar who has built a huge grassroots following, particularly 
among young western Muslims". He has established one college in California, the 
Zaytuna College, which mixes traditional Islamic studies with contemporary 
Western thought. It aims to "train students in the varied sciences of Islam, while 
also instilling in them a sophisticated understanding of the intellectual history and 
culture o f the West"17. In addition, he is an advisor to some academic institutions 
on Islam and some philanthropic organizations; for instance, Stanford University 
Program in Islamic Studies and George Russell's "One nation" that promotes 
pluralism in America18.
Lending further support to scholars who have indicated that discourses on 
Islam in the West are undergoing changes (e.g. Mandaville 1999:18; 2007; see 
Chapter 3), we can safely classify him as one of those who “critique” 
contemporary Muslim discourses from within19. For instance, one o f his published 
articles argues that denying the Holocaust undermines Islam which attempts to 
defy anti-semitic discourses in Muslim contexts (e.g. see KhosraviNik (2010) on 
the anti-semitic discourses by the former politican Mahmoud Ahmadinejad). On 
another occasion in 2006, Hamza Yusuf claims that when some Muslims burnt the
17 The website o f  Zaytuna college: Last accessed 6th April 2015http://www. /.aytunacol I ege.org/about/
18 According to Hamza Yusuf's website, htt p ://sa n d a I a. org/abo ut/ham zayus uf/ Last accessed 6th April 
2015
19 The term is taken from Mandaville (1999:18), which he refers to as a "notion that has gained particular 
currency in recent years among diasporic Muslim intellectuals in the West".
20 The article is published in many websites and forums, for instance, 
http://vvww.tikkun.om/article.php/Yusuf-WhyHoloeaustdenialundcrminesIslam/print Last accessed 6th 
April 2015
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flag of Denmark, they ended up doing what they criticize the West for: blaming a 
whole community for the action of a handful of people21.
Like Yusuf Estes, Hamza Yusufs sermons are generously accessible online. 
In addition, he has a blog where he posts personal thoughts, notes o f his lectures 
and updates of his events. Besides, he has a number of fan pages on Facebook 
administered by himself and his fans. Like Yusuf Estes, he is one of the “traveling 
preachers” who give sermons not only in the United States but also in the United 
Kingdom and in Malaysia.
Baba Ali
Ali Ardekani was born in 1975 in Iran and grew 
up in the United States o f America. While Yusuf Estes 
and Hamza Yusuf have online visibility, Baba Ali, his 
nickname, is truly a product of the digital age. He first 
broadcast on YouTube and rose to publicity through a 
series of video-blogs that triggered millions of hits, 
which granted him airtime on TV channels such as the Islamic Channel (based in 
the United Kingdom) and Guide Us TV based in The United States 
(MacFarquhar22, 2008). Unlike the other two televangelists, Baba Ali is not 
concerned with "big goals" such as bringing Muslims back, as Hamza Yusuf 
always argues, to the highest moral ideals. More precisely, he is a down-to-earth
21 http ://w w w .voLitub e .co m /w atch 7 v ~ ry P X 3 Z1 PTjk L ast accessed  6th A pril 2015
22 Pub lished  in N ew  York tim es: h ttp ://w w w .n v tim es .co m /2 0 0 8 /0 5 /0 8 /u s /0 8 v id eo .litm l? r=3& orcf=slo«:in/ 
Last accessed  6th April 2015
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televangelist who deals with topics such as the carelessness o f Muslims in Friday 
prayers and makes fun of Muslims who hide the fact that they are Muslims at 
work, and, in another instance, gives Muslims tips on how to avoid being 
suspected of being terrorists (because they are Muslims) in an airport.
Baba Ali has set up a marriage website, "Half our deen", helping Muslims 
to find their spouses via the Internet; the website is "distinct as it go [es] deeper by 
asking questions regarding how they [profile] users understand Islam, what their 
family expectations are, and even what their personality is like"23.
Ali does not give long sermons like the other two televangelists but rather 
gives short sermons, about ten minutes, a hybrid genre o f sermon and drama in 
which Ali primarily acts the characters he wishes to criticize while giving his 
message at the end. For instance, in his YouTube video "Culture versus Islam"24, 
he acts the character of a young man using slang that another character, the father, 
cannot identify. These scenes come in the context of the main point that Baba Ali 
makes in his video, that children lose contact with their parents as a result of 
parents’ mistaken interpretation o f Islam. Baba Ali's Facebook page defines him as 
"an artist" and in his timeline picture; he poses in a theater holding a mike.
23 http://vvAvw.racebook.coni/ffl/haltburdeen/info Last accessed 6th April 2015
24 Link to the YouTube video: https://vvww.youtube.com/watch?v=GT3ol-iuCGU Last accessed 9th June 
2015
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In light of the above, there are some similarities and differences between the 
three televangelists that are worth noting. The three are contemporary Muslim 
televangelists who grew up in the United States of America and therefore are both 
Americans and Muslims. This sets them in contrast to other televangelists who are 
based in Muslim majority contexts and have given some o f their sermons in 
English, for example, Zakir Naik in India or Moez Masoud in Egypt. The three 
televangelists, however, are different, in terms of their approach to religion: Yusuf 
Estes seems most interested in propagating faith to non-Muslims, Hamza Yusuf 
urges Muslims to regain "their moral compass" and Baba Ali is more interested in 
Muslims' social life in the West from finding a spouse, to responding to claims and 
misinterpretations about Islam and Muslims. Therefore, their discourses convey 
different ideologies and subject positions. This allows for a comparison and 
juxtaposition of how each televangelist imagines a Muslim community and in what 
discursive aspects they overlap, which will enable us to identify if  there are 
recurrent patterns in televangelists' representation of Muslim identities that 
constitute a distinct representation o f Islam/Muslims in televangelists’ YouTube 
sermons.
1.5. Data Selection Criteria
In the following, I present my data selection criteria:
• The macro-topic25 of the selected sermons is "Islam/Muslims in the West", 
as it allows for an examination o f how each televangelist represents
25 Van Dijk (1995: 385) defines macro-structures as "topic" or "theme" that account for the
"global meaning" o f  discourse or conversation.
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Islam/Muslims in the West. The texts selected are first mediated in the post 
9/11 context. While anti-Muslim sentiments existed in the pre- 9/11 context 
(e.g. Runnymede Trust used the term "Islamophobia" in 1997) it became 
more apparent in the post 9-11 era (see Allen 2004: 131; Cesari 2010:20-23 
and Triandafyllidou and Wodak 2009: 239-261). This gives rise to the 
important question of how Muslim identities are represented in 
televangelists' sermons in this context and how each televangelist instructs 
Muslims on how they should react and become.
• Only “sermon” is selected. In comparison to “interviews”, the sermon is 
primarily aimed at persuasion, which gives way to the representations of 
Islam/Muslims by each televangelist.
• As a performance, the sermon can be looked at as "socialized, molded and 
modified to fit into the understanding and expectations of the society in 
which it is presented" (Goffman 1959:44). Drawing on Bell (1984), Sharoff 
and Secara (2007:176) point out that "the context in which a speech is given 
acts as a filter (the context also includes the audience)". Therefore, the
*)f\sermons selected were all given in the West (e.g. England, Australia and 
the United States). The texts selected covered the time span from 2004- 
2008. While September 11, 2011 represents a "rift" in the relationship
26 Despite the fact that the context o f  Muslims (as a collective group) possibly differs from one Western 
country to the other, there has been conformity o f  practices among Western countries (e.g. Islamophobia, 
migration restriction see Allen 2004; Cesari 2007; 2009) that makes me regard the West as one uniform 
context when it comes to some attitudes towards Islam.
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between the so-called Islam and the West (e.g. Cesari 2010:23), other events 
took place during the period o f 2004-2008, that kept the "spirit" o f 9-11 
"going"; metaphorically speaking; for example, the terrorist attack in 
Madrid (March 11th 2004) and the Prophet Muhammad Cartoon publication 
(September 30th 2005). On the political spectrum, the sermons, therefore, 
occur during George Bush's "war on terror" or before Barack Obama’s 
presidency where an attempt has been made to "seek a new beginning", 
using Obama's words, with Muslims around the world27. The following 
table presents a summary of the sermons selected for analysis.
Table 2: Details o f the Sermons Selected for analysis
Televangelist Name of video and link on 
YouTube
Place and date given j YouTube
I hits
Length
Yusuf Estes Why the West needs Islam:
https://www.youtube.com/wa
tch?v=c33fYIRuN3M
5th of June 2008
Australia (University of Melbourne) 
Islamic Information and Services 
Network of Australasia (IISNA)
146, 807 61 minutes
27 Link to Obama’s speech in Cairo: http://www.youtube.com/watch'/v^ B 889oBKkN Li Last accessed 6th 
April 2015
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1 Hamza Yusuf j A message to humanity28 
| https://www.youtube.com/wa 
j tch?v=ih-ZtO_Hkfik
1 -4th?) September 2004 
Chicago, ISNA convention (41st 
Annual ISNA Convention, September 
3-6)
3,162 34 minutes
Baba Ali 1 Who hijacked Islam? 
j  https://www.youtube.com/wa 
tch?v=V qmMdPKw3 78








July 21, 2006 325,276 7 minutes
How did you convert to 
Islam
h tt d s  ://w vvw. voutube.com/wa 
lch?v=E79LSs ZvCM&feat 
ure=relmfu




June 2006 373,469 6 minutes
Total minutes 133 minutes
28 In fact, this sermon is re-mediated on YouTube in a shorter version in two parts with the title "Islam and 
the West": http://www.voutube.com/watch?v~7ttcA9Kto9M and
http://www.voutube.com/watch?v=Mx QopuSEQY. with hit records o f  59,728 and 49,350 respectively; 
Last accessed 6th April 2015
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There are some differences that are worth noting between the above 
selected texts. As for texts by Yusuf Estes and Hamza Yusuf, the sermons were 
given at conferences and conventions sponsored by Muslims organizations in the 
West, namely the Islamic Circle of North America (ICNA), and Islamic 
Information and Services Network of Australasia (IISNA) (Australia), being 
important organizations that represent Muslims in the West (e.g. Ghazali, 2004 and 
Ali, 2009). In this way, they differ from Baba Ali's video-blogs aimed at imagined 
online viewers. However, the fact that the sermons of the first two televangelists 
are video-recorded, and that the televangelists themselves are public figures 
indicate that the speakers are probably aware that they are addressing an 
international audience that go beyond their limited co-present attendees29.
It is worth noting that the choice of a few sermons to analyze was 
predicated on the length of sermons that span in total 127 minutes. The unequal 
length of data examined for each televangelist was due to the different style of 
preaching that makes two genres: relatively long sermons by Yusuf Estes and 
Hamza Yusuf as opposed to the relatively short "sermon/drama" genre by Baba Ali.
29 For instance, in one sermon given in India, Yusuf Estes says the following: "it is sad when we start our 
programmes defending our right to even breathe and in some cases we feel like that, we feel we are 
being scrutinized, looked at under a magnified glass that any mistake we make, is gonna be on YouTube 
tomorrow or may be on the 6"0 clock news the next day but it is good in a way for 
us..http://www.voutube.com/watch?v--z21 bEuvHJCU Last accessed 6th April 2015
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In the following, I would like to explain how the data selected is 
representative o f the discourse of each speaker. As for Yusuf Estes, the sermon 
“Why the West needs Islam” is representative of his discourse in many ways. It 
invokes discourse topics on conversion of non-Muslims that are common in Yusuf 
Estes' sermons/YouTube excerpts such as “four people convert to Islam after Yusef 
Estes' lecture30” (uploaded to YouTube Jan 2013), “Another Sister Accepts Islam 
(Crying) as her Way of Life- With Sh Yusuf Estes”31 (uploaded to YouTube Dec. 
2013) and “looking for truth, Yusuf Estes, Christian converts to Islam ”32 which are 
about non-Muslims converting to Islam and Estes' guiding them to utter shahada 
or belief in Islam.
Another distinctive feature in Yusuf Estes' discourse is the positive construction of 
Us (Muslims) and the negative construction of Them (Westerners and non- 
Muslims). As I will demonstrate in Chapter 7, the sermon “Why the West needs 
Islam” represents Estes' use of the positive presentation of Us and the negative 
presentation o f them, e.g. non-Muslims and Christians who are represented as 
attacking Muslims. This can be evident in other sermons for Estes for example, his 
sermon “introducing Islam to non-Muslims” , given in Australia (and uploaded to 
YouTube in 2012) and “Why they attack us34” (uploaded to YouTube in 2012). At 
the beginning of his sermon “introducing Islam to no non-Muslims”, Estes points
30 Link to the sermon: https://vvww.voutube.comAvatch?v=YGV-c3P5-4U Last accessed 27 January 2016.
31 Link to “Another Sister Accepts Islam (Crying) as her Way o f  Life- With Sh Yusuf Estes”: 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_zOZUiCanms. Last accessed 27 January 2016.
32 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WwBAPxeTruU Last accessed 27 January 2016.
33 Link to the sermon: https://www.voutube.com/watch?v=RJttCU Tzb4 Last accessed 8 February 2016.
34 Link to the sermon: https://www.voutube.coni/watch7v~oZLgiL5LpRI Last accessed 8 February 2016.
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out that the topic of his sermon is how Muslims can “respond to the harsh attacks 
and criticisms against Muslims, the Prophet and Islam in every aspect of it” . The 
negative representation of Christians in this sermon is conveyed through the 
narrative o f a Christian preacher -whom Estes met in an inter-faith debate-who 
“attacked” Islams and “misquoted” verses from the Qur'an. The narrative of the 
story ends with Estes pointing out that -as a result o f the attacks of that preacher- 
many non-Muslims took shahada (i.e. converted to Islam) on that event, invoking 
the discourse topic on the conversion of non-Muslims to Islam which is recurrent 
in his discourse. The sermon “why the West needs Islam” also bears features that 
characterizes Yusuf Estes' sermons/YouTube videos such as the use o f narratives 
and voice animation. For example, in his sermon “Introducing Islam to non- 
Muslims”, Yusuf Estes recounted his conversion story and his encounter with a 
young Muslim man from Egypt, who made him interested in Islam.
Moving on to Hamza Yusuf, there are many ways in which the sermon “a 
message to humanity” is representative of his discourse. First, it is a highly inter- 
discursive hybrid fabric in which Yusuf invokes discourse on religion and politics; 
as he calls for the unity of Abrahamic faith, criticizes George Bush's government 
and creates a parallel representation of Islam and the United States o f America (see 
Chapter 7). The hybridity of Yusufs discourse - realized in his sermon - can also be 
evident in many of his sermons; for example, in the “9/11 Unity Walk Speech35” 
given in 2011, Hamza Yusuf holds a comparison between the 9/11 attack and Pearl 
Harbor, and calls for the unity of Muslims, Christians and Jews, thus invoking
35 Link to the speech on YouTube: https://www.voutube.com/watch?v=LTW7Pz7N RE Last accessed 8 
February 2016.
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discourse on religion and politics. In another YouTube video, “Does God love
36war” , given in Berkeley (US) in 2006, he calls for bringing down the global 
armament trade, criticizes the involvement of the United States in wars across the 
globe and denounces the division of US and them (Islam/West) that can lead to 
wars. His sermon ends by showing Islam's call against tribalism and indiscriminate 
violence, thus creating an interdiscursive fabric of religion and politics. Second, 
another characteristic feature of his discourse - realized in his sermon “a message 
to humanity” - is dismissing the dichotomy o f Us and Them through the positive 
representation of Americans/Westerns. For example, in the sermon “United we
37  • • • •stand ”, given in Washington DC in 2011, Yusuf called on the human community 
to reassert their rights to have a good governance. He also praised the U.S. as a 
nation that is “much better than it has ever been” (e.g. in terms o f white/black 
equality). Another topic he invoked is his assertion that he is - like many Muslims 
in America - American and is part of it.
Moving on to Baba Ali's discourse, the sermons selected for analysis 
exemplify two main topics relevant to Muslims/Islams in the West that run through 
Baba Ali's YouTube videos, namely “misrepresentation of Islam” (section 8.3.1. 
Discourse on the misrepresentation of Islam) and “ethnic Islam” (section 8.3.2. 
Discourse on ethnic Islam). Discourse on “the misrepresentation o f Islam” is 
represented in many YouTube videos for Baba Ali (examples: “who hijacked my 
religion”; “How did you convert to Islam”, “Why Islam” and “Muslim while
36 Link to the speech on YouTube: https://www. youtube.com/watch?v=F-vacoQOgFM Last accessed 8 
February 2016.
37 Link to the speech on YouTube: https://vvww.voutube.com/watch?v=09cCrnvTq c Last accessed 8 
February.
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flying”). The salient feature in this discourse topic is the use of argumentation 
strategies to counter the representation of Islam in mass media as being linked with 
terrorism; for example, through the claim that Muslims have been in the West 
generation after generation and that Muslims are in the West in large numbers. 
Furthermore, another discourse topic I examined relevant to Muslims in the West is 
ethnic Islam or culture versus Islam (e.g. see 8.3.2. Discourse on “ethnic Islam”). 
As I will indicate in Chapter 8, this discourse topic is represented in many 
YouTube videos for Baba Ali such as “culture versus Islam”, “my culture”, and 
“racism and pride”. Within this thematic cluster, his video “culture versus Islam” is 
selected for analysis for having the highest views on YouTube (see Chapter 6). As I 
will demonstrate in Chapter 8 of the thesis, Baba Ali here touches upon topics that 
are discussed in literature on Islam/Muslims in the West, for example, the inter- 
generational gap between Muslim parents and youth and young Muslims' 
dissatisfaction with the “ethnic” practices of their parents such as forced marriage. 
In terms of the ideological positioning of Islam and West, I will explain in the 
forthcoming chapters that unlike Hamza Yusuf and Yusuf Estes, “the West” as a 
social actor does not seem to occur in Baba Ali's YouTube videos; rather Baba Ali 
negatively represents the media which in his view is responsible for the 
misrepresentation of Islam/Muslims (see section 7.3.1. addressing multiple 
audiences).
1.5. Outline of the thesis
The thesis consists of ten chapters. Thereafter, Chapter 2 explores the 
phenomenon o f televangelism in terms of its main features, and its broader
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dynamics, for example new media power, the predominance o f “info-tainment”, 
the commodification o f religion and fragmentation o f religious authority. I argue in 
this chapter that televangelism is a complex phenomenon and can be perceived 
from many varied perspectives.
In Chapter 3 “Muslim identities in a global context”, I investigate the 
complex meanings of identity and draw on the concept o f imagined communities. 
I trace the emergence of “transnational Islam” in terms o f its dynamics and 
manifestations (e.g. rise of global media technologies and e-religion). I argue that 
transnationalism, rather than “diaspora” can be a theoretical framework through 
which we can understand the processes of identities' construction, particularly 
among Muslim youth in the West (e.g. Vertovec and Cohen, 1999, p. xxi and Faist, 
2010, pp. 14-22). This is a significant aspect of the theoretical framework of the 
study; since it will enable us to better understand the processes underlying 
identities' construction o f Muslims in the West and how televangelists' sermons 
and their online visibility fit into these processes.
In Chapter 4, I turn attention to the Internet (e.g. Barton and Lee, 2013; 
Page et al, 2014) as one medium through which the selected televangelists have 
achieved popularity. First, I engage with the question of whether the Internet 
provides a virtual public sphere; then, I examine what happens to new media when 
it meets religion. I aim here to gain a perspective on the dynamics and 
manifestations that are shaping religion on the Internet. One aspect I highlight in 
this chapter is how televangelists' fans play an important role in “popularizing” 
their discourses and extending their visibility.
46
In chapter 5 ,1 examine the methodological frameworks I will draw upon in 
examining televangelists' sermons and online data. I locate the thesis within 
Critical Discourse Studies and employ a synergy of the Discourse Historical 
Approach (e.g. Wodak, 2001 and Wodak and Meyer, 2009) and multi-modality 
(e.g. see Kress and van Leeuwen, 1996; Le Baron and Streeck, 2013; van 
Leeuwen, 2005; 2011 and Wodak 2001) to deconstruct salient features of 
televangelists' performance, including the use o f staging, dress code, color schemes 
and gesture and to explore the salient discursive strategies most related to 
persuasion and identities' construction; for example, use o f repetition and 
narratives; creation of in-groups and out-groups (e.g. Wodak et al, 2009) and the 
use of historical and religious references in constructing a collective memory for 
Muslims (e.g. Heer, Manoschek, Poliak and Wodak 2008:7).
In chapter 6 , 1 explore the first research question o f the thesis, i.e. how each 
televangelist self-represents his identities. I argue in this chapter that each 
televangelist constructs multi-faceted identities, inter alia, as preachers and media 
celebrities. I argue that -in representing their identities- televangelists draw on 
many resources including drama-related features (e.g. staging and gestures), 
discursive strategies (use of particular topics rather than others), and cinema 
techniques (e.g. graphic elements and reaction shots). Thus, I highlight how 
televangelists' sermons have become a multi-modal field.
In chapter 7 , 1 examine how Islam and the West are linguistically referred to 
and predicated. I will throw light on the different ideological positions the three
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televangelists adopt towards the West. For example, whereas Hamza Yusuf 
constructs a bi-cultural Muslim identity in which he addresses his audiences as 
both Americans/Westerns and Muslims, Yusuf Estes adopts the strategy of 
“calculated ambivalence” in which two contradictory images of the West are given, 
using negative and positive predication. Baba Ali, however, refrains from using the 
West as a homogenous entity; however, he negatively represents the media, as the 
other.
In Chapter 8, I explore the discourse topics and fields of action that each 
televangelist invokes and how these elements contribute to the construction of a 
distinct representation of Islam and Muslims. As I will illustrate, topics that are 
recurrent in televangelists' sermons include the misrepresentation of 
Islam/Muslims and Muslim civilization.
In Chapter 9 ,1 investigate how each televangelist re-contextualizes religious 
and historical references in his sermons and to what effects. I examine the two 
sources that the three televangelists draw upon: Qur'anic resources and the 
Prophet's sayings. I further explore the historical references made by each 
televangelist, the eras they refer to and their meanings. Finally, in Chapter 10, I 
present a summary o f my findings and suggest opportunities for further research in 
the domains of religious studies and Critical Discourse Studies.
48
Chapter Two
2. Televangelists as "media celebrities": What is at stake in televangelism?
Historically speaking, the use of television as a medium of religious 
preaching started in the 1950s in the United States (e.g. Bruce 1990: 29-48) when 
religious institutions sponsored radio and television programmes for the 
dissemination o f religious information. In the 1980s, however, a new form of 
religious programmes appeared. Fast-paced and entertaining, programmes 
constituted of a series of segments that included songs, talk shows, interviews, film 
clips and sermons (Schmidt and Kess, 1986, p. 36). With telephone counseling and 
prayer requests, callers were automatically placed into a computerized mailing list 
through which appeals for donations were sent (ibid.).
Back then, it was the first time that songs, interviews and recorded clips 
were integrated into sermons by religious figures. These programmes attracted 
wide audiences and as a result of their popularity, religious figures became- for the 
first time- media celebrities, on equal grounds to popular stars. Televangelism was 
soon transferred to Muslim religious contexts in many countries. As thousands of 
audiences in the United States turned their TV programmes to watch programmes 
by televangelists in the 1980s, audiences in Muslim majority contexts such as 
Egypt and Indonesia turned around TV sets years later to watch the televangelists 
who were -broadly speaking - different in their dress code and style of 
presentation from the formally educated preachers.
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As has been the case with Muslim majority contexts such as Egypt and 
Indonesia, Muslims in minority contexts such as the United Kingdom and the 
United States soon produced their "home-made" televangelists. British and 
American Muslim televangelists were featured on religious satellite channels such 
as Huda TV, Islam Way, Islam Channel UK and on YouTube.
As one main aim of the PhD thesis is to explore how televangelists 
discursively construct the religious identities o f their audiences, this entails first an 
understanding of the phenomenon of televangelism, which raises some interesting 
questions. For instance, what does televangelism -as a hybrid phenomenon of 
entertainment and religion- suggest about the representation of Islam in the twenty 
first century? In addition, what wider interactions and dynamics may relate the 
phenomenon of "televangelism" to a similar phenomenon, i.e. "politico-tainmenf' 
where politics and entertainment are blurred (e.g. see Riegert, 2007; Wodak, 2009, 
2010)? In addition, what critique can we give on this combination of what was 
once sacred (religion) and entertainment; and what does the popularity of 
televangelists, particularly among Muslim youth, reveal about religious authority 
and leadership in Islam in the twenty first century?
In this chapter, I argue that televangelism can be better understood as a by­
product of the interaction between media power, the rise o f infotainment and the 
commodification of religion (e.g. Couldry, 2003a and 2003b; Hallin, 2008 and 
Kellner, 2003; 2010). It is worth noting that in Chapter 3 o f the thesis, I will take 
my investigation further by focusing on Muslim identities' construction and the rise 
o f transnationalism.
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Thematically, the chapter is divided into two parts. In the first part, I 
delineate the main characteristic features of televangelism. In the second part, I 
explore the wider interactions that appear to be relevant to the shaping of 
televangelism including media power, the rise o f infotainment, and the 
fragmentation of authority. This is followed by a closer inspection of the socio- 
historical context o f Muslim youth in the West that represent the main audiences of 
the selected televangelists (e.g. see Gilliat-Ray, 2010: 162; Echchaibi, 2011).
2.1. The main features of televangelism
As a phenomenon, televangelism has particular characteristics. I list them 
below; I will elaborate on these features in the following sections:
• The use o f entertainment features such as music and sound effects
• The interest in commercialization
• The presentation of religion as a force of social change and as being 
relevant to everyday life (see below).
• Televangelism is also a phenomenon that appears to be relevant to 
Muslim youth of middle and upper-middle classes, which adds 
further meaning to this phenomenon in terms o f its possible societal 
impact (see below).
First, entertainment is a salient feature o f televangelism (e.g. see Howell, 
2008 Lotfy, 2009). In Indonesia, Howell (2008) examines the sermons of two 
popular televangelists, Aa Gym and Arifin Ilham. She points out that entertainment
51
features are integrated in various ways into the sermons of both televangelists. For
• 38 •instance, Sufi , practices are adapted to create a visually engaging spectacle that 
includes massive audiences, celebrities and famous figures (ibid. p. 52). Howell 
(2008: 52-58) points out that the movements of the head and upper body 
characteristic o f Sufi performances are simplified into the mere recitation o f the 
names of God and the repetition of short phrases and passages from the Qur'an. In 
addition, Aa Gym, compared to Arifin Ilham, makes more use of entertainment 
features by singing and telling jokes in his services (ibid. pp. 56-58). One aspect 
Howell (2008, pp. 58- 60) mentions is that televangelism in Indonesia is most 
influenced by Sufism, unlike televangelism in Egypt.
While exploring televangelism in Egypt, Lotfy (2009:17) indicated that 
what was striking about Egyptian televangelism, when it first appeared in the late 
1990s, was not only the "style" of the "new preachers" that was different from the 
style o f traditionally educated religious scholars in terms of dress code and use of 
language but also in terms of the presentation o f religion as a force of individual 
change (ibid.). The televangelist Amr Khaled, Lotfy explained, called on his 
audiences to dismiss pessimism, work on improving their talents and skills and 
adopt a positive attitude to life (also see Kutscher 2009:33). Furthermore, Lotfy 
(2009:19-25) adds it is the upper and middle-classes that are particularly attracted 
to televangelists' discourses, because these social strands do not lack wealth or
38 Sufism can be defined as a mystical dimension o f  Islam in which Muslims seek the divine truth through 
direct relationship with God. It first appeared in the 7th century as a reaction against the worldliness and 
luxurious lifestyle o f  the early Umayyad period (661- 749) (Encyclopedia Britannica) Online: 
http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/571823 'Sufism Last accessed 6th June 2015.
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capabilities and to them the concept o f "civic Jihad" is more appealing than the 
radical messages of Islamist ideologies.
In fact, the popularity that some televangelists such as Amr Khaled have 
achieved in Egypt triggers an examination of religious discourse and practice in 
Egypt, which can provide a better understanding of the reasons that have rendered 
televangelism particularly appealing to middle and upper-middle classes in Egypt. 
In this vein, one influential religious establishment is Al-Azhar University, which 
teaches Islamic studies together with logic, grammar and rhetoric. During the era 
o f Gamal Abdel Nasr, A1 Azhar went through a modernization process through 
which secular knowledge was taught including science, medicine, engineering and 
pharmacy. The aim was to produce “complete scholars versed at the same time in 
religious and secular knowledge” (Zeghal 2007: 119). Zeghal (2007: 119) argued 
that the modernization o f Al-Azhar and its representation as an advocate of 
moderate Islam have both contributed to Al-Azhar's prominence as a religious 
establishment; for example, its curricula are adopted by some South Asian 
countries such as Malaysia and it attracts an increasingly large number of 
international students (Zeghal 2007: 119).
Despite the leading position of Al-Azhar as a religious establishment, in my 
view it falls short of addressing topics that are relevant to the lives of Egyptian 
youth. This can be testified in a study by Zayed (2007), who examined the 
contemporary discourse of Al-Azhar in its magazine that carries the same name. 
Zayed (2007) found that the majority of the articles produced by the magazine 
were aimed at the admonition or waaz and focused on explaining how religious 
rites such as fasting and praying should be practiced correctly. This could be
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juxtaposed with the discourse of the televangelist Amr Khaled, as an example, who 
addresses topics relevant to the everyday life of (Egyptian) youth such as 
friendship, how to treat parents and love in Islam.
Another aspect in relation to Al-Azhar's discourse is that it appears to 
present a traditional discourse that is against the (secular) aspects of the Egyptian 
society such as the working of women. One article, for example, which Zayed 
(2007) examined, adopted a gendered classification in which women were 
perceived to be more suitable to particular jobs such as nursing and teaching. This 
could be opposed to the discourse o f Amr Khaled who was able to reconcile 
aspects of the modern life with religious discourse. For example, he wore modern 
clothes such as shirts and jeans/trousers vis-a-vis the jilbab  usually worn by Al- 
Azhar clerics and advised young Muslims, including women, to work on 
improving their skills and making the best use of their time through playing sports 
and through learning computer courses.
The popularity of televangelists among youth of middle and upper-middle 
classes in Egypt has also an economic dimension to it. New middle and upper- 
middle classes have appeared in Egypt o f educated professionals and hard-working 
businessmen (Lotfy 2009: 25-27) and televangelists' messages which praised 
wealth and individual improvement seems appealing to the aspirations of those 
classes in terms of social mobility and gaining more wealth (Lotfy 2008: 25-27).
From another perspective, televangelism in Egypt has also distinguished 
itself from the discourse of militant Islamist groups that rose in Egypt in 1980s. A 
notable example was al-Jama‘a al-Islamiya. Established in the 1970s, it aimed to
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“radically change society and politics by abolishing the existing regime and 
violently taking over state power”. This, to them, “seemed the only viable way to 
(re)-establish a 'true Islamic state and society'” (Hamzawy and Grebowski 2010: 
3). Al-Jama4a al-Islamiya conducted a series o f violent acts including the murder of 
the intellectual Farag Fouda and Luxor massacre in 1997 that led to the death of 62 
people, mostly tourists. At the end o f 1990s, after years of violent confrontation 
with the Egyptian government, al-Jama‘a al-Islamiya was defeated by Egypt’s 
security forces. Accepting their failure to radically define society and politics, 
however, it underwent a revisionist stage in which they denounced violence and 
“urged for nonviolent political and social activism” (Hamzawy and Grebowski 
2010 : 1).
Thus, in many ways, on the political and religious levels, the discourse of 
televangelists in Egypt - Amr Khaled being an example - appeared to be able to 
address many gaps and achieve multiple aims. Firstly, unlike Al-Azhar's discourse 
that focused on religious rituals, Khaled was able to relate to the everyday life of 
Muslim youth in Egypt as he gave advice on topics such as making friendships, 
and spending the spare time from an Islamic point of view. Second, whereas the 
violent Islamist discourse that gained visibility in the 1980s in Egypt put its 
followers in a violent confrontation with the state, televangelists' discourses 
constituted a “safe religion” (Lotfy 2009: 37) aimed at individual development and 
civic engagement. As the popularity o f Khaled grew, for example, he created many 
initiatives to fight illiteracy and to encourage youth to give up smoking. Relevant 
to the above is the emergence of new strata of middle and upper-middle classes in 
Egypt, o f skilled workers that have the economic potential, yet are deprived of any
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form of political and civic engagement (Lotfy 2009: 25). Thus, as I described in 
my encounter with the young female accountant in Egypt in the Preface to the 
thesis, Khaled was able to give meaning to the lives o f many Egyptian youth 
within a context of political frustration and a discourse by Al-Azhar that seemed 
out o f touch with the context and aspirations of Egyptian youth.
In another context, in Indonesia, Howell (2008:52-58) was able to show 
how the two popular televangelists Aa Gym and Arifin Ilham presented religion as 
a means o f personal development. Addressing his audiences, mostly from middle 
and upper classes, the televangelist Aa Gym integrated his religious message with 
advice on personal development and business management (e.g. promoting 
communicative skills, managing stress and socializing pp. 56- 58). He has three 
mottos: "start with yourself', "start with small things" and "start now". One thing 
Howell (2008 ibid.) highlights is that in both contexts, in Egypt and Indonesia, 
religion is presented as a means of triggering individual change. To further 
elaborate, the televangelist Amr Khaled calls upon his audiences to dismiss 
pessimism and take part in civic action (e.g. see Lotfy 2009: 17); for example, by 
volunteering to the organization he established, Life Makers39, which is aimed at 
fighting illiteracy and drugs.
Within the context o f global Islam, Echchaibi (2011) reviews the content of 
programmes by the two Egyptian televangelists, Amr Khaled and Moez Masoud, 
and the Iranian-born American video-blogger Baba Ali (who is being examined in 
the thesis). Echchaibi contends that one common element among the three 
televangelists is that they preach a kind of religion that is highly relevant and
39 The link to the organization: http://!ifeinakers.org/ Last accessed 6th June 2015.
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applicable to modem life (p. 34). In the Internet program, "Ask Baba Ali", the 
televangelist Ali Ardekani responds to questions on topics such as dating, marriage 
and friendship (p. 34). According to Echchaibi (2011:34), Muslims in the post-9/11 
context are confronted not only with crucial questions about "jihad" and "suicide- 
bombing" but also with day-to-day questions about music, television and dating. In 
addition, the three televangelists appeal to the "umma", the wider community of 
believers, which has become "more concrete and potentially realistic" through the 
proliferation of Islamic websites (39-42). As televangelists call on "civic 
responsibility", they appeal to a transnational umma that is only "meaningful 
through local and national networks of interaction" (p. 41). Interestingly, he sees 
"the umma" as a marketing tool to appeal to Muslims on a global scale (also see 
section 3.6.1. The meanings of umma for more on the term umma and its 
importance).
Still discussing televangelism, another relevant study is Adnan (2010) who 
has explored a government-sponsored religious television program mediated in 
English in Malaysia. The program is divided into three sections: the activities of 
local youths at public universities, Islam and science and motivational words from 
Malaysian academics and experts. In his study, Adnan makes use of textual data 
and interviews to explore how Islam is represented. He notes that except for the 
second section o f the program about Islam and science, a non-technical register 
was used with the first person present tense to convey the idea of the presenter 
talking to the audience (p.37). The words o f the highest frequency were "life", 
"lifestyle", "youth", "young" and "value", which he interpreted as one objective of 
the program, to instill positive values among youth (p. 38). Other objectives were
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highlighting the role of science in Islam and presenting an image o f a "modem" 
Islam open to multi-cultural differences (p. 38-39). In fact, as I will illustrate in 
Chapter 8 of the thesis, one discourse topic Yusuf Estes invokes is Islam and 
science (space), which testifies to the argument that televangelism is one 
manifestation of an Islamic popular culture (Mandaville 2007, pp. 327-331, also 
see below). Adnan (2010) concluded that by having more programmes like these, 
people in Muslim majority countries such as Malaysia will be able to respect their 
multi-cultural differences. One limitation Adnan acknowledged is that he did not 
show to what extent the program has achieved what it aimed for in terms of 
highlighting the role of science in Islam or promoting multiculturalism.
The above studies shed light on the phenomenon of televangelism in terms 
of main themes and scope of popularity. One common remark in studies on 
televangelism is that it mainly attracts young Muslims o f middle and upper classes 
(for example, see Echchaibi, 2011, p. 26 Howell 2008, pp. 50-58). There are two 
points that are worth noting with regards to televangelism in the West. First, the 
fact that youth represents the main audience o f televangelists triggers an 
exploration o f the wider socio-historical contexts of Muslim youth that may have 
contributed to televangelists' popularity. For instance, since 9-11, discourses have 
become predominant that designate Muslims as the "other" (e.g. Allen, 2004; 
Baker et al, 2013 and Wodak et al, 2013 on the anti-semitic and anti-Muslim 
rhetoric o f the far-right). In addition, studies on Muslim immigrants (e.g. Schmidt, 
2005) have shown that there is a growing dissatisfaction o f Muslim youth with the 
Islam of their parents, for instance, in terms of the expectations of women's rights 
and gender relationship roles. Second, I argue here that televangelism has become
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part o f an Islamic popular culture (Mandaville, 2007, pp. 327-331) that is 
generously mediated and re-mediated through a multitude o f media platforms, 
including television and the Internet (e.g. Cesari, 2007, p. 58 on "electronic 
religiosity").
While the socio-historical context of Muslim youth, including their 
engagement with popular culture, will be explored in the forthcoming sections in 
the chapter, in the coming section, I will start by investigating the broader contexts 
that seem to have given televangelism its characteristic features, i.e. the rise of 
neoliberalism, the power of media and the rise o f infotainment (Geertz, 1973d:89; 
Hallin, 2008; and Kellner, 2003; 2010).
2.2. The power of media
Relevant to the question of why televangelism has gained popularity among 
some Muslim audiences is a broader question o f why mass media, including the 
television and the Internet, have come to have "very particular power-effects" 
(Couldry, 2003a: 1; Thompson, 1995).
In this vein, Couldry (2000; 2003a; 2003b) argues that the power of the 
media is sustained through a myth or an assumption that that "there is a Centre to 
the social world, and that, in some sense, the media speaks for that Centre and that 
we accept that Centre's position in our life as legitimate" (Couldry 2003a:2). 
Couldry (2003a: 115-135) supports his claim by investigating reality TV and self­
disclosure on television. Since confession is an act that entails "an authority that
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requires the confession" (Couldry 2003a: 123), Couldry argues that this authority 
does not emanate neither from the TV presenter nor from the audience in the studio 
but rather it is "the authority of television itself', as "the assumed representative of 
the social Centre and our access point to social reality" (ibid.). To reformulate what 
Couldry has explained, the authority or power o f the media lies in the imagination 
that media is the Centre of society and to confess on TV, literally means 
confronting and encountering that Centre, i.e. to speak to what is legitimated and 
perpetuated by the media as "speaking for society as a whole", for its "Centre" 
(Couldry 2003 a: 47).
In line with Couldry, Thompson (1995) explains that mass media is 
"symbolically powerful" (ibid. 16-17). Media communication is powerful because 
it "may lead others to act or respond in certain ways, to pursue one form of action 
rather than another, to believe or disbelieve, to affirm their support for a state of 
affairs or to rise up in collective revolt" (ibid.).
Another aspect underlying media power is what can be referred to as 
"space-time distanciation" (e.g. See Giddens, 1984; Thompson, 1995). According 
to Giddens (1984, pp. 95-110), who coined the term, one inherent characteristics of 
modem societies is the "fading away of time and shading off o f space" (ibid. p. 
132) for instance, through the rise o f print houses and through the expansion of 
means of communication. In line with Giddens (ibid.), Thompson (1995) has 
argued that mediated communication is "detached from its context o f production 
both spatially and temporally and re-embedded in new contexts which may be 
located at different times and places" (p.21). This does not only mean -to
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Thompson- that the power the media exercises transcends spaces and localities but 
also that mediated communication can be taken up and appropriated differently by 
different groups of people (p.30-33). According to Thompson (1995), mediated 
communication is not a passive process, but rather an active process "in which 
individuals take hold of and work over the symbolic materials they receive" (ibid. 
P- 39).
In my view, the distanciation of "space and time" in media outputs offers an 
explanation from a theoretical perspective as to why some televangelists have 
achieved a "transnational popularity"; as audiences in different localities can 
appropriate and relate their messages to their own contexts. For instance, the 
video-blog by Baba Ali "Who hijacked my religion", referred to in Chapter 1, is 
critical of how Western media represents Islam and calls on the audiences not to 
take media stereotypes and the actions of some "misguided followers" as 
representative o f Islam. The video-blog appears to be aimed at (non-Muslim) 
Western audiences. Yet, Muslims in non-Western contexts may identify with it 
within the context of global awareness of misrepresentation of Islam after 9-11 
(e.g. see El Nawawy and Khamis, 2009: 4).
While the above social theories give an account of why mediated 
communication has "very particular power-effects" (Couldry, 2003a, p.l and 
Thompson, 1995), other studies (e.g. Kellner, 2003; 2010; Hallin, 2008) have 
related media power to the broader context of the rise o f neoliberalism in the 
twenty first century.
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It was the 1980s and 1990s, in the United States o f America that the media 
system shifted towards market-oriented media through privatization of state-run 
media and the growth of broadcast markets and foreign investments (Hallin 2008: 
47). The author states that commercialized mass media contributed to the 
predominance of neo-liberalism practices. It has played a role in "promoting the 
growth of the consumer society" (p. 49) and is "firmly rooted" in it (ibid. p. 55).
In line with Hallin (2008), Kellner (2003; 2010) elaborated on the dynamics 
between media culture and consumerism; where culture can be defined here as "a 
system of inherited conceptions expressed in symbolic forms by means of which 
men communicate, perpetuate and develop their knowledge about and attitudes 
towards life" (Geertz 1973d:89).
Drawing on the French theorist Guy Debord (1967), Kellner (2003: vii) 
states that media culture is shaped by the spectacle of the consumer society. 
Examples he gives are sports spectacles, fashion industry and music performances 
which are predominant elements that relate to celebrities, advertisements and 
branding. The Internet has also become a "spectacle", Kellner added, where "it is 
no longer good enough just to have a website; it has to be an interactive spectacle, 
featuring not only products to buy, but music and videos to download, games to 
play, prizes to win, travel information and links to other cool sites" (ibid. p. 4).
Kellner (2003) drew on Castells (1997b: 1) who argued that the 
technological revolution of the twenty first century brought about the growth of 
interactive global networks that began to "reshape the material basis o f our
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society" (ibid.). Kellner, however, added that "entertainment" acted as an important 
mechanism between "information revolution" and the "new technologies", which 
have led to a "network infotainment society" (ibid. p. 14).
Thus, Kellner (2003) points to the rise of the "infotainment" society. It has 
infiltrated media culture from science programmes in which visual effects, 
complex interlocking images, and a conversational style of content presentation are 
intertwined (Fairclough 1995a:3-8) to entertaining politics in which politics is 
fictionalized (e.g. see Wodak, 2009 and 2010) and the domains o f politics and 
entertainment are blurred (e.g. Riegert, 2007 and van Zoonen, 2005).
In fact, we can get a better understanding of televangelism if we compare 
the dynamics of televangelism to the dynamics of "politico-tainment", i.e. the 
blurring between entertainment and politics (e.g. Riegert, 2007; van Zoonen, 2004; 
2005; Wodak, 2009). These dynamics, I will illustrate below, depend on the 
interaction between politics/religion and popular culture on the one hand (e.g. see 
van Zoonen, 2005; Wodak, 2009; 2010) and religion and consumer culture on the 
other (e.g. see Miller, 2004; Carrette and King, 2005 on commodifying religion).
In the following, I will explore the dynamics of "politico-tainment", relating 
it to televangelism. I raise the important question of how we can evaluate the 
phenomenon of infotainment; this is followed by an investigation o f the interaction 
between religion and consumerism. I will examine the rise o f consumer culture and 
its impact on our understandings of the role and functions of religion in the 
contemporary world (e.g. Miller, 2004 and Carrette and King, 2005).
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2.3. Politicotainment
One media phenomenon that has attracted scholarly attention (e.g. Riegert, 
2007; Street, 2003, p. 85 and Wodak 2009) in recent years is the increasing 
interdependence between politics and popular culture. Van Zoonen (2005: 45), for 
instance, remarked that during the 1980s, the British Labour Party became engaged 
in the Red Wedge, a music band in which youth, musicians and politicians 
campaigned against Thatcherism. In the United States, American presidents invited 
popular musicians to the White House and used popular songs as their campaign 
anthem (e.g. Clinton's use of Fleet-Wood Mac's "Don’t stop thinking about 
tomorrow") (van Zoonen ibid.). In the same vein, Street (2003, p. 85) referred to 
popular stars' engagement in politics, for instance, Bono's campaign to end the debt 
of the Third World. Focusing on right-wing politics in Europe, Wodak (2013, p. 
28) remarked that right-wing politicians make use of self-presentation techniques 
that draw on celebrity popular culture, as they represent themselves as "the savior 
of the man and woman in the street".
Drawing on the above examples, researchers (e.g. Riegert, 2007; Wodak, 
2009) have highlighted the convergence between the practices of popular culture 
and politics. Riegert (2007), for instance, perceived Big Brother with "its use of 
interactivity... and its raw authenticity" "a parallel with democratization" (ibid. 
p. 10). She adds that political life and democracy in this way "are enacted in 
participatory multi-media formats" (ibid. p. 10).
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While it may be difficult, in light o f the above examples (e.g. Street, 2003; 
van Zoonen, 2005; Wodak, 2009), to draw a line between the domains o f politics 
and entertainment in their contemporary configurations, Holly (2008:329) offers a 
useful framework that delineates two types of "politicotainment", namely politics 
that makes use of entertainment as exemplified above in the use of popular music 
in political campaigns or by right-wing politicians (e.g. see also Wodak, 2013); and 
political entertainment that makes use of "political tropes, topics and events 
strategically as material to construct its fictional world of images and to make its 
products interesting and attractive" (Holly ibid.).
In the latter type, i.e. political entertainment, studies (e.g. Richardson, 2006 
and Wodak, 2009; 2010) have focused on the popular drama series The West Wing 
as an example of a media genre in which politics is "fictionalized" (see Wodak, 
2009, 167). Wodak (2009) drew on the narrative theory developed by Propp (1968) 
and Wright (1977) to explore the depiction of the hero in The West Wing. She 
suggested that the fictional depiction of the US President in the drama series, Mr. 
Bartlett, is similar to the depiction of the hero in the genre of Wild West movies. 
As in Wild West movies, Mr. Bartlet is portrayed as having an exceptional ability 
(giving speeches) and is recognized by the society as a "hero" who faces a "villain" 
(ibid. p. 174). Politics, in this way, Wodak argued, is constructed through the 
Manichean division of "hero" versus "villain" and "good" versus "bad" (ibid.).
One important question that Wodak (2009) explored is what the popularity 
o f The West Wing may indicate about people's perception and understanding of 
politics. Citing Crawley (2006: 129), Wodak (2009:160) pointed out that several
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unions and associations in the United States mentioned President Bartlett's 
characteristics as a good example that "the Presidential candidates Gore and Bush 
would be wise to copy" (ibid. p. 167). Another journalist remarked that the 
endorsement of Barack Obama by many liberal voters might emanate from a 
general hope that he resembles the fictional President Bartlett (Wodak 2009 ibid.).
In line with Wodak (2009), van Zoonen (2005) points out an important 
interaction between entertainment and politics. In both domains, it is 
"performance" that is the mechanism through which politicians and popular stars 
construct their constituencies of audiences, an aspect which I explore in my 
investigation of televangelism (Chapter 6). In contrast to politics in the past where 
the politician relied on his/her persuasive skill, van Zoonen (2005) contends, 
contemporary politics has become a "performance" where the politicians' success 
depends on self-presentation, style and charisma (Riegert, 2007; van Zoonen, 2005 
and Wodak, 2009).
In my view, it is only through exploring the broader dynamics between 
popular culture and politics/religion that we can go beyond perceiving 
televangelism, in a similar way to "politicotainment", as an "innovation" towards a 
conception of it as a by-product of the neoliberal ideology and its manifestations, 
namely the rise of the consumer spectacle (Kellner, 2003) and the interactions 
between entertainment, network society and consumerism (Comer and Pels, 2003).
What televangelists have done in a similar way to politicians is that they 
have made use of the "infrastructure" of the dominant culture by integrating music
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and aesthetic visual elements in their programmes, by commercializing their 
programmes and by making use of the networks of fans that have consolidated 
their visibility in cyberspace (see Chapter 4 of the thesis). One can visually 
represent the dynamics of televangelism in the figure below:
TelevangelismPopular culture Consumerism
Figure 2.1. Televangelism as an interaction between the practices of popular 
culture and consumerism
As infotainment has infiltrated contemporary media, televangelism being 
one of its manifestations, one question that follows is how we can evaluate this 
phenomenon? I discuss this point below and revisit this question in the concluding 
chapter of the study, after I have examined televangelists' discourses.
Media critics have adopted varied attitudes towards infotainment (e.g. van 
Zoonen, 2004; 2005 and Wodak, 2009). Van Zoonen (2005), for instance, seems to 
be most critical of "politicotainment", and of infotainment by implication, as she 
mentions that "the celebrity politician of television does not have to depend on
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anyone else except his own talent as a performer. He owes nothing to any lobby 
association, interest group or party as long as the media aura of his public body 
lasts" (ibid. p. 79). Riegert (2007) and Wodak (2009; 2010) seem to be more 
interested in exploring what "politicotainment" reveals about "real politics". For 
instance, Wodak (2009) interprets the "fictionalization" of politics in the popular 
US TV soap The West Wing, inter alia, as an indication of audiences' 
disillusionment with politics and their cynicism about politicians' ability to make 
decisions (ibid. p. 20). Riegert (2007:1-10) points out that some genres of reality 
television have come to replace "real" politics.
Perhaps Holly (2008), if compared to van Zoonen (2005), seems to be more 
sympathetic towards infotainment. While Holly remarks that dramatization, 
emotionalisation and aestheticization are salient features of infotainment, he argues 
that these elements have to be evaluated separately as to whether they function 
merely as "packaging" elements or if they can be seen as "stimulating, enriching 
and facilitating comprehension" (ibid. p. 328). According to Holly (2008 ibid.), 
infotainment seems to be an inevitable outcome of a "tendency for modernization 
that ...has long tried to better reach audiences by means of media-specific design"; 
and as such, it has to been evaluated on its own terms.
In fact, I agree with Holly (2008) that we cannot evaluate the phenomenon 
of infotainment without contextualizing it in the broader dynamics that seem to 
have led to its emergence. Building on Wodak (2009)'s critical discursive approach 
to the phenomenon o f infotainment, I argue below that televangelism is a by­
product of the interaction between religion and popular culture on the one hand
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and commodification of religion on the other. I explore these topics in the 
following section.
2.4. Religion and the consumer society
As I have suggested earlier (1.1. Introduction), one critical aspect about 
televangelism is what it reveals about the representation of religion in the twenty 
first century. I argue that televangelism can be contextualized in the rise of the 
culture of consumerism, according to which everything, including religion, can be 
commodified (e.g. Miller, 2004; Carrette and King, 2005). Examples that testify to 
the commercial aspects involved in televangelism are: televangelists' selling of 
tickets for their events, selling DVDs o f their sermons and the broadcast o f their 
programmes on satellite channels. In fact, to digress here, one observation that the 
analytical chapters will demonstrate is how Baba Ali's and Yusuf Estes' sermons 
draw on advertisements and how users themselves use the online spaces of the 
three televangelists to advertise their own Islamic online spaces (see Chapter 4), 
which takes us to the question of authority that I will discuss in the following 
sections.
On the question of commodification of religion, Miller (2004) has given us 
some useful insights. Focusing on popular culture, the author illustrates how 
religious themes, ideas and symbols became an object of commodification from 
the use of gospel songs by popular artists (e.g. Moby’s album Play), to the selling 
of religious figures toys (e.g. Hindu God finger puppets) to the therapeutic
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programmes that combine "mind-cure techniques such as autosuggestion and 
hypnotism with Christianity" (ibid. pp. 73- 86).
What is relevant here is that such commodification, Miller (2004) argues, 
has dual impacts on the meanings and functions of religion in the contemporary 
world (ibid. p.84). Originally, religious traditions "involve connecting symbols and 
beliefs to practices that form a way of life" (ibid. p. 91). However, as religious 
themes and symbols are commodified, they lose "their communal, ethical and 
political consequences" and "become free-floating cultural objects ready to be put 
to whatever use we desire" (ibid. p. 84).
In addition, the consumer society has given rise to a "consumer self' which 
under "the massive cultural force of advertising", derives its meanings, wholeness 
and belonging through consumption (ibid. p. 85-88). With consumerism, a need for 
a "therapeutic" religion has emerged, one that the middle classes in particular need, 
to placate their contradictions and to assist them in "a social world reconfigured in 
terms of market competition" (Miller 2004: 86). It is worth quoting him at length:
People no longer hunger for salvation or an era o f justice, but for the 
feeling, the momentary illusion of personal well-being, health and psychic 
security (ibid. p. 85).
What is at stake here is that in this way "elements of religious traditions pose less 
of a challenge to the status quo; they can be easily made to conform to the default 
assumptions and practices of the dominant culture (ibid. p.91).
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In line with Miller (2004), Carrette and King (2005) tracked one domain 
where religious symbols and themes are commodified, i.e. spirituality and its 
glorification in the contemporary world. Drawing on one understanding of the 
secularization40 thesis according to which religion is relegated to the private sphere 
(e.g. Davie 2007: 53), the authors argue that this thesis is challenged by the 
glorification of the spiritual in the contemporary world, which shows from the 
branding of cosmetics and body sprays as "spiritual" to programmes offering 
"spiritual techniques" for business development (ibid. 2005: 1-16). Commodifying 
religious resources as "spiritualities" exploits "the historical respect and aura of 
authenticity of the religious traditions", while dissociating itself from the world 
religions that have been perceived as problematic since the secularization 
processes (e.g. see Bruce, 1996: 26 and Davie, 2007: 53).
What is at stake in the contemporary reconfigurations of spirituality, 
Carrette and King (2005) claimed, is that they are "not troubling enough" (ibid. p. 
5); rather than challenging the status quo or the structures of inequality, they help 
consolidate the neoliberal grip. It is important here to point out the distinction that 
Carrette and King (2005) made between (old) "revolutionary or anti-capitalist 
spiritualities", exemplified in Buddhist notions of soothing the suffering o f others
40 It is worth noting that secularization is a debatable concept. Bruce (1996: 26), for instance, defines 
secularization as: "the decline o f  popular involvement with the churches; the decline in scope and 
influence o f  religious institutions and the decline in the popularity and impact o f  religious beliefs".
Berger (1999:2-3), however, disagrees with the idea that religion has declined in modem society: "The 
idea is simple: Modernization necessarily leads to a decline o f  religion, both in society and in the minds 
o f the individuals. And it is precisely this idea that turned out to be wrong".
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or Islamic notions o f just economy; and modem forms o f spiritualities. The old 
spiritualities seem to address "structural and social inequalities", whereas 
contemporary spiritualities are taken over -in  their many configurations- by the 
consumer capitalist ideology (pp. 17-21). For instance, under "business- 
ethics/reformist spiritualities", Carrette and King refers to the Quaker tradition and 
some Catholic social ethics schools that "accept, with some ethical modification, 
the status quo of the market and business world; and do not seek to question the 
underlying basis of its ideology" (p. 18). There is also what they termed the 
"capitalist spirituality" in which traditional religions' call is transformed from the 
importance of community and social interconnectedness to "the desirability of 
working for the corporate community or buying more of this or that product" (ibid. 
p. 20). In other words, rather than being a "critical reflection" of the consumer 
culture, modem spiritualities- in this way- act as a "perpetuation of the consumer 
status quo" (ibid. p. 23) as they "smoothe out resistance to the growing power of 
corporate capitalism and consumerism as the defining ideology of our time" (ibid.
p. 11).
Most relevant to my PhD thesis is Carrette and King's reference to 
televangelism in the US as one form of "consumerist spirituality" in which faith is 
perceived as a means to increasing material wealth (Carrette and King, 2005: 19; 
also see Woodhead and Heelas 2001: 174 on "prosperity religions"). If 
commodification has indeed encroached upon religion (e.g. Miller, 2004 and 
Carrette and King, 2005), Islam is not an exception in this regard (e.g. Gokariksel 
and McLamey, 2010). I examine the commodification of Islam in the following 
section.
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2.5. Commodification of "Islam"
There are many studies that attest to the interaction between consumerism 
and religion in Islam (e.g. Hasan, 2009; Hirschkind, 2001).
Focusing on the context of Indonesia, Hasan (2009) discussed the 
commodification of religious symbols/themes in Islam, from the selling of 
religious pamphlets by street vendors, to watching an Islamic soap opera to 
attending study circles with popular preachers. These activities, the author claims, 
have become part of a popular culture that "links an individual, indirectly perhaps, 
to a larger social group and global Muslim community in a general sense" (ibid. 
p.231).
In Egypt, Hirschkind (2001) examined the popularity of "cassette-recorded 
sermons o f popular Islamic preachers", which since the 1970s and until now, has 
become "one of the most widely consumed media forms among lower-middle and 
middle-class Egyptians" (ibid. p. 625). While he points that tapes are produced by 
particular companies and are offered for sale in many places (e.g. outside of 
mosques and in front of train stations), they are one product among other products 
associated with "Islamist social trends" including modest dress styles for women, 
perfumes, books and pamphlets from Islamic publishing houses (ibid.). Hirschkind 
(2001) adopts an ethnographic approach to the exploration of the practice of 
listening to tape-recorded sermons. He has underlined the interaction between 
consumerism and religion; for instance, where cassette sermons are used as a
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"technology of self-improvement" and as a "means by which a range of Islamic 
virtues could be sedimented in (audiences') characters, enabling them to live more 
piously and avoid moral transgressions" (ibid. p. 627).
From another perspective, Gokariksel and McLamey (2010, p. 7) focused 
on consumer culture and Muslim women. They showed, for instance, how the 
Muslim veil is transformed into "a commodity moving through the ever changing 
cycles o f the global fashion industry" through trendy and colorful style (ibid.). 
While the veil is worn by some women as a sign of piety, as a consumer product, it 
has become a practice of social distinction in terms of class and taste (ibid. p. 7).
If we examine televangelism from the point o f view of the rise of consumer 
society, we can see some relevance between televangelism and Miller's (2004) 
statement on the rise of the "therapeutic" religion that does not conflict with 
neoliberalism, as the dominant ideology, but rather smoothes its flow. On 
televangelism in Egypt, Lotfy (2009) points out that popular televangelists in 
Egypt have predominantly praised the accumulation of wealth and presented 
religion as a way of life (ibid. p. 17). In Indonesia, Howell (2008) remarks that the 
popular televangelist Aa Gym integrates in his programmes advice on business 
management and personal development (ibid. pp. 56-58), which lends truth to 
Miller's remark, cited above, that modem spiritualities serve to assist the individual 
in "a social world reconfigured in terms of market competition" (ibid. 2004: 86). 
With regards to the three Muslim televangelists, being examined in this study, 
“therapeutic” religion has entailed addressing the socio-historical context of 
Muslim youth in the West, for example, by bringing up the topic of
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misrepresentation of Islam; Baba Ali also addresses topics most relevant to Muslim 
youth in the West such as the generational gap between youth and parents and their 
different perspectives (see Chapter 8 for the analysis of the main discourse topics 
by the three televangelists).
It is noteworthy here that commercialization is one activity the three 
televangelists undertake; for example, as their books and DVDS are offered for 
sale on websites and through the events they hold in which attendees have to pay 
fees to attend. Most specific to Baba Ali is how he inserts advertisements in his 
YouTube videos and how he establishes a link between Islam and entrepreneurial 
success. To illustrate, one YouTube video by Baba Ali, posted on his blog, is 
entitled "Finding the Halal investment" in which he recounts his experience of 
starting "Halal projects", pointing out that "there are not many Halal investments", 
that do not involve "alcohol" or "interest". Dealing with his partnership with two 
animators whom he networked with, he points out how one project, a video-game 
entitled "Mecca and Medina", gave him 24% return profit. The aim o f the YouTube 
is to sell tickets for an event in which talented people, "the hidden gems of the 
Muslim umma" can come together and "build business networks" with investors 
and entrepreneurs; this is more valuable, Baba Ali reiterates than the 75 dollars that 
the participant will pay to attend the event. What Baba Ali is doing here-true o f the 
remark by Miller (2004) on therapeutic religion- is to help his audiences build 
networks and start enterprises, i.e. to assist his audiences in a market/business 
driven world. In addition, Yusuf Estes owns a religious channel, "Guide US TV" 
that he promotes in one of his Facebook pages (Figure 2.1.).
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Figure 2.2. Yusuf Estes promoting his channel "Guide US TV" on one of his 
Facebook pages.
In addition, it is the "feel good" Islam -  to use Miller's term- in which the 
televangelist Hamza Yusuf provides reconciliatory tones for his Muslim audiences 
in the possibility of being both, Americans and Muslims. The same is generally 
true of Yusuf Estes who has described practising Muslims in one YouTube video as 
generally "better" than their Western (non-practising) citizens (see Chapter 7 and 
Chapter 8 for more insights into the representation of Muslims in televangelists' 
sermons).
As indicated earlier (1.1. Introduction), an important aspect related to 
televangelism is what it reveals about the structure of religious authority in the 
twenty first century. This takes me to the following section.
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2.6. Religious authority
One issue that the phenomenon of televangelism raises is religious authority 
in Islam in the contemporary age. Building on one important remark by Wodak 
(2009) on the popularity of US TV-soap The West Wing, being a possible indication 
of audiences' disillusionment with politics, I would like to raise the question if the 
popularity o f televangelism, by analogy, may signal audiences' disillusionment 
with traditional religious scholars.
In my view, if televangelists have become a source of authority to some 
Muslim audiences (e.g. see Echchaibi, 2011; and Gilliat-Ray, 2010), it is partly 
because the ulama or formally educated scholars have become displaced from the 
Centre o f religious authority, as new dynamics and platforms of attracting 
audiences have emerged (e.g. see Sisler, 2007). A note about the changing nature 
o f religious authority is perhaps important.
For long, the dissemination of religious knowledge was under the authority 
of formally educated scholars, or ulama as students relied on an oral tradition 
where they studied religion through the memorization of the Qur'an and the 
Prophet's sayings (e.g. Eickelman, 1982:10 and Robinson, 1993: 245). The advent 
of print capitalism to the Muslim world in the nineteenth century, however, marked 
an important change for the practice religious authority as religious texts became 
accessible to larger constituencies of readers. This, in a way, Eickelman argued 
(1982), initially extended the control of the ulama on the dissemination of religious 
knowledge.
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However, with the rise o f literacy rates and the availability o f religious 
texts-now in print form- religious knowledge became accessible to larger 
constituencies o f readers who can now "read" and "interpret" (Robinson, 1993: 
245). As Robinson (1993: 245) put it, "books . . . could now be consulted by any 
Ahmad, Mahmud or Muhammad, who could make what they [would] o f them".
If print capitalism has broken the monopoly of religious scholars on Islamic 
knowledge, the predominance of new media has even accelerated the dynamics of 
accessing religious texts. Through CD Roms, websites, blogs and forums (e.g. 
Bunt, 2000, 2003; and El Nawawy and Khamis, 2009) the Prophet's sayings, 
exegesis and jurisprudence can be stored and accessed by users in multi-media 
format (Mandaville, 2001: 178).
In fact new media, particularly the Internet, have become an important 
platform where voices can compete for religious authority (also see Chapter 4).
One stark example in this vein is the issuing of fatwas, i.e. authoritative 
opinions, online (e.g. Sisler, 2007: 206). Whereas in the past, one traditional route 
for getting fatwas was accessing educational institutions or formally educated 
scholars, fatwas can now be offered through websites (e.g. Islamonline.net; 
Islamcity.com) where answers to questions are responded to by scholars associated 
with the website (Sisler, 2007: 206). This means that new media has opened up 
new spaces where varied actors can claim religious authority.
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This applies, inter alia, to Muslims in the West (e.g. Kutscher, 2009; 
Mandaville, 2001: 177). Sisler (2007), for example, shows how fatwas posted in 
English, seem to particularly address issues of Muslims in Europe and the United 
States (ibid. 209). For instance, he cites the case of one fatwa  issued by the 
European Council for Fatwa and Research which -unlike one reading o f Islamic 
law- has permitted the use of a loan in order to solve a housing situation (ibid. p.3). 
Published by Islamonline.net and Ukim.org, the fatwa has triggered a debate on 
cyberspace, and "has clearly influenced subsequent fatwas, for example one issued 
later by Al-Azhar" (ibid. p.3). The latter example testifies to the creation of a 
global "public sphere" where some Islamic interpretations may be discussed, 
negotiated and contested in chat rooms and websites across the board (Mandaville, 
2001, p. 177; Sisler, ibid; Turner, 2007 and van Bruinessen 2003); in Chapter 4, I 
will elaborate on this topic further as I examine manifestations of the virtual public 
sphere. The issuing of Fatwa by the European Council for Fatwa and Research also 
demonstrates that Islam in Europe can shape and/or reshape the dominant 
interpretations of Islam in some Muslim majority contexts. Whether fatwas are 
issued by religious institutions such as A1 Azhar University or independent 
organizations such as the European Council for Fatwa and Research, the 
cyberspace has become an important platform where religious knowledge can be 
disseminated, contested and negotiated, undermining or asserting the authority of 
particular actors.
To add to the above, the easiness of communication and the 
interconnectedness of economic ties, as a result o f the processes of globalization, 
have brought about new platforms and interactions for disseminating religious
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knowledge (e.g. Mandaville, 2001:173; Metcalf, 1996: Xv and Turner, 2007). 
M etcalf (1996: xv) refers to international publishing networks that publish books 
on Islam in English, linking Washington D.C. with London. Researchers 
(Mandaville 2001; Turner, 2007; van Bruinessen, 2003) refer to the emergence of 
online magazines such as Q-News and the Muslim news that are "available to 
those whose first language is English" (Mandaville 2001: 173).
While I argue that televangelism is indicative of the emergence of new 
platforms where voices compete for authority, in my view, any considerations of 
televangelism in the West have to take into account the broader socio-historical 
context of Muslims in the West. This is because authority, like discourse, does not 
operate in vacuum but is contextually and historically bound (e.g. see Wodak and 
Meyer, 2009 on the Discourse Historical Approach).
In other words, if we presuppose that the selected televangelists have filled 
gaps in the "structures of everyday life" of some Muslim youth (to use one term by 
Miller, 2004: 91) then what voids can we point to here?
As I pointed out above, Muslim youth in the West have their characteristic 
(peculiar) context. For instance, unlike their parents who seemed to be strongly 
connected to the cultural traditions of the Islam o f their country of origin, young 
Muslims, educated and socialized in the Western context, seem to be critical of the 
ethnic Islam of their parents (see Cesari, 2003; Mandaville, 2003). Cesari (2003), 
for instance, arguing against the essentialisation of Muslim identities, points out 
that young Muslims bom in France undergo a transformation o f identities as they
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perceive their religion in terms of individual belief (p. 259-264). Cesari (2003) 
argues that unlike their peers in Muslim majority contexts who have less freedom 
in "individualizing" their religion, the pluralism in the Western context has led 
young Muslims to "privileg(e) personal choice over the constraints of religious 
tradition" (Cesari, 2003: 260). Dissatisfied with sectarian differences, some 
Muslim youth are in search of a "universal Islam" that focuses on the core values 
of Islam (e.g. equality, truth) (e.g. see Cesari ibid. 257).
It is worth giving an explanation of the term “universal Islam”. According 
to some Muslim scholars (e.g. Ramadan 2004: 14-16; Nasr 2002), universal Islam 
can be understood within the context of the oneness o f God, “the One, the 
Absolute and the Infinite, the Infinitely Good and All-Merciful” (Nasr 2002: 43); 
which renders Islam, Christianity and Judaism a community of faith as 
monotheistic religions. However, another approach (e.g. see Ibrahim 2006) defines 
the universality of Islam with reference to the (core) human values it preaches such 
as justice, freedom, seeking knowledge and care for the environment. Ibrahim 
(2006: 6-9), for example, argues that “Islam has always expressed the primacy of 
W /, or justice, which is a close approximation of what the West defines as 
freedom”. Seeking knowledge is another concept that Islam attaches importance 
to; for example Netton, (1996) pointed out how “a love of knowledge and learning 
has been a leitmotiv of Islam from its earliest days. The Holy Qur'an instructs the 
believer to ask The Lord to increase Him in knowledge (Q 20: 114); while in a 
very famous hadith, the Prophet Muhammad instructed his followers to seek 
knowledge to even as far as China” (p. vii). In another study, Fairak and Rao 
(2005) showed how Islam - like Judaism and Christianity - took up an ecological
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perspective in which the Qu'ran asks the believer to “contemplate the (wonders of) 
creation in the heavens and the earth” (Quran 2: 190-191; Fairak and Rao 2005: 
71). Fairak and Rao further add that the Qu'ran has numerous mentions of 
creatures such as the mountains, the skies and stars, and suggest- based on Qu'ranic 
readings - that a “'believer' (in Islam) is not only one who recites prayers all the 
time; however, philosophers and artists, who spend hours reflecting on the natural 
wonders, are true believers as well” (p. 71).
The search of some Muslim youth for a universal Islam that focuses on core 
values such as justice and freedom can be interpreted as a rejection of some 
ethnic/cultural perceptions for example in relation to forced marriage and gender 
roles. This seems to be echoed in in Baba Ali's sermons who criticizes forced 
marriage and the inter-generational gap between Muslim youth and their parents 
(see section 8.3.2).
In fact, the conception of a universal Islam - that focuses on core human 
values - raises the question about the role of culture in Islam, i.e. whether Islam 
could exist without any cultural variations or adaptations. In my view, a salient 
feature of the spread of Islam since the seventh century is that it has been able to 
accommodate to a variety of cultures and localities. Bowen (2010), for instance, 
asserts that jurisprudence or fiqh  (i.e. legal rulings in Islam) is not static but is 
rather defined differently according to the differences in the contexts and the 
environments in which Islam existed (p. 163). One example he gave is the different 
rulings on obtaining a loan for housing. While some Muslim jurists prohibit 
borrowing at interest, the European Council for Fatwa and Research issued a fatwa
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that allows Muslims to benefit from mortgages in European/Western countries 
since “if they were forbidden from banking institutions, then Islam would be 
weakening their social life, which would contradict the principle that Islam should 
benefit Muslims” (p. 174). Thus, in my view, proposing an Islam with no cultural 
associations could be seen as denying, rather than allowing, the great diversity and 
richness of cultures among Muslim believers.
Another important aspect that appears to be most relevant to Islam/Muslims 
in the West is the call on "critical Islam" (e.g. Mandaville, 2003; Turner, 2007; and 
van Bruinessen, 2003). Mandaville (2003) draws on the critical theory of the 
Frankfurt School making a distinction between traditional theory that "assumes the 
presence o f certain underlying and eternal structures that determine all social 
outcomes" and "critical theory" that raises questions about why "what is accepted 
as "natural" came to be so... including the historical conditions— and particularly 
the relations of power— which gave rise to the present world" (p. 130-131). A 
number o f scholars (e.g. Fazlur Rahman, 1982 and Nadawi, 1983) have focused on 
Muslims in the west, urging them to move beyond what was described as "the 
dogma" (Mandaville ibid.) of (some of) the Medieval religious literature that is not 
(yet) recognized as a product of its time and the interplay o f the relations o f power 
(ibid. 130-132). In this vein, research (e.g. Gilliat Ray, 2010, p. 162 and 
Mandaville, 2001) highlights how the call for the critical engagement with the 
religious tradition (e.g. exegesis, the Qur'an) by some Muslim scholars (e.g. Fazlur 
Rahman, 1982; Nadawi, 1993; Wadud, 1999) has resonated with some Muslim 
youth in the West. The above mentioned scholars call upon Muslims in the West to 
undertake "a fresh study of the Qur'an...(and to) read it as if it were not an old
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scripture but one sent down for the present age or rather one that is being revealed 
to (them) directly" (Nadawi ibid. p. 190).
Within this context, mosque imams, a traditional source of religious 
authority, seem to be out of touch with the "intellectual pressures" that some 
Muslim youth may face. They largely appear to be imported from Muslim majority 
countries' contexts and may understand the questions asked to them but fail to 
understand the context of the questioner (Gilliat-Ray, 2010: 162 on imams in 
Britain). In another study on religious teaching in faith-based schools in the UK, 
Rosowsky (2012) remarked that in the congregation, which constituted of migrants 
from Pakistan (Mirpur), the imam spoke in Urdu to the audience “whose younger 
members have either both Panjabi and English or just English” (p. 622), which 
relates to Gilliat-Ray’s remark on the difficulties that face the younger generation 
of Muslims in the UK in communicating with mosque imams (also see Rosowsky, 
2008: 36-37 and 2011: 139-142 on the linguistic challenges facing young Muslims 
in the UK as a result o f not using English in liturgical practice in mosques).
Adopting a CDS approach, one aim of this study is to explore how the 
above layers of context may reflect on the discourses of the three televangelists. 
This means going beyond the attitude towards televangelism as intrinsically 
"negative" (e.g. see van Zoonen, 2005) or trivial towards exploring the layers of 
contexts in which televangelists' discourses are contextualized. For instance, if 
approaching the religious tradition from a "critical' perspective represents an 
"intellectual pressure" to Muslim youth in the West, what is it that the three 
American televangelists might critique?
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As I will demonstrate in Chapter 8 and Chapter 9 of the thesis, Hamza 
Yusuf levels criticisms at George Bush's government and appears to be in 
“dialogicality” with anti-Muslim rhetoric, for example, through the reference to the 
large numbers of Muslims in Europe and the US, giving legitimacy to 
Islam/Muslims and through a reference to the Muslim civilization that “did not 
divorce people from its land, culture and tradition” (see Chapters 7-9). This 
reference serves to subvert the representation of Islam in anti-Muslim rhetoric as a 
threat to Western values (see Baker et al 2008; 2013; and Wodak 2015). Baba Ali 
appears to be critical of the conflation between ethnic practices such as forced 
marriage and gender discrimination and Islam. In the following chapters, I will 
explore how the-above mentioned layers of context (e.g. misrepresentation of 
Islam and the inter-generational gap) appear to interact with the discourses of the 
three televangelists.
2.7. Discussion and conclusion
In this chapter, I have explored the phenomenon of televangelism from 
different perspectives. I started by exploring the characteristic features of 
televangelism, namely the blurring between information and entertainment, and the 
use of commercialization. I have examined the broader dynamics that have helped 
sustain the popularity of televangelism such as the predominance o f infotainment, 
media power and the fragmentation of religious authority.
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I argued that, as a media phenomenon, televangelism can be seen as a by­
product of the interaction between the rise of consumerism and info-tainment. One 
can imagine here a huge machine with gears in which the movement of one seems 
to affect the other. One gear is the power of media itself that seems to drive or be 
driven by another gear, i.e. commercialization and advertising. As one gear pushes 
the other, the result is infotainment or, relevant to my PhD topic, televangelism as 
one form of popular religion.
From another perspective, televangelism may indicate the fragmentation of 
religious authority in the contemporary world. New platforms have emerged in 
which voices are competing to claim the authority to speak on behalf of Muslims 
and to address them. In the Western context, this has not only entailed establishing 
publishing houses, in which (new) discourses on Islam can be produced but also 
online platforms where varied social actors can speak for Islam (e.g. see Sisler, 
2007).
Specific to televangelism in the West is the socio-historical context of 
Muslim youth who, inter alia, are exposed to a call for critical engagement with the 
exegesis and traditional Qur'anic interpretations (see Fazlur Rahman, 1982 and 
Wadud, 1999). In addition, while Muslim youth brought up in the West may regard 
themselves as "European" or "American", there is a rise of anti-Muslim and anti- 
semitic discourses in which Muslims, inter alia, are perceived as non-belonging, as 
the Other (e.g. Baker et al, 2013; Richarsdson, 2004 and Richardson and Wodak, 
2009a and 2009 b). To illustrate, in his study on the (mis)representation of Islam in 
British broadsheet newspapers, Richardson (2004) has outlined the processes
86
through which Muslims in some media discourses are misrepresented, namely the 
creation of a “space (which can be political, cultural, social...)” that draws different 
boundaries between Us and Them and the attribution o f negative “social value on 
both this space and its composition” (p.69). The differences between 
Muslims/Islam and the West, Richardson (2004, p. 75- 93) suggests are “translated 
into reports o f Muslims which are marked by their inferiority, negativity and 
threat” (p. 75).
In a more recent study on the representation of Islam in British press, Baker 
et al (2013) illustrated how the representation of Muslims in British broadsheet 
newspapers is subject to processes of collectivization; Muslims are represented in 
collective terms such as “the Muslim world”, “the Muslim community” and “the 
Muslim country”. In line with Richardson (2004), Baker et al (2013) noted that 
Muslims (represented as a monolithic entity), are susceptible to negative 
representation; for instance, by constructing a view of a community that, among 
other things, has “the potential to be offended” and that is “separate from the rest 
o f Britain” (ibid. pp. 126-127).
What I aim to do in my thesis, therefore, is to analyze how these layers of 
context might be echoed in (and shaping) televangelists' discourses. I cannot 
proceed, however, without exploring the meanings of identities' construction and 
its relevance to televangelists' sermons. In the following chapter, I resume the 
journey.
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Chapter 3: Muslim identities in a ’’global world”
3.0. Introduction
One overarching question of the present study is how Muslim identities are 
discursively constructed in televangelists' sermons. In my view, one cannot explore 
the above question without examining the medium through which televangelists 
mediate their sermons, i.e. satellite TV channels and YouTube. These mediums 
have a global reach and transcend localities and borders; my entry point to the 
examination of televangelists' discourses will be to examine the wider framework 
of globalization and its processes.
In a broad sense, globalization can be defined as "the crystallization of the 
entire world as a single place" (Robertson, 1987a:38), where economic, political 
and cultural structures become increasingly integrated and intertwined (Giddens, 
1990: 64; Mandaville, 2002: 67; and Thompson, 2000). This manifests itself in the 
rise o f a world economy premised on neoliberal norms (e.g. see Featherstone, 
2002: 2 and Mandaville, 2007: 312). It also shows in the increasing use of 
electronic media technologies, the increasing flow of people across borders and the 
legal possibilities of migration (e.g. Delanty, Wodak and Jones, 2011).
How such economic interconnectedness and technological advancement 
impact social relations and- therefore identities- has been the focus of much 
scholarly research (e.g. Castells 1997a and b; Hall 1991). According to Castells 
(1997 b: 2-4), many social and political changes have taken place at the start o f the
twenty first century from the redefinition of family relationships based on "new" 
meanings of gender roles, sexuality and personality to the appearance of new 
forms of political expression and domination including the interdependence 
between media and politics (also see Wodak, 2009 on the phenomenon of politico- 
tainment). Amid these changes, Castells (1997a and b) argues, identity "collective 
or individual...becomes the fundamental source o f social meaning" (ibid. 
1997b:3). As he points out, a "regrouping" of people around primary identities has 
taken place, whether national, religious, ethnic or territorial (ibid. p.3).
From one perspective (e.g. Castells, 1997 b: 355-371; Smith, 1990; Hall, 
1991; 1996 and 1997), "culture" -defined as a sense of shared collective memory- 
has played an important role in the revival of identities. Friedman (1990, pp. 319- 
323), for instance, cites an interesting example o f the Ainu group in Japan; since 
the 1970s a cultural movement has developed that aimed -through establishing 
schools for producing handcrafted goods- to gain recognition and acceptance on 
equal terms with the majority population. In a similar way, in Hawaii, a cultural 
movement emerged in the wake of "the decline of American and Western 
hegemony in the world system" which led to a revival of local cultural identities 
(Friedman ibid. p. 323).
While the Ainu or Hawaiian communities are examples of "ethnic" 
identities that primarily operate within the borders of a nation state, i.e. Japan and 
the United States of America, in other instances, social ties are maintained across 
borders. In this vein, one can refer to the increasing interest in European identities
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(e.g. see Mayer and Palmowski, 2004; Krzyzanowski, 2010) which according to 
Smith (1990: 172-180) are "transnational" and constitute a "family of cultures".
In fact, this study is partly triggered by the importance of identity as a 
fundamental source o f social meaning (e.g. Castells, 1973:3). Since the aim of the 
thesis is to explore how each televangelist constructs a distinct representation for 
Islam and Muslims in their sermons, a theoretical understanding of the complex 
concept o f identity is fundamental.
Thematically, the following chapter is divided into two sections. First, I 
elaborate on the concept of identity and "collective identity" (e.g. see 
Triandafyllidou and Wodak, 2003 and Wodak et al, 2009). Then, I focus on 
Muslim minorities in the West and take up the debate (e.g. see Cohen, 1997: 184- 
196; Vertovec, 2000) as to whether Muslim minorities in the West can be better 
referred to as "diasporic" or "transnational". In the second part, I summarize some 
insights into Muslims' perceptions of their religion, when it is trans-located from a 
majority context to a minority context, in the West. In other words, in this chapter, 
I grasp the dynamics that may influence Muslim communities, which are very 
heterogeneous, in the West (e.g. see Cesari, 2007 and Mandaville, 2007 on the 
emergence of transnational Islam). The significance of discussing the theoretical 
frameworks relevant to Muslim identities' construction is that we will gain insights 
into the processes and dynamics that the three American televangelists appear to fit 
into, which might have widened the scope of their visibility.
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3.1. The complex meanings of identity
In order to explore how the three televangelists are discursively constructing 
Muslim identities in their sermons, we have to grasp, first, the many complex 
meanings of "identity". According to Triandafyllidou and Wodak (2003: 210), one 
basic meaning of "identity" is absolute sameness which entails two possible 
relations of comparison between individuals: similarity and difference. In their 
view, the locus of identity is social interaction because meaning- associated with 
identity- is not an inherent property of words but rather develops in context 
dependent use (p. 210). Constituted through social interaction, "identity", the 
authors argue, is a dynamic phenomenon, a process:
Identity viewed as a process is a condition of being or becoming that is 
constantly renewed, confirmed or transformed, regardless of whether it 
is more or less stable, more or less institutionalized (Triandafyllidou and 
Wodak ibid.).
As the authors point out, there are two forms o f identities: individual and 
collective (ibid. p. 211). Arguing against an artificial separation between both 
forms, Triandafyllidou and Wodak advocate the view that individual and collective 
identities are interdependent and intertwined (ibid.). Collective identities as much 
as individual identities -the authors argue- are in a process of negotiation, 
affirmation or change through the individuals who identify with a given social 
category and act in their name (ibid.). Further, both phenomena include difference: 
an individual identity indicates how an individual is aware of his/her difference/s 
with respect to others; in a similar way, the feeling of belonging to a group is only
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possible in connection with groups or categories to which one does not belong (p. 
213).
If Triandafyllidou and Wodak (2003) perceive social action as the locus of 
identity, Hall (1997: 13-61) argues that social action and culture are intricately 
bound. According to Hall (1997:15), meaning creation- related to identity- is 
formed through systems of representation that connect language to culture. Since 
meanings are made up through social interaction and social norms, they are 
"constructed within not outside discourse" (Hall, 1996: 17). In addition, meanings 
are "produced in specific historical and institutional sites within specific discursive 
formations and practices... and thus are the product o f the marking of difference 
and exclusion" (ibid.); "Britishness is not French, not American... not Jamaican 
and so on" (Hall, 1997: 235). Underscoring the role of history and culture in 
meaning making, Hall (1997:32) points out that all meanings are produced "within 
history and culture; they can never be finally fixed but are always subject to 
change, both from one cultural context and from one period to another" (ibid.).
The above conceptualizations o f "identity" and the interaction between 
individual and collective identities (Hall, 1997: 269-271; Triandafyllidou and 
Wodak, 2003) are crucial for the theoretical framework of this study and my 
assumptions as a researcher. First, the authors highlight that collective identities 
are not a static phenomenon but in a process o f change and transformation through 
the individuals who interact with and shape the collective group (Triandafyllidou 
and Wodak, 2003: 211). Second, the interaction between individual and collective 
identities offers an explanation of why labeling particular characteristics/features
92
as belonging to Islam/Muslims always implies a stark reduction. As Hall (1997: 
249-258) points out, reducing an identity to "a few essentials, fixed in Nature by a 
few simplified characteristics" is one process o f "stereotyping" where an exercise 
of power is practiced to the disadvantage of the excluded group (p.258). Sen 
(2006: 45-49) remarks that the singular classification of members of a group as one 
particular collectivity "is not just crude as an approach to description and 
predication; it is also grossly confrontational in form and implication". The above 
view leads to the assumption that each televangelist: a) could have a distinct 
(different) self-representation and b) could have a different representation of how 
Muslims are and should become.
The fluidity of identities' construction is central to understanding the 
meaning of identities. Another important concept that particularly relates to 
collective identities is the notion of “imagined community”, i.e. a mental construct 
or an image of a collective group that conjures up in our minds. We gain further 
insights into this notion in the following section.
3.2. Imagined Communities
In his book, Imagined Communities, Anderson (1983) argues that 
communities larger than "face to face groups" are imagined communities; he 
defines an "imagined community" as one whose members "will never know most 
o f their fellow members, meet them or even hear o f them, yet in the minds of each 
lives the image o f their communion" (ibid. 1983:15). Communities are to be
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distinguished from one another "not by their authenticity but by the way they are 
imagined" (ibid.).
The idea that communities are imagined provides one salient conceptual 
framework in studies on identities (e.g. see Wodak et al, 2009 on Austrian 
identities and Krzyzanowski, 2010: 42-48 on European identities). For instance, in 
their widely acclaimed book on national identities, Wodak et al (2009:22), citing 
Anderson (ibid.), highlight how the emergence of print capitalism together with the 
rise in literacy levels have led to the possibilities of "rapidly growing numbers of 
people to think about themselves, and to relate themselves to others, in profoundly 
new ways" (Anderson 1983:40). An important aspect that the authors underscore is 
that identities are a discursive construction. It is through discourse that individuals 
can instruct others and be instructed as to who they think they are, with whom they 
should align, and from whom to distance themselves; from that perspective, 
identity is a discursive construction (e.g. Wodak et al 2009:22). Approaching 
"national identity" both as a mental construct and as a discursive one, Wodak et al 
deconstructed macro-strategies used in political speeches and focus-group 
interviews by a range of speakers (e.g. see Wodak et al 2009: 35-43).
The concept of identities as a mental construction (e.g. Anderson, 1983; 
Billig, 1995) and therefore as a discursive one (e.g. Wodak et al, 2009) has 
constituted an important framework in subsequent studies on identities. 
Krzyzanowski (2010: 42-48), for instance, explored the discursive construction of 
European identities and emphasized that "language ideologies become a tool 
which supports the building of communities based on frequently-imagined aspects
94
of commonality and of the unity of groups which, in themselves are internally not 
homogenous".
Yet the conception of "imagined communities" was subject to critique 
primarily because it was squared within the framework of the nation state in what 
is known as "methodological nationalism" (e.g. Beck, 2011: 1347 and Schiller et 
al, 1992). Schiller et al (1992; 2010:111) have emphasized that "taking state 
borders as societal boundaries creates a mode of logic that makes immigrants the 
fundamental threat to social solidarity; natives are assumed to share uniformly 
common social norms" (ibid. 2010).
From this perspective, the famous German sociologist Ulrich Beck (2011), 
argues against "equating modern society with society organized in territorially 
limited nation-states"; he rather takes a global uptake on identities. As he 
hypothesizes, the mediation of risks such as financial crisis, climate change, 
nuclear threats- that are broadcast on a global scale- have created imagined 
cosmopolitan communities of global risks:
Cosmopolitanism means all nations, all religions, all ethnic groups; all 
classes are and see themselves compelled given the potential of civilization 
and its potential for self-destruction to constitute a community with a 
common destiny in the interests of survival (p. 1353).
While Beck's theory seems to be specific to global risks as such and 
therefore not particularly relevant to the investigation of Muslim identities, what is
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highly relevant to my research is how the predominance o f mass media has forged 
new forms of identities- other than the established "old" typologies of identities, 
i.e. national, regional, ethnic and religious. One question that arises here is: since 
televangelists' sermons are mediated or re-mediated on YouTube, will this "new" 
medium have any impact on televangelists in terms of the communities they are 
addressing? That is to say, can one assume here that -a t least- two collective 
entities are appealed to, namely imagined communities of Muslims and imagined 
communities of cyberspace users (e.g. see Herring, 2004; 2008; Androutsopoulos, 
2006)?
In fact, as the analytical chapters will demonstrate, one common aspect 
among the three televangelists is that they are -also- addressing non-Muslim 
audiences. For example, in Chapter 7, I demonstrate that the pronoun “you” used 
by Baba Ali extends the reference to Muslims to a reference to generic audiences. 
Addressing non-Muslims is not in fact specific to Baba Ali but is done in many 
varied discursive strategies in the sermons of the three televangelists. To illustrate, 
the three televangelists appear to present counter-arguments made in exclusionary 
rhetoric; for example, by pointing out that Muslims have been in the West 
generation after generation, which subverts an assumption made in xenophobic 
rhetoric that Islam/Muslims cannot belong to the West (e.g. Richardson, 2004; 
Richardson and Wodak, 2009b). It seems therefore that the mediation of 
televangelists' sermons on a global medium such as the Internet and YouTube has 
made it possible for them to address and imagine not only Muslim communities 
but also to address non-Muslim audiences as I will demonstrate in the analytical 
chapters o f the thesis (see Chapter 7-9).
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Another question arising from the literature (e.g. Androutsopoulos, 2006: 
421-423; Castells, 1997b: 385-391) is: how can users- that by default may not 
necessarily have a real life contact with each other- make up an online community?
Perhaps Castells' elaboration (1997b) on "the rise of network societies" can 
provide some clues to the answer to the above question. What has emerged with 
the technological revolution of the twenty first century, Castells (ibid.) argues, is 
the growth of interactive global networks, including new channels of 
communication that began to "reshape the material basis o f our society" (ibid. p .l). 
Building on Rheingold (1993) who argued for the emergence o f a new form of 
communication that groups people online around shared values, Castells (ibid.) 
conceives a virtual community as "self-defined electronic network of interactive 
communication organized around a shared interest or purpose" (p. 386).
In this vein, many studies (e.g. Baym, 2003; Herring, 2004 and Jones, 1997) 
have suggested that interactive platforms such as blogs and Twitter have allowed 
for the imagination of online communities.
It is important to point out here that research (e.g. Jones, 1997) has differed 
upon the criteria that constitute an online community. Jones (1997), for instance, 
illustrates that a pre-requisite o f an online community is a "virtual settlement" 
which is characterized by interactivity, the existence of more than two 
communicators and a common-public-place where members can meet and interact, 
and a sustained membership over time. Herring (2004:346), however, seems to
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adopt a stricter criteria; she argues that "not all online groups constitute virtual 
communities"; and that a virtual community is operationalized through 
dimensions, including the emergence of roles, rituals and hierarchies; self- 
awareness of the group as an entity that is distinct from other groups; evidence of 
shared history, culture and value; solidarity and support as manifest in humor and 
politeness. These features, Herring argues, provide sociability, support and identity 
to the members of this group, characterizing them as a community.
In the same vein, in his work on Twitter, Gruzd et al (2011), drawing on the 
concept of imagined communities by Anderson (2006), examined the network of 
one Twitter user in terms of the degree of interactivity and messages sent to users, 
language used, and sustained membership. As the authors put it, if a key element of 
an imagined community is the development of a common language, Twitter 
participants have adopted a set of linguistic conventions, for instance, the use of 
hashtags (#) for labeling topics, or the use of “(X of Y)”, when messages exceed 
more than 140 characters, where X indicates the part number and Y the number of 
parts that complete the message (ibid. p. 1302). In addition, the presence of a 
shared historical dimension among members of a community is manifest, 
according to Gruzd et al (ibid.) in the use of Twitter as a global platform for raising 
awareness and in the use of Twitter as a platform for re-mediating headline news 
(see also Kwak et al, 2010). Based on the above features, Gruzd et al have 
concluded that "whether people are primarily on Twitter to follow others, to 
promote their ideas, or to broadcast what they are doing ...it is impossible for them 
to be on Twitter and not to be aware of other residents of this virtual place, just as 
in Anderson's concept of imagined community" (ibid. p. 1289).
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Building on Gruzd et al (2011), I argue that YouTube broadly speaking has 
allowed for the imagination of virtual users and virtual Muslim users. This can be 
demonstrated in the analysis of user-generated comments that I undertake in 
Chapter 4 and in the analysis of the YouTube comments by Baba Ali (see Chapter
7) in which users have adopted features that may characterize an online 
community; for instance, interactions between commenters; use of conversational 
style (mimicking Baba Ali) and use of humor.
Since the selected televangelists have online visibility and are already 
popular, we can assume that it is impossible that the three televangelists are 
unaware that they are-also- addressing imagined users in cyberspace. This is 
particularly relevant to the televangelist of the younger generation, Baba Ali (bom 
1975), whose programmes are exclusively mediated on YouTube.
In addition, because YouTube is a "global medium", we can assume that 
constituencies of audiences will possibly be attracted to televangelists' discourses, 
from second, third and fourth generations of Muslim immigrants (e.g. see Gilliat- 
Ray, 2010: 166 on Hamza Yusuf), to Muslim converts who seek religious 
information, to Muslims in majority contexts (e.g. Dubai) that may have adequate 
knowledge of English and that have come across these televangelists as "famous 
preachers" in the religious sphere. Thus, the fact that the selected televangelists are 
American Muslims suggests that their immediate addressees are American 
Muslims, or broadly speaking Muslims in the West who have become unified by 
some predominant discourses of othering since 9/11 (e.g. see Allen, 2004: 134-137; 
Richardson 2004; Geaves, 2007 and Meer, 2010: 87).
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In my view, to better understand why the three televangelists have acquired 
popularity among Muslim audiences, we need to examine the processes of 
identities' construction related to Muslims in the West who are the immediate 
audience of the three televangelists. If Muslims are an imagined community, then 
one question here is: which conceptual framework can enable us to examine the 
processes of identities construction among Muslims in the West? What type of 
community are we referring to here: a "diasporic" or a "transnational" one? As I 
explain below, these two terms are frequently employed in migration studies to 
refer to Muslims in the West, sometimes used interchangeably, despite the fact that 
they point to different processes. In the following section, I take up the challenge 
of drawing distinctions between these two conceptual frameworks o f identities' 
construction. I seek to clarify the meanings of these frameworks and to contribute 
to the scholarly debate on the theoretical frameworks that can enlighten us on the 
processes o f identities' construction among Muslim communities in the West. This 
is significant to the understanding of the mechanisms through which the three 
televangelists have acquired popularity among some Muslim youth in the West.
3.3. Diasporic ties and connections
In studies on migration, two terms that are used to describe the processes of 
identities' construction of Muslim communities are "diaspora" and 
"transnationalism" (e.g. Vertovec and Cohen, 1999: xiii; and Faist, 2010: 14-22). In 
the following, I examine the conceptual framework that each term stands for. I take 
up the debate (e.g. see Smart, 1987; Hinnells, 1997; Vertovec, 2000; McLoughlin, 
2005) as to whether Muslim communities in minority contexts can be referred to as
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"diasporic" or "transnational" communities; this is crucial to understanding the 
dynamics o f identities' construction among Muslims in the West, and the relevance 
o f these dynamics to the three case studies under examination.
3.3.1. Diaspora: an old notion with new meanings
As a proper term, Diaspora refers to the dispersion of the Jews "throughout 
many lands, signifying as well the oppression and moral degradation implied by 
that dispersion" (Safran, 1991: 83; also see Vertovec and Cohen, 1999: xvii). With 
the many terrible calamities that occurred to the Diasporic Jews over the centuries 
(e.g. Cohen, 2008: 3), "diaspora", now used in small letter to refer to other 
communities, has become associated with "forced displacement, victimization and 
loss" (Vertovec and Cohen ibid.). With such inherent traits, the term has been used 
to refer to other populations including Armenians, Africans, Irish and Palestinians 
(see Cohen, 2008, p. 2-4). As Cohen (ibid.) remarks, ten million Africans were 
transshipped for slavery and indentured labor forming the "misfortune that 
constituted the African diaspora". Similarly, two-thirds o f the Armenian population 
were deported to Syria and Palestine during the Ottoman rule in 1915-1916 (Cohen 
ibid.). Likewise, hundreds of thousands of Palestinians were forced to leave their 
homeland (Safran, 1991: 87).
If  the loss of a "homeland" and experience of "victimization" are two 
important meanings of a "diaspora", memories of the "homeland" become part of 
the consciousness of the diaspora population (e.g. see Safran, 1991: 91-95). 
Speaking of the Palestinian diaspora Safran points out that hundreds of thousands
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of Palestinians have "memories of their homeland and their descendants cultivate a 
collective myth about it" (p. 368). According to Safran (ibid.), the importance of 
the homeland to the consciousness of the diaspora is an important distinctive 
criterion that has characterized the Jewish Diaspora and following that the African 
and the Palestinian diasporas (ibid. pp. 87-90). Safran's remark on the role of the 
homeland in cementing the consciousness of the diaspora is particularly 
illuminating: it seems to be a defensive mechanism by the diaspora towards the 
"slights" of the host country towards the minority; "it is used to make life more 
tolerable by holding out a utopia -o r eutopia- that stands in contrast to the 
perceived dystopia in which actual life is lived" (Safran ibid. p. 94).
If diaspora in its classical manifestations has the meanings of victimization 
and a return to "an imagined homeland", the meanings associated with "diaspora" 
have changed amid a mushrooming of interest in the term both in journalistic 
writings and in academia (e.g. see Cohen, 2008: 8 and Faist, 2010). Cohen (2008:
8), for instance, traced the development of the meanings of diaspora from a term 
connoting alienation, dispersal and uprooting to the everyday occurrence of the 
term which, in one use, connotes an exotic culture, identity and folk music.
In academic writings, as Vertovec and Cohen (1999: xvii) observe, the 
collapse o f the post-colonial states (such as Rwanda and Burundi), and the break­
up of the Soviet Union and of Yugoslavia have opened the possibility for many 
displaced populations to be qualified as "diasporas" (ibid. p. xvii). Commenting on 
the new meanings o f diaspora, Faist (2010:12) underscores two particular 
characteristic features where replacement of old meanings has taken place. First,
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instead of the forced dispersal -exemplified in the Jewish Diaspora and Palestinian 
diaspora- new notions of diaspora refer to any kind of dispersal, including trade 
and labor diasporas (e.g. see Cohen, 2008: 18). For example, under "labor 
diaspora", Cohen (2008:5) included the nineteenth-century system of “indentured” 
labor which affected many Indians, Japanese and Chinese. Second, instead of the 
prototype "Diaspora" cemented by the idea of the return to "an imagined 
homeland" (e.g. see Cohen, 2008: 4 and Safran, 1991: 91-95), newer notions 
replace the idea of return with "dense and continuous linkages across borders" 
(Faist, 2010:12). For example, commenting on the Diaspora o f the Jewish 
population, Cohen (2008:12) argues that in some contemporary manifestations, 
the notion of a "homeland" have yielded to “softer notions of a "found" home in 
the diaspora and to a "virtual home" in a summer camp- perhaps augmented by 
occasional visits to Israel rather than permanent settlement” (ibid.).
As I have mentioned above, the political changes that have occurred on a 
global scale have led to the designation o f many populations as "diasporas". 
Starting from the 1980s, Cohen (2008:1) remarks, the term has been used to refer 
to expatriates, expellees, political refugees, alien residents, immigrants and ethnic 
and racial minorities. Attempting to draw a line between what can or cannot 
constitute a "diaspora", researchers (e.g. see Cohen, 1997: 26; 2008: 6 and Safran, 
1991) have delineated some criteria that should exist for a population to constitute 
a diaspora:
• Dispersal from an original homeland, often traumatically, to two or 
more foreign regions;
• Alternatively or additionally, the expansion from a homeland
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in search o f work, in pursuit o f trade or to further colonial ambitions
• A collective memory and myth about the homeland including its 
location, history, suffering and achievements
• An idealization of the real or imagined ancestral home and a 
collective commitment to its maintenance, restoration, safety and 
prosperity and even to its creation.
Examining the above criteria, one important question to answer is: If the 
more recent meanings of diaspora entail "the movement" (rather than dispersal) 
from "a homeland" and a more enduring collective memory of an imagined 
homeland, could we refer to "religious diaspora"? Or more specifically, could we 
examine Muslims in the West as a "diaspora"? The following section engages with 
this question.
3.3.2. Diaspora religion
One question that has triggered debates is whether religion can be an 
essential binding element for a diaspora (Cohen, 1997: 184-196; Vertovec, 2000). 
Early in the late 1980s, the term "religious diaspora" was coined by Ninian Smart 
(1987), the famous scholar of religious studies. According to the author, the 
increased pace of globalization, manifest in cheap distant travel has brought about 
the possibility o f building ties in religious communities. Through this 
interconnection, certain religions take on the aspect o f "world" or "global" 
religions (Cohen 1997: 188). To illustrate, Smart (1987: 290-1) provided an
104
example of a newspaper which styled itself "an international bimonthly newspaper 
fostering Hindu solidarity among 650 million members of a global religion".
It was Hinnells (2010), however, who has apparently given the term 
(religious diaspora) more currency as he devoted one chapter entitled "the study of 
religious diaspora" in the second edition of the Handbook o f  Living Religions. 
According to the author, one drawback in the study of religions is that they are 
primarily examined in their old countries. Any examination of those religions in 
the West, therefore, has been treated as marginal to the main history of those 
religions (p. 686).
One issue that has emerged in literature (e.g. Hinnells, 1997; Cohen, 1997) 
is what concept we can use to refer to immigrants including second and third 
generation immigrants. According to Hinnells (2010: 686), "migration" or 
"migrant" is an unsatisfactory term for second and further generations of migrants 
whose religion, Hinnells argues, is not in migration but is part o f the national 
scenes of their (Western) countries. Hinnells (2010: 686) finds in "diaspora 
religion" a better term; he considers the term applicable “to the religion of any 
people who have a sense of living away from the land of the religion or away from 
"the old country”.
The conception of a "diaspora religion" is, however, contested in literature. 
In Global Diasporas, for instance, Cohen (1997: 189) argues against the use of the 
term. The so-called "world religions", Cohen points out, lack an important feature 
o f a "diaspora": the idealization and the restoration o f a "homeland" (e.g. see
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Safran, 1991). His view on religions and diaspora is most quoted in studies (e.g. 
Vertovec, 2000; McLoughlin, 2005) that have argued against the use of the term. It 
is worth quoting him at length:
In general, I would argue that religions can provide additional cement to 
bind a diasporic consciousness, but they do not constitute diasporas in and 
of themselves" (ibid. p. 189).
Study by Vertovec (2000) offers more important thoughts concerning the 
interrelation between "diaspora" and "religion". Citing Cohen’s earlier view 
(1977:189) that religions do not constitute diasporas, Vertovec (ibid. p. 10) 
provides another explanation against the use of the term:
This is largely because religions often span more than one ethnic group, and 
in the case of faiths that have come to be widely spread around the globe, 
religions normally do not seek to return to, or to recreate a homeland.
If Judaism and Sikhism are two obvious exceptions to the above claim (e.g. see 
Cohen, 1997, pp. 105-126; 2008), Vertovec adds that Hindu diaspora is another 
exception: "most Hindus tend to sacralize India and therefore have a special kind 
of relationship to a spiritual homeland" (ibid.).
In fact, I agree with Vertovec (2000:11) that Muslims (as a monolithic 
group) cannot be grouped as a "religious diaspora". To quote the author here:
It broadens the term (diaspora) far too much to talk -a s  many scholars do- 
about the "Muslim diaspora", "Catholic diaspora", "Methodist diaspora" and
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so forth. These are of course world traditions that span many ethnic groups 
and nationalities that have been spread by many other means than migration 
and displacement (ibid.).
In another relevant study, McLoughlin (2005) contributes to the debate 
which he sees as one theoretical issue that has occupied scholars in the last decade 
(p. 540). An important point in McLoughlin's study (2005) is that he opens up the 
debate to a new direction, i.e. perhaps the reference to "transnationalism" or 
"transnational communities" would better grasp the dynamics of global religions 
(p. 541). So I will argue in the following section.
3.4. Transnationalism and Islam
Transnationalism refers to the establishment of social, cultural, economic 
and political ties that operate beyond nation-state (e.g. Grillo, 2004: 864 and 
Schiller, 1992: ix). As the political scientist Rudolph (1997:1) indicates, religious 
communities are "among the oldest of the transnationals... Catholic missionaries 
and Buddhist monks carried work and praxis across vast spaces before those 
spaces became nation-states or even states". According to Mandaville (2011: 9), 
transnational Islam existed in various forms, from Sufi masters that spanned 
regions, searching for knowledge or establishing links with other followers of the 
mystic order; to commercial, educational and political connectivity since the 
thirteenth century. As post-colonial migration of Muslims started in contemporary 
times in the 1960s and 1970s, immigrants established social patterns linking the 
country of origin to the country of settlement (Mandaville, 2009: 497).
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In fact, the examination of how migrants establish ties, whether familial, 
religious and economic, between multiple localities, has been a central question in 
migration research since the 1990s onwards (e.g. Schiller et al, 1992; Basch et al 
1994). Schiller et al (1992: 11-13) pointed out that an immigrant in New York may 
be called to talk to the Mayor of New York about the development o f "our city" 
and in the next day return to his home town to talk about the development of "our 
nation". Through Internet and satellite channels, social ties are maintained, 
establishing "continuity in time and in terms of people’s emotional and cultural 
attachment to an imagined community that spread beyond national boundaries" 
(Georgiou, 2006: 143-149). And through global communication systems, economic 
ties are established, for instance, by sending funds, remittances and earnings to the 
"home country" (e.g. see Schiller et al 1992: 1-5 on immigrants from Haiti, the 
eastern Caribbean and Philippines in the United States).
Recently, some attention has been given (e.g. Grillo, 2004 and Mandaville, 
2009; 2011) to exploring how Muslim immigrants establish transnational networks 
and ties. For the purposes of the study, it is important to gain perspective on the 
emergence o f transnational Islam, which will help explain the processes through 
which Muslims in the West can establish religious ties and how the three 
televangelists (i.e. Hamza Yusuf, Baba Ali, and Yusuf Estes) may fit in and support 
these processes.
In the following, I start by delineating the different ways through which 
transnational Islam is enacted, moving on to explore what happens to Muslims'
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perceptions of Islam as they are trans-located from a majority context into a 
minority one and to examine the role that new media can play in generating 
religious meanings. The aim here is to explore the socio-historical context of 
Muslims in the West who represent the immediate audience of televangelists' 
sermons and to turn attention to digital media being an important platform for the 
mediation and re-mediation o f televangelists' sermons. I will further explore this 
latter aspect in the following chapter. Transnational Islam is the focus of the 
following section.
3.4.1. Manifestations of transnational Islam
There are many manifestations of transnational Islam. One is the 
demographic mobility of flows of migrants, including nexuses of countries of 
origin and settlement, for example, France-Algeria, Britain-Pakistan, Germany- 
Turkey, Italy-Morocco (e.g. Grillo, 2004: 865; Mandaville, 2009:494). There are 
also globalized social and political movements that operate on a transnational or 
pluri-national level (e.g. see Cesari, 2007: 56-59 and Mandaville, 2009). To this 
category belong movements such as the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, and its 
Pakistani counterpart Jama'at-i Islami; these have crossed the borders of their 
origins to establish organizations in many European states (Cesari ibid); for 
example, Union of French Islamic Organizations, established 1983, the Islamic 
Community in Germany, established 1982, the Muslim Association of Britain 
established 1997 and the Intercultural Islamic League of Belgium, established 
1972. To the same category belong Sufi orders such as Mourid and Tijaniyya that
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are transnational in terms of operating through migrants' transnational networks 
and linking up diasporas (Grillo, 2004: 865).
There are also networks of non-governmental participants such as religious 
leaders and immigrants that have developed bonds that transcend the borders of 
nation-states (Cesari, 2007: 58). Mandaville (2007: 315), and Graf and Skovgaard- 
Petersen (2009) cite the example of Yusuf al-Qaradawi, the religious figure who 
has created "a global infrastructure for the dissemination of his particular religious 
worldview"; he has established the European Centre for Fatwa and Research 
(ECFR) in Ireland, and has taken part in establishing the International Union of 
Muslim Scholars aiming to uniting scholars from different sectarian backgrounds 
in the name of a global Islamic unity (ibid).
While al-Qaradawi provides an illustration of the mediation o f religious 
discourse, situated within classical traditions, other figures have fostered a 
"reformist" and "progressive" approach to the religion (Mandaville, 2007: 315). 
For example, Mandaville (ibid.; 2001: 178-191) provides a list of scholars such as 
Hassan Hanafy in Egypt, Amina Wadud in the United States, and Fazlur Rahman 
in Pakistan. To Mandaville (2001: 188), these figures are "translocal"; they are no 
longer confined to the exclusive container of a nation-state. To quote the author, 
“Rahman and Hanafi have at one time or another been "traveling Muslims" and 
these translocal experiences have significantly influenced the development of their 
thinking by bringing them into contact with new peoples and bodies of theory, 
Muslim and non-Muslim alike”. As I have indicated earlier, these scholars call for 
a critical approach to the understanding of religious tradition. This point is relevant
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to this study because it is in the West- as Mandaville (2001: 182) informs us- that 
these voices have gained particular currency in recent years. Being an advocate of 
a critical approach to religious texts myself, this is one reason that has motivated 
me to explore televangelism in the West. In other words, the examination o f the 
sermons o f the three televangelists can serve to test the ground in relation to the 
above claim.
Digital religion or "virtual Islam" is another manifestation of transnational 
Islam. Cesari (2007:58) defines it as a form of "electronic religiosity" that is 
"contributing to the global expansion of Islam". The circulation of audio and 
video-tapes, and the broadcasting of independent television satellite shows are 
examples (e.g. Cesari ibid; Hirschkind, 2006; Mandaville, 2007: 318). In addition, 
bulletin boards, chat rooms and discussion forums on the Internet provide a space 
for alternative or contesting understandings of Islam where previously only 
nationally based understandings existed (Cesari ibid).
The above studies give account of the manifestations of transnational Islam, 
through the use of new media and the proliferation of global Muslim networks. 
This view is substantiated by studies on anthropology (M etcalf 1996 and Werbner 
1996) which give us fresh insights into how Muslims in the West can maintain 
their religious identities.
One important anthropological study is by Schmidt (2005) who examined 
religious ties by Muslim youth in Sweden, Denmark and the United States of 
America. She highlights that the events of 9/11 and the rise of anti-Muslim
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sentiments in many countries in Europe have reinforced the idea of a transnational 
Islam based on Muslims' awareness of misrepresentation and being a "threat" to 
Western secular countries (pp. 582-583). Referring to the televangelist Hamza 
Yusuf, whose discourse is being examined in this PhD thesis, Schmidt (2005) 
explains how the United States is looked upon by her informants in the 
Scandinavian context as an important Centre for the dissemination o f religious 
knowledge in Western communities; it is in the United States, she argues where 
"the trails of transnationalism intersect with the trails of globalization" (p. 582). To 
illustrate, she cites the example of Aysha, a young woman from Sweden, whose 
dream was to travel to California to join Zaytuna College established by Hamza 
Yusuf. One important point in the context of Sweden is that transnational ties 
operate both on a transnational level and at a local level by inviting speakers from 
outside Sweden, where teaching material often consisted of downloaded texts 
produced by scholars abroad (p. 580).
There are other informants in Schmidt's study (2005) who did not attend 
conferences abroad; yet the concept of a border-crossing Islam applied within local 
settings as a means to attract new believers or "to demonstrate Islam's egalitarian 
character, for example to African-Americans" (p 581). In the above contexts, the 
upholding of transnational religious ties among her informants came within the 
context of seeking religious knowledge and shared feelings of misrepresentation 
and suffering (p. 582). Thus, the author testifies to transnationalism- and the 
creation of transnational ties- as a framework through which Muslims in the West 
construct meanings about Islam in the contemporary age.
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In the same vein, Metcalf (1996:1-30) offers a psychological account of 
how Muslims in transnational settings relate to aspects of their religious life; she 
proposes that Muslims relate to Islam by "creating spaces". The calligraphy of a 
Qur'anic text in a Muslim home in Canada or the virtual prayer of the adan 
(prayer's call) coming from a computer are examples of how Islamic symbols can 
be replicated everywhere; or to cite one shopkeeper observing Ramadan in her 
study: "the same food, the same moon, God is everywhere" (ibid. p. 11).
As I will demonstrate in the following chapter, the dissemination o f modem 
technology and the expansion of digital Islam, from YouTube sermons viewed 
online, to religious songs on websites (see Eickelman and Anderson, 1999) have 
created online spaces where Muslims (in the West) can relate to and replicate 
aspects of their religious experience in different localities (also see Metcalf, 1996: 
1-30).
If globalized technology has become a means through which Muslims relate 
to aspects of their religious experience despite differences in geographical 
locations, the question remains: what happens to Muslims, and therefore Islam, as 
it is "transposed" from a majority context to a minority context. In other words, 
what changes may possibly occur to Muslims in the West as they encounter a 
myriad of ethnicities, cultures and lifestyles (i.e. secular and Islamic-oriented), 
beliefs and disbeliefs?
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3.5. Islam in the West
As I mentioned earlier (section 3.3. Imagined Communities), an important 
conception in understanding collective identities is that communities can be 
imagined. In fact, intrinsic to Islam is the imagination of an umma- an (imagined) 
global Muslim community- that encompasses many cultures and ethnicities (e.g. 
Denny 1975). Because of the importance of the term umma in the Islamic tradition 
and its potential relevance to the discourses of the three televangelists, I choose to 
elaborate on the meanings of this term and its development (see below), before 
moving on to discuss the specific context of Muslims in the West. This study 
proposes that the Internet (and the misrepresentation of Islam in the post 9-11 
context) has helped “activate” the theoretical notion of the umma or a global 
Muslim community in televangelists' sermons and in users' comments online. This 
takes me to the following section.
3.5.1. The meanings of umma
A conception relevant to the investigation o f Muslim identities is the 
conception of the umma (i.e. an imagined Muslim community). According to 
Denny (1975), the term umma occurred 64 times in the Qur'an and has many 
varied meanings. One use of the term in the Qur'an is to refer to "a fixed time": 
"And If We delay the penalty for them for a definite term (umma), they are sure to 
say, "What keeps it back?" Ah! On the day it (actually) reaches them, nothing will 
turn it away from them, and they will be completely encircled by that which they 
used to mock at" (Yusuf Ali: 11:8) (Denny ibid. 38). Umma can also mean
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"exemplar", as in the reference to Abraham in 16:120, "Abraham was indeed a 
model (umma), devoutly obedient to Allah, (and) true in Faith, and he joined not 
gods with Allah" (Denny ibid.).
Another important meaning of umma in the Qur'an is "community". In the 
Qur'an, 23:52, God recounts, addressing the Prophets: “ Surely this community of 
yours is one community, and I am your Lord; so fear Me” (Arberry’s translation). 
In 6:38, umma is used to refer to creatures with common characteristics: "There is 
not an animal (umma) (that lives) on the earth, nor a being that flies on its wings, 
but (forms part of) communities like you. Nothing have we omitted from the Book, 
and they (all) shall be gathered to their Lord in the end" (Yusuf Ali's translation).
Denny (1975; 1977) argues that umma in the Qur'an refers to a community 
in a religious sense. Delineating the meanings of umma in the Qur'an, scholars 
(Denny, 1975; Decasa, 1999) have underscored that one m otif running through the 
concept of "umma" as a religious community is the idea of oneness. Humans the 
Qur'an, points out, originally belonged to one religion, yet went different ways: "At 
one time all people were only one nation (umma). God sent Prophets with glad 
news and warnings. He sent the Book with them for a genuine purpose to provide 
the people with the ruling about disputed matters among them (2:213, Muhammad 
Sarwar's translation). Classical interpretations, Denny (1975) and Decasa 
(1999:58-58) point out, refer to the whole mankind (represented in Adam and his 
descendants) as an umma, who submitted to one God, representing one religious 
community.
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The umma also has historical significance. With the migration of Muslims 
from Mecca to Medina, the first Muslim community came to be constituted. If the 
social system in Mecca was based on tribal ties, it was the first time in Medina that 
Muslims revoked that social system in terms of a greater unity. Mandaville 
(2007:70) reminds us:
For those who participated in the first migration, then, it was not the 
geographic move from Makkah to Medina which mattered, but rather the 
much more dramatic split from their tribal kin-groups. These affiliations had 
been the crux and core of social solidarity in Arabia at the time, and to leave 
them behind in the name of Islam signified a major break with traditional 
practice.
To establish a community in Medina, a "brotherhood" was held between the 
Muslim migrants in Mecca and Muslim converts in Medina. Interestingly, a 
security pact was held between Muslims and the inhabitants of Medina that 
constituted three groups: the new Muslim settlers who had migrated with 
Muhammad, the converts of Medina and the polytheist clans and their Jewish allies 
(Arjmond, 2009: 565). Denny (1977:44) perceives the security pact as a “very 
much a political-military document of agreement designed to make Yathrib 
(Medina) and the peoples connected with it safe”. The pact came to be known as 
the Constitution of Medina (e.g. Arjomand, 2009).
In the Constitution of Medina, umma was an important term that defined the 
parties to which the Constitution included. The term umma refers to a confederate 
community of clans comprising Muslim immigrants; Muslims of Medina and their 
affiliates o f Jews; and non-Muslims. What is crucial in the constitution is one 
section on religious tolerance that stipulated that "The Jews of the clan of -A w f are
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a community {umma) with the faithful covenanters, the Jews having their religion 
(d in) and the Muslims their religion" (Article 15).
As Arjomand (2009: 560) has argued, umma included both Jewish, Muslims 
and non-Muslims, marking the institution of religious pluralism in Islam. It was 
during Medina, Halliday (1990: 24) argued, that a "proto-cosmopolitan streak 
stressing unity" became materialized. In addition, the fact the Constitution came to 
defend a territory for its covenants made "umma" for the first time a 
"heterogeneous political unity" (Arjomand, 2009:565) and I would add a moral 
unity as well.
There appears to be a specific relevance between the theoretical conception 
o f umma (an imagined Muslim community) and Muslims in the West. It is in the 
West, Mandaville (2001: 174) argues, that Muslims "come face to face with ... 
shapes and colors of global Islam, forcing their religion to hold a mirror up to its 
own diversity. These encounters often play an important role in processes of 
identity formation prompting Muslims to revitalize and compare their 
understandings of Islam".
The national and ethnic diversity of those who profess Islam, particularly in 
Western contexts, have led some scholars (e.g. Grillo, 2004: 863) to postulate that 
that "there is no Islam but Islams" (ibid.). The author, however, warns that the 
statement may be misinterpreted as "representing different inflections of an 
essential Islam, in different locations". The same view is echoed in Mandaville 
(2001a:55) who argues that the mention of many "Islams" risks the very
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"essentialisation" that the plural "Islams" was intended to escape. Rather, he argues 
that there is indeed one Islam, one that is "far more fluid", "a single master 
signifier, with each aspect becoming another instance of a more general identity" 
(ibid.). To fully quote the author: "Islam can hence be seen as a single discursive 
field -  a "lifeworld" perhaps -  yet one whose borders are constantly changing" 
(ibid.).
In this vein, Grillo (2004: 864) testified to the diversity of Islam (in Europe) 
by noting that to the Muslims, the Other may not be a non-Muslim but a Muslim 
himself/herself whose ideas can be regarded as heretical and un-Islamic. As Grillo 
(2004:864) remarked, this othering may be due to "theological rather than 
sociological issues but they matter to Muslims themselves, not least in debates 
about Islam in/of Europe" (ibid). With this (possible) diversity within Muslims 
themselves and as Muslims come in contact with the "secular" West, some 
Muslims, research points out (e.g. Mandaville, 2001a: 181), "negotiate" their 
identities. To this point, we now turn.
3.5.2. Negotiation of identities
Research (e.g. Jacobson, 1997; Sartawi and Sammut, 2012 and Schmidt, 
2005) suggests that an important aspect related to Islam in the West is that some 
Muslims are negotiating their identities.
One study is by Sartawi and Sammut (2012) who have examined inquiries 
sent by first-generation British Muslims to three mosques in London generally
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attended by Muslims from different backgrounds including Middle Eastern, South 
Asian, and African Americans. The data collected focused on queries where the 
participants were involved in a contradiction between what the researchers 
classified as "British" and "Islamic" worldviews. For instance, one participant 
inquired if she could change the name of her daughter from an Islamic name (i.e. 
Fardous which means paradise in Arabic) and inquired if the change of the name 
would be displeasing to God. Another participant inquired if he can offer liquor in 
his restaurant to attract more customers.
If negotiation of identities in the above examples revolves around 
accepting/practising views which the participants thought of as "un-Islamic", in 
other instances negotiation of differences takes place due to a generational gap 
between the parents' views of religion and those of the offspring (e.g. see 
Jacobson, 1997; Schmidt, 2005).
Since Muslim televangelism appears to be particularly relevant to youth (as 
I explained in Chapter 2) and since televangelists' sermons are widely mediated on 
YouTube - a medium that primarily attracts young audiences (e.g. Burgess and 
Green, 2009:3) - in the following section, I will explore aspects relevant to the 
socio-historical context of the younger generations of Muslims in the West. I take 
Muslim youth in the United Kingdom as an example.
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3.5.3. Muslim Youth in the United Kingdom
According to Lewis (2007: 1-7), half of the Muslims below the age of 
twenty five in the UK, are bom and educated in the UK; these are faced with social 
and intellectual challenges as a result o f growing up in an environment different 
from that of their parents. Unlike their parents, they experiment with a variety of 
lifestyles, religious and secular, and have to "negotiate" the challenges they face 
either because of differences across cultures or across generations.
Jacobson (1997) focuses on the perception of British Pakistani community 
in London of the second generation. While alienation from the "British society" 
has been documented by many of the respondents in her study many of the 
respondents, particularly females, pointed out that they are dissatisfied with the 
views of their parents on how women should lead their lives. One respondent, for 
instance, stated "independence" and "voicing opinion" as part of her perception of 
being "British" that her parents attempt to shut down. This is echoed in Schmidt 
(1995: 575-577) who noted that the dissatisfaction with "ethnic Islam" on the part 
of Muslim youth has led them to the search for a global Islam.
In a related vein, Mandaville (2001:175) cites examples of contemporary 
Muslim scholars (Fazlur Rahman, 1982; Nadwi, 1993:190) in the West who urge 
Muslims to "go back to the sources and read for themselves, exercising good 
judgment and trusting in their own personal opinions as to what the texts mean for 
Islam today". As Mandaville (200la: 134) comments: "there is hence no reluctance 
to delve into the usul al-fiqh (the core texts of Islamic jurisprudence) but there has
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been a shift as to what Muslims are hoping to find there. Gone is the obsession 
with the somatics of prayer and correct bodily practice. The emphasis now is on 
wider questions concerning Muslim identity and relations between Muslims and 
non-Muslims".
3.6. Conclusion
In this chapter, I have researched the conceptual frameworks that can enable 
us to grasp the processes of identities' construction among Muslims in the West. I 
have examined the complex meanings of identity. Following Wodak and 
Triandafyllidou (2003), I approach identity as a dynamic process, which leads to 
the hypothesis that each televangelist may have a different discursive construction 
of "Us, Muslims". An important theoretical underpinning of identity construction is 
that it depends on the construction of in-groups and out-groups or demarcating 
boundaries between the Self and the Other. I have suggested that the celebrity 
status that the three televangelists have achieved and their awareness of the 
dissemination of their sermons online leads to the assumption that the 
televangelists are presumably addressing not only Muslims but also imagined 
cyberspace users.
Having delineated the meanings of identities construction, I then moved on 
to discuss the theoretical frameworks used in literature to designate Muslims in the 
West, including the terms “migrants” and “religious diaspora”. I have argued that 
these terms fall short of grasping the diversity o f Muslims in the West. Instead, I 
postulated that “transnationalism” is a more adequate theoretical framework that
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can grasp the dynamics through which Muslims in the West are forging ties beyond 
the nation state and/or creating meanings related to a global Muslim community. 
This in my view is substantiated by the processes o f transnationalism, including 
the creation of globalized social and political movements (e.g. Sufism, Muslim 
Brotherhood) and the widespread of global media including the mediation of 
Islamic content online. Another aspect this chapter has examined is how the rise of 
anti-Muslim sentiments in the post 9-11 context has reinforced the perception o f a 
global Muslim community based on Muslims' awareness of misrepresentation and 
being conceived of -in some discriminatory rhetoric- as a “threat” to European 
countries (see Wodak and Boukala, 2014:180-182). Reflecting on the data to be 
examined in the following chapters, misrepresentation o f Islam indeed emerges as 
one common topic recurrent among the three televangelists (see Chapter 8). On the 
question of “transnational Islam”, M etcalfs (1996) proposition on the creation of 
“imagined spaces” provides some useful insights into how some Muslims generate 
religious meanings through religious symbols or media forms such as YouTube 
sermons.
In my view, the emergence of “transnational Islam” can account for the 
popularity that the three televangelists have achieved, either through the 
transnational nature o f these televangelists as "traveling" preachers (see bio­
information of the examined televangelists) and/or through the mediums (e.g. 
YouTube, websites) through which these televangelists have widened the scope of 
their popularity.
122
If “transnationalism” is one contextual framework through which we can 
view the phenomenon of televangelism, the rise of “digital Islam” and e-religion is 
another important layer of context that can explain why televangelism-broadly 
speaking- has become popular. I discuss this theme in the following chapter.
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Chapter 4: Religion and televangelism in cyberspace
4.0. Introduction
The continuous developments in modem technology over the past few 
decades have had their impact on the growing accessibility and expansion of 
digital media technologies (Couldry, 2012; Manovich, 2001:23). This has entailed 
the convergence of old media into new media (Manovich, 2001: 28); for instance, 
online press, digital radio and TV and the growing influence of new media types 
identified with “the use of the computer for distribution and exhibition” 
(Manovich, 2001: 19); for instance, CD Roms, DVD, digital videos, and computer 
games. In addition, the Internet has emerged as an important medium (e.g. 
Campbell, 2013), fostering new and rapid forms of global communication and 
coordination (e.g. Eickelman and Anderson, 1999:4 and Bunt 2000:2).
Research (e.g. Forchtner, Krzyzanowski and Wodak, 2013 and Lorenzo-Dus 
and Blivich, 2013) has suggested that the Internet and digital media technologies 
have become important mediums of communication in many domains, including 
politics and religion. To illustrate, in the domain o f politics, Forchtner, 
Krzyzanowski and Wodak (2013) documented the rise of the far-right in Europe 
and the increasing use of electronic media by FPO in Austria to perpetuate anti- 
Muslim and anti-semitic messages. They explained that the political leader Heinz- 
Christian Strache of the FPO (Freedom Party of Austria) managed to gain more 
votes of young electorates by mediating two genres on the Internet: a YouTube 
song entitled “Viennese blood” (a theme that has anti-Semitic references and draws
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on anti-Muslim rhetoric) and a hybrid comic/narrative genre that uses the topos of 
fear as a strategy to present a multimodal narrative of the Ottoman siege of Vienna 
that took place in 1683 (also see Wodak 2015).
Like the domain of politics, religion is mediated online. As early as 1990s, 
religious groups started to make use of the most common platforms at the time, i.e. 
Use Net (e.g. Helland, 2007) to form religious communities. With electronic media 
expansion, religion inhabited many platforms such as blogs, YouTube and social 
media networks. Contemporary manifestations of religion online varies from 
sermon excerpts that can be listened to online or downloaded as i-tunes, to 
websites that offer religious content in multi-media format (e.g. Cheong et al 2008; 
Campbell, 2010a on religious blogs; and van Zoonen et al 2010 and 
Mosemghvdlishvili and Jansz, 2013 on YouTube). Thus, televangelism can be 
perceived as a manifestation of the rise of digital Islam.
In this chapter, I argue that the Internet and digital media technologies are 
among the most important aspects that have granted televangelists' discourses (e.g. 
sermons and Facebook posts) wide visibility and popularity. The three 
televangelists make use of a plethora of new media platforms, including Facebook 
and blogspots (see below). The fact that the Internet is one main medium through 
which televangelists' discourses are disseminated calls for an examination of the 
broader practices and dynamics of “digital religion” that represent important layers 
of context through which televangelists' discourses are mediated and received.
One aim o f this chapter is to explore the meanings of “digital religion”. As 
Campbell (2013:1) remarks, “digital religion does not simply refer to religion as it
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is performed and articulated online, but points to how digital media and spaces are 
shaping and being shaped by religious practice”. This entails, inter alia, exploring 
the dynamics of online communication and how these have shaped and re-shaped 
religious practice (both online and offline), and the different practices related to the 
consumption of televangelists' messages online. Thematically, this chapter is 
divided into two broad sections: in the first section, I explore main themes in 
Internet scholarship, namely the Internet as a virtual public sphere, the different 
manifestations of religion online; and the interrelation between online and offline 
religious practices (e.g. Campbell, 2010; 2011; Hutchings, 2011 and Jacobs, 2007). 
In the second section, I move on to investigate the use of the Internet by the 
selected televangelists and their fans and followers. I examine some of the media 
platforms that the three televangelists use (for instance, Facebook, and YouTube) 
and examine the practices that surround the reception of televangelists' messages. I 
will delineate two patterns a) some users perceive televangelists' online spaces as 
a platform where they can experience devotional aesthetics (e.g. reiterating “God is 
great” in Arabic “Allahu Akbar”) and b) some users approach televangelists' online 
spaces as a platform to advertise their own online spaces (e.g. religious Facebook 
pages/websites) and gain more authority.
Thus, in this chapter, I capture the underlying practices and frames related 
to the consumption of religious content online, in light of relevant literature (e.g. 
Campbell, 2013; El Nawawy and Khamis, 2009; and Hirschkind, 2012) and in 
light of the analysis of user-generated content of televangelists' fans online. I argue 
here that televangelism can be perceived as a manifestation of “participatory
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culture" in which "fans and other consumers are invited to actively participate in 
the creation and circulation of new content" (Jenkins, 2006a: 10).
4.1. The Internet: A virtual public sphere?
As I have indicated earlier (2.6. religious authority), research (Kutscher, 
2009; Sisler, 2007) has positively described the Internet as a global "public sphere" 
where religious views can be discussed, negotiated and contested in chat rooms 
and websites across the board (Mandaville, 2001: 177; Sisler, ibid; Turner, 2007 
and van Bruinessen, 2003). I assess this claim by engaging with the debate in 
Internet scholarship as to whether the Internet can represent/revive the public 
sphere (e.g. Papacharissi, 2002 and Wodak and Wright, 2006).
The term “public sphere” is postulated by Habermas (1992) who offered a 
historical account of late seventeenth and early eighteenth century Europe. He 
suggested that a readership of middle class men (sic!) was formed for a brief 
period during that period and represented “a sphere between civil society and the 
state, in which critical public discussion of matters of general interest” took place 
(Habermas 1989: xi). According to the author, one characteristic feature of the 
public sphere was that it disregarded power hierarchy and social inequality in favor 
o f critical-rational debates. In the following quotation, Habermas (1989:36) 
comments on salons and coffee houses as a meeting point for the publics:
They (the institutional criteria in coffee houses) preserved a kind of social 
intercourse that far from pre-supposing the equality of status, disregard 
status altogether. The tendency replaced the celebration o f rank with a tact
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befitting equals. The parity on whose basis alone the authority of the better 
argument could assert itself against that of social hierarchy and in the end 
can carry the day meant, in the thought of the day, the parity of "common 
humanity".
Indeed, the conception of the public sphere as imagined by Habermas was 
subject to criticism (e.g. Calhoun, 1992 and Fraser, 1992). Calhoun (1992: 3) for 
instance, noted that men of lower socio-economic classes were excluded from the 
public sphere, and Fraser (1992) added that women were likewise excluded. 
However, the revival of the “public sphere” remained an answer to the question of 
how to enhance democratic participation, since it is through “the formation of 
public opinion (that) official decision making can be held democratically 
accountable” (Dahlberg, 2006:1).
A more recent engagement with the notion o f public sphere is study by 
Wodak and Koller (2008:3) who have identified, at least, two theoretical 
approaches towards it: one approach accepts the criteria put forth by Habermas 
such as equal accessibility to information, eradication o f social hierarchies and the 
importance of critical rational debates; the other has a post-modernist turn and puts 
emphasis on “plurality” of voices. To illustrate, in his account of the emergence of 
the public sphere in England, France and Germany, Habermas (1989) identified 
coffee houses as a space where "the bourgeois met with the socially prestigious but 
politically uninfluential nobles as 'common' human beings" (ibid. p. 35). Coffee 
houses served as a hub for information exchange among this emerging readerships 
(ibid. p. 34); Habermas exemplified by commenting on the engagement of
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eighteenth-century writers with the coffee houses: "There was scarcely a great 
writer in the eighteenth century who would not have first submitted his essential 
ideas for discussion in... lectures before the academies and especially in the salon. 
The salon held the monopoly of first publication: a new work, even a musical one, 
had to legitimate itself first in this forum." (ibid. p. 34). As for the other approach 
to the public sphere, Wodak and Koller (2008) remark that it has a post-modernist 
turn and puts emphasis on “plurality” and creating “parallel discursive arenas 
where members of sub-ordinated social groups invent and circulate counter­
discourses” (ibid.).
This study contributes to the conceptualization of the public sphere by 
identifying two methodologies in its examination in recent studies (e.g. Dahlberg, 
2001; Papacharissi, 2002; Triandafyllidou, Wodak and Krzyzanowski, 2009; 
Wamick, 2007; Wodak and Koller, 2008; Wodak and Wright, 2006). On the one 
hand, some studies (e.g. Dahlberg, 2001; Papacharissi, 2002) have revisited this 
notion from a theoretical perspective in the light of relevant literature on 
accessibility of information on the Internet and the extent of rational-critical debate 
online. Another approach (e.g. Wodak and Wright, 2006) is qualitative and 
examines the realization of critical debate through the analysis o f discourse, i.e. 
language in use, to investigate the platforms and processes through which online 
communication has led to the formation of public opinion.
To elaborate the above, a study that has engaged with the question from a 
theoretical perspective is Papacharissi (2002). She examined whether the potential 
of free expression online and anonymity can bring about “a more representative
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and robust public sphere” (ibid., p. 13). She points out some limitations to the 
potential of the Internet as a public sphere. For instance, access to online 
information is not available in equal measure to all (since some lack access to 
computer/Internet in the first place). She has added that while self-expression of 
opinion on the Internet may “empower” users, it remains uncertain the extent to 
which online views can lead to “genuine civic engagement” (ibid. p. 17). 
Moreover, the predominance of commercialization which applies to Internet 
technologies (e.g. portals) undermines “the democratizing potential of mass 
media” (ibid. p. 19); since new technologies will become in this instance 
commercially driven, rather than encouraging/supporting critical discussion, 
building on these limitations, Papacharissi (2002) refrains from describing the 
Internet as a “public sphere”; rather, she designates it as “a public space” which 
“facilitates but does not ensure the rejuvenation of a culturally drained public 
sphere”.
If Papacharissi (2002) argues that the Internet cannot represent a “public 
sphere”, Dahlberg (2006), while initially pointing to the commodification of 
cyberspace as one limitation to the autonomy of public interaction online, proposes 
that “the Internet is facilitating discourse that replicates the basic structure of 
rational-critical debate and that in various ways approximates the requirements of 
the public sphere”. However, he flags up many problems that limit the formation of 
a public opinion based on equal access to information and rational-critical 
discussion; for instance, difficulty identifying the correctness o f information put 
forward on the Internet, the domination of online interaction by particular 
individuals or groups and exclusions from online interaction as a result of social
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inequalities. The critique o f these limitations have led him to propose that 
technology should be developed which enhances critical deliberation and modifies 
the rules of discourse online (or netiquette) so that it would encourage deliberation 
and rational-critical discourse (ibid. pp. 16).
From a different perspective, Wodak and Wright (2006) have adopted a 
“hands on” approach to the question by analyzing online discourses, inter alia, in 
terms of the extent users have engaged critically with the topic/s under discussion. 
Two aspects they explored are: a) who participates in the first place and b) if a 
rational discussion takes place at all or if the various postings are independent of 
each other.
In their study, Wodak and Wright (2006) focused on the context of Europe, 
particularly examining Futurum, the online forum that was created to allow for 
public debates about the future of Europe for citizens of the European Union. In 
contrast to Papacharissi's (2002) pessimistic view about the potential o f the 
Internet in reviving critical-rational discussions, the researchers argue that the 
Internet can represent a virtual public sphere. The authors examined discussion 
threads on the topic of multilingualism and language policies in Europe and 
detected that the forum (Futurum) created a space where participants engaged in 
debates about language policies and the future of Europe. For instance, whereas 
one user claimed that “German as European working language would be an 
additional victory from Hitler and therefore has to be refused” (ibid. p. 265), 
another user counter-argued his claim stating that “it is an unlegitm (sic.) offence 
to the germans and the german-speaking population in Europe, to link our
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language exclusively to hitler, denying that german is de facto the most spoken 
native tongue in Europe, the language of some of Europeans best literature, 
philosophic” (ibid. p. 266). Wodak and Wright (2006) noted that Futurum  helped 
“bring (European) citizens closer to each other”. However, they asserted that only 
when the main themes/topics raised in the forum would be drawn upon by policy­
makers of the European institutions that these discussions would be useful to the 
EU institutions and could tackle the “democratic deficit” between “the European 
Union and the people it serves” (ibid. p.251; also see Triandafyllidou, Wodak and 
Krzyzanowski, 2009:2).
In a different context, in Egypt, Root (2012) assessed the creation of a 
virtual public sphere during the events of the Egyptian uprising that took place in 
2011; the researcher analyzed one Facebook post by the activist Wael Ghoneim in 
February 2011. In this post, Wael Ghoneim clarified his position that he did not ask 
protesters to leave Tahrir Square. Exploring users' comments on Facebook, the 
author argued that the Internet provided a virtual public sphere that allowed for an 
inclusive environment that encouraged responses and enabled users to converge 
between different media forms as some users used text, pictures and videos to 
support their arguments.
As I indicated earlier, one question that has recently received some attention 
in religious studies (e.g. El-Nawawy and Khamis, 2009) is whether the Internet 
could provide a scope for religious deliberation and formation of public opinion. 
For instance, while building on the Habermasian conception of the public sphere, 
El-Nawawy and Khamis (2009:1-22) examined discussion threads in two online
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Muslim forums: Islamonline.net and Islamway.com. The topics of the discussion 
threads included the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, the infamous "Danish cartoons", 
ethnic cleansing in Chechnya and the corruption o f the Arab leaders. Among the 
important findings of the study is that these forums provided a space for consensus 
based on collective endorsement of issues o f shared interest, rather than a 
consensus reached after negotiations and/or debates around controversial issues 
(ibid. pp. 124-132). For instance, one topic that was raised in the discussion forum 
is how to have an “industrial development project for the umma” (i.e. the global 
Muslim community). One engineer suggested creating teams in the different areas 
o f engineering to launch engineering projects across the Islamic countries. The 
suggestion was positively received by the users; for instance, one user wrote: 
“Thank you very much brother Wael for your idea and I am very excited about 
participation”; another used commented: “May God bless you for your great idea. 
We are in dire need for such a project”.
Apart from study by El Nawawy and Khamis (2009), the majority of 
scholarly research (e.g. Bunt, 2009; 2010; Campbell, 2010; 2013; Hirschkind, 
2012; Hutchings, 2011 and Jacobs, 2007) has explored the manifestations of 
religion in the virtual public sphere in terms of the extent of the plurality of voices 
and online practices, thus pointing to the potential of the formation of a public 
sphere online. This takes me to the following section.
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4.2. Religion in the virtual public sphere
If we adopt a definition of the public sphere as one that allows for the 
“plurality of voices” and creating “counter-discourses” (see Wodak and Koller, 
2008:3), then we can consider the claim that the Internet represents a platform 
where many religious voices and views are displayed, mainstream and independent 
voices alike. To get a deeper insight into how the Internet has become a space for 
the expression of plurality of voices online, I have chosen below to draw on 
examples from relevant literature (e.g. Bunt 2004) and to examine up-to-date 
examples drawn from my observations and analysis of religious representation 
online. Using up-to-date examples is in fact informed by the view that the study of 
digital religion is a relatively new sub-field o f research and, indeed, one challenge 
it faces is keeping up with the growing use of the Internet and new media for 
religious expression, for example, in terms of documentation and categorization 
(e.g. see Campbell, 2013:1-8).
Helland (2007:964) points out that one example of mainstream official 
organization represented online is the Vatican; established in 1995, its website 
offers information about the Catholic Church and the doctrine of Catholicism. 
While exploring digital Islam, Bunt (2004) has shown that the Internet is home to 
multi-faceted religious, cultural and political complexities; three main strands of 
Islam are represented: Sunni, Shia and Sufis.
The proliferation of Web 2.0 media channels such as Facebook, YouTube 
and blogspot has further extended the visibility of religious organizations and has
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given way to new voices. If we further explore the example of the Vatican by 
Helland (2007), we can observe that the Vatican has extended its presence to social 
media networks, including Facebook, allowing room for interactivity. One page 
related to the Vatican that has large number of fans on Facebook is “Vatican Radio 
English”; the page has about 370 thousand fans and mediates news and updates 
about the Pope and the Vatican Church. In a similar way to the website41 of Vatican 
Radio, the Facebook page is focused on the Pope. The “cover photo” of the 
Facebook page is an image of the Pope, smiling while holding a pigeon up the sky, 
behind him the Vatican and an obelisk. His smile, while holding the pigeon up to 
the sky connotes peace, friendliness and openness (see Figure 1). The focus on the 
pope in both media outlets, i.e. Facebook page and the website relates to one 
aspect o f new media that relates to the three televangelists, i.e. convergence (see 
Barton and Lee 2013: 7), which suggests that the same media content can be 
mediated in many related online spaces.
Radio Vatican: http://en.radiovaticana.va/ Last accessed 6th June 2015.
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Pope Francis on Twitter 
who do net love u?
Christ teaches us to lov
Figure 4.1. Vatican Radio English Facebook page47
O f course, there are many other examples of independent (religious) voices 
in new media. An example can be drawn from the mediated content on the conflict 
in Gaza and Israel (8 July 2 0 1 4 -2 6  August 2014) in which the Facebook page the 
Jewish Voice of Peace (JVP) has gained visibility.
Founded in 1996, JVP4j “is inspired by Jewish tradition to work together for 
peace, social justice, equality, human rights, respect for international law, and a US 
foreign policy based on these ideals. JVP opposes anti-Jewish, anti-Muslim, and 
anti-Arab bigotry and oppression”. Figure 2 represents a poster in a demonstration 
organized by JVP which aims to end the occupation in the Occupied Territories.
42 R adio  Vatican Facebook page: h ttps://w w vv.facebook .com /V aticanR adioE im lish . Last accessed  28th 
A ugust 2014.
43 Link to Jewish Voice for Peace: https://jewishvoiceforpeace.org/content/jvp-m ission-statem ent Last accessed: 24th 
N ovem ber 2014.
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The post, dated 20th August 2014, has about five thousand “likes” and is shared by 
about two thousand users on their profile pages, testifying to how social media can 
enhance the visibility/influence of (independent) voices online.
•hcebook.com. n  tevvU; P  '  C X j |  ,»$ Jewish Voice for Perce
Fiie Edit View Fevorites Tcofs Help
5 ]  Shaimaa Home a Find friendsJewish Voice for Peace
Figure 4.2. Facebook page of Jewish Voice for Peace
In addition to Facebook being the largest social media network, YouTube 
has emerged as an important medium of religious expression and mediation (e.g. 
Mosemghvdlishvili and Jansz, 2012 and Myers, 2010). Paolillo (2008), for 
instance, remarks that religion (particularly Islam followed by Christianity) forms 
the second biggest thematic cluster on YouTube, after music videos. The increasing 
use of YouTube to express views on Islam (e.g. see Mosemghvdlishvili and Jansz, 
2012 and van Zoonen, Vis and Mihelj, 2010) triggers an investigation of the main 
themes in these videos and the motivations of users to create them.
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Mosemghvdlishvili and Jansz (2013) examined a sample of 120 videos 
about Islam. They found out that YouTube videos on Islam gravitate around three 
main themes: a) educating/preaching Islam (n=20) aimed at Muslims and non- 
Muslims; b) videos that are anti-Islam in terms of verbal abuse and visual 
representation and c) videos that criticize the mis-representation of Islam in mass 
media; for instance the coverage of the cartoons of Prophet Mohammed in the 
British press (ibid. p. 489). The motivations behind producing these videos 
included: communicating views on Islam and “removing” the misconceptions 
some people have about Islam, particularly in Western contexts (p. 494). Self- 
expression without experiencing social constraint is another motivation for 
producing videos about Islam; for instance, one user who posted videos that are 
anti-Muslim reported that his Muslim acquaintances don't know about his channel, 
since "the relationship would only become sour if they knew I disagree with their 
religion" (ibid. p. 494).
The above examples lend truth to the claim that the Internet, including 
YouTube, has become a space of stance-making, views and counter-views (e.g. see 
Barton and Lee, 2013 and Myers, 2010). The fact that the criticism of the 
misrepresentation of Islam in mass media and preaching Islam emerge as two 
important themes in the YouTube videos examined by Mosemghvdlishvili and 
Jansz (2013) reminds us of a theme examined earlier on the fragmentation of 
religious authority (2.6. religious authority); it appears that YouTube and the 
Intemet-broadly speaking- has widened the circle o f religious expression, enabling 
more users to speak for Islam.
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In another study, van Zoonen, Vis and Mihelj (2010) focused on the 
controversy surrounding the anti-Islam video Fitna, produced in 2008 by a member 
of the Dutch Parliament, Geert Wilders (e.g. See Wodak and Boukala, 2014: ISO- 
182). The authors explored the responses of the YouTube users to the production of 
the video and demonstrated that video blogging on YouTube has become an 
expression of a political and/or a religious self. This is realized through many 
different media genres, as the authors point out. One genre the study identified is 
the stand-up comedy; for example, a young man, standing on stage starts by 
ironically refuting some of the stereotypes about Muslims; for instance, he says “I 
don't live in a tent or keep my wife zipped up in it every day”. A dynamic upturn 
occurs in the video as the young man declares: “Trust me, I would like to go back 
to my country but I am already in it”; this is followed by the insertion of the US 
flag and a statement made by the speaker: “I believe in people of all different 
religions and beliefs living together in harmony”, which articulates a political 
stance. Another genre is the “jamming and saying sorry” that takes no longer than 
15-20 seconds; in one version, one or more persons wear a wig (parodying 
Wilders' bleached hair) saying and singing "sorry". In other versions, a screen- 
wide cartoon Dutch flag is featured, with a round hole in it, through which the 
person puts his face, saying “I am sorry”. This is exemplified in the figure below.
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Figure 4.3. I am sorry for Wilders' fitna44
Van Zoonen et al (2010) have interpreted the performance of the participants (e.g. 
the use of the English "I am sorry" rather than the Dutch one) as an indication of 
assuming a global imagined community which they aim to reach. According to the 
authors, through these videos the users enact their religious and political self. The 
large amount of videos posted in response to Fitna ties in, according to the authors, 
with the conceptualization of a public sphere.
The above discussion indicates that the Internet has become a scope for self- 
expression and mediation of religion. Interestingly, the Internet has also become a 
space where rituals and religious practice can be performed (e.g. Campbell, 2013; 
Hutchings, 2011 and Jacobs, 2007). In the following, I further elaborate on the 
meanings o f religious practice online.
44 L ink to  the Y ouTube video: https://wvvvv.voutube.com /vvatch?v^eG M w  pnD V SM  Last accessed  24th 
N ovem ber, 2014.
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4.3. Religious practice online
The emergence of religious forums and virtual churches and mosques have 
given rise to the question of how a sacred space can be constructed online; this has 
entailed much research about the characteristics of religious practices online. I 
define “religious practice” as a form of “social practice” which refers to “socially 
regulated ways of doing things” (Van Leeuwen 2008: 7). The performance of 
social practice, as Van Leeuwen remarks (ibid, pp. 7-12) entails many elements, for 
example, participants, a set of actions performed in a sequence and presentation 
styles such as the use of particular dress codes. Examples of religious practice 
include reading the Qur'an, praying, fasting and pilgrimage (e.g. Ayoub and 
Cornell 2005; Rosowsky 2008:6-11; and Rosowsky 2012:617). One important 
topic is how digital technologies have shaped religious practice (e.g. Campbell 
2012; 2013), which gives us an understanding of how our perceptions of religion 
and religious practice may change or gain new meanings when religion is mediated 
online.
Jacobs (2007) has explored a virtual Christian Church designed so that users 
can perform “asynchronous cyber-rituals”, i.e. “those performed online at a time 
convenient to individuals and do not require collective online assignations at 
specified times” (ibid. p. 1103). Employing ethnography as an approach, Jacobs 
(2007) interviewed the designers o f the Christian Church to find out how the 
architecture of the virtual church has created a sacred space. Jacobs (2007) 
emphasizes that a sacred space is created through a simulation of reality. This is 
achieved through architectural style, design and use of images; in the online
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church, the user comes across a painted corridor, with the words “virtual church” 
woven into the carpet. At the end of the corridor, a screen appears with the words 
“open” and “close”. By clicking on the word “open”, a blurred image of people 
from the back appears where people are engaged in some activity taking place in 
the front o f the hall; conveying a sense of space in which “the viewer is standing at 
the back of a Christian congregation joined together in worship” (p. 1108). In 
addition, there are links to all aspects of a “real world” service; for instance, the 
Worship Room has a link to a Christian radio station that broadcasts Christian pop 
songs and offers the possibility of “singing along with worship" while the 
accompanying music is provided in an audio file (ibid. p. 1114).
The interviews held with the Church designers and users emphasize that 
simulation of reality is an important aspect in the design of the Church; one 
participant has commented that the Church is “a place that can be visited 
analogous to visiting a church in the real world” and “a place where people can go 
and feel safe” (ibid. p. 1110). The flexibility of online religious practice is another 
salient aspect; as one participant commented: it “was much easier to walk out” of a 
virtual sermon if he found it boring, without hurting the feelings of the pastor” 
(ibid. p. 1116).
From a different perspective, Hutchings (2011), while still focusing on 
“virtual churches”, explored if virtual churches have offline connection: the 
“Church of Fools” was non-denominational yet received funding from the 
Methodist Council. The Church of Fools, which attracted media attention and 
lasted only for four months, allowed for novel forms o f religious expression;
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participants, for instance, became avatars who could perform simple actions like 
kneeling and raising hands. They could also choose to remain invisible and view 
the world as “ghosts” that no one could see. The Anglican Cathedral in Second 
Life is another example (ibid. pp. 1124-1127). It was originally established without 
the approval of the Anglican Communion; yet its leaders built informal 
connections with dioceses in England and New Zealand (Campbell 2010:123-127). 
As for Church Online (http://!ive. 1 ifechurch.tv/), it was established in 2006 by the 
Oklahoma-based multi-site mega-church LifeChurch.tv as an online campus (ibid 
p. 1124). It resembles evangelical programmes, since it broadcasts religious 
programmes and songs; in addition, it has a chat room where “hosts” welcome 
visitors, answer their questions and encourage them to participate. By elaborating 
on more examples, Hutchings (2011) highlighted that virtual churches tend to act 
as complementary to offline churches rather than aiming to replace them.
Focusing on religious practices by Muslims, Hirschkind (2012) explores 
some of the practices around listening to/viewing excerpts on YouTube. He 
focused on one YouTube sermon excerpt by the Egyptian televangelist Mohamed 
Hassan that has around three million views; he categorizes the YouTube excerpt by 
Hassan as part of a genre conceived of as being “mu'ather”, from the Arabic root 
“athara” which embraces among its meanings “ethical and devotional dispositions 
as humility, regret, fear, hope, states of the heart that within Islamic ethical 
traditions may lead one to the experience of pious tranquility and a stillness of the 
soul” (ibid. p.6). These feelings, he argued, are brought about by the topic of the 
sermon and the style of Mohamed Hassan. In the YouTube except, Mohammed 
Hassan speaks in an impassioned voice about death and the Day o f Judgment,
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reciting Qur'anic verses that feature those themes. The weeping of those gathered 
in the mosque is another salient acoustic aspect in the YouTube video. In the 
following, I focus on the patterns of religious practice that Hirschkind (2012) is 
able to identify, while in the following chapter (Chapter 5), I revisit Hirschkind's 
(2012) study to reflect on the distinctions between this genre of fear-inspiring 
sermon by Mohamed Hassan and the sermons of the three televangelists.
One religious practice Hirschkind (2012) identifies is users' offering prayers 
for and praise of Mohamed Hassan, which he argues, is a simulation o f an 
“offline” practice in which the audiences in mosques show their devotion by 
uttering prayers and in response to the aesthetic affect brought about by the pious 
speech of the preacher. Another observation Hirschkind (2012) makes is that 
norms of polite interaction are kept in the YouTube comments, typical o f “pious 
exhortation”; he remarks “questions asked are almost never left unanswered and 
are often treated with great solicitude and generosity” (ibid. p. 10). Moreover, 
many users who link to Hassan's segment have on their personal pages video clips 
from other genres aimed at emotional exhortation (p. 12); for instance, there is a 
YouTube excerpt entitled “The Tape that Made the Scientists Cry” which features 
images of space taken by the Hubble Telescope. By presenting these examples, 
Hirschkind has shown how some YouTube excerpts have become a space for 
experiencing aesthetic/devotional effects.
Another study on online religious practice is Becker (2011) who examined 
how sacred spaces are constructed in online forums and chat rooms by salafiyya 
Muslims in Germany and Netherlands. Becker (2011) defines salafiyya as a
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revivalist trend within Islam that attempts to “purify religious practices from 
corruption and heretical innovations (bida*) by referring to the revelation, the 
Qur'an and the Sunna, which are both understood to be essentially pure and to 
carry information over the perfect model of a Muslim life (ibid. p. 1188)”. As 
Becker (2011, 1187) states, salafiyya has played an important role within Muslim 
life in Germany and the Netherlands since the 1990s and their members have 
achieved visibility in public discussions about integration, Islamism and terrorism; 
and national security. Becker delineates common practices and strategies used by 
salafiyya Muslim members to construct a sacred place. One practice is making 
dua, prayers to fellow members, invoking God to intervene in a situation or give 
his blessings. Giving religious advice (or in Arabic nasiha) is another strategy used 
to create an Islamic space and discipline the discussion among its members; in one 
forum, for instance, one user has given religious advice, which ensures what 
Becker (2011:1191) terms the “Islamicity” o f the environment: “people, please, 
either talk good or remain silent. Silence is effortless worship” (ibid.). Other 
strategies used by salafiyya members include using names which draw on the 
tradition of salafiyya, for example, ahl al-sunna wal-jamaa (followers of the 
Prophet's creed and the community and Qur'an wa sunna (Qur'an and Prophet's 
legacy). In addition, sacred symbols are used to create an Islamic space, for 
instance, through icons of the Qur'an, mosques and female and male Muslim 
figures in devout positions, for instance praying or reading the Qur'an.
Thus, we can conclude that the Internet and Web 2.0 affordances have 
shaped the religious sphere online. First, as a site of religious and political 
expression, the Internet has widened the scope of expression and participation, to
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include more users/citizens (e.g. Mosemghvdlishvili and Jansz, 2013); this relates 
to earlier remarks made in this study about the fragmentation of religious authority.
Another important outcome of the interaction between religion and new 
media is the emergence of new forms and genres for religious mediation including 
Second Life, where users can choose to be avatars, and the stand-up comedy genre 
in which Muslims are able to express their views, for instance, on the 
misrepresentation of Islam (van Zoonen et al 2010).
Religious practice- in addition- can be “modified” on the Internet. Two 
aspects emerge that can differentiate between religious practice online and offline, 
namely the “flexibility” of users to do religious practice online (for example, by 
choosing when to listen to a YouTube sermon) and the emergence of novel forms 
of religious expression (for example, choosing to be a “ghost” while praying).
Thus, an important layer of context that surrounds the phenomenon of 
televangelism is the rise of digital religion, with its novel forms of expressions and 
hybrid religious practices. This layer o f context appears to have influenced the 
most the televangelist Baba Ali. In the following chapters, I will demonstrate that 
Ali's YouTube sermons feed into “vernacular creativity” taking the term to mean 
"creative practices that emerge from non-elite, specific everyday contexts" (Light 
et al 2012:433). This shows for example in his use of novel forms of 
preaching/expression such as creating a dialogue with an imagined viewer about 
Islam and its misrepresentation in mass media. In the following section, I seek to 
obtain an understanding of how the selected televangelists have managed to create
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their own online spaces and the role of their fans in popularizing their discourses, 
and granting them more visibility.
4.4. Televangelists online: Media use and practices
One important aspect of televangelists' popularity is their visibility in 
cyberspace. Besides their websites, their sermons are widely mediated on YouTube 
and are linked to in their Fan pages on Facebook. In the following, I will provide 
examples o f the online spaces that the three televangelists use; then I will identify 
practices related to the reception o f televangelists' spaces. I draw on these online 
spaces, again, in Chapter 6 as I examine the self-presentation strategies of the three 
televangelists.
4.4.1. Use of new media by Yusuf Estes and his fans
Yusuf Estes draws on many online platforms, including Facebook. One of 
Estes' websites is http:f/yusulestes.com/ which introduces biographical information 
about Estes and has an article about his conversion story; conversion appears to be 
a predominant element in Estes' self-representation which I will explore further in 
Chapter 6. Another website http ://w w w. i slam news room .com/ posts general articles 
about Islam including “pilgrimage”, “the scientific proofs” of the Qur'an and has 
video excerpts for Estes.
Yusuf Estes is also visible on Facebook. He has two Facebook pages: one 
links to the website of his channel “Guide US TV” and has about 300, 000
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subscribers; the other links to his website http://www.islamnewsroom.com/ and has 
about 500,000 subscribers. Both pages advertise Yusuf Estes' forthcoming events 
and news and link to articles posted on his website or YouTube excerpts for him, 
again showing the importance of convergence (linking to other related websites) in 
maintaining the visibility of online spaces (by the three televangelists).
To illustrate, one of the posts on Estes' Facebook page is a YouTube video 
featuring him and a non-Muslim woman, declaring her belief in Islam. Another 
post links to an article published in Islam Newsroom, one website he owns, about 
Stephen Hawking, the English scientist and cosmologist who has helped 
popularize science and has numerous publications on the origins of the universe 
(e.g. Hawking 1988; and 2010). The post about Stephen Hawking that is about 
space, science and Islam is an example of the hybridity of televangelists' 
discourses, which I will further explore in Chapter 8 o f the study. The article refers 
to a YouTube video by Hawking in which he argues that the universe is expanding. 
Interestingly, the article links Hawking's statement to a Qur'anic reference that 
appears to communicate the same meaning about the expansion of the universe. 
The article claims:
Example 4.1.
Until the 1920s, everyone thought the universe was essentially unchanging 
in time. Then it was discovered that the universe was expanding.
It was recently discovered the universe is expanding.
“And it is Allah Who has constructed the heaven with power and certainly, it 
is Allah Who is steadily expanding it. "
- Qur'an, chapter 51, verse 47
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Distant galaxies were moving away from us. This meant they must have 
been closer together in the past. If we extrapolate back, we find we must 
have all been on top of each other about 15 billion years ago. This was the 
Big Bang, the beginning of the universe.
“Don't the unbelievers see the heavens and earth were all jo ined together 
(as one creation) BEFORE we split them apart? 
Allah made every living thing from water. Won"t they ever believe? ” 
- Qur'an, chapter 21, verse 30
In the above example published on Yusuf Estes' website, comparisons are 
made between Qur'anic allusions to heaven's expansion and the prevailing 
cosmological theories such as the expansion of the universe. The article ends on a 
note that “our future is in space”, supposedly encouraging cosmological inquiry. 
This, however, is in contradiction to the preface to the article, which rather shuts 
down exploration since the Qur'an -as the preface put it- provided us with the 
answers:
Stephen Hawking, famous scientist gives lectures on universe and creation, 
while looking for answers to his questions. 
But we already know the answers (in the) Qur'an. Allah created a single 
thing and then "expanded it" and it is still "expanding" today. Allah brought 
EVERYTHING OUT OF NOTHING.
YES! Hawking said, "Universe created itself out of NOTHING"
WHAT? HOW?
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His understanding (or lack of it) makes anyone wonder why these genius 
intellectuals still refuse to accept the truth of Islam that came 1,400 years 
ago in Qur'an?
Amazing video proves scientists are forced to admit facts we know in 
Qur'an today.
In the above example, scientists referred to as “these genius intellectuals” 
are-fallaciously- represented as being at odds with Islam. This shows in the 
implied predication “still refuse...Islam” and “forced to admit” in which 
“scientists”-referred to in generic terms- are represented as denying the truth and 
antagonistic to Islam, creating a false dichotomy between Islam and scientific 
inquiry. In fact, this is not the only example of logical leaps or fallacies in Estes' 
discourse. As I will demonstrate in the following analytical chapters (Chapter 7 
and Chapter 8), Estes draws on many other fallacies and manipulative devices such 
as the conflation between past and present and the fallacious homogenization of 
the West, represented as an entity attacking Islam/Muslims.
In terms of the importance of Estes' online spaces, we can observe that it is 
a space for interactivity (see below). The large number o f users on Yusuf Estes’s 
Facebook pages invites an examination of the practices that surround the 
consumption of Estes' updates and posts. One common practice is the devotional 
expression of glorification of God and giving prayers for Yusuf Estes. For instance, 
on the topic about the conversion of a girl from Texas to Islam, recurrent 
comments are “Mashallah” and “Allahu Akbar”, phrases that are used as a
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reminder of God's glory and will. One user has written “Mashallah, Allah Akbar”; 
followed by an emoticon, a heart symbol.
Example 4.2.
Timo Dx 5 R  Mashallah, Allah Akbar ^
Another practice featured on users' comments is tagging other Facebook 
pages to advertise them. For instance, on the topic of Stephen Hawking"s 
statement on universe expansion, one user has commented:
Example 4.3.
we don't need that proof as much they do, why don't you give him this 
message ? you can reach people like this better than us. Just like Mission 
Dawah with Snoop Dogg :), may allah bless you our sheikh 
Like (8) 29 August at 20:12
While the first sentence “we don"t...than us” is presumably addressed to Yusuf 
Estes who can, from the perspective of the commenter, invite non-believers to 
Islam, the second sentence sounds like an advertisement in which the user requests 
the reader to “like” two Facebook pages. One Facebook page is “Snoop Dogg”, an 
American rapper, singer-songwriter (who converted to Islam); the other is 
“Mission Dawah”45 aimed -according to its website- at “mobilising a network of 
duaat across the world to convey the message of Islam”.
45 Link to Mission Dawah: https://www.racebook.com/MissionDawah7rref-ts Last accessed: 11th June 
2015.
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Another example of users advertising their Facebook pages can be found below; 
the user “Forsan Al-Islam” (literally meaning, the knight o f Islam) also asks 
readers to “like” his/her Facebook page:
Example 4.4.
Assalamu Alikum ( Hello ) ,  my brothers and sisters, with your permission, 
help me and click on the Like in Islamic page „ and if you are a Muslim and 
you love Islam and want to spread Islam among the people ? if Press Like / 
Thank you Peace AA
In the above example, the user drew on the advertisement genre through using the 
directives “help me” and “click on” and the hypothetical statement/question “ if 
you are...people” that is common in advertisements (e.g. see Myers, 2010, p. 82 
on the use of questions in advertisements). Clicking the link the user provided 
leads to a Facebook page with a profile picture of a Sheikh kissing the Qur'an; the 
cover photo is an iconic image of Venice; the moon falls down the sky as the river 
glitters, the use of color and icons reveal that aestheticization appears to be a 
salient aspect o f the Facebook page (see Figure 3).
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Figure 4.4. One user publicizing his Facebook page on Yusuf Estes' Facebook page
As the above figure illustrates, an Islamic space is created through the icon 
of an old man kissing the Qur'an, reminds us of studies discussed earlier (e.g. 
Hutchings, 2011 and Becker, 2011) on the creation of sacred space through the use 
of icons, images and names. An important point in the above-mentioned example 
is the use of Estes' Facebook page as a space to get more “ likes” to other Facebook 
pages.
Another observation that applies to the online spaces of the three 
televangelists is that their fans have an active role in extending their visibility and 
popularity. In Google play, for example, one user has created an “unofficial” 
Android application to allow users to download excerpts of Estes' sermons on their 
mobile phones.
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The application has 155 reviews on Google Play, including a comment by 
Estes himself mentioning that he likes the application. Most of the comments are 
an expression of devotion (e.g. glorifying God and giving prayers to the developer 
o f the application). A few comments, however, are suggestions which indicate that 
some Muslims are imagining a (global) Muslim community.
Example 4.5.
A Google User- 5 October 2012
Mashallah This is the BEST app. I just wish that you could actually see the 
shiekh while talking becos it does get tiring just staring at a black box with 
a "Pause" button. I'd prefer watching him (looking at him) But alhamdulilah 
i am an 11 yr old sister & this has TOTALLY gained my knowledge in Islam. 
Plus: I love the acccent mashallah shiekh !!!
Another reviewer points out:
Example 4.6.
A Google User 24 November 2012
Ma Sha Allah Realy This App Is Very Use Full And It Will More Better If U 
can Ad IMore Option To share It To Any Network May Allah Bless U All 
Aameen
The above two comments suggests an appeal to a wider community of faith 
through the act of praying (i.e. May Allah bless U All) and through the recurrent 
practice of thanking and glorifying God (e.g. “Mashallah” and “alhamduallah”). 
This seems in line with research (e.g. El Nawawy and Khamis, 2009; Mandaville 
2001a) that has pointed out that the Internet has enabled users to imagine or re-
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imagine an umma, a global Muslim community. As is the case with Yusuf Estes, 
new media has helped popularize Hamza Yusufs discourse.
4.4.2. Use of new media by Hamza Yusuf and his fans
Like Yusuf Estes, Hamza Yusuf has many online spaces, including his 
websites and his fan pages on Facebook. His website sandala.org includes the 
biography of Hamza Yusuf and a multi-media section that has audio files of 
sermons by Yusuf, news and events section that announces Hamza Yusuf 
forthcoming events and updates (e.g. new application offering free access to his 
sermons on mobiles). The web site also has a link to Hamza Yusufs online store 
where users can buy his books and DVDS. This relates to an earlier discussion on 
commercialization being a characteristic feature of televangelism (Chapter 2).
The website also links to a blog which has some sermon notes and articles 
for Hamza Yusuf. Some articles touch upon topics Hamza Yusuf has previously 
discussed in his sermons; for instance, in one article “Ten Years Later: Reflections 
on my Post 9-11 Interview with Richard Scheinin in the San Jose Mercury”, 
Hamza Yusuf argues that criticism of U.S. policies does not imply sympathy for 
terrorists and that “almost all (Muslims) are disgusted to see the devastation 
unjustly wrought in Islam"s name”46.
46 https://www.sandala.or&/blou/ten-vears-later-reflections-on-my-post-<>-l 1 -interview-w ith-ricliard- 
scheinin-in-thc-san-iose-mercury- Last accessed: 10th August 2015.
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Besides his website, Hamza Yusuf has an “official” Facebook page and 
other Facebook pages created by his fans (see Figure 4 of his official Facebook 
page).
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Figure 4.5. The “official” Facebook page of Hamza Yusuf
The Facebook page links to his website Sandala.org; in his profile picture, 
he poses, as he smiles, facing the viewer; the “cover page” is an image of the sea, 
the mountain, and the sky, which seem to evoke tranquility and spirituality.
Moreover, he has two other fan pages on Facebook; “Shaykh Hamza Yusuf 
in Malaysia” which re-mediates YouTube sermons by Hamza Yusuf and/or follow 
Yusuf events and updates (e.g. his visit to Malaysia held from 28th August to 4th
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September 2014) and “Hamza Yusuf, Birmingham Wants You”47 that rather has a 
cause: “to bring this great scholar to us Muslims in the UK” and is dedicated to 
him and “all those who have benefited from Shaykh Hamza Y usuf’. It is 
interesting to note that while the Facebook page “Birmingham Wants You” carries 
the name of Hamza Yusuf, it posts quotations by other preachers and scholars. One 
post, for example, is a poem by Rumi:
Example 4.7.
Shaykh Hamza Yusuf- Birmingham Wants You
Your calling of my name is My reply 
Your longing for Me is My message to you.
All your attempts to reach Me
Are in reality My attempts to reach you.
Your fear and love is a noose to catch Me.
In the silence surrounding every call of'A llah' 




Last accessed: 6th June 2015
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The use o f a quotation by Rumi, the famous Sufi poet, indicates that to some users, 
Hamza Yusuf relates to spirituality and Sufism. This relates to the theoretical 
framework of “space-time” distanciation discussed earlier (2.3. Media power) in 
which media outputs can be taken up and appropriated differently by different 
users or groups of people (p.30-33). In other words, the fan page of Yusuf or its 
administrator has actively engaged in attributing the dimension of spirituality to 
Hamza Yusuf through relating him to Rumi.
Blogspots are another space used by Hamza Yusufs fans. One blogger, 
Noora Deen, for instance, has dedicated a blog for Hamza Yusuf. The banner o f her 
blog reads “How my sister and I rediscovered the traditional Islamic Knowledge 
our forefathers used to teach thanks to the lectures and writings of Shaykh Hamza 
Yusuf and how this journey changed our lives”. In her first post to the blog, 
published in December 26, 2012, Noora Deen explains why she has started this 
blog:
Example 4.8.
In this blog I will introduce you to Mauritania (my home land) and speak to 
you about people who share inspirational verses of the Kuran, Hadiths and 
stories of the Sunnah and swap Hamza Yusuf lectures in order to keep trying 
to better themselves and be closer to Allah Almighty. I will also speak about 
the encounters I have had with many muslims, muslims to be and non- 
muslims who have changed my life, if my journey carries any interest for 
you please feel welcome to join and to share with me your thoughts.
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A remarkable aspect in the above example is that the user imagines a global 
audience not only of Muslims but also of non-Muslims, i.e. “I will speak about the 
encounters I have had with many Muslims... and non-Muslims who have changed 
my life”. This relates to the conceptualization of the umma discussed earlier (see
3.6.1. The meanings of umma) which in one of its meanings is not enclosed upon 
the Muslim communities but refers to humanity by large, as can be seen in the 
religious pluralism of Medina that encompassed not only Jews and Muslims but 
also non-believers. As the analytical chapters will further demonstrate, each of the 
three televangelists creates a distinct representation of the Muslim community or 
the umma.
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Figure 4.6. One blogger, Noora Deen, from Mauritania, dedicates her blog to 
Hamza Yusuf
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In her blog, Noora Deen links to Hamza Yusuf's blog and another blog 
entitled “Shaykhy notes”48 (i.e. the notes of my preacher) which publishes excerpts 
for Muslim preachers; the user “Arfan Shah”, from the United Kingdom, 
introduces his blog as a “unique blog that features videos and notes given by top 
traditional Muslim scholars”. In the following, I move on to address the use o f new 
media by Baba Ali.
4.4.3. Use of new media by Baba Ali
Like Hamza Yusuf and Yusuf Estes, Baba Ali uses new media including 
Facebook and YouTube to maintain an online visibility. His Facebook page has 
19,689 likes and defines Baba Ali as an “artist” and “arguably ...the Muslim 
world's first Internet celebrity with his edgy video blogs, which has been watched 
by millions world wide”. It links to his website Half Our Deen, a dating website he 
created to help Muslims find their partners. Baba Ali's YouTube channel “Umma 
films” is another important medium; his YouTube channel has up to date 74,251 
subscribers and 15,241,802 views.
Characteristic of his Facebook page is the use of graphics and images which 
relates to aestheticisation, as a feature of infotainment. In the figure below, 
broadcast on 5th September 2013, advice about marriage is given where a man and 
a woman stand on one side of a road. The comment on the picture serves as an
48 http://sheikhynotes.bloaspot.co.uk/ Last accessed 6th June 2015.
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"anchorage’" allowing the reader to “choose between what could be a confusing 
number of possible denotative meanings” (Rose 2007: 87), i.e. an advice to 
married couples on the importance of “being together”. An interesting feature of 
the image is that it carries the logo of Baba All’s dating website, “Half Our Deen” 
which is being linked to in the comment section on the right hand side.
Figure 4.7. Marriage advice on the Facebook page of Baba Ali, linking to Baba 
Ali’s dating websites
Another online space of Baba Ali is a website for acting and stand-up 
comedy, http://alistandup.conF; through which Baba Ali presents himself as “a 
stand-up comedian” and advertises his coming “tour dates”.
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Interestingly, Baba Ali has a page on “kick-starter”, the crowd-funding 
platform, in which Ali, together with another actor, Omar Regan, raise funds to 
establish “Halal y wood” movies that aim to educate “the masses about Islam”. 
The web page features a trailer by Baba Ali and Omar Morgan entitled “American 
Sharia” a movie that will be produced in 2015. The brief plot summary of 
“American Sharia” on IMDB49 suggests that the movie takes place against a 
background of profding every Muslim as “a terrorist”. On kick-starter, the project 
has secured 122, 102 thousand dollar out of a target of 115,000.
"A M E R IC A N  S H A R IA "
by Oftur
I $122,102SX*HOMctfS1i&.90oa»lo
a n r n m i u i r -
The First Ever Halal Comedy/Action Feature Film of it's kind 
Movies that Represent Muslims Worldwide Stories by us 
everyone can enjoyl
Figure 4.8. The trailer of “American Sharia” on Kick Starter, securing $122,102 
4.5. Conclusion
In this chapter, I have sought to gain an understanding of the dynamics of 
religion online and what changes occur to religious understanding and practice
h ttp ://w vvw Jm dh .com /title /tt3889450 /p lo tsum m aiy7ref ^ t t  ov p i L ast accessed: 6 th June 2015
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when it meets new media. One aspect that I was able to demonstrate is that the 
Internet has become a scope for extending the visibility of different voices on 
religion online. I have drawn upon two up-to-date examples: the Facebook page of 
the Vatican that mirrors in its interests, its website; and the Facebook page, Jewish 
Voice for Peace that emerged as an important independent source of information 
and expression of political/religious views during the recent conflict in Gaza 
(2014).
Another important aspect that the Internet has given rise to is the creation of 
a hybrid form of religious practice where users can experience traditional aspects 
of religious rituals (e.g. praying, singing hymns in a choir) and online culture; for 
instance, users can practice online rituals in the time they choose, and can leave 
without offending the pastor.
When the Internet has widened the scope of religious expression, one aspect 
I have demonstrated is how televangelists' fans appear to play an active role in 
disseminating televangelists' discourses; this shows, for instance, in the example of 
the user creating an application for Yusuf Estes and users linking to Hamza Yusuf’s 
sermons in their blogs. As I will elaborate in Chapter 8 of the thesis, the YouTube 
comments following Baba Ali's videos demonstrate that users are actively 
engaging in interpreting and negotiating some of his views, for example, on the 
conflation between cultural practices and Islam.
Another aspect this chapter has exemplified is that the mediation of 
televangelists' sermons and updates benefits from the infrastructure of Web 2.0
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communication, convergence being one aspect of it. As Barton and Lee (2013:7) 
comment, the convergence of writing spaces in social media present “new 
opportunities for easy creation, posting, and sharing of multimodal texts such as 
sharing a video from YouTube with a self-generated written description posted on 
Facebook” (p. 7). This accounts for the fact that televangelists' followers/fans play 
an active role in their popularity, through re-mediating or re-creating their content 
or linking to them among their networks. This shows for instance, in the example 
o f a user creating an android application to further popularize Yusuf Estes' sermons 
or Noora Deen linking to another blogger from the UK who follows Yusufs 
sermons. In addition, the convergence between different media forms has helped 
televangelists “link” to their websites and online spaces; for instance, in his 
website, Hamza Yusuf has a link to his online store and Baba Ali's Facebook page 
links to his website “Half Our Deen”.
The chapter has also identified two practices related to the reception and 
consumption of televangelists’ online discourses (e.g. Facebook posts). First, some 
users seek televangelists' Facebook pages as as a devotional space, for example, to 
glorify God. Second, other users approach televangelists' Facebook pages as a 
platform for advertising their own Islamic pages on Facebook. This testifies to the 
widening of the scope of religious authority by giving individuals the opportunity 
to claim authority and speak for/to Muslims, through the use o f new media. 
Another salient aspect is the imagination of a global community o f Muslims, as 
shown in the introductory comment by the blogger Noora Deen and in the 
comments following Yusuf Estes' android application, created by one o f his fans.
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The examination of the online spaces of the selected televangelists suggests- 
in addition- that users give meanings to televangelism. To illustrate, to the 
administrator of the Facebook page “Hamza Yusuf: Birmingham Wants You”, 
Hamza Yusuf seems to be linked to the realm of spirituality. The self-presentation 
strategies of the three televangelists will be further discussed in Chapter 6 of the 
thesis. In the following chapter, I present the methodological frameworks I have 
employed in the PhD thesis.
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Chapter 5: Methodologies
This study is situated in the discipline of Critical Discourse Studies which 
explores the relationship between language, power and ideology. According to 
CDS, “language is not powerful on its own- it gains power by the use people make 
of it and by people who have access to language means and public fora” (Baker et 
al 2008: 280). Therefore, the popularity that the three televangelists have acquired 
raises an important question about the many and manifold reasons that might have 
contributed to televangelists' popularity and the discursive strategies they draw 
upon in their self-representation and Muslim identities' construction.
More specifically, this study draws on a synergy of two approaches to CDS, 
namely the Discourse Historical Approach (e.g. Wodak 2011) and the theory of 
Visual Grammar (e.g. Kress and Van Leeuwen, 1996). It is thus important at this 
point to give a brief synopsis of these two approaches. As I will explain below, the 
DHA is an approach to language analysis that pays particular attention to the socio­
political and historical contexts surrounding discourse (e.g. the situational contexts 
surrounding the speech event and the broader historical contexts of the 
discourse/phenomena in question) apart from analyzing the linguistic, pragmatic 
and rhetorical-argumentative details of text and talk (see Angouri and Wodak,
2014). The Theory of Visual Grammar focuses on examining the communicative 
potential of images and their ideological effects (see Kress and Van Leeuwen, 
1996: 12).
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The aim of this chapter is twofold: first, to justify the use o f the DHA and 
the Theory of Visual Grammar as an analytical framework and second, to explain 
the theoretical underpinnings of these two approaches. Thematically, the chapter is 
divided into three main sections. First, I will elaborate on the genre of religious 
preaching and televangelism, which will enable me to explain how the DHA, with 
its interest in the socio-historical contexts of discourse, is a suitable framework for 
examining televangelists' sermons, both as a hybrid and novel genre. Second, 
having traced the development of religious preaching, I will elaborate on the 
theoretical underpinnings of the DHA and the theory of Visual Grammar. 
Important concepts I will draw upon are "ideology", "power" and "critique". In the 
last section, I will explain the analytical categories I will employ in the analytical 
chapters o f the thesis.
5.1. The genre of religious preaching
In order to justify the choice of the DHA as a theoretical framework, it is 
important to obtain an understanding of the genre of religious preaching, its main 
characteristic features and its development, and to contextualize televangelism 
within the broad genre of religious preaching. While there have been a few studies 
that have focused on the genre of religious preaching and its development (e.g. 
Gaffney, 2004; Swartz, 1999), these studies have focused on different eras of 
Islamic histories, which gives us insights into the developments of Islamic 
religious preaching.
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Gaffney (2004) focuses on the khutba, a generic Arabic term used for the 
sermon genre. Historically speaking, the khutba goes back to the life of the Prophet 
Mohamed and has occurred on many occasions including Friday prayers, festival 
days or in response to natural phenomena such as drought or eclipse (Gaffney, 
2004). Gaffney (2004) describes the khutba as an “authoritative” genre since it was 
first limited to the caliph himself or his official representatives (ibid. p. 1). As the 
author informs us, performance (e.g. as manifest in staging and dress code) has 
been integral to the sermon. Traditionally, the sermon was staged in a distinct 
physical setting such as a grand or “cathedral” mosque “distinguished by its central 
location, extraordinary dimensions and monumental architecture” (ibid. p. 1). The 
preacher stood on a pulpit or minbar “several meters high and frequently 
impressively built and adorned” (Gaffney ibid.). There were fixed rubrics that 
accompanied the sermon, for example, the preacher gave the sermon “while 
leaning on a bow, a sword or a s taff’ (ibid. p. 2).
While Gaffney (2004) appears to focus on religious preaching in the early 
stages of Islamic history, Swartz (1999) addresses religious preaching in medieval 
Islam. The author gives particular attention to work by a twelfth century scholar 
from Baghdad named Ibn al-Jawzi; he was a prolific writer of more than a hundred 
homiletical works. The study discusses and analyzes two books for the author, 
namely Ruus al-Qawarir and Kitab al-Mudhish (ibid. p.38). The author points out 
that Ruus al-Qawarir is particularly important since it appears to have been written 
at a later stage of Ibn al-Jawzi scholarship and as such “it expresses views and 
perspectives that had been tested over many years in the public arena” (ibid. p. 39). 
This is because Ibn al-Jawzi was a prolific writer and a leading scholar of
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homiletical work and as such the author assumes that Ibn al-Jawzi's style was 
popular in the domain of preaching in twelfth century Baghdad. In fact, the book 
is intended "as manuals to be studied by those who wished to become masters of 
the art o f preaching" (ibid. p. 38); hence its relevance in throwing light on the art 
of Islamic preaching in medieval Islam. The author points out that the homily was 
a highly stylized genre that consisted of elements such as rhyme scheme, 
metaphors and figures of speech and included lines of poetry, which were 
introduced in the homily in a very structured and systematic manner (see below). 
Thus, reviewing the sub-genres of the homily gains significance, since this will 
enable us to assess the novelty of televangelism as a genre, and the relevance of 
the DHA to sermon analysis.
One sub-genre in Ibn al-Jawzi's homily is the Khutba (sermon), which 
serves as an introductory element. It starts with the “exaltation and praise of God” 
and concludes with a verse fragment from the Qur'an that matches the “khutba 's 
rhyme scheme” (ibid. pp. 41-42). Unlike the sermon in contemporary times (see 
below), a characteristic feature of the Jawzian khutba is that “it does intend 
primarily to admonish, instruct, censure or reprove”. It is “an invitation to worship 
and a celebration o f God's greatness” (ibid. p. 42). Moreover, the khutba draws 
heavily on metaphors and figures of speech (ibid.). The following excerpt from a 
Jawzian Khutba is an illustration:
Praise to God who raised aloft the heaven...who preserves them from fissure 
(futur) and deviation (fujur) and who adorns them with stars like a necklace 
(iqd)...morQ beautiful than a gilded fabric studded with pearls. He is who
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placed the earth upon turbulent waters, who established it firmly with 
mountains as a place of refuge (ibid. p.43).
The use o f figures of speech in the above excerpt, for example, the 
comparison of the beauty of stars to a necklace points to one feature Swartz (1999) 
emphasized, namely that the khutba was a stylized genre (ibid.). He remarks that 
the figures of speech in the Jawzian homily were taken “from nature or have to do 
in some way with natural phenomena” (ibid. p. 42); for example, in one piece of 
his homily, Ibn al-Jawzi speaks of spring as a time “when gardens smile like the 
smiling of the beloved when the absent lover returns” (ibid.).
The second sub-genre o f the homily is the qissa (or story) in which Ibn al- 
Jawzi relates to “events o f the past of special religious significance, particularly 
those events having to do with the lives of the prophets and the history of the 
revelation” (p. 43). Swartz (1999: 43) observes that unlike the khutba, the qissa is 
“composed in a relatively straightforward prose style, frequently interspersed with 
lines of poetry”.
Another important genre of medieval homily is waaz or admonition, which 
remains an important genre in contemporary religious discourse (see below). 
Characteristic of admonition is the use o f fear as a discursive strategy. This can be 
seen in the themes that Ibn al-Jawzi addressed which tackled “the transient nature 
o f human existence, the illusory character of material possessions and the 
emptiness of life devoted to the pursuit o f pleasure” (p. 44). Unlike other sub­
genres of the homily, the admonition includes direct address to the audience,
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through the use of formulaic expressions such as ya ikhwani (O my brothers) and 
ya nas (O people!). The fourth aspect of the homily is khawatim (conclusions) 
which represents the concluding section of the homily and “consisted of the 
recitation of verses of poetry” (p. 45).
The comparison of the Jawzian homily to contemporary Islamic preaching 
leads to a comparison of two genres of religious preaching that have gained 
visibility: waaz (admonition) and televangelism. In the following, I will review 
studies on the contemporary waaz genre (e.g. Hirschkind 2001; 2012) and compare 
it to televangelism.
A study that has explored contemporary religious preaching is Hirschkind 
(2001) who identifies the rise of the cassette sermon in Egypt since the 1970s and 
till now; it has become "one of the most widely consumed media forms among 
lower-middle and middle-class Egyptians" (ibid. p. 625). Hirschkind interviewed 
some audiences of cassette sermons as well as preachers to gain an insight into the 
characteristics o f the contemporary sermon genre. One aspect that the participants 
in the study underscore is that fear is used as a main discursive strategy in 
contemporary khutba. In the following excerpt, Hirsckind (2012) explains the role 
o f a preacher (khatib) in this genre of fear-inspiring khutba as he comments on one 
of his informants, Sheikh Subhi:
For the khatib, the challenge of enabling the listener to attain the proper 
affective disposition must be addressed in terms of rhetorical 
technique...The khatib (preacher) must shake listeners from their state of
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lassitude (fiutur), stillness (sukun) and fatigue (humud). Death is the subject 
most capable o f achieving this. What is needed, according to Subhi, are 
images of death that are “full of fear and terror, that startle and frighten 
people out of their slackness and immobility” (ibid. p. 631).
Another feature of waaz (admonition) in contemporary religious discourse 
is that it draws heavily on the use of Qur'anic recitations and Qur'anic narratives. 
To illustrate, in another study, Hirschkind (2012) analyses YouTube khutba and 
explores one sermon by the Egyptian preacher Mohamed Hassan; the sermon was 
video-recorded in a mosque and re-mediated on YouTube. True to the waaz genre, 
Hassan invokes the theme of death and Judgment and the sermon primarily 
consists of Hassan's recitation of Qur'anic verses that deal with these themes (ibid. 
p.8). I would like to juxtapose the genre of waaz and televangelists' sermons. 
While the sermons of the three televangelists examined in the study included 
Qur'anic references and allusions, they primarily touched upon topics that have 
relevance to Muslims in the West, for example, the misrepresentation of Islam in 
media and how Muslims should deal with non-Muslims. Baba Ali tackled topics 
that can squarely fall into the domain of social counseling, including marriage and 
friendship; these topics fall outside the realm of the waaz genre aimed at invoking 
fear through addressing topics such as death and the perils facing a believer on the 
Day of Judgment. As I will demonstrate in the following chapters, one aspect that 
characterizes televangelists' sermons is that they are open to many discourse topics 
on religion, society and politics (see Chapter 8). For example, in his sermon “Why 
the West needs Islam”, Yusuf Estes invokes topics and sub-topics on the
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misunderstanding of Islam, black/white racism and the presidential elections of 
2008 in the US.
Another element that differentiates televangelism from the fear-inspiring 
khutba is that in the latter, little attention is given to the visual aesthetic element. 
As Hirschkind (2012) rightly comments, the fear-inspiring sermon tends to be 
"visually quite basic”. Hirschkind cites an example o f a YouTube excerpt by the 
preacher Muhammad Hassan; the sermon “was filmed with a hand-held camera by 
a member of the mosque congregation during a Friday sermon and the image is 
jerky and at times out of focus” (ibid. p. 12). This can be juxtaposed with the 
sermons of the three televangelists in which visual aesthetics are manifest either in 
their self-representation and performance (Chapter 6) and sometimes in how these 
televangelists are represented by their audiences (Chapter 4).
Despite the apparent differences between televangelism and waaz, both are 
rather aimed at entertainment (e.g. Howell, 2008; Lotfy, 2009). As Hirschkind 
(2001) comments, "many cassette sermon listeners were engaging in the practice 
as a form of entertainment, for the pleasure of the emotional experience produced 
through audition" (ibid. p. 630).
In terms of style, televangelists also appear to be different from the 
preachers o f the waaz genre. For example, if Mohamed Hassan, the preacher 
discussed above wears a traditional garb or jilbab, the three televangelists wear- in 
many performances- modem attire: a jacket in the case o f Yusuf Estes, a suit in the 
case of Hamza Yusuf and a t-shirt in the example o f Baba Ali (see Chapter 6). In
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addition, the three televangelists use informal non-literary language. This can be 
differentiated from the highly stylized tradition of the waaz genre abundant with 
metaphors and figures of speech.
As I demonstrated in the previous chapter, the three televangelists have 
online visibility on Facebook, blogspots and websites. This has implications for the 
data selected for analysis. In exploring the self-representation strategies of the 
three televangelists, I have explored a repertoire of data that are relevant to the 
self-representation of each televangelist, including excerpts/sermons by 
televangelists on YouTube, posts on televangelists' websites and YouTube 
comments by users (see Chapter 6). For example, the observation of Estes' online 
visibility indicates that one salient aspect in his self-representation is his ability to 
convert (attract?) non-Muslims to Islam. His interest in conversion is evident not 
only in his website (where the main post is about his conversion to Islam) but also 
in some of his excerpts on YouTube in which he guides non-Muslims to utter 
shahada (the belief in Islam) (see section 6.1.4.). The observation o f Baba Ali's 
performance indicates that he represents himself as a “funny guy”. This self­
representation can be demonstrated not only in the unreal scenarios he creates in 
his sermons, for example, singing in front of airport security but also in the 
YouTube comments that follow his sermons, endorsing his identity as a comedian 
and funny guy (see 6.3.3). In other words, I have supported my observations on the 
performance of the three televangelists with as much information as possible to 
confirm the results. In doing so, I have relied on two main criteria for data 
collection: a) the representativeness o f the data collected i.e. being a salient pattern 
in the performance of the televangelist and b) where relevant, the visibility of the
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YouTube excerpts selected for analysis, judging by the number of views it has 
scored (e.g. see Angouri and Wodak, 2014: 546-548).
Having elaborated on the development of religious preaching, the 
differences between televangelism and waaz or admonition and the relevance of 
new media to televangelism, I would like to focus on the choice of the DHA and 
the theory of Visual Grammar as an analytical framework. First, the DHA with its 
multi-layered analysis of the “context” of discourse (see below) enables us to grasp 
the complexity of televangelists' sermons as a highly (hybrid) genre that weaves 
historical/religious references with contemporary topics in its fabric. This is 
because the DHA has focused on concepts such as interdiscursivity and 
intertextuality which are highly relevant to televangelists' sermons (see below). 
Second, over the past few decades, the DHA has deconstructed the practices of 
power, inclusion and exclusion (e.g. Baker el al 2008 on the representation of 
migrants; Wodak and Forchtner, 2014 on right-wing discourses in Austria as well 
as Angouri and Wodak, 2014 on the rise of the far-right in Greece and Wodak,
2015). The DHA has also focused on the question of identities' construction (e.g. 
Wodak et al 2009; Unger, 2013), hence its relevance to the topic o f the PhD thesis 
which is about Muslim televangelists' self-representation, their performance and 
their representation of Muslim identities (Wagner and Wodak, 2006; Wodak, 2011; 
2014; 2015). In fact, one contribution of the present study is that it further extends 
the application of the DHA to religious discourse which is little examined in 
Critical Discourse Studies (Chilton 2004: xii).
175
In addition to the DHA, I integrate the Framework of Visual Grammar to 
examine the performance of the three televangelists. As I pointed out above, 
performance has always been integral to the sermon genre; thus, it is worth 
clarifying this concept in the light of recent research. One of the pioneering 
scholars who put forth the concept of identity as “performance” is Goffman 
(1959). According to the author, life and social reality (e.g. how individuals 
interact in the world) can be conceived of as "a theater in which a show is staged 
on" (Messinger et al, 1975: 32). Another important scholar who popularized the 
concept of performance is Judith Butler. She drew on J. L. Austin's speech act 
theory and his differentiation between constative utterances which describe a 
situation (e.g. “It's a sunny day) and performative utterances (e.g. I name this ship 
Normandy) through which an action is performed. Butler (1990) suggests that -in a 
similar way to performing actions through uttering verbs- we “perform” identities, 
for example gender, through “a stylized set of acts”, norms and rituals (Butler, 
1990: xv).
If identity is also performance -as Erving Goffman and Judith Butler inform 
us-then it is important to examine both verbal language and the visual features 
relevant to televangelists' self-representation (e.g. Wodak, 2011; 2015). This takes 
me to the following section in which I throw light on the theoretical underpinnings 
o f the DHA and the Theory of Visual Grammar, before moving on to explain the 
analytical categories I will employ in the following chapters.
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5.2. The DHA and the Theory of Visual Grammar
The DHA and the framework of Visual Grammar fall under the umbrella of 
CDS. CDS perceives discourse (language in use) as “social practice”. The 
following quotation by Wodak and Fairclough (1997) can serve as an illustration:
CDA sees discourse-language use in speech and writing -  as a form of 
“social practice”. Describing discourse as social practice implies a 
dialectical relationship between a particular discursive event and the 
situation(s), institution(s), and social structure (s), which frame it. The 
discursive event is shaped by them but it also shapes them. That is, 
discourse is socially constitutive as well as socially conditioned- it 
constitutes situations, objects o f knowledge and the social identities o f and 
relationships between people and groups of people” (Wodak and 
Fairclough 1997: 258).
Important concepts in CDS are “ideology”, “power” and “critique”. Ideology can 
be defined as "representations o f aspects o f the world which contribute to 
establishing and maintaining relations of power, domination and exploitation" 
(Fairclough 2003: 218). Ideology is enacted through linguistic realizations, 
conveying attitudes and mental representations that shape and/or re-shape social 
practice. As Wodak and Meyer (2009) put it, ideologies “hold on to assumptions”; 
for example, gendered discourse may assume men and women speak differently 
(Harringhton et al 2008: 10). Another important concept in CDS is “power” which 
refers to "an asymmetric relationship among social actors who assume different
177
social positions" (Reisigl and Wodak, 2009: 88). One aim of CDS is to explore 
how power is legitimised (or de-legitimised) through discourse and how unequal 
power relations are produced and reproduced (Reisigl and Wodak, ibid. 88-89). 
Therefore, CDS is aimed at “critique” through “produc(ing) and convey(ing) 
critical knowledge that enables human beings to emancipate themselves from 
forms o f domination through self-reflection” (Wodak and Meyer 2009: 7).
In the present study, “critique” entails exploring how televangelists' 
sermons relate to the broader contexts in which their discourses are produced and 
re-produced (e.g. the use of new media technologies and the rise of anti-Muslim 
discourse in the West). It also entails adopting a critical approach to the 
phenomenon of televangelism by exploring: a) how the three televangelists 
legitimize their authorities, inter alia, as media celebrities (Chapter 6) and b) what 
sort of discourses (e.g. topics, themes, arguments) they produce to represent and 
construct Muslim identities (Chapter 7 to 9). It is worth noting that the DHA 
considers discourse to be a) socially constituted and socially constitutive b) related 
to a macro-topic and c) linked to argumentation (Reisigl and Wodak, 2009: 89). 
Hence, argumentation strategies or topoi are addressed in the theoretical 
framework of the DHA (see below).
Another relevant aspect o f the DHA is that it pays particular attention to the 
context of discourse. The DHA conceives of context as a multi-layered concept 
that takes into account four levels (Wodak, 2001: 67):
1- The immediate language or text-internal co-text and co-discourse
2- The intertextual and interdiscursive relationship between utterances, texts, 
genres and discourses
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3- The extralinguistic social variables and institutional frames of a specific
"context o f situation"
4- The broader sociopolitical and historical context, (in) which (the) discursive
practices are embedded and related to.
To illustrate the above, one level of context is the immediate language, which can 
include an analysis o f the use of nomination, predication, and argumentation 
strategies, among others (see below for further elaboration). The second level of 
context is the intertextual and interdiscursive relationships between texts/genres. 
Interdiscursivity indicates that discourses can be linked to discourses on other 
topics or sub-topics; intertextuality refers to the link to other texts through 
invoking a topic, an event or a main actor; for instance, discourse on climate 
change may contain discourses on finance and health and discourse on exclusion 
can possibly link to discourses on education and employment (e.g. Reisigl and 
Wodak, 2009: 90-93; Richardson and Wodak, 2009: 46). A “genre” may be 
described as “a socially ratified way of using language in connection with a 
particular type of social activity” (Fairclough 1995: 14) and a “text” may be 
characterised as “a specific and unique realization of a discourse” (Richardson and 
Wodak, 2009: 46). The third level of context is the extralinguistic 
social/institutional context; it refers to all aspects of a situation (in which the 
discursive event is embedded), for instance whether it is a formal/informal event, 
the place and date in which the speech event occurred, the recipients of discourse 
and their social and political background/context (cf. Blackledge, 2005: 18). In the 
case of televangelism, this entails an investigation of elements such as staging,
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gestures and the video-edition of the speech, which I investigate using the theory 
of Visual Grammar, hence integrating the two approaches.
In exploring the immediate language, the DHA pays attention to particular 
discursive strategies addressed in the following questions (Wodak 2001: 72):
• How are persons, objects, phenomena/events, processes and actions 
named and referred to linguistically?
• What characteristics, qualities and features are attributed to social 
actors, objects, phenomena/events and processes?
• What arguments are employed in the discourse in question?
• From what perspective are these nominations, attributions and 
arguments expressed?
• Are the respective utterances articulated overtly; are they intensified 
or mitigated?
The above questions serve as discourse analytical tools to explore the discursive 
strategies of nomination, predication, argumentation, perspectivisation, 
intensification, and mitigation. A strategy refers to “a more or less accurate and 
more or less intentional plan of practices (including discursive practices) adopted 
to achieve a particular social, political, psychological or linguistic aim” (Wodak, 
2001: 73).
In the DHA -  as in CDS broadly speaking -  discourse refers to a “semiotic” 
entity that can include verbal and visual features (e.g. Reisigl and Wodak, 2009:
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89). This gives way to the analysis of the visual features of televangelists' sermons. 
This takes me to addressing the main theoretical prisms of the theory of Visual 
Grammar.
Drawing on Systemic-Functional Linguistics, Kress and van Leeuwen 
(1996: 2) proposed that images -  in a similar way to verbal language -  can denote 
action in what they termed “visual structure”, i.e. “interpretations of experience 
and forms of social interaction”. To exemplify, in a narrative visual structure, 
participants (things/persons) are represented as being involved in an action through 
a line of directionality or “vector” linking the “Actor” (the doer of the action) to 
the “Goal” (the affected participant) (see figure 5.1. below).
Figure 5.1. Illustrating vectors or the lines of directionality
50 Source o f  the photo: h ttp ://w w w .fanpop .com /clubs/cats/im a»:es/37043536/title/aw vvw \v-how -cute-photo  
L ast accessed  6th June 2015.
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As can be seen in the above image, the Child (Actor) is hugging the cat 
(Affected Participant); the arrows represent the line of directionality or vectors in 
which the child is surrounding the cat with his arms.
Having explained the theoretical underpinnings of the DHA and the theory 
o f Visual Grammar, below I expand on the analytical categories I employ in the 
thesis.
5.2.1. Nomination and predication strategies
As I indicated earlier (Chapter 3), an important discursive strategy related to 
identities' construction is the creation of in-groups and out-groups; hence the 
relevance of nomination (how objects are named) and predication (how objects are 
described). As Reisigl and Wodak (2001: 45) assert, the way particular groups or 
persons are linguistically named can carry ideological meaning. One extreme 
example is the use of the word “nigger” to refer to blacks, which is a racist term. 
In-groups and out-groups can be constructed through explicit and implicit 
evaluative attributions of negative or positive traits (Reisigl and Wodak, 2009, p. 
95). To illustrate the above, in their study on the representation of Muslims in the 
British press, Baker et al (2013) pointed out that Muslims in British press are 
treated as a monolithic entity that is fallaciously homogenized. For instance, one 
recurrent term used in relation to Muslims is “Muslim community” prefaced by the 
definite article “the”, constructing Muslims “as a single, homogeneous mass” (ibid. 
p. 124). Moreover, the term Muslim community occurs with collocates such as 
“antagonize”, “offensive” and “upset”, which represent “the Muslim community as
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having the potential to be offended” (ibid. p. 126), negatively predicating them. 
Baker et al (2013) showed how Muslims are represented as “the Other”. Their 
findings are in line with earlier research (e.g. Richardson 2004 and 2006) which 
pointed out that the terms “Islam” and “West”; and “Muslim” and “Westerner” are 
represented as two different “cultural camps” in the British press (Richardson, 
2004, p. 113).
One question this study explores is how the categories Islam/Muslims and 
the West/Westerns are named and predicated (see Chapter 7). The focus on these 
two categories, namely Islam and West is predicated on the post 9-11 context in 
which Islam and the West are frequently homogenized and represented as antithetic 
entities (see Richardson, 2004; Baker et al 2008), hence it is important to examine 
how the three televangelists represent Islam/Muslims and West/Westerns against 
this background.
As I will elaborate in Chapter 7 and Chapter 8 of the thesis, the three 
televangelists adopt different ideological positions towards the West. While Hamza 
Yusuf, for example, fallaciously represents Islam and the West as two “different 
worlds”, he also represents them as two entities that could come closer. The 
following excerpt illustrates this. It occurs within a context of Yusufs criticism of 
George Bush's government.
Example 5.1.
They (Americans) will stand up in one voice and I believe this in my heart 
and they would condemn and reject what is happening in their name...In the 
heart of the Americans is a love of truth, a love of justice and a love of
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liberty and they believe these should be values and virtues that are promoted 
throughout the world.
In the first example, the clause “I believe this in my heart” intensifies the claim 
made by the speaker; the clause also makes “they” (Americans) a close entity 
whom the speaker has an insight into. Positive representation of Americans is 
communicated through the repetition o f the affective word “love” (he could have 
said love of truth, justice and liberty) and the use of the nouns “values” and 
“virtues”, themselves positive implicit predicates. In other words, one macro­
strategy with reference to the representation of Muslims and Americans in the 
above text seems to an intentional choice to refrain from the dichotomy of 
Us/Them.
5.2.2 Interdiscursivity, intertextuality and fields of actions
Two other questions I explore in the thesis are: a) the topics, texts and 
discourses the selected televangelists draw upon and to what effect; and b) the 
historical references (religious and non-religious) the three televangelists invoke in 
their sermons. The aim here is twofold: a) to identify the discourse topics that each 
televangelist regards as salient in his representation of Islam and Muslims and b) to 
underscore the historical eras and the religious texts each televangelist positively 
represents as part of the Muslim histories.
Analytical categories that are relevant here are “interdiscursivity”, 
“intertextuality” and “fields of actions”. Interdiscursivity indicates that discourses 
can be linked to other genres and discourses (e.g. see Reisigl and Wodak, 2009a:
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90-93). Intertextuality refers to the link to other texts through invoking a topic, an 
event or a main actor (e.g. Richardson and Wodak 2009b, p. 46). Taking an 
element from its context is de-contextualization, while inserting it into a new 
context is re-contextualization (e.g. see Reisigl and Wodak, 2009: 90). As a result 
of this process of taking an element from one context (i.e. de-contextualization) 
and inserting it into a new context (i.e. recontextualization), the re-contextualized 
elements can partly acquire new meanings (e.g. Reisigl and Wodak, 2009: 90-93 
and Richardson and Wodak, 2009b: 46). As for fields o f actions, this can be 
defined as “a segment of social reality which constitutes the frame of a discourse” 
(Reisigl and Wodak, 2009: 90). Examples of fields of action include the formation 
of public opinion and attitudes, for instance, through speeches and press releases 
(Reisigl and Wodak ibid. p. 91). In addition, by linking to new sub-topics, new 
“fields o f actions” can be created (e.g. Reisigl and Wodak, 2009: 90).
Fields o f actions are deemed relevant to televangelists' representation of 
Islam/Muslims. In Chapter 9 of the thesis, I will demonstrate that there are fields 
of actions that are specific to each televangelist. For instance, whereas Yusuf Estes 
appears to focus on proselytization, Hamza Yusuf invokes change of political 
attitudes towards Bush's policies as a field of action. As for Baba Ali, he invokes 
change of attitude in the domain of personal relationships and family. One topic he 
criticises is the conflation of culture and Islam manifest in forced marriage.
5.2.3. Argumentation strategies
Another important discursive strategy relevant to televangelists' 
representation of Islam/Muslims is argumentation. Broadly speaking, topoi or
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argumentation strategies in televangelists' sermons serve two functions: a) to 
construct a coherent representation of Islam and Muslims and b) to legitimize 
Islam/Muslims in the West. For example, one warrant employed by the three 
televangelists is that Muslims are in the West in large numbers, which leads to the 
conclusion rule that Muslims have the right to live in the West, hence employing 
numbers as topos (see below).
Since topoi is a debatable concept (e.g. Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca, 
1969 and Kienpointner 1996), in the following, I will start by defining the term, 
moving on to focus on the specific conception of topoi in the DHA.
In one broad definition, topoi are "loci", i.e. "headings under which 
arguments can be classified (Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca, 1969) or "search 
criteria for locating arguments" Kienpointner (1996: 226). From the point o f view 
of pragma-dialectics, topoi are "argumentation tactics" used to advance an 
argument over one's opponent (Van Eemeren et al 1996: 38).
There are two types o f topoi: formal and content related (e.g. Walton et al 
2008). Formal topoi represent common types of inference structures that are used 
in everyday discourse (Walton et al, 2008: 1); for instance, argument from analogy 
and cause and effect. The premise in argument from analogy is that “case Cl is 
similar to case C2”, then what is true/false in Case Cl is true false in Case C2 
(Walton et al, 2008, p. 315). An example o f argument from analogy is when we 
attempt to persuade a friend, for instance, to buy a particular brand of car in light 
of reports from other friends that this is a good car, hence employing analogy as
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the warrant leading to the conclusion rule that “if friends have reported that this car 
is good, then by analogy the car you will buy must be good” (ibid.).
In the DHA, topoi are defined as “the formal or content-related warrants or 
conclusion rules which connect the argument (s) with the conclusion, the claim” 
(Keinpointner 1996: 75). More specifically, the DHA adopts the framework put 
forth by Toulmin (2003). According to the author, a warrant “is part of an argument 
structure that enables a transition to be made from evidence or data to a conclusion 
or claim” (Charteris-Black 2014:133; Toulmin ibid. pp. 89-91). The following 
figure, adapted from Charteris-Black (2014: 137), illustrates the argumentation 
structure in the DHA:
Figure 5.2. : Topos in the DHA
Data
It takes a long time to 
get anywhere by car.
claim
Traffic congestion is a problem.
Warrant: There are so many cars on the road.
Topos of numbers: if there is too much of something, a problem will 
arise.
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To clarify the above, in putting forth an evidence that “it takes a long time to get 
anywhere by car”, the topos of numbers can be inferred as we reach the 
claim/conclusion that “traffic congestion is a problem” (Charteris-Black, 
2014:137). In other words, topoi in the DHA serve as warrants, i.e. “part of an 
argument structure that enables a transition to be made from evidence or data to the 
claim” (ibid. p. 133).
One important contribution of the DHA is that it has examined both 
content-related topoi and formal topoi. Thus, Reisigl and Wodak (2001: 72-78) 
have investigated salient discriminatory topoi used in discourses about migrants in 
Austria. For instance, the "topos of threat of racism" implies that the native 
population will not be able to cope with too many immigrants and will therefore be 
hostile to immigrants. This argument was employed by the Austrian government 
after the Second World War to prevent the re-immigration of or reparation of 
Aryanized (stolen) goods/businesses to Austrian Jews (ibid. p. 76). In addition, the 
topos of culture presumes that because the culture o f specific people are different, 
specific problems arise; the topos of abuse implies that immigrants exploit the 
welfare system or social security system of the state (ibid. p. 80). Another topos is 
“the topos o f history" which can be deconstructed as follows: “because history 
teaches that specific actions have specific consequences, one should perform or 
omit a specific action in a specific situation (allegedly) comparable with the 
historical example referred to” (Wodak 2001:76; also see Forchtner 2014 and 
Reisigl 2014). Topos of history proves to be relevant to my data and is examined in 
Chapter 9 of the thesis.
188
I cannot discuss argumentation structure without throwing light on the 
concept of “fallacy”, since it is related to the meaning-making process of the 
argumentation structure and its evaluation. Fallacies refer to “technique(s) of 
argumentation that (have) been used wrongly (abused) in such a way that it goes 
strongly against the legitimate goals of a dialogue” (Walton, 1992:77). For 
example, in order for an argument from an analogy to be valid the “two terms of an 
analogy must share the highest number of characteristics in order for the argument 
to be strong...If not the argument may default and thus prove to be fallacious” 
(Walton and Macagno, 2008: 49). This means that the context is important in 
determining whether or not a particular argument is fallacious. Walton (1992) 
argues that in an appeal to pity or argument ad misericordiam, the context o f the 
dialogue can determine if the appeal to pity is used fallaciously (p.60). For 
example, in charity causes, it is legitimate to appeal to pity and what will trigger 
action is not the appeal to pity itself but other factors such as the credibility and 
reliability of the charity organization (p. 116). Similarly, in giving excuses, appeal 
to pity can either be put forward for consideration or be rejected as fallacious (p. 
116-119).
One contribution of this PhD thesis is that it challenges one common 
assumption about religious discourse as problematic and irrational (see Davie 
2007: 53 on the secularization thesis); and extends the application of 
argumentation analysis to religious discourse. I identify the argumentation 
strategies (topoi) used to represent Islam/Muslims (and West/Western). As I will 
demonstrate in the following chapters, although the three televangelists have 
different styles, there are recurrent arguments permeating their discourse, for
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example, that Muslims are in the West in large numbers and that Muslims have 
contributed to (Western) civilization. I will clarify below with an example from my 
data by deconstructing the topos of numbers, for example, as used by Hamza
(Topos of numbers) If there is an abundance of a particular group, they can play an 
active role in the community in which they reside.
In the above figure, the topos of number is employed as a content-related warrant 
leading to the conclusion rule that since Muslims are in Europe and the US in large 
numbers, they carry responsibility to correct misconceptions about Islam (through 
assimilation with non-Muslims).
Yusuf.
Figure 5.3. Use of topos of numbers by Hamza Yusuf
claim
Muslims are in the West
in large numbers.
Muslims have a 




Another variation of the “topos of numbers”, as employed by Hamza Yusuf 
is that since Muslims are in the West in large numbers, they have the right to live 
and co-exist in the West.
While the above analytical categories focus on verbal language, as I 
mentioned above, the video-edition of the speech and the sermon as a genre give 
way to the use of visual elements. This takes me to the following sections.
5.2.4. Visual structure
One analytical concept I apply to televangelists' YouTube excerpts is “visual 
structure”, i.e. “interpretations of experience and forms of social interaction” 
(Kress and Van Leeuwen, 1996: 2). While in “narrative structure”, participants 
perform actions (see Figure 5.1.), in “analytical” structures, participants carry 
attributes rather than perform an action. A profile photo of a young girl may serve 
as an example. She will be the carrier of attributes, for example, the color of her 
hair, her pony tails and her complexion (cf. Kress and van Leeuwen, 1996: 45-87).
Other concepts that are relevant to the video-edition of televangelists' 
sermons are distance, angle and gaze. Distance refers to whether the shot is a long 
one or a close-up; a "long shot" represents people as if they are strangers; whereas 
people depicted in a "close-up shot" are shown as if they are "one of us" (Van 
Leeuwen, 2008:138). In addition, the angle through which the viewer sees the 
represented participants can reveal their power relation; while looking at someone 
from eye level signals equality, looking down on someone can indicate an
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imaginary symbolic power over that person (ibid. p. 139). In the same vein, 
participants can be represented as directly addressing the viewer with their gaze or 
can be represented as objects for our scrutiny (Van Leeuwen, 2008: 140).
5.2.5. Dress code
Another element I examine in televangelists' performance is the use of dress 
code. According to Van Leeuwen (2005: 58-61), dress code has an important social 
meaning. Adopting an anthropological view, Van Leeuwen (ibid.) compared the 
social meanings of dress codes in some religious communities in the United States 
to some of the contemporary meanings of dress code in Western societies. Whereas 
in the Mennonite community in North Carolina and Pennsylvania, young girls 
have more freedom than married women in choosing what to wear, in 
contemporary Western consumer culture, dress codes “are certain accessories that 
signify change” in which “aspects of identity” signified by clothes are not related 
to constructs such as gender and age but seem to be rather related to “personality 
traits” such as “adventurous” and “calm” (ibid. p.62). For example, the following 
advertisement is taken from the website of New Look, a fashion store popular 
among youth, in which the t-shirt is commodified as being most suitable to those 
who love adventure.
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White Love Adventure T-Shirt 
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Figure 5.4. Love Adventure T-shirt on New Look
5.2.6. Gestures
Another element I examine is the use of gestures. Krauss, Chen and 
Gottesman (2000) provide a categorization of gesture types. Motor gestures are 
“simple repetitive rhythmic movements that bear no obvious relation to the 
semantic content of the accompanying speech” (ibid.) and tend to accompany 
speech prosody. Symbolic gestures have conventionalized meanings; examples of 
symbolic gestures would be holding finger to lips indicating “be quiet” . In 
addition, deictic gestures “consist of indicative or pointing movements, typically 
formed with the index finger extended and the remaining fingers closed”. The 
meaning of a deictic gesture is to indicate the things pointed to (ibid. 263). As for 
metaphorical gestures, they are visual representation of abstract ideas and
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categories, e.g. displaying an empty palm hand may indicate "presenting a 
problem".
As I will illustrate in the following chapter, the use of gestures is a salient 
element in televangelists' performance. For example, both Hamza Yusuf and Yusuf 
Estes make use of the index finger to give emphasis to their claims and adopt the 
footing o f authority. The following image for example is a Print Screen shot from a 
YouTube video in which Yusuf Estes converts a young man to Islam. Estes 
explains -to him- what Islam means; the use of the index finger together with the 
clutching of his right hand serve to position him as a figure of authority, which acts 
as an “anchorage” to the banner that reads “Sheikh Yusuf Estes”, presenting Estes 
as a revered preacher .
Figure 5.5. Estes' footing of authority
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5.2.7. Frames
Following Goffman (1974: 10), I define frame as “principles of organization 
which govern events and our subjective involvement with them”. According to 
Riberio and Hoyle (2009), many contextualization cues can indicate change in 
frame, for example, choice of topic, voice quality and postural shifts. In Chapter 6, 
I examine an excerpt for Yusuf Estes in which he converts a young man to Islam. 
The use of frame serves to give a dramatic effect to Estes' performance (see 6.1.4. 
Estes, the proselytizer). To illustrate, in the YouTube video I will examine in 
Chapter 6 in which Estes proselytizes a young man, two frames occur in the video: 
1) Estes stands at a podium talking to a young man (among the audience) 
explaining Islam to him and 2) Estes walking down the stage towards the young 
man, hugging him as he utters his belief in Islam. The contextualization cues that 
signal the transition between frames include Estes' movement towards the audience 
accompanied by the use of music indicating the shift to new action.
5.3. Conclusion
In this chapter, I have started by situating this study in the discipline of 
Critical Discourse Studies, pointing out that the study employs a synergy of the 
DHA and the theory of Visual Grammar. The first section of the chapter elaborated 
on the genre of religious preaching and televangelism. First, I have noted 
differences between the admonition genre which focuses on death and the Day of 
Judgment and televangelists' sermons that are relevant to the everyday life of 
Muslims. Second, the sermons of the three televangelists appear to be aimed at 
visual aesthetics unlike the waaz genre that is visually basic and focus instead on
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the acoustic performance (e.g. weeping). This indicates the hybridity and 
complexity of televangelists' sermons which have become a multi-modal field. 
Moreover, the fact that the three televangelists have online visibility has 
implications for the development of the study as I draw on various data to 
investigate how the three televangelists construct their identities, including 
YouTube sermons, posts published in their online spaces and YouTube comments.
In the second section of this chapter, I discussed the relevance o f the DHA 
to televangelists' sermons as it allows for the deconstruction of the layers of 
context surrounding televangelists' sermons, including verbal language and 
performance-related elements such as dress code and staging. Using DHA as an 
analytical framework also allows for the deconstruction of other discursive (and 
rhetorical) strategies such as the construction of in-groups and out-groups, the 
discourse topics and the fields of action each televangelist creates and 
televangelists' use of religious and historical references, among other aspects. 
Related to the above is that the DHA has particularly addressed the discursive 
construction of collective identities, hence its relevance to the topic of the study. 
Following on from this explanation, I have elaborated on the main analytical 
categories I employ in analyzing televangelists' sermons and their performance. In 
the following chapter, I move on to investigate the first research question of the 
study: How do the three televangelists self-represent their identities?
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Chapter 6
Televangelists' self-representation strategies: Constructing multiple identities
One question I explore in the study is how the three televangelists self­
represent their identities. However, I cannot examine the above question without 
contextualizing it in the complexity of televangelists' sermons being a hybrid genre 
that embeds many discourses, genres and sub-genres. As a discourse genre, 
televangelists' sermons are a highly interdiscursive fabric in which televangelists in 
many ways invoke discourse topics on religion, society and politics (see Chapter 
8).
To illustrate the above, whereas politics is an anchor point for sermons by 
Hamza Yusuf, society or rather the criticism of Muslim societies is a main topic in 
Baba Ali's YouTube video-blogs. In addition, while personal narratives are featured 
in the performances of the three televangelists, it is heavily drawn upon by Yusuf 
Estes; for instance, in his sermon "Why the West needs Islam”, Estes narrates 
stories about his childhood, employing discourse topics on racism in the 1940s to 
the 1960s in the United States, which serves his discursive strategy of the positive 
representation o f US (Muslims) and the negative representation o f Them 
(Americans) (see Chapter 8). In the same vein, the three televangelists draw- in 
varied ways- on entertainment-related features such as dramatization, music and 
sound effects.
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If we use a metaphor here, a cooking one, we can compare televangelists' 
use of modes and genres to baking ingredients; the same ingredients (discursive 
and multi-modal) are drawn upon by the three televangelists; however, their 
performance and identities are different because they make use o f different clusters 
of discourses and sub-genres that create for each televangelist a distinct 
representation.
To illustrate the above, the discourse topics Hamza Yusuf addresses 
contributes to his presentation as an intellectual, taking the latter to mean “a person 
of recognized intellectual attainments who speaks out in the public arena, generally 
in ways that call established society or dominant ideologies to account in the name 
of principle or on behalf of the oppressed” (Hewitt, 2003:145). One topic he 
invokes, for instance, is the unity of Abrahamic faith (e.g. The Unity Talk, 
Washington, September 201151); he mentions that the word "merciful" (Rahman in 
Arabic) is related to the Hebrew word "Rakhm". In the same sermon, he argues 
that "Jews and the Muslims have a shared destiny as a people" and that "when the 
Jews were threatened by extinction in Andalusia, it was the Moroccans and 
Ottomans that said "come, come to us and the Jews in Morocco to this day, 
acknowledge that". Thus, he seeks to assert the unity of Muslims and Jews and to 
defy anti-semitic rhetoric by some Muslims (see KhosraviNik, 2010 on the anti- 
semitic rhetoric of Ahmadinejad). On another occasion, Yusuf argues that 
Holocaust denial undermines Islam and that "in acknowledging the pain of
51 Link to Hamza Yusufs talk: https://www.voutube.com/watch7y---LTW7Pz7N RF. Last accessed 17th 
May 2015
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others... we achieve fully our humanity"52. By positioning Muslims and Jews in 
the same community of fate, Yusuf is taking a normative position of rejecting anti- 
Muslim discourses and, equally important, anti-semitic ones (e.g. see Reisigl and 
Wodak, 2001; KhosraviNik, 2010).
Moving on to Baba Ali's performance, unlike Hamza Yusuf, he makes more 
use o f entertainment features and in part represents himself as an entrepreneur. His 
recent YouTube video-blogs start with a song that advertises a dating website he 
created “Half our Deen”; it draws its name from a religious saying "marriage is 
half our faith, deen". In a similar way to Estes and Yusuf, Ali invokes many 
discourses; for example, religious advice and social counseling/criticism. While in 
one video-blog, he warns against arrogance ("Arrogant People", broadcast January 
200753), in another video blog, he offers a comedic sketch of idiosyncrasies he sees 
during Friday praying. In a boring sermon, one character falls asleep, another 
circulates photos, and a third reads the newspaper (“Funny Things You See During 
Jummah, broadcast June 200654).
Whereas Yusuf Estes and Hamza Yusuf construct their authorities, inter alia, 
as preachers, Baba Ali frequently repeats "I am just an ordinary brother reminding 
people and reminding m yself', enacting his “ordinariness” and claiming a different 
type o f authority (see below). However, while being a different profile from
52 Link to the article: https://vvww.voutube.com/waich7v-LTW7P7-7N RE Last accessed 17th May 2015.
53 Link to the video: https://vvvvw.voutube.com/vvatch7v9fka3Lu prO Last accessed 17th May 2015.
54 Link to the video:
https://vvww.voutube.com/wateh7v-3o6kpCLDM Vg&indc.v-l&list--PL409C23L2r9031-8D3 Last accessed 
17th May 2015.
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Hamza Yusuf, for instance, he uses slang unlike Yusuf, he shares with him a call on 
an intellectual approach to Islam -yet he does not exactly specify what this entails. 
For instance, he argues that the Qur'an asks Muslims to think and reflect ("Why 
Islam", broadcast July 2007). In a similar way to Yusuf Estes and Hamza Yusuf, 
Baba Ali performs multiple identities- he is a comedian, an entrepreneur and a 
religiously-oriented speaker.
From the same perspective, we can examine Yusuf Estes' performance. In a 
similar way to Hamza Yusuf, he represents himself as a media celebrity. His 
speeches feature professional cameras capturing large theater halls and massive 
turnout of audiences. Like the other two televangelists, he seems aware of the 
importance of dress codes and gestures in staging his identities: as a preacher, 
proselytizer and media celebrity. In this way, the three televangelists draw upon the 
same modes. This can be summarized in Figure 1 below.
Figure 6.1. The modes that shape televangelists' performance
Discursive 
s t ra te g ie s  
(e. g. the topics 
they invoke)
Entertainment 
(e. g. sound 
effec ts)
Televangelis ts’
se lf -p re sen ta t io n
Drama 





(e. g. reaction  
shots
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As can be shown in the above figure, the three televangelists draw on 
multiple modes and resources. One mode they draw upon is verbal language, for 
instance, through invoking particular discourse topics and argumentation 
strategies. As I will explain in this chapter, gestures, staging and dress codes are 
integral to the process of meaning-making by each televangelist. Entertainment 
effects are used; songs and sound effects are employed in Yusuf Estes' and Baba 
Ali's programs. The video-edition of the sermon also gives rise to the use of 
camera movement techniques, as the camera pans between the audience and the 
speaker in the case of Yusuf Estes and Hamza Yusuf or the alternation between 
medium and close-up shots in the case of Baba Ali. In the following, I will explore 
how the modes, genres and sub-genres employed by the three televangelists 
contribute to representation of multi-faceted identities. I start by exploring Yusuf 
Estes' performance, moving on to Hamza Yusuf’s and Baba Ali's performances.
6.1. Yusuf Estes: A Preacher, a Media Celebrity and a Proselytizer
One characteristic aspect of Yusuf Estes' performance is his self­
representation as a preacher, a media celebrity and a proselytizer. Salient modes in 
Yusuf Estes' self-representation are dress code, staging and camera movement. In 
the following, I examine Estes' use of dress code and its functions.
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6.1.1. Estes' dress code, the preacher
As I pointed out earlier (section 5.2.5. Dress code), dress code has a social 
meaning. According to Van Leeuwen (2005: 58-61), in contemporary Western 
consumer culture the meanings of dress codes have veered away from being 
related to fixed constructs such as "age" and "gender" to becoming related to 
"personality traits" such as "adventurous" and "calm" (ibid. p.62).
The dress code o f Yusuf Estes varies from the traditional attire worn by 
religious scholars/preachers to a hybrid dress code o f modem garments (e.g. a 
jacket and/or a cap) together with jilbab  (long dress); thus creating a new form of a 
hybrid modem-traditional attire. Figure 1 below represents Yusuf Estes' dress code 
in the sermon "Islam tomorrow"55 uploaded on YouTube in January 2012 by the 
Islamic Centre in Qatar. In the sermon, Yusuf Estes wears the "power dress code" 
that has been traditionally associated with preachers and scholars (e.g. see Gaffney 
2004 on the sermon as an authoritative genre).
55 Link to Estes' sermon: https://vvww.voiniibe.com/watch7v-8H-xu.MCOoC8 Last accessed: 17th May 
2015.
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B s a m
Figure 6.2. Estes at a podium, giving a sermon
While the sermon, referred to above, could have started by the camera 
surveying the faces o f mosque attendees, what we first get is a distant shot 
showing audiences (in a typical mosque environment) sitting on the ground, 
followed by the camera panning to Estes who then occupies the screen. The aim of 
the shot is not to show individual faces of the audiences (showing their ethnic 
inclusivity, for instance, or individuating them) but rather to capture the setting 
where the event is staged. Elere is Estes standing at a podium that has Islamic 
ornaments on its front. There are audiences; all of them are men, sitting on the 
ground.
If not by virtue of the historical authority conferred upon the sermon as a 
genre as it was first limited to Caliphs and rulers (Gaffney, 2014:2), the authority
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of Estes is established through multi-modal means. Estes occupies an elevated 
position than his audience and is presented as the object of attention. If one 
examines the above sermon in terms of its "lines of directionality" or its "vectors" 
(Kress and Van Leeuwen, 1996), one can draw a line of directionality emanating 
from Estes (who is looking at his audience), and occupies the role of the Actor, 
directed at the audience, the Goal. The fact that some of the audiences are clearly 
lifting their heads up is an index that their gaze and attention are set at the speaker. 
One can read the above shot as follows: "Yusuf Estes is giving a sermon and/or his 
audiences are paying attention to him".
If, as seen above, the aim of the above shot is to present Estes as a 
"preacher", in other instances, when Estes projects the persona of a "media 
celebrity", there are reaction shots and there is a focus on individual faces as the 
camera pans between Estes and the audience. In fact, this informs us about the 
nature of televangelism and its novelty as a religious genre that draws on a variety 
of meaning-making resources including, camera movement techniques, graphic 
elements and staging. In the following section, I investigate Estes' self­
representation as a celebrity and an entertainer.
6.1.2. Estes, the celebrity
On many occasions, dress code and camera movement techniques 
contribute to Estes' representation as a celebrity. One example is his sermon, 
"Muslim issues in the West"56, where he speaks about aspects that are deemed
56 Link to the sermon: https://www.voutube.com/vvatch7v buA OuOdbL8 Last accessed 17th May 2015.
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conflicting with Islam according to some views (e.g. serving alcohol). The sermon 
starts by a sound bite in which Estes' voice is heard saying: "Islam tells us about 
right and tells us about limits". As we hear this sentence, Estes walks out of the 
stage curtain, surrounded by an aura. He walks down, raising his hand, as if 
welcoming someone; he hugs the man standing close to the podium and shakes 
hands with him. Once at the podium, we see Estes face-to-face, gesturing with his 
hands as if weighing something: "Always in Islam, if there are rights, there are 
limits to offset". This is followed by a close-up shot on individual faces pondering 
over what Estes is saying (see figures 2 and 3).
Figure 6.3. Estes appears on stage surrounded by an aura, waving to the audience
205
Figure 6.4. A reaction shot featuring two young men pondering over what Estes 
says.
As can be seen above, in a short time span, Estes is involved in a series of 
actions from moving down the stage, waving his hands to his audiences, to 
welcoming his host, which represents Yusuf Estes as an important figure, a "hero". 
Through the use of sound bites- borrowed from the domain of journalism- Estes is 
represented as a figure entitled to give concise claims about what Islam means, 
establishing his authority.
6.1.3. Estes, the en tertainer
An aspect relevant to Estes' performance is the use of entertainment 
features. On the textual level, Yusuf Estes' discourse features interesting narratives 
in which many voices are represented and characters undergo dramatic upturns.
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For instance, in his sermon "Why the west needs Islam", that is being examined in 
Chapter 8, Estes narrates a story about a white Christian woman who had negative 
views about Islam yet converted to Islam upon visiting poor villagers in Africa. 
Many voices appeared on that narrative: a tour guide who accompanied the woman 
in her visit to Africa, the villagers who offered her food, the woman who was 
astonished at the hospitality of the villagers and the voice o f Estes who animated 
the characters and gave the coda of the narrative. Moreover, the same sermon, 
"Why the West needs Islam", starts with a song, lasting approximately for three 
minutes. The song draws on religious themes, for instance, Abraham building a 
house for God in Mecca, and the birth of the Prophet Mohamed.
The song that precedes the sermon has multiple functions relevant to the 
understanding of televangelism and Estes' visual representation of Muslim 
identities. First, the song serves to add an entertainment aspect to Estes' sermon, to 
render it more appealing to some viewers, presumably youth who are most 
attracted to popular culture. Second, the song has references to religious places and 
figures, serving to construct a religious realm, invoking memories, narratives and 
feelings about Abraham who is a revered figure for most Muslims, since his 
mention in the Qur'an (e.g. see van Bruinessen, 2003 and Rosowsky, 2006 and 
Rosowsky, 2007:314 on the Qur'an as an authoritative source). As the song plays, 
however, a banner runs on the screen about the Islamic Centre where the sermon is 
held: "The Islamic Information and Services Network of Australasia is a non-profit 
organization which is dedicated to sharing sound Islamic Information and Services 
that will benefit Muslims and non-Muslims in the Australasia region" (ISSNA). We 
see images that represent services offered at ISSNA; for instance, a gym room,
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children playing sports, children sitting on the ground listening to a sermon, and a 
young woman looking for a book. The images are accompanied by moving text -in  
clear typography- presenting an anchorage to the images (e.g. see Rose, 2007: 87), 
i.e. spelling out what these images are about. For instance, the camera shows a 
group o f young men and children gathered round a bearded man as the text comes 
through in clear Tahoma-style typography "Studying" and "Learning". As such, 
while evoking religious meanings, the song interestingly draws on the 
advertisement genre. This relates to an observation I have made earlier (in Chapter 
4) on how some users approach televangelists' online spaces as a platform for 
advertising their own Islamic spaces (e.g. Facebook pages). This, again, reflects 
the impact of new media on widening the circle of those who can speak for Islam.
Another salient aspect in the song is that it offers a collective representation 
of Muslims, connoting strength, unity and harmony. There are close-up shots 
focused on weightlifting equipment. Other shots show young men playing boxing 
and karate, thereby serving to "empower" the viewer, since these sports are 
stereotypically associated with power and strength. This is shown in figure 6.4. 
below.
208
Figure 6.5. A close-up shot on the hands of the karate players
As can be seen in the above figure, one line of directionality (i.e. the vector) 
starts from the middle player, visually foregrounded by a white pad surrounding 
his arm. He is co-joined by the line of directionality of the first player, who is 
clutching his hand; both vectors are in the same direction, evoking unity and 
power. Other shots are focused on children, of white and black complexion, 
symbolizing equality in community building. The image below, for instance, 
features a young boy taking part in an excursion activity.
Figure 6.6. A child in an excursion
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Therefore, the song which precedes Estes' sermon constructs a 
representation of a Muslim community in unity and harmony. This takes us back to 
the conception of a global Muslim community in the Islamic tradition that has been 
discussed in Chapter 3 (section 3.6.1. The meanings of umma). I argue that one 
consequence o f the interaction between new media and religion is that it has made 
it possible for some users to re-imagine a (global) Muslim community. The 
following chapters will further highlight how the umma is imagined or re-imagined 
by each televangelist.
If entertainment (e.g. songs and music) is integrated in Estes' sermons, on 
other occasions, Yusuf Estes creates a media spectacle, which testifies to Kellner's 
(2003) claim on contemporary media culture as an arena for seizing massive 
audiences. This leads to the following section.
6.1.4. Estes, the proselytizer: the creation of a spectacle
On YouTube, there are many videos for Estes in which he converts non- 
Muslims to Islam. One video excerpt is interesting in many ways. First, it is 
uploaded on YouTube by different users with different titles, and has in one version 
more than one million views57 (e.g. "ISLAMIC VIDEOS Very Emotional Brother 
Converted to Islam"; and "Very Emotional Video new convert To Islam the best 
scenes Ever"). Second, the fact that the video features a young black man seems in 
line with Estes' attempt at creating a niche with African Americans. To clarify, in
57 Link to the video: https://www.voutube.com/watch?v-:LQY8naI8g3vv
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the sermon “Why the West needs Islam”, that is being examined in the study, Estes 
juxtaposes racial discrimination in the U.S. (1940s- 1960s) with racial equality 
presupposed in Islam, committing the fallacy of faulty analogy, which occurs 
“when the types of objects in the premises of an analogical argument are relevantly 
dissimilar to the object in the conclusion” (Salmon, 2012: 160). In other words, he 
fallaciously represents Islam (religion) and the West (geographical place) as two 
comparable entities in which Islam is represented as a “better” entity, hence, 
creative the discursive dichotomy of Us and Them. The video examined below - of 
Estes converting a young black man to Islam - demonstrates how Estes uses multi­
modal means (e.g. gestures, camera panning to massive audiences) to create his 
authority.
There are two "frames" in the video, taking the latter to mean "principles of 
organization which govern events and our subjective involvement in them" 
(Goffman, 1974: 10). As indicated earlier (section 5.2.7. Frames), many 
contextualization cues can signal change in a particular frame; for example, choice 
o f topic, voice quality, and postural shifts (Ribiero and Hoyle, 2009). The YouTube 
excerpt has two frames. In the first frame, Yusuf Estes, at the stage, holds a 
conversation with the young man who speaks to Estes through a microphone. In 
the second frame, Estes, moves down the stage towards the man as he leads him to 
utter his shahada or belief in God and Islam.
The first frame starts by Estes saying "they are looking for truth" then cuts 
to a close-up shot of a young man who is nodding in agreement. This is followed 
by the camera panning to audiences sitting on chairs, some have crossed their
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hands. The camera-again- cuts to Estes as he explains to the young man what Islam 
means. While raising his right hand, pointing his fingers, he says "I am gonna give 
you five words in the English language". The camera moves through faces of 
audiences and cuts back to Estes, who is now holding his left hand in front of him, 
holding his fingers and asks "Do you want those things in your life?" There is a cut 
back to the young man who utters "Yes, sir". Estes replies "I do too". He utters the 
five words he referred to earlier, this time making use of gesture to add a dramatic 
effect. For approximately nineteen seconds, he poses, clutching the fingers of his 
left hand, while moving his fingers as he repeats the words "surrender, sincerity, 
submission and peace". The index of his right hand is positioned upwards; a 
banner appears on the screen "Sheikh Yusuf Estes" (see Figure 6.7.).
Figure 6.7. Estes poses while explaining what Islam means
ISLAMIC VIDEOS Very Emotional Brother Converted to Islam Yusuf Estes
SJwikh Y tm ifB h 'S
UAVAUM l C W U  ■ ft
► 4) 1 :0 7 /0 3 0
212
As can be seen above, the use of gestures contributes to the construction of 
Estes' authority. The gesture of his hand (on the right comer of the screen) serves 
to concertize the abstract words he refers to (e.g. sincerity and peace); as his 
fingers serve to deictically refer to them. The pointing of the index finger (in an 
upward direction) -together with the banner on screen- serves to construct Estes' 
“footing of authority”, of a preacher who “expects to be believed by virtue of his 
knowledge” (Ribiero and Hoyle, 2009: 83).
A change of frame takes place as music plays, monotonous and 
melancholic; we see Estes making his way down the stage, towards the audience. 
He embraces the young man, the two men are surrounded by audiences, creating a 
spectacle; some are now standing, while holding their mobile phones taking 
photos. A change of camera angle shows that the young man is crying. Estes talks 
to the young man, off the microphone, raising the curiosity of the viewer as to 
what the two men are talking about. A high camera angle shows massive audience, 
gathered round the two men watching the spectacle. As the music stops, the man 
utters his belief in God and Prophet Mohamed; Estes embraces the young man and 
the camera pans again to massive turnout of audiences from different angles.
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Figure 6.8. Estes embracing the young man; the camera pans to massive audiences
Thus, in this performance, Estes draws on dramatization, emotionalisation 
and the creation of the spectacle. With the accompanying music, Estes, like an 
actor, is engaged in a number of acts; he moves down the podium, embraces the 
man, talks to him and touches his heart as he utters his belief in Islam. A "media 
spectacle" is created (Kellner, 2003: vii) in which audiences are seen standing, 
holding their cameras and clapping.
To summarize, in his self-representation, Estes draws on entertainment- 
related features such as songs and sound effect. In addition, like public figures, 
Estes makes use of gestures to alternate "footings"; he is once an “entertaining” 
preacher telling interesting stories (as will be further elaborated in Chapter 8) and 
once an “authoritative” preacher who claims he has the truth, drawing on the topos 
of authority which is based on the conclusion rule: “X is right or X has to be done
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or X has to be omitted because A (=an authority) says that it is right or that it has to 
be done or that it has to be omitted” (Reisigl and Wodak, 2001: 79).
If Estes represents his identity as a media celebrity, a preacher and a 
proselytizer, Hamza Yusuf constructs his persona as a public speaker, a scholar and 
an expert on Islam. This is further illustrated in the following section as I elaborate 
on Hamza Yusufs self-representation strategies.
6.2. Hamza Yusuf’s multi-faceted identities
Verbal language is one important mode through which Hamza Yusuf 
legitimizes his representation as a preacher and intellectual. The latter can be 
defined as “a person of recognized intellectual attainments who speaks out in the 
public arena, generally in ways that call established society or dominant ideologies 
to account in the name of principle or on behalf of the oppressed” (Hewitt, 2003: 
145). In the following section, I outline some of the legitimation strategies that 
permeate Yusufs discourse.
6.2.1. Discursive Strategies: From diagnosing ’’crises" to reference to travels 
to the "Muslim world"
One important discursive strategy Hamza Yusuf draws upon is his recurrent 
reference to "the Muslim world", fallaciously represented as a homogenous body 
which Yusuf has knowledge of. One example occurs at the beginning of his speech 
"Islam and the West" in which Yusuf remarks:
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Example 6.1.
When I embraced Islam at the age o f eighteen.. .1 went to the Muslim world 
and I immersed myself in another world, for many, many years and gained 
immense insight and also a modicum of knowledge of this religion and I 
continued to struggle with that, learning and acquiring more knowledge.
In the above example, Yusufs positive self-representation is communicated 
through the use of the implicit predicates “modicum” and “knowledge”. In the 
phrase, “immersed myself in another world”, Hamza Yusuf employs a metaphor in 
which Islam/Muslim world is compared to a sea or a deep container, suggesting the 
depth o f knowledge Yusuf has acquired. Through the use of the predicate 
“immense” insight, the verbs “struggled” and “continued” and the superlative form 
“more knowledge”, Yusuf positions himself as a learned scholar, obsessed with 
attaining knowledge.
Another example occurs in an interview, held with him on BBC in 2001 in 
which Yusuf represents himself as an expert on Islam. One topic the interviewer 
referred to was the war in Afghanistan. Hamza Yusuf comments:
Example 6.2.
Muslims in the Muslim world and I have lived there for ten years; I have 
gone back a few times a year; for the last several years and I have made the 
pilgrimage to Mecca several times, the Muslims really do feel that the West 
has been relentless in its attacks; that is the perception, whether it is valid or 
not, that's for people to decide but that's the perception of the man on the 
street.
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The embedded sentence in the above quotation "I have lived there...several times" 
serves to construct Yusufs authority as an expert on Islam through his pilgrimage 
and through inhabiting “the Muslim world” for ten years. As an argumentative 
scheme, the topos of authority runs as follows: "if source "a" is in a position to 
know about things in a certain subject", then what "a" asserts is true (Walton et al 
2008: 309). The use o f nomination strategies realized in the "Muslim world" 
objectifies Muslims as one monolithic entity which Hamza Yusuf has an insight 
into, hence positioning himself as an expert who can speak “on behalf o f the man 
on the street”.
Another self-legitimation strategy in Yusufs discourse is the use o f the 
rhetorical structure of problem/solution in which Yusuf consistently delineates 
problems and presents "action points" and/or attitudes and stances that audiences 
should adopt (see Chapter 7). I will illustrate this by examining his sermon 
“Changing the Tide: Islam in America”, recorded by Yusufs company Al-Hambra 
and given in 2006 in a conference in New Jersey. Yusuf starts the sermon by 
bringing forth persuasive factual claims about the representation of Islam/Muslims 
in the post 9-11 context and uses these claims to lead to his argument that Muslims 
carry a responsibility to educate non-Muslims about Islam. It is important to 
outline the rhetorical structure of Hamza Yusufs sermon, since this will enable us 
to understand how Yusuf constructs his authority. Rhetorically speaking, the 
sermon can be divided into three main moves:
1: Praise to God and prayer to the Prophet. This reminds us of the khutba
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component in the Jawzian homily aimed at glorifying God.
Example 6.3.
El salam 3alikom wa rahmatu Allah wa barakato (Peace be Upon you) 
Allahoma salli 31a saydena Mohamed wa 31a alih wa ashahih wa salam 
(Prayers to Prophet Mohamed and his followers). Allahuma la 31im lana ilia 
ma 3almtana (We have the knowledge that you taught us). Allahuma iftah 
3alina hekmatak wa anshur alina rahmatak ya za al-galal wal-ikram (Please 
God, endow us with wisdom and spread your mercy).
2: Outlining problems facing Muslims in the post 9-11 context.
Example 6.4.
It is very important for us to realize we are in a very precarious situation; 
our community is under siege, and if you don't think there is a siege going 
on, you are simply out o f touch with reality.
In the above example, two metaphors are employed from the semantic 
domain of war in which mental images of a siege and an attack are created. The 
use o f the possessive plural pronoun in “owr community” serves to place Yusuf in a 
position of authority to speak on behalf of “the Muslim community” who are 
objectified and represented as one community. While delineating the problems 
facing Muslims, Hamza Yusuf invokes sub-topics on a) Muslims are always 
defending themselves, explaining what they are not (e.g. terrorists) b) change of 
attitudes towards Islam after 9/11 and c) rise of anti-Muslim discourse in the US 
and Western Europe. Outlining "problems/crises" acts as a persuasive device to 
persuade his audiences to adopt Yusufs stance and attitudes of the important role
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his Muslim audiences can play in correcting misconceptions about Islam. It is also 
a strategy through which Yusuf self-legitimizes his representation as an intellectual 
who can diagnose and analyze social and political problems.
3: Proposing solutions- Muslims have to educate non-Muslims about Islam 
In the following example, Yusuf moves on to suggest that Muslims have a role to 
play, using the topos of history and the topos of numbers as legitimation strategy. 
Example 6.5.
We are a historical community. We are part o f a historical process. We are 
here for a purpose. We are in the United States of America in large numbers. 
And we should be utilizing that fact. We have a job to do and that job is to 
reconcile. Because we don't want a planet that disintegrates into more 
violence, into more hatred, into more human suffering. We don't want that. I 
don't want that for my children.
One claim made by Hamza Yusuf in the above example is that Muslims 
carry a responsibility to reconcile between Muslims and non-Muslims. Evidence 
used to support Yusufs claim is that: a) Muslims are in the US in large numbers 
and b) Muslim are a historical community. The latter is developed by means of a 
historical reference to trade between the ancient Chinese and Muslims. In this way, 
two content-related topoi (topos of number and topos of history) are employed by 
Hamza Yusuf in his persuasive claim that Muslims have a responsibility towards 
their wider communities. This can be illustrated in the following figure.
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Figure 6.9. Muslims have a responsibility to reconcile between Muslims and non- 
Muslims.
! Data
Muslims are in the West in 
large numbers.
Muslims are a historical 
community.
Topos of numbers: If there is an abundance of a particular group, they can play an 
active role in the community in which they reside.
Topos of history: Since Muslims had interactions with other communities in the 
past, they should have a responsibility/interactions in their wider communities at 
the present time.
It is worth noting that the rhetorical structure of problem/solution is not only 
specific to Hamza Yusuf but is also employed by Yusuf Estes and Baba Ali (see 
Chapter 8). In a similar way, the topos of numbers and the topos of history are 
employed in the sermons of the three televangelists (see chapter 9 for more 
elaboration). This suggests that particular arguments and shading of meanings are 
recurrent in the sermons of the three televangelists despite having different ages 
and different styles, as I will elaborate in the following chapters.
Muslims have a 
responsibility to reconcile between 
Muslims and non-Muslims.
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Other rhetorical strategies Hamza Yusuf uses to construct his authority is the 
recitation of Qur'anic verses and poetry in classical Arabic, the language of the 
Qur'an, showing that he is well-versed in the Islamic and Arabic rhetorical 
traditions. In his sermons, Yusuf recontextualizes religious references, for instance, 
sayings by the Prophet and/or includes references to well-known medieval Islamic 
scholars such as Abu-Hamid Al-Ghazali (A1 Gazel) and Al-Raghib al-Isfahani (e.g.
c o
see Danger o f Heedlessness, uploaded on YouTube in May 2007 ). Likewise, he 
makes references to Greek philosophers, such as Aristotle (e.g. his sermon “How 
to Read a book”), European and American intellectuals such as John Locke and 
Thomas Jefferson respectively (as in his sermon, “A message to humanity”), 
positioning himself as an intellectual who is familiar with non-Muslim intellectual 
traditions, e.g. Greek and American.
In a similar way to Yusuf Estes and Baba Ali, Hamza Yusuf straddles 
different spheres. In the following, I will further demonstrate how Hamza Yusuf 
performs multi-faceted identities as a preacher, an intellectual, and a media 
celebrity.
6.2.2. Yusuf, the preacher
In some o f his sermons, Hamza Yusuf converges towards the xvaaz genre or 
admonition. His YouTube video, “The danger o f heedlessness”, produced by his 
recording company Al-Hambra Productions is a case in point. It starts by Yusuf
58 Link to the sermon: https://www.voutube.com/watcli7v--~1eiQXZdh-Z4 Last accessed 18th May 2015.
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reciting a Qur'anic verse about heedlessness, i.e. inattentiveness to one's action, 
followed by an elaboration of the meanings of heedlessness in the Qur'an. The 
following excerpt illustrates this. It is taken from the beginning of the sermon in 
which Yusuf introduces a Qur'anic verse about heedlessness:
Example 6.6.
Allahu subhano wa tala said in the Qur'an eqtaraba lei naas hesabohom 
wahom fi ghaflatin mo3redon that people's reckonings are growing nearer 
and yet people are in heedlessness, not thinking about that, eqtaraba lei nas 
hesabohom (The Day of Judgment is coming closer). Yawm el hesab. The 
Day of Judgement. Allah subhano wa t3ala described the state o f these 
people. Wa horn fi ghafla (they are unaware). Ghafla is a word in Arabic. It 
has a lot of different meanings. Generally, whenever you have a word that 
begins with ghain (letter ghain), it has a lot o f different meanings, it has 
some kind of covering or something being hidden or veiled like ghab 
(being absent), ghafar (forgiving) and so the basic meaning of it is that 
people are in a state of heedlessness.
In the above example, Hamza Yusuf recites a Qur'anic verse that warns people 
against heedlessness. The above excerpt exemplifies a point I mentioned earlier 
(section 6.2.1) about Hamza Yusufs use of Arabic terms to contribute to his 
representation as a learned scholar who is well-versed in the Arabic language and 
the Qur'anic meanings.
The examination of the situational context (e.g. staging and dress code) 
indicates that the sermon draws on multi-modal features including the use of
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staging, dress code and camera movement. The video starts by a distant shot 
showing co-present audiences sitting on the ground listening to Yusuf- in a 
traditional mosque environment; there is a gradual zoom-in on Hamza Yusuf who 
stands at an arch, wearing a semi-traditional garb, i.e. a suit, a turban and a cloak. 
The persona that Yusuf projects-in this instance- is that of a preacher.
Figure 6.10. Dress code in Yusufs sermon “The danger of heedlessness”
In the sermon, Hamza Yusuf pursues the argument through drawing a 
comparison between animals' attentiveness and heedlessness in humans. One 
rhetorical and discursive strategy that relates to the speaker's self-representation is 
the use o f personal narratives or argument from testimony. This refers to the use of 
first-hand experience to testily that A is true or false (see Walton et al 2008: 310). 
The following examples illustrates this.
Example 6.7.
People are walking around daydreaming. I was taking my children across 
the street yesterday; it was at night and I said look, when you go across, you 
have to be completely aware because these people are sleeping, they are
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driving around, they are daydreaming, people are in an automatic pilot and 
just to prove my point, as I stepped off the curb and pedestrian things had a 
sign (gesturing with his hand) saying walk 10 9 7 6 and a car swerving 
coming around almost hit me. And this lady looks at me. She did not even 
see me. Just to prove the point. That is the state people in.
In the above example, Yusuf paints a picture of people's inattentiveness through 
many rhetorical strategies. A metaphor is used to compare people to an automatic 
pilot susceptible to go astray. The meaning is reinforced through the repetition of 
three phrases that are parallel in structure: “people are sleeping...they are driving 
around...they are daydreaming”.
If “the danger of heedlessness”, like other sermons of Yusuf converges towards 
admonition or waaz, other sermons converge towards politics. This is exemplified 
in the following section, indicating that Yusuf navigates between many discourses.
6.2.3. Hamza Yusuf, the intellectual
On other occasions, Yusuf creates a hybrid fabric of sermon and political 
rhetoric. In his sermon "Islam and the West", which is examined in detail in 
Chapter 8, Hamza Yusuf calls on the Muslim community to denounce terrorism 
which he argues is a modem phenomenon. Discourse topics Yusuf invokes are the 
contribution of the Muslims to civilization, the unity of the Abrahamic faith (Jews, 
Christians and Muslims), and the criticism of the U.S. government under George 
Bush's administration. By introducing these topics, Yusuf not only assumes the role
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of a preacher who advises the "Muslim community" but also an intellectual who 
raises questions about the unjust policies of the former president George Bush in 
the Middle East and calls for addressing the Palestinian cause; and calls for 
denouncing indiscriminate killings, “whether it is an Israeli child, Russian child, 
Palestinian child”.
Dress code is an important mode through which Yusuf stages his 
performance. Unlike the semi-traditional garb he wore in his sermon “the danger 
of heedlessness”, Hamza Yusuf wears a suit, which contributes to his self­
representation as a public speaker (figure 6.9.).
Figure 6.11 .Hamza Yusuf in "Islam and the West"
Other salient modes are color and staging. The speaker stands at a podium 
wearing a black suit, a color associated with authority and modernity; for example, 
it is the color of tuxedos and clothes of policemen (Van Leeuwen, 2011:2). In
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addition, one recurrent gesture in the speech is the pointing of the index finger to 
give emphasis to his claims. As LeBaron and Streek (2000:120) emphasize, 
gestures serve to create an anchor point for meanings, giving a vivid performance. 
Pointing the index finger is, interestingly, a gesture used by politicians in their 
performances; Barack Obama is an obvious example. This suggests the interaction 
between political rhetoric and religious discourse in the case of Yusuf, which I will 
further illustrate in Chapter 8 of the thesis.
6.2.4. Hamza Yusuf, the celebrity
As I indicated earlier, televangelists' sermons are a multi-modal field that 
employs many meaning-making resources. The video-edition of televangelists' 
sermons is a salient meaning-making resource to explore in relation to 
televangelists' self-representation.
In a similar way to Yusuf Estes (see section 6.1.4. Estes, the proselytizer: 
the creation of a spectacle), there is a focus on Yusufs ability to create a spectacle 
and seize massive audiences. In the sermon “Islam and the West”, that is examined 
in detail in the following chapters, the camera cuts to distant shots of audiences 
following Yusuf sermon in a lecture hall and through a big screen. This is shown 
in the following figure.
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Figure 6.12. The camera pans to a large turnout of audiences
While Hamza Yusuf stands at the podium saying that “we must in one voice 
condemn and completely reject the concept o f indiscriminate killings”, there is a 
change of camera angle through which we see audiences watching Yusuf on stage 
as the screen reveals his image (Figure 6.12.). This is followed by a close-up shot 
on the cameraman video-recording Yusuf on stage, highlighting the mediation of 
the event (Figure 6.13.).
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Figure 6.13. Hamza Yusuf on screen, while a cameraman is video-recording him 
on stage
As can be seen in the above image (Figure 6.13), a cameraman is featured 
video-recording Yusuf. The image is composed of three layers: the subtitling 
(foregrounded through the white/black contrast), the cameraman, and Flamza Yusuf 
who is shown through the screen and occupies a larger space in the image frame, 
foregrounding his presence. If one uses Kress and Van Leeuwen's framework 
(1996), the man who is video-recording Yusuf is involved in a “transactional” 
action; the camera man occupies the role of Actor and Yusuf occupies the role of 
the Goal: the cameraman is video-recording Yusuf. The line of directionality (the 
cameraman holding the camera) is rather dimmed by the Arabic subtitling. If we 
transform the camera man and its relation to Hamza Yusuf (on screen) into a 
linguistic form, one reading of the image can be: Hamza Yusuf is giving a sermon 
and there is a cameraman in front of him. In this way, the mediation of the event is 
highlighted.
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Another salient aspect of the video-edition of the sermon which relates to 
the self-representation of Yusuf is showing the involvement of the audience 
through reaction shots. One pattern that emerges is having close-up shots on faces, 
with a focus on young women who seem to belong to different ethnicities (e.g. 
Middle Eastern, Indian and Asian), highlighting the ethnic inclusivity of Yusufs 
audience.
Figure 6.14. A reaction shot in Yusufs sermon "Islam and the West"
* ! '}  10:32
In the above figure, the contemplative look of the young woman's face 
serves to show the importance of Yusufs claim that “Muslims have contributed to 
civilization”. In addition, the sub-titling of Yusufs sermon in Arabic indicates his 
attempt to reach to non-English speaking audiences (also see Schmidt, 2005 on 
Elamza Yusuf as a transnational figure). This points to the importance of (new) 
media such as satellite television and YouTube in granting the three televangelists 
a border-crossing popularity (see 3.5. Transnationalism and Islam). This holds true
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in the case of Baba Ali who has achieved popularity on YouTube, being a global 
medium. Unlike Estes and Yusuf, he does not speak to co-present audiences in 
theater halls or mosques but rather to virtual audiences on YouTube. The fact that 
Baba Ali mediates his sermons to a virtual audience on YouTube appears to have 
given way to a style of preaching that is different from that of Hamza Yusuf and 
Yusuf Estes in terms of playfulness and creativity.
6.3. Baba Ali’s performance
If  the authority of Hamza Yusuf and Yusuf Estes emanates from their 
representation, inter alia, as preachers or figures o f authority (e.g. Gaffney, 2014 
on the sermon), Baba Ali's authority emanates not from being different from his 
audiences but in being similar to them. He frequently reiterates he is neither a 
scholar nor a preacher (e.g. Arrogant People, Season 2):"I am not a scholar; I just 
an ordinary guy trying to remind people and remind m yself'. As a disclaimer, this 
serves to represent his ordinariness. Baba Ali's self-representation of ordinariness 
is manifest on the visual and textual levels, as I will illustrate below.
6.3.1. Baba Ali: I am an ordinary guy
Unlike Yusuf Estes and Hamza Yusuf, Baba Ali does not give his sermons in 
lecture halls but rather presents his show, while sitting at an armchair, wearing 
casual clothes. The ordinariness of his self-representation is represented as a virtue, 
an aspect he boasts about. In one of his earlier video-blogs “distractions during
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salat/praying”59" (broadcast July 2006), Baba Ali starts his video-blog by 
expressing his astonishment that he has got thirty thousand views:
Example 6.8.
Thirty thousand views (camera close-up) Thirty thousand views? That’s 
crazy hah. Are all these people watching me doing a simple show like this? 
That's just me, sitting in a chair, with the camera, and talking about the stuff 
that's going through my head. But people seem to be watching (close-up 
shot) (laughing) some people even laughing. Do you see? I don’t know why 
some people think I am a comedian. For the record, I am not a comedian, I 
am not an actor. I am just a brother with a video-camera talking about just 
random stuff.
The ordinariness of Baba Ali in the above example is discursively 
constructed through his reference to the staging, i.e. “that’s just me, sitting in a 
chair, with the camera”, and through the repetition o f the adverb “just”, i.e. “that is 
just me” and “talking about just random stu ff’, indicating that he is not different 
from his audiences. On a linguistic level, the ordinariness of his representation is 
communicated through the use of conversational language, e.g. expressions of 
personal feeling and conversational interjections (e.g. That’s crazy hah), which 
gives the impression that Baba Ali is speaking his own mind. This is a style 
different from the speeches of Hamza Yusuf or the sermons o f Yusuf Estes which
59 Link to the YouTube video:
https://www.youtube.com/watch7v--MTwh6p 1 kvR O & listPL409L23H 219Q3 ! 8D3&index 6 Last 
accessed 20th May 2015.
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are staged events where the speakers come across as having thought about and 
pondered over the topics they are discussing.
The conversational nature of Baba Ali's performance is a strategy he 
employs to involve his virtual audiences. On the linguistic level, this is achieved 
through the use of rhetorical questions (e.g. thirty thousand views?), which 
suggests a shared view of experience (Myers, 2010b: 83). In addition, "Do you 
see?" is an example of "enacting conversational interaction" (ibid. pp. 84-86) in 
which Baba Ali is engaged in a dialogue with an imagined viewer. This is further 
elaborated below.
6.3.2. Involving the audience: "You know what I talking about man"
As I explained above, one salient strategy through which Baba Ali projects 
“informality" and “ordinariness” is enacting conversational interaction. Recurrent 
phrases in his video-blogs are “you know what I am talking about man" (e.g. 
Culture Versus Islam) and “Do you know what I am saying” (e.g. Who hijacked 
my religion). On the visual level, these phrases are accompanied by extreme close- 




Figure 6.15. Baba Ali (coming closer to the camera): Do you know what I am 
saying?
Another salient involvement strategy in Baba Ali's video-blogs is the 
representation of the viewer as one voice/character. In "Distractions during 
praying", Baba Ali acts the character of an imagined viewer with whom he engages 
in a dialogue. The excerpt lasts for four minutes; in which Baba Ali engages in a 
self-mocking debate as to whether he can be labeled a comedian. Most importantly, 
at the end of the video-blog Baba Ali calls on his audiences to take part in the 
production of his videos. In the following extract, "Baba Ali 1" represents his 
persona, whereas "Baba Ali 2" is that of an imagined viewer.
Example 6.9.
Baba Ali (1): Sometimes you have to be serious.
Baba Ali (2) (frowning like a child): I don’t like you when you are
serious.
Baba Ali (1): What if I am joking around, you would not take me
seriously?
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Baba Ali (2): Fine, Okay.
Baba Ali (1): Anyway, this whole video-blog was an experiment; it was 
never meant a weekly show.
Baba Ali (2): But it is a weekly show, right?
Baba Ali (1): Kind of (.) There is only ten episodes and this is the sixth of 
the tenth, which means that we have four more left.
Baba Ali (2): What?
Baba Ali (1): Yeah. Four more left. After that I will take a break for a while. 
I have other stuff to do.
Baba Ali (2): What?
Baba Ali (1): I came to this every week. These things take time to do.
Baba Ali (2): COME ON.
Baba Ali (1): You know what? What about you try it?
Baba Ali (2): What do you mean I try it?
Baba Ali (1): How about you guys put the material together and I will do 
the show.
Baba Ali (2): Are you serious?
Baba Ali (1): Yeah. You will do the show based on what you think. The 
audience has many suggestions and comments. Yes, I read them. Sure we 
can come up with something together. You guys put the content together. I 
have the camera. I have everything. We can do it. We will broadcast it on 
YouTube. We will broadcast it on Umma Films and it will go there and you 
will get comments from everyone.
Baba Ali (2): You serious. Aren't you?
Baba Ali (1): Yeah. I am serious.
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Baba Ali (2) (touching his chin with his hands): Okay (.) mhm. Let us 
do it.
In the above example, “you” is used to address “the built-in” audience who 
-  idiosyncratically - spoke like a child (signaled by his frown and the tone of his 
voice). Towards the end of the dialogue, however, the reference is broadened to 
“you guys”, a collective reference to the audience as a group, and inclusive “we” 
that sets Baba Ali and the viewers in the same group, e.g. “sure we can come up 
with something together”.
A remarkable aspect-in the above extract- is Baba A li’s call on his audience 
to “put the content together” and take part in the production o f his videos, which 
reminds us o f Jenkins' (2006a:290) argument that YouTube is a site o f “a 
participatory culture” in which “fans and other consumers are invited to actively 
participate in the creation and circulation of new content” (p. 10).
Indeed, in what seems to be a successful call on interaction, there are 
approximately one thousand five hundred comments on his video. The comments 
vary from being suggestions as to what themes and topics Baba Ali can pick up on 
in his future video-blogs to comments on particular scenes/instances in his video to 
general comments about his performance. The latter are o f particular significance 
since they indicate the aspects of his self-representation that are commented on by 





Alhamdulillah for your channel. Just a quick note:
"You're a nutter!!"
A good one, just like the rest of use.
Example 6.11.
Merihan 2010
Omg alii u make mee laugh hysterically you are like the most funniest guy 




omg! i love this man!!!!! loool 
Example 6.13.
GeekyGirl 1011
30,000 views, now over 300,000 Mash'Allah!
Example 6.14. 
progman
Assalamualaikum, Great Job„„you're funny my brother....even without
joking, your face is funny and joyfull....and make me laugh A A...thanks 4
that
As can be seen in the above examples, the ordinariness o f Baba Ali is 
echoed by Zoe Pope above who comments that Baba Ali is a “good nutter”, “just 
like the rest of us”. In addition, the comedic aspect o f his performance and his self­
mockery is evident in the comments of the other viewers; Merihan 2000, for 
instance, perceives Ali “as funniest guy i've ever seen”.
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We cannot separate the ordinariness o f Ali's performance, from the 
linguistic expression of his followers, which is rather "conversational" (e.g. Myers 
2010; Tolson 2010). This is partly evident in the respondents' use of colloquial 
language (e.g. You are a nutter), and the use of emoticons and conversational 
abbreviations (e.g. A_A...thanks 4 that). In addition, a couple of users have picked 
up on Baba Ali's opening remark that he has thirty thousand views, updating the 
number to its actual figure, 300,000 views, echoing the cooperative exchange of 
conversational turn-taking when a listener, for instance, corrects a piece of 
information uttered by the speaker (e.g. also see Tolson, 2010: 282).
The above-examined features, i.e. the ordinariness of his appearance, the 
characterization of the audiences and the conversational nature of Baba Ali's 
linguistic performance, as well as that of his audience are, therefore, important 
strategies that have contributed to Baba Ali's self-presentation as an ordinary funny 
guy. Thus, as it is the case with Yusuf Estes and Hamza Yusuf, there are a variety 
of modes through which Baba Ali's identities are projected (e.g. discursive and 
visual). Yet while being a funny guy, he is also a social critic, a counselor and an 
entrepreneur, as I will explain below.
6.3.3. Baba Ali, projecting multi-faceted personas
In his performance, Baba Ali occupies an ambiguous role of giving social 
advice, religious advice and in some instances, explaining what Islam is about. In 
fact, he navigates between two main genres: a) hybrid social counseling/religious 
genre in which he acts out different “characters” and b) a speech genre.
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6.3.3.1. Baba Ali, giving social and personal advice
One role Baba Ali assumes for himself is that of a social critic who gives 
social and religious advice. One example is his video-blog “25,000 Muslim 
Weddings” (broadcast June 2006) in which he criticizes parents for asking for 
expensive weddings for their daughters/sons60. In the following excerpt, Baba Ali 
plays two characters, Baba Ali himself, (referred to as "Baba Ali 1") criticizing that 
some parents stipulate a fancy wedding in marriage, and an imagined character 
(also representing an imagined viewer) that is being invited to a fancy wedding 
(Baba Ali 2):
Example 6.15.
Baba Ali (1) (wearing a white t-shirt): For those who never attended one of 
those fancy weddings, let me break it down for you so that I can tell what 
you are missing.
Baba Ali (2) (wearing a suit and a tie): Imagine sitting alone at a table in a 
fancy hall, wondering where everyone is (Baba Ali seems like he is 
sweating, his hand touching his forehead), quickly learning that 6 pm on the 
invitation means 7 pm (looking at his watch), getting dressed up in an 
uncomfortable clothes, sitting in a huge hall and saying "Wow this must be 
expensive", getting free refills of soda, eating fancy food (holding a plate 
while moving his jaws), staring at the wedding program, saying salam to
60 Link to the YouTube video: https://vvww.voutubc.com/wateh7y--rH2nNlt ls5pk Last accessed 20th May 
2015.
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the people you only see at weddings, funerals and eid, playing with your 
napkin, taking pictures with the bride and groom, here is pictures by family 
and friends crying and saying goodbye (Baba Ali clapping).
By the way (2) (looking at the camera with a suit and the tie), why are you 
saying good bye, they are not dying; they are just getting married.
One important aspect in the above example is the dramatic performance of 
Baba Ali who performs the actions that is being commented on; for instance, while 
hearing “imagine sitting at a table in a fancy hall”, Baba Ali rolls his eye upwards 
to show the character's astonishment of the big fancy hall where the wedding is 
held (Figure 6.16.).
PLAYLIST I 3 / 1 0  V id e o  B lo g  # 3 : $ 2 5 ,0 0 0  M u slim  W ed d in g s!!
Figure 6 .16. Baba Ali acting out his astonishment of the big fancy hall
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Following the rhetorical structure o f problem/solution, he gives his personal 
advice as he proposes an alternative to expensive wedding ceremonies:
Example 6.16.
But there is an alternative. Try this. Google the web to find inexpensive 
wedding invitations. Well, I can really save some money. How about having 
your wedding in the best location? The masgjid (mosque). The masgiid (we 
see the photo of a mosque). You will save a group of money and what honor 
getting married at Allah subhanoho wa taalah house. Consider the time 
between Maghrib to Aisha. That is when people get on their time. Can you 
imagine the reward of having hundred people to the masgjid to pray salat. 
That is what I am talking about man. Contact your local halal restaurant and 
ask him for a deal (Baba Ali holding the phone, talking in a foreign accent) 
You Know how they say oki dop, so give me a good deal Hah, I love it I 
love it mwah". And finally, make dua (praying) to Allah Subhano wa talah 
and make it pure intention.
As in advertisements in which questions and directives are used to engage 
the audience (see Myers, 2010b: 82), Baba Ali, in an example of generic 
intertextuality, makes use o f directives and questions, as if  creating an 
advertisement: “Try this”, “Google the web”, “How about having your wedding in 
the best location?”.
An interesting aspect here that points to a feature of televangelism is that 
practical solutions are mixed up with religious motivation; the (moral) benefit of 
having a hundred people pray in the mosque is mentioned as one reason why the
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mosque is a better place for a wedding to take place. In this way, Baba Ali creates a 
hybrid discourse of the social/personal counseling genre and the sermon genre.
There are other sides to this discoursal hybridity (e.g. Fairclough, 1995a: 
88-90; Chouliaraki and Fairclough, 1999: 83; and Wodak et al 2013). One is that 
many registers are represented in the video blog; including that of a character 
calling a local restaurant and asking for a good deal in which specific slang 
expressions are used (e.g. Oki Dop) and "I love it". The use of spontaneous 
interpolations (e.g. "wow") and informal address terms (e.g. That’s what I am 
talking about man) are also used. These features- in the above extract- render it not 
only a hybrid fabric of colloquialism and religious themes but also a space for 
creativity and playfulness, as a polyphony of voices, and discursive features (e.g. 
ethnic accents; colloquial terms and religious ones) are represented. This lends 
truth to recent research on YouTube that refers to it as a site of "vernacular 
creativity" (e.g. see Burgess, 2006; 2007), i.e. "creative practices that emerge from 
non-elite, specific everyday contexts" (Light et al 2012:433).
Playfulness is - in addition - communicated through the use of cinema and 
modem vocal techniques. For instance, at the beginning of the video, the phrase 
“twenty five thousand dollars”- referring to an estimate o f wedding expenses - is 
mentioned twice: once by Baba Ali, and once by adding a “robot voice effect” in a 
slow motion, foregrounding the number “Twenty Five Thousand Dollars”. In 
addition, images are inserted in the video; for instance, as he utters his directive 
“Google the web to find inexpensive” wedding invitation; there is a cut to an 
image of wedding invitations in a pink background (Figure 6.17.)
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PLAYLIST I 3/10 Viceo Blog #3: $25,000 Muslim Weodingsll
b* 4 ')  3:44/6:08
Figure 6.17. Google the web to find inexpensive wedding invitations.
On other occasions, Baba Ali plays the role of an entrepreneur. This is explained 
below.
6.3.3.2. Baba Ali, the E ntrepreneur
Characteristic of Baba Ali's self-representation is that he positions himself 
as an entrepreneur. In his recent video-series “The Reminder Series by Baba Ali 
(Half Our Deen)”, he talks about a dating website he created that aims to help 
Muslims find their partners. Each video blog in the series starts with a short song 
that advertises the website “Half Our Deen. Com”. The song starts by a question 
“Do you want to know what makes love grow?”. This is accompanied by a
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symbolic image of flowers, in pink, growing as the lyrics continue “It is Half your 
Deen. Said the Prophet Peace Be Upon him. Half of your Deen” (see Figure 6.18.).
Figure 6.18. Advertising the website "Half Our Deen" in Baba Ali's video-series
The words Half Our Deen. Com appear on the screen in capital, in big 
letters; the background is blue with small flashing spots, indexing stars and the sky. 
The videos are aimed at giving social advice as to how a married man should deal 
with his wife and vice versa. In this way, his series "Half Our Deen" represents a 
hybrid genre of advertisement and social advice. On other occasions, the 
entrepreneurial persona of Baba Ali is constructed through his references to 
characters who would like to have projects with him. In one YouTube video, for 
instance, Baba Ali acts the character of a "cardiologist" who would like to work 
with him; the aim of the YouTube video is to criticize some "cultural" Muslims 
who do things that contradict Islam in the name of their culture, branding it 
“Islamic”.
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Relevant to the above is a blog post, published by Baba Ali, where he 
advertises one event organized by him to help Muslims create networks and 
partnerships. The blog post starts with a narrative in which Baba Ali recounts his 
story of meeting young investors who -like him-had “saved a little money but had 
nowhere to invest it”. Baba Ali describes himself in the post as “the guy with the 
idea/project” who made partnership with his friends. Baba Ali then moves to the 
aim of the post which is to sell tickets for an event “to put together a room full of 
talented people and ambitious people so they can expand their networks, build 
connections, and to connect for present or future projects”. Baba Ali ends his post 
with the claim that “I have learned that it's not always what you know but often 
time, who you know that opens doors of opportunity”. The creation of business- 
networking events by Baba Ali relates to Miller's (2004:86) remark about the rise 
of “therapeutic” religion, which “the middle classes in particular need, to placate 
their contradictions and to assist them in a social world reconfigured in terms of 
market competition”.
In the same post, Baba Ali uses the topos of numbers (24 % return profit) 
and topos of experience (i.e. life has taught me that network is important) to self­
represent himself as a successful entrepreneur. He also refers to his travels, 
positioning himself as a celebrity. This aspect is further emphasized in his “stand- 
up” comedy website61, which has a section for Baba Ali's tour dates in the UK, US, 
Canada and Australia, establishing one aspect of his identity as a “traveling 
Muslim” and “a media celebrity”.
61 Link to Baba Ali's stand up comedy website: http: //w w w. m us 1 i ni com ed i an .com/ 
Last accessed 6th June 2015.
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6.4. Conclusion
This chapter has aimed at delineating the self-representation strategies of 
the three televangelists examined in this PhD thesis. One aspect I have highlighted 
in the thesis is how the sermons of three televangelists represent a multi-modal 
field in which televangelists draw on multiple modes to represent their identities 
including verbal language, music, graphic effects and camera movement 
techniques. Rhetorical strategies used by the three televangelists include the use of 
comparison (for example, in comparing heedlessness in humans and attentiveness 
in animals) and use of argument from experience to give legitimacy to the 
speaker's claim. Most specific to Hamza Yusuf is the use of other legitimation 
strategies such as his knowledge of the Arabic language and his fallacious 
representation o f the Muslim world as inhabiting a distinct geographical boundary 
which Yusuf has knowledge of.
Another aspect that this chapter underscored is that televangelists' 
discourses are open to generic intertextuality and discoursal hybridity. Examples 
include the use of sound-bites from the domain of journalism (Yusuf Estes), 
advertisement-related features such as the use songs to advertise websites/Islamic 
serves (Yusuf Estes and Baba Ali) and the use o f rhetorical features related to 
advertisements such as the use of imperatives and rhetorical questions (Baba Ali).
Moreover, the chapter has outlined two types o f “religious celebrities”. On 
the one hand, Hamza Yusuf and Yusuf Estes represent themselves, inter alia, as 
“preachers”, a role that has meanings of respect and reverence to many/most 
Muslims (see Gaffney, 2004). On the other hand, Baba Ali represents himself as
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“ordinary guy”. His authority emanates not from being different from his 
audiences but in being similar to them. On the visual level, Baba Ali wears an 
informal attire (i.e. t-shirt) vis-a-vis the garb usually worn by Yusuf Estes or the 
suit worn by Hamza Yusuf. On the discursive level, Baba Ali's ordinariness is 
realized through the use of colloquialism, conversational interjections and informal 
address terms. To add, if the examples analyzed for Hamza Yusuf and Yusuf Estes 
feature reaction shots on individual faces, Baba Ali does not speak to co-present 
audiences. Yet, his involvement of the audience is innovative; it draws on many 
multi-modal means including close-up shots and creating dialogues with an 
imagined viewer. This is echoed in the comments on Baba Ali's YouTube videos, in 
which commenters simulate conversational turn-taking by repeating phrases that 
Baba Ali mentions. From this perspective, Baba Ali is an example of the 
emergence of “vernacular creativity” (Burgess, 2006; 2007) in the religious sphere 
as his sermons feature many clusters and fragments of discourses of slang, 
colloquialism and religious expressions (e.g. mashallah).
This chapter, thus, provide further illustration of the phenomenon of 
televangelism and its novelty. One common aspect among the three televangelists 
is that they perform multifaceted roles and inhabit many spheres; Yusuf Estes 
represents himself as a media celebrity, preacher and proselytizer. Baba Ali is a 
social counselor, an entrepreneur and a comedian. Hamza Yusuf represents himself 
as a media celebrity, a learned scholar and a public speaker. By broadening the 
discourses they navigate through, the three televangelists are apparently able to 
gain a wider circle o f audiences that are maybe attracted to contemporary media 
aesthetics (e.g. use o f music, songs and colorful images), celebrity culture,
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entrepreneurship, seeking social counseling, criticism of contemporary 
society/politics, while at the same time, getting the moral benefit of seeking 
religious advice and ethical improvement, from a religious point o f view.
Having explored the self-representation strategies of the three televangelists 
and their performance, I move on in the forthcoming chapters to analyze the 
selected sermons of each televangelist. In the following chapter, I focus on one 
important aspect in Muslim identities' construction in televangelists' sermons. I 
ask: How does each televangelist represent Islam and Muslims in the post 9-11 
context?
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Chapter 7: Islam and the West?!
This chapter marks the beginning of the second part of the empirical 
investigation o f this study in which I explore the representation of Muslims' 
identities in televangelists' sermons. I would like to reiterate here why this question 
is timely and important. Since 9-11, discourses have reverberated in which 
Muslims are imagined as the Other, a homogenized entity that is antagonistic to the 
West (e.g. see Baker et al 2013). Hence, one question that emerges is: within this 
context, what will the three televangelists instruct Muslims to do and what 
discursive representations will the three televangelists construct of Islam/Muslims? 
The question gains further significance in relation to Muslims in the West who 
have limited access to Islamic knowledge and who rely on the Internet to seek 
religious advice (Gilliat-Ray, 2010: 162). This calls for an examination of Muslim 
identities' construction in televangelists' sermons in the light of the popularity they 
have achieved and in light of their deemed influence on shaping Muslim views and 
identities.
The examination of Muslim identities' construction also has a historical 
dimension to it. As I have indicated in Chapter 3 (3.6.1. The meanings o f umma), 
inherent in the Muslim tradition is the imagination of an umma. The later can refer 
to a Muslim community in which Muslims, Jews and non-believers are in 
solidarity, as was the multi-cultural umma o f Medina. The term can also be used to 
refer to a (global) Muslim community, imagined to be innately bound and in 
solidarity. The study, thus, examines how the contemporary representations of the
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Muslim community in televangelists' sermons might compare/juxtapose with 
meanings o f the umma in the classical tradition.
I would like to point out how this chapter relates to the 
previous/forthcoming chapters. In the previous chapter, I have explored the-self- 
representation strategies and the performance of the three televangelists. In this 
chapter, I focus on the representation of Islam/Muslims and the West being 
important social actors in televangelists' sermons; as I indicated earlier, the three 
televangelists appear to be addressing not only Muslims but also non-Muslims, 
attempting to bring about change of attitudes in the public perception of Islam. The 
examination of the intended audience in televangelists' sermons, and their 
representation of Islam/Muslims leads to the examination of analytical categories 
such as the use o f pronouns, metonymy, nomination, predication and 
argumentation strategies, which I found to be relevant to televangelists' 
construction of in-groups and out-groups. The representation of Muslim identities 
is further examined in Chapter 8 and Chapter 9 of the study. In Chapter 8 ,1 explore 
the discourse topics invoked by each televangelist and how these topics contribute 
to constructing distinct representations of Islam/Muslims. In Chapter 9 , 1 move on 
to investigate how history is employed by each televangelist and to what effects. 
The focus on these elements, again, points to the discursive hybridity of 
televangelists' sermons that include many discourse topics and different self­
representation strategies.
Thematically speaking, this chapter follows the same organizational pattern. 
In the first three consecutive sections, I start in each section by providing 
contextual information about the sermon (where and when it is given) which can
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contribute to its interpretation. I then examine the salient discursive strategies used 
in the sermons of each televangelist in relation to the representation of 
Islam/Muslims and in relation to the construction of in-groups and out-groups. In 
the following, I explore Yusuf Estes’ sermon “why the West needs Islam?”.
7.1. Yusuf Estes: Why the West needs Islam?
The sermon “Why the West needs Islam” was given in Australia on the 
15th June 2008 in IISNA (Islam Information and Services Network o f Australasia), 
a non-government organization, “dedicated to sharing sound Islamic information 
and services that will benefit Muslims and Non-Muslims in Australia”62. Using the
ATproblem/solution rhetorical mode , Estes starts by outlining issues which he 
presented as problems in the West (e.g. racial and gender inequality) putting forth 
the claim that Islam can solve many problems “if the West understands what Islam 
is really about”. Another claim made by Estes is that not only the West needs Islam 
but also Muslims.
A salient feature of the sermons is that many social actors are represented 
including Yusuf Estes, predominantly referred to through the pronoun “I”, 
“people”, “people in the West”, “Muslims”, “Christians” and historical figures 
such as Malcolm X and Martin Luther King; I elaborate on the representation of
62 Link to the organization: h t tp :  m y cen t re.org.a u / a b o u t /  Last accessed: 6th June 2015.
63 As its name suggests, in the problem/solution organizational mode, a problem is introduced and a 
solution is presented; there are four basic elements o f  the problem/solution organizational mode: 
situation, problem, solution, and evaluation (e.g. see Hoey 2001: 123-126).
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historical figures such as Malcolm X in Chapter 8 in which I analyze the main 
discourse topics in the sermon.
One macro-strategy in Estes' sermon is the creation of a discursive 
dichotomy between Us and Them. To gain further insights into the creation of in­
groups and out-groups in Estes' sermon, I will investigate: a) who are the audience 
addressed and included in the sermon and to what effects and b) the nomination, 
predication and argumentation strategies used in representing Islam/Muslims. 
Exploring the above-mentioned aspects will help us identify the mechanisms of the 
creation of in-groups and out-groups in Estes' sermon and their rhetorical and 
linguistic realizations.
7.1.1. Use of pronouns
An aspect relevant to the sermons o f the three televangelists is that they 
align themselves to other groups, other than Muslims. Yusuf Estes' orientation 
towards non-Muslims shows at the beginning o f the sermon; he raises his hands 
towards his forehead for 26 seconds; he utters as he smiles: “Is there anybody here 
who is a Muslim? Who are the Muslims here? If the angels came right now and 
wanna know who is the Muslim, who would raise their hands? Let us see (turns his 
head to face more audience) hello?' (See figure 7.1. below).
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W n y  tra W g s *  N e ^ t f s  t s i a m  Y u s u t  S ss te a i
Figure 7.1. Estes gestures to his audiences: "who are the Muslims here"?
Thereafter, Estes makes use of deictic and generic expressions to refer to 
the West and Islam. Initially, Estes uses the generic reference “people”; from the 
context, it can be understood that people refers to “people in Australia”; since it is 
accompanied by the deictic expression “I was wondering what happens when 
people hear about Islam.. Just the other day right here in Australia, I had the 
chance to interview some people”. Use of pronouns (e.g. we, you and they) is an 
important aspect we can explore, which will enlighten us about whom Estes 
imagines as an audience and whom Estes includes as an in-group.
One linguistic pattern in Estes' sermon is the use of the pronoun “we”. It has 
three meanings:
1) We = Estes + co-present audience
Example: Do we have anybody here who is a Muslim?
2) We= Estes+ co-present audience+ an imagined group of Muslims
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Example: Islam is one of the largest religions in the world. We passed them
(Christians) up in the last census.
3) We= Estes+ an imagined group of Westerns/Americans 
Example:
We have been through a lot (of prejudice) in our countries (US) and we 
have seen buses taking children from the black area to the white area and 
from the white area to the black area (during the 1940s-1960s). We spent 
all o f our security money to do it.
Another example is:
You might think it (racism in the US) is over, we don’t have that problem? 
No. What it does is that it goes deeper, hides its head down low.
The above examples represent a discursive strategy in Estes' sermon in which he 
imagines himself as both an insider and an outsider to the West which is 
homogenized and negatively represented as an out-group. To clarify, Estes 
positions himself as American/Western when he flags up problems, which serves 
his discursive strategy of the negative representation of the West. The problems he 
outlines are racial discrimination and gender inequality. This sets him in contrast to 
Hamza Yusuf who represents Americans/Westerns positively, which serves to 
represent them as an “in-group” (see below). The pronoun “we” is also used by 
Estes to refer to the co-present audience and an imagined Muslim community; as 
can be seen in example 2, in which Estes fallaciously compares Islam to 
Christianity, employing the topos of number.
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Another pronoun used to refer to the audience is the second person pronoun 
“you”. The use of the expression “you know” is recurrent in Estes' text and relates 
to his (informal) style, which we will gain more insights into in the following 
chapter (Chapter 8) as I analyze Estes' narratives. Besides “you know”, Estes uses 
other patterns to involve the audience and mitigate the (social) distance between 
him and the viewer/listener; for example, through the use o f (rhetorical) questions 
and the recurrent phrase “you and I” which assumes that Estes and the (imagined) 
audience have the same view. For example, on the topic of racial equality 
presupposed to Islam, Estes remarks: “would it be strange if you and I we go to 
local masjid and find it (only) for Chinese?”. These elements serve as persuasive 
devices to get the viewers to believe Estes' (fallacious) claims (see below and 
following chapter).
7.1.2. Creation of in-groups and out-groups
An out-group that Estes constructs is the West/Westerns. Terms used to refer 
to the West include the third person pronoun “they” and the nominal terms “West”, 
“people in the West” and the term “so-called people in the West”. In terms of the 
use of nomination, referential and argumentation strategies, Estes employs a 
strategy of “calculated ambivalence” in which the West is represented as both 
“good” and “bad”. “Calculated ambivalence” can be taken to mean: “the fact that 
one utterance carries at least two more or less contradictory meanings, oriented 
towards at least two different audiences” (Forchtner and Wodak, 2014: 237). The 
beginning o f the sermon is a case in point. Estes starts by giving an account of 
non-Muslim characters he met “right here in Australia” and their perception of
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Islam. Characteristic of his representation is that he creates different 
representations of sub-groups o f people in the West through which he reveals two 
attitudes: a more sympathetic attitude towards them (Westerns) and a negative 
attitude towards them. The former predicates some people in the West as being 
ignorant (of what Islam means) and as such cannot be blamed for their 
misrepresentation o f Islam, hence employing the topos of ignorance as an 
argumentation strategy. The latter objectifies and personifies the West as an 
“attacker” while Muslims are personified as the victim of its attacks. The following 
excerpt illustrates this.
Example 7.1.
When people hear stories of what some Muslims do and this of course has 
to be exaggerated a little bit. Then we find out there are pretty rotten stories 
that come around. And just the other day | right here in Australia, there was 
a chance for me to interview some people. I like to do that man on the street 
thing with the camera, and go around and ask people: Have you heard about 
Islam? What do you know about Muslims? And you listen to people 
responses (.) Some of them are hysterical. Some of them you will be 
surprised that a person, non-Muslim tells you “Well, Islam means you have 
to do shahada and pray have times a day”? Wow. But some others will say. 
I remember one time I was asking someone what do you know about Islam 
and he kept thinking and thinking and he said, Islam? Is that a salad 
dressing? But you know, so you have things in-between and you have those 
who really have a bad notion about Islam. And it is fair because if that's all 
they know, then that’s all they know (.)
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As can be seen in the above example, many sub-groups are represented: a) 
those who have good knowledge of Islam and b) those who misrepresent Islam; 
these are negatively predicated through the use of the explicit predicates “pretty 
rotten stories”. A third sub-group is presented who have a “really bad notion” 
about Islam. The topos of ignorance (i.e. it is fair because if that's all they know, 
then that's all they know) is used to mitigate the negative representation of this 
sub-group, rather offering a more sympathetic view on their misrepresentation of 
Muslims. In this context, the topos of ignorance is premised on the following 
condition: “since some people are ignorant o f what Islam means, they cannot be 
held responsible for their beliefs about it” .
Thereafter, Estes' negative representation of the West becomes more 
apparent; as can be seen in the following:
Example 7.2.
The point I am trying to get really is how much the West needs to 
understand what true Islam is about, because it is the thing they claim to be 
looking for, the claim they are making when they make their big speeches, 
and pontificate us infinitum to the principles that they offer to the ignorant, 
you know, backward, third world countries.
The third person pronoun “they” in the above example refers to the West, 
which is described as an arrogant pompous entity, antagonistic to Muslims as 
indicated in “pontificate us infinitum”. The West is also anthropomorphized, 
describing Muslims as “ignorant” and “backward”.
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As can be seen above, Estes creates an image of the West “attacking” 
Muslims. This is mitigated, however, by means of an “afterthought” in which a 
disclaimer is made that “it is wrong to assume that everybody is like that” 
(attacking us).
Example 7.3.
So if somebody is attacking you as a Muslim, if somebody is even 
attacking Islam in front of you, realize that it is not really you, it is not us 
as a whole, the problem is they are responding to something they don't 
wanna accept, they don't wanna to accept it coz it will mean they have to 
give up all the stuff they are doing, you follow me, that is the problem. In 
the west for the most part, not everybody, by the wav it is wrong to sum up 
and say everybody is like this in there, is not that wrong, like if somebody 
said that about us. no. we are human beings, we have different ideas, hopes 
and goals, true, for the most part. Muslims are good, and for the most part. 
Muslims are following Islam and doing a pretty good job, but there are 
some stinkers out there, true, in the same case, when you look to the west, 
it is wrong to say, all the West is like this, because they are not, there are 
good people there, and there are also human beings, they have goals, they 
have desires, they have things they are trying to do as well, and there are 
some who are looking, searching for the truth and they would love to know 
some of the things you will take for granted every day.
The use of the repetition in the above example “for the most part, Muslims are 
good” serves to emphasize Estes' positive representation of Muslims. The use of 
the disclaimer “it is wrong to assume., there are also good people there” is not
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incidental. It can be interpreted as a strategy of “calculated ambivalence”, which I 
have outlined earlier. Hence, his disclaimer can be presumably aimed at Western 
audiences, in an attempt to appeal to them. Towards the end of the utterance, Estes 
asserts that there is a sub-group of Western people “who are looking, searching for 
the truth and they would love to know some of the things you will take for granted 
every day”; the construction “would love to know some of things..every day” 
places responsibility upon Muslims to invite non-Muslims to Islam, which seems 
in line with Estes' missionary agenda (see section 6.1.4. Estes, the proselytizer: the 
creation of a spectacle). This also relates to Hamza Yusufs claim that Muslims 
have a responsibility to carry; in this case, to correct the misconceptions about 
Islam and educate non-Muslims about it.
Related to the predication of Islam/Muslims is the representation of a sub­
group of Muslims who abuse religion. This can be interpreted as an attempt to 
counter-argue the (negative) association between Islam and terrorism, offering a 
justification why this sub-group (of terrorists) cannot in fact represent all Muslims. 
The following example demonstrates this:
Example 7.4.
But it should be after somebody is dealing with Muslims they should have a 
good impression of what all Islam is really about. But as you heard a few 
minutes ago, some Muslims are pretty tough and not some and not so good 
and that leaves a bad impression for all o f us.
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The topos of abuse in the above example is premised on the following condition: 
Since only a minority abuses religion, they cannot be representative of a whole 
religion (Islam/Muslims). The following figure contextualizes the argument made.
A sub-group of Muslims abuse religion.... Islam cannot be blamed.
Data Claim
Warrant: Since only a sub-group of Muslims abuse religion and the majority is 
peaceful, this sub-group cannot be representative of Islam.
Another example of the creation o f out-groups occurs within the context of 
Estes' comparison between Islam and Christianity. Employing the topos of 
comparison, Estes uses the discursive strategy of the positive representation of Us 
and the negative representation o f them. This again testifies to Estes' aim at 
proselytization, creating it as a field of action (see the following chapter). In the 
following excerpt, Estes makes a fallacious comparison between racial inequality 
presupposed in Islam and racial differentiation in Christianity.
Example 7.5.
Islam claims to be for all places and all people and all times. This is the 
claim of Islam. Because I grew up with a Christian background I can really 
speak from the fifty' forty years and tell you that, I definitely saw, whether 
they will ever admit it or not, prejudice because even today there are 
Christian churches for Chinese and Christian churches for Japanese. And 
we have Christian churches for black people and Christian churches for
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Mexican people even though they speak English. But would it strange to 
you and I if somebody said Oh don't go to that mosque because it is for 
black people? Because any masgjid (mosque) in the world could have a 
black person as the imam or a white person or a yellow person or any color 
person we would not think about it.
There are many linguistic devices in the above excerpt that serve to 
represent Christians as an out-group. The use of “Christian churches” in reference 
to Christianity is an example of synecdoche, which can be defined as using a part 
to refer to the whole (see Wodak et al 2009:43). It contributes to the negative 
representation of Christianity through the simplification of what could have been a 
complex argument about religion and defying racism (for example, by 
contextualizing the discussion within the context of the human struggle for racial 
and gender equality in the modem age). The use of the adverb “prejudice”, 
together with the argument from comparison and personal experience serve as 
argumentation strategies to negatively represent Christianity. The argument from 
personal experience (e.g. Walton et al 2008, p. 310) is based on the condition “if 
someone witnesses a particular event, then what s/he is saying may be plausible”. 
This can be indicated in Estes' claim “because I grew up with a Christian 
background, I definitely saw prejudice whether they will admit it or not”.
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7.1.3. The notion of “true Islam”
Another strategy used by Estes to counter the negative representation of 
Islam is putting forth the notion of true Islam that Muslims have deviated from. 
The following example illustrate this:
Example 7.6.
When Malcolm x was close to real Islam, when he came to real Islam, that 
was one of the things that struck him that he had gone for Hajj and he is 
amazed, he said I will pray next to a white person and blacks and browns 
and all colors. You know all together, he was amazed.
Example 7.7.
I am saying not only the West needs Islam, I am saying Muslims need 
Islam, yes or no? We deviated far away, far away from the real Islam, it is 
not just in the eating, in the health and taking care of our bodies, but it is 
also in the way we treat each other, and that is much worse, because it is an 
important aspect of Islam, because after your correct relationship with your 
lord, the next close important thing is your correct relationship with the 
people and if it sucks, what are you all about? How are you a good Muslim 
if no body likes you? How? How does that work?
The above excerpts constitute Estes' claim that there is a “real” or a “true” 
Islam that Muslims (and non-Muslims) fail to understand; this is developed by 
means of definition in which Estes equates true Islam to one “that sets a close 
relationship with the people” following the “correct relationship with your lord”. 
The repetition of rhetorical questions such as “how are you a good Muslim if
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nobody likes you?” serves as rhetorical strategy to persuade the viewer o f Estes' 
claim.
The following table summarizes the nomination, referential, predicational 
and argumentation strategies used in Yusuf Estes' sermon.
Table 7.1. A summary of the predication, nomination and argumentation 











Some stinkers out there
“So if  somebody is attacking you as a 
Muslim,”
Topos o f  responsibility
Muslims have the responsibility to represent Islam 
"correctly" to non-Muslim peoples.
"It should be after someone is dealing with 
Muslims, they should have pretty good 
impression about Islam".
Topos of abuse
There are some people who abuse Islam
"But some Muslims are pretty tough and not so 
good". (Therefore, people misunderstand 
Islam).
The topos of number
"According to the Catholic church's last 
release, we have the distinction o f  being the 
largest religion o f  the world". But what matters 
is the akhlaq or behavior.
Topos of comparison Islam vis-a-vis Christianity
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|“Islam claims to be for all places and all people 
and all times. This is the claim o f  Islam, 
because I grew up with a Christian background 
I can really speak from the fifty forty years and 
tell you that, I definitely saw, whether they will 
ever admit it or not, prejudice because even 
today there are Christian churches for Chinese 




People in the West
The so-called East and the so-called West 
The West 
We
Topos o f  ignorance: Because some non-Muslims 
lack knowledge about Islam, they misrepresent it
In the West, we still have problems, how come 
Hilary Clinton is out o f  the race?”
“When I interviewed men on the street about 
their understanding o f  Islam, some have 
knowledge o f  it yet others were ignorant”. 
"Someone kept thinking and thinking" and said 
"Islam, is that a salad dressing"?
The notion of “true” Islam {The West needs to understand what true
{Islam is about. Because this is the thing they 
{claim they are looking for when they make 
jtheir big speeches and pontificate us 
{infinitum about the background third world 
Mental image is created o f  the West as an arrogant {countries, 
pompous entity attacking Muslims.
Negative predication of the West.
In the following, I move on to explore Hamza Yusufs sermon in terms of his 
representation o f Islam/Muslims.
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7.2. Hamza Yusufs sermon: A message to humanity
The sermon "A Message to Humanity" was given by Hamza Yusuf in the 
41st Annual Islamic Society o f North America's (ISNA), held in Chicago, 2004; it 
was attended by about thirty thousand Muslims (Ghazali, September 2004). On 
YouTube, there are two versions of the sermon, a shorter edited version that lasts 
for fifteen minutes, entitled "Islam and the West", and the actual sermon given at 
the conference, entitled "A message to humanity". The latter spans thirty five 
minutes and is the one I explore in this chapter.
Looking into the genre of the sermon, it is a highly interdiscursive fabric of 
religion and politics; including topics on the contribution of Islam to civilization, a 
terrorist incident (Belsan School crisis) that took place in Russia, United States 
being hijacked (politically) by extremists and the U.S. role in the Palestinian issue 
(see Chapter 8 for further elaboration on the discoursal hybridity o f the speaker's 
sermon). In the following, I examine the pronouns used by Hamza Yusuf to address 
the audience, which will enable us to identify the intended audience in his sermon 
and the in-groups and out-groups he constructs, through the use of pronouns and 
other discursive strategies such as nomination and predication.
7.2.1. Use of pronouns
In a similar way to Yusuf Estes, Hamza Yusuf addresses the audience using 
the inclusive pronoun “we” and the second person pronoun “you” . However, if the 
we-group in Estes' case constitutes Muslims, in Hamza Y usufs discourse, “we” 
refers to more inclusive entities. As I will explain below, the pronoun “we” in
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Hamza Yusufs case has three referents: 1) we as Americans 2) we as Muslims 3) 
we as Americans and Muslims and 4) we as humans. Below are some examples. 
Example 7.8.
I feel that we as Muslims are suffering all over because o f the acts o f a 
handful of people, we must in one voice condemn and completely reject the 
concept of indiscriminate killing in this religion.
Example 7.9.
So this is the issue of the age, the Republican party is basing their entire 
platform, basing an entire platform in the most powerful military nation on 
the earth, it is based on the idea that Islamic fanatics are a threat to the 
security of this country and this must be condemned (audience clapping). 
We have a society now that is facing social disintegration (.) we have the 
erosion o f the middle class in this country (.) we have joblessness(.) we 
have an entire continent of Africa that has had 40 million deaths by AIDS, 
twice as many people as died in the great plague of Europe, the black 
plague, 40 million human beings and yet there is no funding for research 
into this plague that is afflicting the women of Africa in great numbers that 
we are looking at a hundred million people that are facing death by the 
plague of Aids and yet we are spending five hundred billion dollars on a 
defense budgets that is nine times greater than all o f the defense budgets on 
this planet put together (.) that is not RIGHT (.) it is against every principle 
upon what this country was based.
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In example 7.8. above, the pronoun “we” refers to Muslims as indicated in 
“we as Muslims” are suffering all over as a result o f a “handful of people”. This in 
a way seems similar to Estes' representation of a sub-group of Muslims who are 
abusing religion and seems in line with Estes' representation of the suffering of 
Muslims. In example 7.9., the pronoun “we” refers to groups whom the speaker 
appears to endorse as an in-group: “we as Americans and Muslims” and “we as 
humans”. To illustrate, in the sentence “we have the erosion of middle class...we 
have joblessness”, “we” can be taken to mean “we as Muslims and Americans 
have the erosion o f middle class”. The reference to Aids in Africa and the use of 
the word “planet” which is recurrent in his discourse (see ElNaggar, 2012) 
suggests that Yusuf is speaking here from a more human perspective. This is 
further substantiated through the topos of right, "that is not right. It is against every 
principle upon what this country was based”, through which he positions himself 
as American.
I would like to remark here that by invoking topics on joblessness and the 
problem of Aids in Africa, Hamza Yusuf appears to subvert the topos of “Islam as 
threat” frequently used in media representations of Islam; it relies on the 
conditional “if a particular groups (Muslims) is causing threat to the nation, then 
this group must be eliminated” (e.g. see Wodak and Boukala, 2014: 177-180 on the 
representation of immigrants as a threat).
As is the case with Estes' discourse, Muslims are referred to as a collective 
body or one community, as indicated in the use of the collective pronoun "we" and 
the terms "the Muslim peoples", "the Muslims", "the Muslim world" and "our 
religion". The use of the predicates and the deontic modality “we must in one voice
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condemn indiscriminate violence” is rather an appeal to unity. This takes us back 
to the discussion in Chapter 4 about users' comments on televangelists' spaces and 
the visual analysis of the song that precedes Estes' sermon in which Muslims are 
represented as a community in harmony. This, again, lends truth to the claim made 
in this study that web 2.0 platforms (erg. blogspots, Google i-player) and satellite 
television have enabled some Muslims to re-imagine and address a virtual umma 
or a global Muslim community (e.g. also see Mandaville, 2001a; El Nawawy and 
Khamis, 2009).
Still exploring the nomination and predication strategies in Yusuf sermon, 
we can note that Americans are referred to in collective terms such as “we”, “the 
people of the United States of America”, “this/these people”, and “they” ; “this 
country”, “the United States”, “this people”, “Americans”, “American people”, 
“the people o f the United States of America”, “these countries in Europe and the 
U.S”, “the majority o f the people”, "this/these people", "they" and “we as 
Western”. Hamza Yusuf attributes positive predication to Americans. The 
following examples occur within the context o f Hamza Yusufs criticism of George 
Bush's government:
Example 7.10.
They will stand up in one voice and I believe this in my heart and they 
would condemn and reject what is happening in their name.
In the heart of the Americans is a love of truth, a love of justice and a love 
o f liberty and they believe these should be the values and virtues that are 
promoted throughout the world.
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The phrase “I believe this in my heart” in the above example renders Americans 
referred to as “they” a close entity whom the speaker has an insight into. In the 
second utterance, positive representation of Americans is communicated through 
the repetition of the affective word “love” and the use of the nouns “values” and 
“virtues” themselves implicit predicates. In other words, one discursive strategy 
with reference to the representation of Muslims in Yusufs text seems to be an 
intentional choice to refrain from the dichotomy of Us/Them.
Thus, unlike Yusuf Estes who represents Islam and the West as two rigid 
entities in opposition, Hamza Yusuf represents Islam and West as two fluid entities 
that could overlap, representing an in-group. In fact, a rhetorical strategy Yusuf 
uses to this effect is creating a parallel representation of Muslims/Islam and 
Americans/US. Both entities, for example, are hijacked by a select group of 
extremists and both entities have a moral ideal to live up to. I would like to dwell 
on this representation in the following section.
7.2.2. Parallel representations of Islam/America
One claim made by Yusuf is that both America (under George Bush's 




I feel that we as Muslims are suffering all over because of the acts of a 
handful of people.
Example 7.12.
I believe this country is being hijacked by a select group of extremists 
themselves. There is an extremist agenda in this country not in the best 
interest of the United States. It is for the goodness of this people that every 
war this country goes to is done in the name of the highest ideal o f this 
country.
In another instance, he says:
Example 7.13.
So I want you all to recognize that this country has great ideals. These 
ideals are rooted in Islamic ideals.
The above examples indicate that the speaker attempts to discursively map the 
representation o f contemporary Muslims onto contemporary Americans, and the 
ideal Islam onto the ideal America. To clarify, that "Muslims now are suffering 
because of the acts of a handful o f people (terrorists)" seems parallel to "this 
country that is being hijacked by a select group of extremists". Both utterances 
represent a description of a continuous action and in both there is "select", 
"handful" o f (extremists) that are doing Islam and America harm, an out-group. 
Moreover, great ideals are attributed to both Islam and this country. In other words, 
the ideological positioning of Us/Them does not seem to hold in the speaker's 
representation.
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The following table summarizes the nomination, predication and argumentation 
strategies used in relation to the representation of Islam/America in Hamza Yusufs 
sermon.
Table 7.2. A summary of the predication, nomination and argumentation 











This community (in the United States)
The Muslim world
We as Muslims
We as a community
We as Americans and Muslims
The Muslim peoples
The Muslims |
Positive predication “ Some o f  the greatest contributions in our history have
been from the Muslims, diverse contributions".
Subverting the topos of i “It/Islam did not divorce the people from their land, from
culture/Islam as a threat their culture and their tradition; it enhances and purifies
(Wodak and Boukala, the inherent genius o f  the people”.





Topos o f abuse
[West/
iWesterns
'‘We are suffering all over because o f  the acts o f a handful 
o f  people.”




Americans; American people; 
the people o f  the United States 




(These countries in Europe and the U.S 
The majority o f  the people |“The majority o f  the people would stand up and I believe it
We as Westerns jfirmly in my heart and condemn and reject what is





Topos o f abuse
We
this planet
f in  the heart o f  the Americans is a love o f justice, love o f  
[truth and love o f liberty and they believe these should  
[be values that are promoted throughout the w orld”
j“ in the most powerful military nation”
f‘This country is being hijacked by a select group of 
(extremists them selves”
“There is an extremist agenda in this country”
‘‘We have a society that is facing disintegration; the erosion 
p f  the middle class; joblessness”
(“We have 40 million people in Africa dying as a result of 
A ids”
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In the following, I move on to discuss Baba Ali's discourse.
7.3. An overview of Baba Ali’s YouTube videos
Baba Ali has produced five series of video-blogs over eight years (2006- 
2014); in total, 50 video-blogs. Each series of video-blogs has the title of a 
“reminder” in which Baba Ali addresses aspects of life o f Muslims (in the West), 
for example, distractions during Friday prayers; personal relationships and the 
difficulties Muslims could face while flying. Each o f these follow the same 
rhetorical pattern in which Baba Ali, first, outlines the problem then finally gives 
his advices. In a similar way to Estes and Yusuf, Baba Ali appears to address many 
audiences.
7.3.1. Baba Ali: addressing multiple audiences
A common linguistic term used by Baba Ali to address his audience is the 
pronoun “you” which oscillates between a) a general you and b) specific referents 
to Muslims. The following excerpts are taken from Baba Ali's YouTube video 
“who hijacked my religion” in which he explains why some non-Muslims may 
have a negative view about Islam.
Example 7.14.
People are often scared of things they don’t understand; and don't think we 
are the only people who is victim o f this propaganda; you remember the way 
Japanese were treated during World War II, or the way African American
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are treated during the Civil Rights movement. You get the picture; history 
continues to repeat itself and the way that stereotype is built is done in a very 
sneaky sneaky way. You watch TV and you see images of black people 
stealing; I guess if you see it enough times, you assume that all black people 
steal or all Hispanic people cross the border to steal your jobs or all white 
people are trash or women are inferior to men and the false list of stereotypes 
goes on and on. These tactics are not new; it is the same tricks over and over 
again but this time they are building a stereotype of the Muslims.
In the above example, Baba Ali represents Muslims as victims of 
misrepresentation and represents the media negatively since it has initiated 
propaganda against Muslims, according to his view. The argument is developed by 
means o f the topos “history teaches us lessons”, which I will further examine in 
Chapter 9. O f interest is how Baba Ali adopts different alignments towards his 
audiences and as such the pronoun “you” gains different meanings. The sentence 
“people are often scared of things they don't understand” is a generic statement that 
offers a sympathetic view towards those who fall victims of media 
misrepresentation of Muslims. Baba Ali, then, seems to align himself to “we”, 
Muslims who are represented as a victim of propaganda, i.e. “don't think we are 
the only victims of this propaganda”. An oscillation between “we” (Muslims) and 
“you” (in reference to non-Muslims and Muslims) takes place as Baba Ali makes 
his statement “you remember the way Japanese are treated in World War I” in 
which Civil Rights Movement and World War Two are drawn upon to support 
Baba Ali's claim. In this way, Baba Ali is positioning contemporary
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misrepresentation of Muslims in a context of other injustices towards blacks and 
Hispanic.
Another strategy Baba Ali employs to address non-Muslims is the creation 
o f a dialogue with an imagined viewer. In the same YouTube video “who hijacked 
my religion”, Baba Ali constructs a dialogue with a non-Muslim, whom he 
attempts to persuade that Islam does not teach terrorism.
Example 7.15.
Baba Ali (1): But what about these scary videos they show on TV?
Baba Ali (1): You know when two people meet each other, they say al
salamo alikom, do you know what that means? That means may the
blessings of Allah be upon you.
Baba Ali (2): Well, that sounds peaceful.
Baba Ali (1): So many people in America convert to Islam including myself.
Baba Ali (2): You are a convert?
Baba Ali (1); Yes, I am a convert.
Interestingly, the non-Muslim character -in the above excerpt- is not 
represented as being aggressive to Muslims as in Yusuf Estes' sermon but as being 
misled by how media (mis-)represents Islam.
If Muslims are subject to misrepresentation, then one way out according to 
the three televangelists is that Muslims carry the responsibility to change the the 
perceptions o f Islam. Like Yusuf Estes and Hamza Yusuf, Baba Ali represents a 
responsible Muslim who can change people's perceptions about Muslims. To 
illustrate, in “who hijacked my religion”, Baba Ali notes:
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Example 7.16.
Remember, so many enemies of the Islam ended up becoming Muslim 
when they saw Islam practiced correctly. Do you know what I am saying? 
At the end of the day, it does not make difference what the media shows or 
what the newspapers say. A lot of people judge actions not words and if you 
are a good Muslim enshallah, people wanna be like you. So, it is up to us to 
be good examples enshallah. And the only way we can do that is to practice 
Islam properly. Do you know what I am saying? This is Ali reminding you, 
just in case you forgot.
In the above example, Muslims are represented as carrying a responsibility 
to change the misconceptions that some people have about non-Muslims by 
practising “Islam properly”.
7.4. Conclusion
To sum up, in this Chapter, I have attempted to investigate how Islam is 
represented. One pattern that emerges in the discourse o f the three televangelists is 
the imagination of a collective Muslim community, as shown in the use o f terms 
such as “the Muslims” and “we”, which suggests that the three televangelists are 
imagining a Muslim community, calling upon its unity. Another salient point in the 
above discussion is that the three televangelists adopt different attitudes towards 
the West. Yusuf Estes represents the West as the Other (with ambivalence) 
allowing for a positive representation of a sub-group that is looking for the truth.
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On the other hand, Hamza Yusuf attempts to counter the narratives of Us and 
Them, through creating overlapping identities of Islam/America; both entities 
suffer from extremism and both entities have moral values to live up to. As for 
Baba Ali, he appears to refrain from the nexus of Islam/West. Rather, he represents 
mass media negatively which he argues is the main reason for the 
misrepresentation of Islam/Muslims.
A remarkable aspect about Hamza Yusufs discourse is the creation of an in­
group that includes not only Muslims but also humans. In the following chapter, 
we gain further insights into Hamza Yusufs sermon and his emphasis on the unity 
of Abrahamic faith, thus imagining an in-group of Muslims, Jews and Christians. 
Thus, in the following, I throw light on the discourse topics, sub-topics and fields 
of actions each televangelist creates.
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Chapter 8: Discourse topics and fields of action
As I have indicated above, televangelists' sermons invoke discourse topics 
and sub-topics that are “linked to each other in various ways” (Reisigl and Wodak, 
2009: 90) (see below). The aim of this chapter is to examine the discourse topics, 
sub-topics that are invoked in televangelists' sermons (see below), and how these 
contribute to a distinct representation of Islam and Muslims. Discourse topics can 
lead to “fields of action”, a term which has different meanings in the literature (e.g. 
Bourdieu 1991; Reisigl and Wodak 2009). The term “field o f action” is first 
discussed by Bourdieu (1991) who was concerned with the meanings and 
dynamics of power in society. To him, the interplay o f the relations o f power is 
manifest in fields of actions (i.e. domains) in which individuals “seek to maintain 
or alter the distribution of forms of capital” in which capital is not only economic 
(in terms of material wealth) but also can be cultural (e.g. position of particular 
skills and qualifications) and symbolic, for example, as in prestige. A salient point 
is that fields of actions can be interrelated; as Bourdieu (1991: 185-190) illustrates, 
qualifications and skills (i.e. cultural capital) can be translated into economic 
capital as in salary and remuneration. Thus, to Bourdieu (1991) fields o f action 
relate to domains such as the economic, social and political fields. Reisigl (2008: 
243), while being focused on the political domain, adopts a linguistic perspective 
to fields o f action. Reisigl (2008) illustrates that political speeches can have an 
illocutionary effect as they can enact particular “fields of action” such as law 
making and formation of political attitudes. To illustrate, lawmaking procedures 
can be realized in genres such as the State of the Union address and parliamentary 
debates in which legislative procedures can be proposed and contested. Another
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field of action in political discourse, that relates to the analysis of televangelists' 
sermons, is the formation of public opinion and attitudes; for example, through 
presidential speech (e.g. State of the Union speech) and election speech. The 
present study takes up the more specific definition of fields of actions proposed by 
Reisigl (2008:243) in which he argues that speeches can perform “linguistic 
actions” that can have an illocutionary quality such as the formation of public 
opinion.
In this chapter, I will demonstrate that by alluding to particular discourse 
topics, a distinct representation of Islam (and Muslims) is created, sometimes 
enacting fields of action. For example, in his sermon, Hamza Yusuf invokes 
discourse topics and sub-topics on religion and politics (e.g. the Palestinian cause 
and criticism of George Bush's government), attempting to form a public opinion 
and attitudes against George Bush's policies. Furthermore, “proselytization” is a 
“field of action” most specific to Yusuf Estes' sermons. This can be exemplified in 
his sermon “Why the West needs Islam” - as a realization of his discourse- in 
which he invokes many discourse topics on the conversion o f non-Muslims to 
Islam, apparently aiming at proselytization. In the following, I examine the 
discourse topics by each televangelist, starting with Yusuf Estes' sermon/s, moving 
on to Hamza Yusufs and Baba Ali's.
8.1. Analysis of Yusuf Estes' sermon
By invoking particular topics rather than others (i.e. racial discrimination in 
the U.S. and contribution of Islam to civilization to Western Europe), Yusuf Estes
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gives a particular representation of Islam and the West. As I will illustrate below, 
Estes associates the U.S. with topics on racial discrimination in the 1940s-1960s 
and inequalities towards women; and relates Islam to discourse on civilization. 
Hence, the choice of the discourse topics in Estes' sermon serves to represent 
Muslims positively and Americans/Westerns negatively. This is further shown 
below.
8.1.1. Discourse on racism: Conflating the present with the past
One discursive strategy Estes employs is conflating the past with the 
present; as Estes juxtaposes the racial discrimination in the 1940s and 1960s in the 
US with the racial equality presupposed in Islam. To illustrate, one topic in Estes' 
sermon is Malcolm X's visit to Mecca; Estes conflates the past (racial inequality in 
the U.S. during the 1940s-1960s) with the present, as he overlooks the 
developments that took place as a result o f the Civil Rights Movement in the US. 
Example 8.1.
When Malcolm x was close to real Islam, you know he used to be in the 
Nation o f Islam but When he came to real Islam, that was one of the things 
that struck him because he had gone for Hajj and he is amazed. He said I 
"will pray next to a white person and blacks and browns and all colors" 
You know all together, he was amazed. He talked about it. One thing he 
talked about it when he did salah in a small masgjid in Makkah; he said he 
noticed that the one leading probably from Africa he was black and so he 
went to him after the prayer and said "did you ever have a chance to be 
leading prayer in front o f all these white guys?. He said the man looked to
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him and said "what?!" "TWhat are you talking about? Because the stigma, 
the thing he grew up in his mentality; this was a big deal. You know to try 
to find to get a chance to be up to with whity. That is what he talked about.
The above excerpt serves to substantiate Estes' claim that Islam is free of 
ethnic prejudice and to construct a representation of a Muslim community that is 
color blind. There are many rhetorical strategies used by Estes, that are worth 
noting.
A rhetorical strategy that Estes employs is Internal Narration which refers to 
"those cases where the narrator reports a character's cognitive and emotional 
experiences without presenting any specific thoughts" (ibid.). This is indicated, on 
the lexical level, in "when he (Malcolm X) came to real Islam, that was one of the 
things that struck him because he had gone for Hajj and he is amazed", where the 
predicates "struck", "amazed" and "came to real Islam" reveal the cognitive 
processes that Malcolm X experienced.
In addition, Direct Speech is used to vividly represent the dialogue between 
Malcolm X and the mosque Imam; this shows in "He said the man looked to him 
and said "what?" "What are you talking about? According to Semino (2004:435), 
Direct Speech "often results in the foregrounding of the utterances it relates to, 
since it gives us the impression that we are listening directly to the characters’ 
voices, apparently without the mediating interference o f the narrator".
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Another narrative convention used is the Direct Thought presentation 
which allows "the narrator to present a verbal transcription that passes as the 
reproduction of the actual thoughts of the character" (Palmer, 2005: 603). This 
shows in the use of the reporting clause "he said", indicating that what follows 
reflects Malcolm X ’s thoughts, i.e. "He said I will pray next to a white person and 
blacks and browns and all colors"; this is followed by "he talked about it" 
emphasizing Malcolm X ’s astonishment of racial equality in praying. In this way, 
Direct Speech and Direct Thought Presentation are used to give a vivid account of 
the characters' speech and thought processes; hence, they serve as rhetorical 
strategies used by Estes to persuade his audiences of his stance on Islam and racial 
equality.
The story about Malcolm X is followed by another narrative in which Estes 
presents the topic of racial discrimination from the point of view of a child or what 
is known in stylistics as "the mind style", i.e. which refers to "any distinctive 
linguistic representation of an individual mental self' (Fowler, 1977: 103; also see 
Semino, 2007). In addition, through change in paralinguistic features such as the 
use of stress and pitch, Estes animates the voices in the narrative, giving a vivid 
representation of black-white segregation in the 1940s in the U.S. (e.g. Tannen, 
2007: 39 on animation of voices in conversations).
Example 8.2.
So he (my cousin) started talking with his friends about we gonna see some 
colored today, colored people, and I was thinking "wow", like rainbows or 
something, I imagine. I have no idea what they were talking about until we 
were going down to the beach and it had a big sign “no colored” and I was
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thinking why cannot you have any color on the beach? I don't get it. This is 
in the 1940s and it was so fbad that people took it for granted....So we 
were now making a migration from up north to Texas, I remember that, and 
in our way, we stopped in a place called Arkinso, when we stopped in the 
gas station, my dad told us: "go guys and use the bathroom", "|com e on and 
we gonna go", my sister got to the ladies, somebody had demands and I 
kept on and someone said (shouting) f "colored" (.)jcolored I wanted to see 
what a colored bathroom looked like inside. I can imagine, it's gonna be 
something you know (laughing), and some guy told me: "fW hy fdid tyou 
tgo  |in  tthere tfor?" I did not wanna tell him, you know, (whispering, on 
hand on his mouth) I used the jbathroom; he said “ |N o  (shouting) that's for 
colored". I did not gett i t |.
The use o f verbs of thought such as "imagine" and "was thinking" reveal the 
thoughts of Estes in the above example; while the simile "like a rainbow" reveals 
the mind style of a child, i.e. "I imagine it (the colored bathroom) was like a 
rainbow or something".
As with the narrative on MalcolmX's visit to Mecca, the voices in the 
narrative are animated; for instance, Estes, animating the father's character speaks 
in a loud voice as he ordered his children to use the bathroom "come on and we 
gonna go". Two other voices were animated, "shouting" at Estes, the child in the 
1940s, for overlooking the rules of white/ black segregation. One effect of the use 
of the above rhetorical conventions is the vivid representation of an event that took 
place more than 50 years ago, as if it is taking place now, thus conflating the past
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with the present (e.g. see Semino, 2007, on mind style and Tannen, 2007: 120-124 
on use of paralinguistic features); therefore, highlighting the segregation that 
blacks experienced in the U.S. during the 1940s-1960s.
If one moves from the level of rhetorical/discursive strategies to the 
historical account given by Yusuf Estes on racial discrimination in the US, it is 
manipulative in many respects.
While historically speaking slavery was abolished in the United States in 
1865 through a constitutional amendment (e.g. Vorenberg, 2004: 1), a supremacist 
ideology in favor of whites was manifest in segregation in schools, public places, 
and public transport. For instance, white children attended separate schools, and in 
buses seats were reserved for black people usually in the rear o f the bus (e.g. see 
"Rosa Parks and the Montgomery Bus Boycott64). In addition, blacks had limited 
access to education, employment, facilities and services (e.g. see White, 1991: 10- 
13).
In 1954, however, the Supreme Court decision declared segregation in 
public schools unconstitutional, marking the emergence o f the American Civil 
Rights Movement (e.g. see White, 1991: 10-16). In this vein, two prominent 
figures that had a leading role in the Civil Right Movement were Martin Luther 
King and Malcolm X (e.g. see White, 1991).
64 Available at:https://wwvv.thehenrvford.or»/exhibiis/rosaparks/story.asp Last accessed 23rd December 
2014.
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It is worth noting that racist structures have not vanished in the US and 
many forms of racism have emerged (e.g. see Bonilla-Silva 2014); hence, racism 
in the US seems to be a complex issue and cannot be covered in a satisfactory way 
here. However, the argument still holds that, in his account of racial 
discrimination, Estes overlooked the fact that as a result o f the Civil Rights 
Movement, many improvements on the civic level took place; for instance, the 
Voting Rights Act of 1965 that aimed to address discriminatory voting regulations 
targeting blacks (e.g. see Bardes et al 2009: 153-164), together with improvements 
in housing conditions, employment and economic possibilities (e.g. see Bardes et 
al ibid. and Ezra, 2013: 1 -8). The deletion of the improvements that took place in 
civil rights fulfills Estes' aim of the negative representation of this era of the US; 
hence employing the strategy of the negative representation o f Them and by 
comparison the positive representation of US.
To give legitimacy to his representation, Estes re-contextualizes narratives 
by Malcolm X and Martin Luther King, who have played an important role in the 
United States history, calling for civil rights and equality. Hence, the 
recontextualization o f narratives related to both figures serves as the topos of 
authority according to which “X is right because A (=an authority) says that it is 
right” (Reisigl and Wodak 2001: 79). Thus, by highlighting the struggle of 
Malcolm X and Martin Luther King, Yusuf Estes is giving legitimacy to his claim 
about racial segregation in the United States from the 1940s to the 1960s.
In another instance, Estes invokes a discourse topic on the presidential 
elections in the United States that was taking place in 2008 between the
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Democratic Party nominee Barack Obama and the Republican Party nominee John 
McCain. This is exemplified below.
Example 8.3.
You know in the West, they still have problems with women holding high 
position, believe that? How come Hilary Clinton is out o f the race? Because 
and watch what’s now happening to Obama when he goes against McCain, 
McCain is what? What color? Pretty white. You will see, I can be wrong, I 
have been wrong before, we will see.
The above excerpt invokes two overlapping topics: discourse on politics and 
discourse on gender. Estes claims, based on racial inequality and segregation at 
one historical point in the United States, that Obama will not win the race, a 
prediction that proved to be wrong, since Obama became the United States 
president in 2009. In addition, a claim is made about the little representation of 
women in leading political positions in the West; the latter is represented as a 
homogenous entity. Taking into consideration that this is a problem that is shared 
by non-Western and Western countries (e.g. see Gelb and Palley, 2009), the claim 
represents an example of the fallacy of "hasty conclusion" since it "ignores the 
presence or possibility of contrary evidence" (Johnson and Blair, 1983: 44), i.e. the 
problem exists elsewhere. This taps into Yusuf Estes' strategy of the representation 
of the West as the Other.
In other words, by relating the West to topics on racial discrimination and 
gender inequality, Estes is setting the West in a negative light. In contrast,
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Islam/Muslims are positively represented through invoking discourse topics on 
racial equality and civilization. This can be shown in the following section.
8.1.2. Discourse (topic) on Muslim Civilization
Another main topic in Estes' sermon is Muslim civilization. In the example 
below, Estes refers to Andalusia in Spain, as a hub for learning during the Middle 
Ages. He creates two representations that are set in contrast: the supremacy of 
Spain as a Centre of knowledge in the Middle Ages and the dead bodies carried on 
wagons in the Middle Ages, as I will explain below.
Example 8.4.
Now I want to take you back ^thousand years, the big scientists, doctors 
and scholars o f the time, were in El-Andalus, Andalusia, in Spain and these 
people were Muslims and they were using the principles taught by 
Muhammed alih al-Salat wal salam, four hundred years before tthem, and 
they were analyzing these things, talking about these things; being 
philosophical about these things, people like Ibn Senna, Ibn Rushd and 
other people, like this, are still today mentioned in the medical books, 
history books (.) you will find, that they were coming with so much 
amazing things for them, so much so, that by the time o f the Black Death in 
Europe, which we call the West these days, the people there were dying like 
flies, so far they could not bury them, they would throw them on wagons, 
dead bodies on wagons, and it was so badj, that everybody was there was 
fighting this disease, something was killing them, they call it the black 
death or the Black Death, you can read about it in encyclopedia, read about
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it(.) But these same people used to send their children to be educated in 
Spain, because that’s the real higher learning was, theyj sent them to 
|Spain.
In the above example, the supremacy of Andalusia in the Middle Ages is 
represented and highlighted through the use of stress and repetition e.g. "these 
same people used to send their children to be educated in Spain, because that’s the 
real higher learning was, theyf sent them to |Spain". Europe, however, is linked to 
discourse on disease, i.e. the Black Death; the simile "people were dying like flies" 
is a rhetorical device that serves to reflect the severity of the disease, highlighting 
the precarious situation of Europe during the Black Death. Interestingly, Europe is 
represented as a place that is geographically distinct from Medieval Spain. This is 
shown below:
Example 8.5.
But they (scientists) found something amazing, even though some of the 
students came down with these diseases, it was only the students that came 
from Europe but none of the locals got it, why? (.) And they came to knowj, 
that it was because of this: cleaning this hand and only eating with this hand 
and this hand for anything dirty and still washing it anyway (.) the difference 
was that they were able to go back and saw the problem in Europe and that 
was the end of the Black Death after they understood it (.) By the way you 
won’t find that mentioned in the common history books, as there is no 
reason to mention that, is it? Especially because there is a connection to 
Islam.
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According to the above representation, "the locals" in Spain were immune 
of the disease in contrast to the students that came from Europe who carried it 
over. The juxtaposition between Europe and Spain, as two separate entities is 
indicated in his phrasing that scientists were able "to go back" and "saw the 
problem in Europe", in which Europe is represented as a geographically distant 
place and as the source of the problem. Furthermore, "argument from bias" (e.g. 
see Walton 1992: 338) is employed in "you won’t find that mentioned in the 
common history books...because there is a connection to Islam" where bias 
towards Islam by the West is a premise for the conclusion rule, i.e. overriding the 
contributions of Islamic civilization.
To sum up, drawing contrasts and the conflation between the present and 
the past are salient discursive strategies Estes employs to ideologically represent 
the West as the Other. For example, Estes disregards the achievements o f the civil 
rights movement in the U.S., extending racial discrimination in the 1940-1960s to 
the present time, through the use of Direct Thought Presentation and Internal 
Narration in his narratives and through presupposing that Barack Obama will fail 
in the presidential elections as a result o f his color. This acts as a strategy for the 
negative presentation o f Them (Americans/Westerns) and the positive presentation 
of US (Islam/Muslims). Furthermore, the supremacy o f Andalusia as a hub for 
learning (the Golden Age of Islamic civilisation) is juxtaposed with the widespread 
of the Black Death, described as a “European” problem. As such, through the 
constellation o f topics and use of contrasts, Estes creates a dichotomy between US, 
Muslims and Them, Westerns.
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8.1.3. Discourse on the conversion of celebrities
Another important discourse topic in Estes' sermon “Why the West needs 
Islam” is the conversion of celebrities. Estes refers to two popular figures who 
converted to Islam: the boxer Muhammad Ali Clay and the former singer Cat 
Stevens. Both examples serve as the topos of authority which can be read as "since 
Cassius Clay and Cat Stevens (both celebrity figures) converted to Islam, then 
there must be positive aspects in Islam". Estes claims that both figures have faced 
criticism upon converting to Islam, which serves to emphasize Estes' claim about 
the misrepresentation facing Muslims.
Example 8.6.
When Cassius Clay back, it was 40 years ago or was 50 years ago? he was a 
boxer (clenching his fist as if  in a boxing position), he was number one, he 
was on top and everybody is looking, "wow" Cassius Clay, who is this guy? 
Amazing (.) he accepted Islam and changed his name to Muhammed Ali, do 
you know what they said right away? (.) Too many shots to the head (.) 
There were a jazz singer that Elton John was jealous of (.) he was fglad 
when he became a Muslim and he never said I never had any competition 
after he got out o f the business, who is he talking about? Cat Stevens. I think 
he was Greek Orthodox or something, I don’t remember but he was 
Christian at least by name (.) But when he entered Islam, all the people that 
used to love him, because he has got a great voice, even today he has got 
great voice, and very creative with his music, but fas t soonTas The 
fbecame fa  Muslim, you know what they said? Because he had been to the 
hospital, too many drugs (.) Look a that (.) This is the kind o f things that
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people say and it means they have to try to explain, what do you have fto 
explain?
In the above example, Estes presents Muhammad Ali Clay positively 
through the appeal to his strength, fame and success, e.g. "everybody is looking 
Cassius Clay". This is emphasized through the stress on "boxer", "number one" 
and "on top", accompanied by clutching the fist of the hands, with a determined 
expression on his face, which reminds us of the importance of gestures discussed 
in Chapter 6 to the performance of the three televangelists. The following figure 
captures Estes as he performs the success of Cassius Clay.
Figure 8.1. While clenching his fist, Estes says "he (Clay) was a boxer, he was 
number one, on top"
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Another Muslim convert that Estes alludes to is Cat Stevens who is seen 
through the eyes of another celebrity, Elton John, who praised the success that Cat 
Stevens has achieved; once again, Yusuf Estes draws on the topos of authority, 
inter alia, to give legitimacy to his invocation to non-Muslims to adopt Islam.
Related to the discourse topic on conversion is a post published on Yusuf 
Estes' website, IslamNewsroom.Com, about the actor Liam Neeson, who -  
according to the website- may have converted to Islam. The use of an image for 
Liam Neeson at the beginning of the post is interesting in many ways; figure 8.2. 
below is a print screen shot of the report.
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Figure 8.2. In IslamNewsRoom.Com, a report about Liam Neeson allegedly 
converting to Islam
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Liam Neeson’s popularity and fame are highlighted in the report. On the 
textual level, Neeson is predicated as "the famous movie actor Liam Neeson" 
followed by a list o f his most popular movies (e.g. Schindler's List, Star Wars and 
Taken). Liam Neeson's acting roles are recontextualized in the post. The white 
shades round Neeson’s face make up a halo, suggesting he is a hero; at the same 
time, the photo reads "taken", referring to the name of one o f his movies; and 
serves as an anchorage to the image. The word can be read as "taken by an interest 
in Islam"; hence the word is polysemous and has double meanings.
It is worth noting that in the above report, the readers are not assumed to be 
passive but as having the capacity to participate, in an interdiscursive reference 
that mimics mediated democracy i.e. "say something and make a difference". This 
in a way reveals assumptions made in the three televangelists’ sermons that the 
audiences are not passive receivers o f content but are capable of engaging with it 
in many varied ways, for example, by leaving comments or sharing Estes' posts on 
their online spaces.
Example 8.7.
Liam Neeson - Loves Islam!
He Loves Qur'an, Adhan & Salat!
"He left the meeting to pray"
- says a man from the meeting
You Can Leave Him A Message!
Say Something & Make a Difference
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As can be seen above, one discursive strategy Yusuf Estes employs is the 
appeal to the ’’authority" of celebrities in contemporary media culture, perceived as 
"a voice above others, a voice that is channeled into media systems, as being 
legitimately significant" (Marshall 2004: X).
Thus, through invoking particular discourse topics, Yusuf Estes presents a 
distinct representation of Islam vis-a-vis the West. To him, Islam is related to 
civilization, racial equality; and conversion (of celebrities), representing Islam as 
an “attractive religion”. The West, by contrast, is associated with discourse about 
the Black Death (disease) and racial inequality. These constellation o f topics serve 
to represent Islam positively and the West negatively.
In light o f the Discourse Historical Approach, and its emphasis on the 
interrelation between text and the broader socio-historical contexts (e.g. see Reisigl 
and Wodak, 2009: 89-93), I would like to comment on Estes' construction of a 
discursive dichotomy between Us (Muslims) and Them (Westerns). This discursive 
strategy could be seen as one response "on offer" to the othering of Islam/Muslims 
in media discourse (e.g. Richardson, 2004; Baker et al 2013). In other words, if 
Muslims are frequently constructed as the negative "other" in Western media, what 
Estes is doing is that he is inverting the prism, representing the West as the Other. 
To illustrate, upon listening to the sermon, two mental images stand in contrast: the 
supremacy of science in Andalusia and the dead bodies carried on wagons 
elsewhere in Europe. In the same vein, an image of blacks and whites standing 
next to each other as they pray (as can be indicated in the analyzed song in Chapter 
6) is juxtaposed with segregation between blacks and whites in toilets and schools
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in the U.S. in the 1940s, fallaciously equating the past with the present. The 
positive representation of Islam in Estes’ discourse, realized in his sermon, seems 
to be in line with Miller's remark (2004) about modern spiritualities aimed at 
creating a “feel good” experience for the individual.
Moving on to the analysis of Hamza Yusufs sermon “a message to 
humanity”, I will illustrate below that he creates a different representation of Islam 
and Muslims and invokes different fields of action. Unlike Yusuf Estes who 
invokes discourse topics on conversion, on racial and gender inequality, Hamza 
Yusufs sermon is primarily an interdiscursive fabric o f discourse on religion and 
politics; for instance, as he invokes sub-topics on the unity of the Abrahamic faith, 
terrorism and George Bush's policies in the Middle East. The two televangelists, 
however, are similar in their invocation of discourse on Muslim civilization, and 
sub-topics on Africa and draw- to different extents - on the US political scene.
8.2. Analysis of Hamza Yusufs sermon
As I indicated in the above section, a characteristic feature of Hamza 
Yusufs sermon “A message to humanity” is that it invokes many discourse topics 
and sub-topics on religion and politics, including topics on the contribution of 
Islam to civilization, a terrorist incident (Belsan School crisis) that took place in 
Russia, United States being hijacked (politically) by extremists and the U.S. role in 
the Palestinian issue; thus, it is a highly interdiscursive fabric.
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To illustrate, looking into the discourse topics of the sermon, we can 
identify five main broad (macro65) topics in Yusufs text: a) the Contribution of 
Islam to civilization b) Unity of Abrahamic faith; c) Islam and terrorism ; d) 
criticism of the U.S. under Bush’s government and e) the Palestinian issue. These 
topics overlap; this is represented in the figure below:
Building on Van Dijk (1980:6) I define macro-topics as "global meaning structures".
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Figure 8.3. Some of the main discourse topics in Yusuf’s text






The abuse of religion leads to 
extremism (not religion itself)
Discourse Topic 7
Muslims had great civilization 
and should not be ashamed of 
being Muslims.
Discourse Topic 8
The same type of fear 
that led to the Holocaust 
is being used against 
Muslims.
Discourse Topic 2
Terrorist incident in 
Russia
Discourse Topic 4










U.S. Government is 
trying to abuse 
Guantanamo detainees
Discourse Topic 9
Non-conservative claims that! 
U.S. is a Christian country.
Discourse Topic 10
U.S. Cannot wage a war on 
Islam
Discourse Topic 11
Palestine is a festering 
soul on the body of the 
planet.
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As can be seen in the above figure, two interrelated discourse topics are 
religion and politics. Discourse topics on religion includes the contributions of 
Islamic civilization, defending religion itself as a reason of extremism (rather it is 
the abuse o f religion), unity of Abrahamic faith and the use o f quotes and religious 
references in support of the speaker's assertion that Muslims have to denounce 
terrorism and reject the concept of collective guilt.
Discourse on politics66 includes topics and sub—topics that relate to the 
criticism of the U.S. government such as the policy of the Republican Party 
towards Islamic fanatics (perceived as a major threat), the unjust treatment of 
detainees in Guantanamo and the neo-conservative claim that America is a 
"Christian" nation/country.
Discourse on religion and politics overlap. For instance, on the macro-topic 
o f Palestine, the speaker refers to the death of the human right activist Rachel 
Corrie, invoking a topic he mentioned earlier that indiscriminate violence is 
against Abrahamic tradition. The main topics in Yusufs text are explained below.
8.2.1. Islam, an Abrahamic tradition
Unlike Yusuf Estes who presents Islam as a “better” correlate to 
Christianity, the unity of Abrahamic faith emerges as an important topic in Yusufs
66 Following Chilton and Schaffner (1997: 212) 1 take 'political' to mean "those actions (linguistic or
other) which involve power or its inverse, resistance".
297
sermons. He imagines a Muslim community (an umma) that is not exclusive to 
Muslims but one in which Muslims are in unity with Jews and Christians. To 
illustrate, Hamza Yusuf invokes the sanctity o f life in the Abrahamic faith (Topic 
4) within the context of his argument that terrorism is a modem phenomenon that 
has to be denounced.
Example 8.8.
The Abrahamic faith shares the sanctity of life and the Muslims must 
assert their Abrahamic truth, we have to assert to the Abrahamic 
peoples that we are the last extension of the Abrahamic truth (.) that’s there 
is a God and that he communicates with his creation and he calls them to his 
unity, and he calls them to the fhighest morality, known to human kind.
One strategy employed in the above example is the use o f parallel structures 
using the pronoun “we” followed by stative verbs that express a state rather than 
an action (e.g. we have to assert to the Abrahamic peoples that we are the last 
extension of the Abrahamic faith); this serves as a persuasive strategy through 
repetition. Responsibility and morality are employed as topoi leading to the 
conclusion mle that: since Muslims are the last Abrahamic faith, they have (a 
responsibility) to adopt the highest moral values; this claim is premised on the 
content-related warrant that a believer of the Abrahamic tradition should attain the 
highest moral ideas. This is further stressed through the use o f stress on "last 
extension", "Abrahamic truth" and the increased loudness on "highest morality". In 
this way, Yusuf is constructing a representation o f Muslims in unity with Christian 
and Jews; thus, in a way, Hamza Yusuf is re-imagining an umma that converges in 
its degrees of inclusivity to the umma of Medina (see section 3.6.1. The meanings
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of umma). Through the repetition of “morality” and “highest ideals”, the speaker is 
positioning himself, on an intellectual level, as a figure who aspires for morality 
and universal values (see Chapter 6).
8.2.2. The contribution of Islam to civilization
Another important discourse topic in Yusuf’s text is the contribution of 
Islam to Western civilization; it spans different structural points in Yusuf’s sermon. 
Unlike Yusuf Estes to whom the Muslim civilization is restricted to Europe, Hamza 
Yusuf creates a wide (global) spanning for the Muslim civilization.
Example 8.9.
Wherever Islam went it did not divorce the people from their land (.) from 
their culture and their tradition (.) But rather it purified these people (.) It 
purified these people and made them realize their inherent genius....Some 
o f the greatest contributions in our history have been from the Muslims (.) 
diverse tcontributions (.) from Persia (.) from Muslim China (.) from Spain 
(.) and these contributions have infused Western civilization with gifts that 
they had in these countries in Europe and the United States had yet to 
recognize.
As stated earlier, one persuasive strategy Hamza Yusuf employs is the use of 
parallel structures, for example “from Persia (.) from Muslim China(.) from Spain 
(.)” . Through the use of these parallel constructions, each separated by a pause, 
Hamza Yusuf re-imagines a wide-spanning of the Muslim civilization. This is also
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indicated through the stress and increased loudness on "greatest", "diverse" and 
"contributions".
Another important aspect in the above example is the subversion of the 
topos of culture by presenting a (counter-) argument that Islam did not divorce 
people from their culture. The topos of culture is used in discriminatory rhetoric to 
exclude particular groups (see Wodak 2001: 76) and is based on the condition that 
“because the culture of a specific group of people is as it is, specific problems arise 
in specific situations”. In another instance, in Topic 10, the topos o f right is used 
within the context o f the discourse topic on Muslim civilization; the speaker argues 
that Muslims have the right to live in America and should not be ashamed o f being 
Muslims.
Example 8.10.
You should know you are American, you have every right to be here. You 
have every right to descend, to speak your truth. Don't be ashamed o f being 
part of religious tradition that created the civilization o f noble India, that 
created the civilization of Andalusia in Spain, that gave the world some of 
the greatest treasures that we have, whether they be political, whether they 
be governmental, whether they be legal, whether they be philosophical, 
theological and even artistic gems, even artistic gems, don't be ashamed of 
your Islam, stand up fairly and bravely and speak your truth.
The use of the deontic modal verb “you should now”, the second person pronoun 
“you”, as a form of direct address, and the imperatives “stand up...your truth” 
highlight the urgency of Yusufs call that is aimed at “every” Muslim.
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In another topic, i.e. the United States cannot wage a war on Islam, Yusuf, 
again, invokes the topic that Islam had an impact on the Western tradition.
Example 8.11.
So we must see that Islam has given too much and tonight is about giving 
(.) Muslims have given too much to civilization for them to be accused or 
abused by those people who wish nothing but harm for this country (.) That 
is what they want (audience clap).
Yusuf puts an emphasis on the contribution of Islamic civilization through 
the stress on the quantifier "too much" and the material verbs "abused" and 
"accused". In this way, the past Islamic civilization is used in Yusufs sermon as 
topos67 or content-related warrant. This is based on the condition that “because 
Muslim scholars have contributed to Western civilization, Muslims should not be 
misrepresented/abused/accused and should not be ashamed of being Muslims”.
8.2.3. Formation of political attitudes
If one field of action invoked in Yusuf Estes' sermon is proselytization, one 
field of action in Hamza Yusufs sermon is the creation of a public opinion against 
the US government.
67 Drawing on Kienpointner (1992:194) and Wodak (2001:74), I define topos as "content-related
warrants or conclusion rules which connect the argument or arguments with the conclusion, the claim" 
(Wodak ibid.).
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One topic Hamza Yusuf discusses is the claim that the US government is 
abusing Guantanamo detainees; the argument is developed through the topos of 
authority in which Hamza Yusuf refers to two popular attorneys and activists that 
were opposed to George Bush's policies: Michael Ratner68 and Barbara Olshansky.
On the same topic on the abuse of Guantanamo detainees, Hamza Yusuf 
makes the claim that Freedom is an Islamic right, an Abrahamic right and an 
American right. This claim is developed through a reference to wars that have been 
fought in the last 500 years; he recurrently refers to a “planet”, implying that he is 
referring to a global community (see Chapter 7).
Example 8.12.
Too much blood have been shed on this planet, too much blood has been 
shed on this planet, in order that we might have rights and these rights are 
Islamic rights; they are Abrahamic rights and they are American rights and 
if we don't stand up for them, then we will suffer the fate of those who are 
not worthy of the rights that they had been given as we see them taken away 
from us.
In the above excerpt, Hamza Yusuf, once again, draws on the topos of 
rights to develop his argument, premised on the condition that “if a law or an 
otherwise codified norm prescribes or forbids a specific politico-administrative 
action, the action has to be performed or omitted” (Wodak, 2001: 76).
68 Michael Ratner is an attorney and President Emeritus o f  the Centre for Constitutional Rights (CCR), a 
non-profit human rights organization based in New York City and is the president o f  the European 
Centre for Constitutional and Human Rights based in Berlin.
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In another topic, Hamza Yusuf raises awareness of the importance of the 
recognition of the Palestinian cause:
Example 8.13.
And I will end on this note [ (.) that I sincerely believe |  until the 
Palestinian issue is recognized (.) as the festering soul on the body of the 
Planet (taps on the podium), until the United States of America rises up to 
her responsibility in addressing a grave crime against the people for over 
fifty years who have been suffering in humiliation in abject poverty 
(audience clap) and have suffered at the hands o f the current 
government.. .Palestine is the ISSfUE.
The use o f the signpost "And I will end on this note" indicates that Palestine 
is one topic the speaker would like to emphasize; this is highlighted through the 
increased loudness and stress on "festering", "body" and "planet", together with the 
tapping sounds on the podium. The use of the parallel structures, "in humiliation", 
in "abject poverty" accompanied by stress on "humiliation" and "poverty" 
heightens the gravity of the topic; to which the audience responded with applause.
Thus, as can be seen above, the sermon of Hamza Yusuf is not tied to 
religious discourse but rather converges towards political rhetoric as the speaker 
attempts to create public opinion and attitudes against George Bush's government.
If Hamza Yusuf is critical o f the US Policies during Bush's government, and 
his sermon can be understood as an attempt to persuade his audiences to adopt
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these attitudes, Baba Ali seems to be focused on “ethnic Islam” as he attempts to 
redefine the relationship between Islam and culture, fulfilling the field of action of 
the formation of public opinion and attitudes.
8.3. Analysis of Baba Ali's videos
Broadly speaking, there are three macro-topics in Baba Ali's videos: a) 
misrepresentation of Islam; b) discourse on the unity of the Muslim community 
and c) personal relationships and etiquette/behavior.
8.3.1. Discourse on the misrepresentation of Islam
One important discourse topic in Baba Ali's videos is the misrepresentation 
o f Islam. This topic is addressed in his first video-blogs “who hijacked my 
religion” (season 1); “How did you convert to Islam (season 1); “why Islam” 
(season 2); “Muslim while flying” (season 1) and “randomly checked at the 
airport” (season 3). These videos span two sub-genres. One is a hybrid 
drama/speech genre in which Baba Ali, first, outlines the problem, inserts acting 
scenes that aim to highlight the misrepresentation of Muslims/Islam, and puts forth 
his claim at the end. Another genre used by Baba Ali is the short speech, not more 
than ten minutes, in which Baba Ali argues why Islam does not preach terrorism. It 
is worth noting here that in Baba Ali's YouTube videos, claims are made in brief 
bullet-point format in which Baba Ali presents counter-claims as to why Islam 
does not promote terrorism. Hence, because o f the structure of Baba Ali's sermons,
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argumentation strategies present an important discursive strategy, which I give 
attention to below.
Topos 1: The topos of abuse
One topos that recurs in Baba Ali's videos is that since some people 
(Muslims and non-Muslims) misunderstand Islam and/or abuse it, Islam itself 
cannot be blamed. In “Why Islam”, Baba Ali argues that “there are people out 
there who do actions that Islam forbids in the name of Islam abusing this beautiful 
religion”. According to this argumentation strategy, since there are people who 
abuse religion, they cannot be taken as representative of what Islam teaches/all 
Muslims do.
Another variation of this argument is that since some Muslims are ignorant 
about their religion, they cannot be representative o f it. To illustrate, in his video­
blog “Why Islam", Baba Ali states: "most Muslims are bom to this religion without 
anyone explaining it to Muslims and unfortunately, their action and behaviour 
reflect their lack of understanding". According to this content-related topos, since 
some Muslims are ignorant of their religion, they cannot be regarded as 
representative of it.
Topos 2: Islam is the religion of reason and rationality
In the same sermon “Why Islam?”, Baba Ali represents Islam as the religion 
o f reason and rationality. On this topic, Baba Ali explains that "scientifically, there 
are so many verses on scientific knowledge in the Qur'an, that I don't have time to
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explain in this short video. All I can tell you 1400 years ago, it was impossible for 
anyone to have this accurate information, especially when some of these things are 
being discovered in this past century".
This broad theme of Islam and intellect is dealt with in different ways by 
Hamza Yusuf and Yusuf Estes; whereas Hamza Yusuf draws on the importance of 
reading and attaining knowledge (e.g. in his sermon the "The true spirit of 
Islam"69), Yusuf Estes makes use of scientific discoveries alluded to in the Qur'an 
to prove that the Qur'an is a book of science. To illustrate, one of Yusuf Estes’ 
websites, "Islamscience.com" includes videos by Estes in which the speakers 
provide evidence o f the scientific miracles in the Qur'an.
Topos of numbers: "five to eight Muslims live here in the United States"
Another augmentation strategy is the topos o f numbers which is used to 
justify Baba Ali's claim that Islam does not teach terrorism; since generations of 
Muslims have been living in the West. In “Muslim while flying”, Baba Ali points 
out that “if you study Islam, you will see there is no terrorism in Islam. Think 
about it. Out o f the six billion million in this planet, one and half billion people are 
Muslim...So if Islam taught terrorism, one and half billion human beings will be 
doing violent acts. But that is not the reality, because Islam does not teach 
terrorism”. In another video “randomly checked at the airport”, Baba Ali points out 
“the fact is Muslims have been living in the West generation after generation; so, if 
Islam really taught terrorism, they were all pretty bad terrorist” .
69 Link to the sermon: https://\vww.voutube.com/vvatch?v IQciOu. 9frc Last accessed 2nd June 2015.
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In the above examples, the topos of numbers, i.e. there are five to eight 
millions in the United States, is used to support the claim that Islam does not teach 
violence. In the discourse of Hamza Yusuf and Yusuf Estes, the topos of numbers, 
is likewise drawn upon in many varied ways, as I have outlined earlier. For 
instance, in his speech, “Changing the Tide: Islam in America”, Hamza Yusuf 
points out: “we are in the United States o f America in large numbers, and we 
should be utilizing that fact, we have a job to do and that job is about reconciling, 
because we don't want a planet that disintegrate into more war, into more hatred, 
into more violence, into more conflict, into more human suffering”. Numbers are 
used as a content-related warrant to support Hamza Yusufs claim that Muslims 
have a role to do, which is reconciliation.
Thus, topos of numbers as an argumentation strategy is used differently by 
the three televangelists; because we are in large numbers we have a moral 
responsibility to reconcile between Muslims and non-Muslims and/or Westerns 
(Hamza Yusuf); and because millions o f Muslims are in the States, then Islam 
cannot be teaching violence (Baba Ali); and while there are billions of Muslims, 
what matters is the behavior (Yusuf Estes).
In addition to the misrepresentation of Islam, another topic that Baba Ali 
invokes is the criticism of first-generation immigrants who are represented as 
being out o f touch with young Muslims.
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8.3.2. Discourse on “ethnic Islam”
One theme that runs throughout the sermons of the three televangelists is 
the imagination of a Muslim community that is unified. This shows, for example, 
in Hamza Yusufs appeal to the audience to denounce terrorism “in one voice”, 
presupposing unity and harmony. It also shows in the songs that precede Yusuf 
Estes' sermon in which Muslims are represented as a “color-blind” community that 
is unified and in harmony. The theme o f the umma or the imagination of a global 
Muslim community is evident in Baba Ali's YouTube videos. According to Baba 
Ali, the umma (global Muslim community) is in a weak state, because Muslims 
have adopted cultural practices that conflict with the teachings o f Islam. Five 
video-blogs address the topic of “ethnic Islam”: “culture versus Islam” (season 1), 
“racism and pride” (season 3); “my culture” (season 5); “cultural parents” (season 
5) and “what happened to our masjids” (season 5). To illustrate, in his video 
“culture versus Islam”, Baba Ali starts his video by pointing out:
Example 8.14.
Many Muslims who come from overseas, they leave Islam back in their 
home country, I mean, they bring their traditions, their culture but their 
traditions have nothing to do with Islam; for example, the idea o f a forced 
marriage, when a woman gets married without her consent, Islam does not 
allow that, it is totally messed up man. Islam liberated people from this 
ignorant way of thinking. For some Muslims, they love their culture, more 
than they love Islam. And that is why they want to compromise religion 
for the sake of their culture.
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The above example outlines inter-generational gap as one problem that faces 
Muslim youth in the West (e.g. Cesari 2003); as parents are represented as blindly 
following their traditions that conflict with Islam. This is emphasized through the 
representation of Islam as an object that first generation immigrants must have left 
it at home, i.e. “they leave Islam back in their home country” and through the use 
of negation as exemplified in “their traditions have nothing to do with Islam”. The 
use o f the superlative form “they love their culture, more than they love Islam” sets 
culture as an entity that is opposed to what Islam teaches. The use of the 
colloquial term “messed up man” reminds us of the conversational style that 
permeates Baba Ali's sermons that has been discussed thoroughly in Chapter 6 of 
the thesis.
Another discursive strategy used in relation to the representation o f “ethnic 
parents” is the use o f irony to highlight the inter-generational gap between parents 
and Muslim youth. To illustrate, in his YouTube video “my culture”, Baba Ali 
gives a humorous account of an ethnic parent by flouting the expectations of the 
viewers as to how a parent might behave. In the video, the ethnic parent wears 
sharp, exaggerated expressions and acts bizarrely by insisting on giving Baba Ali 
his business card, even though Baba Ali is “not doing any type o f business with 
him” (see figure 8.4. below). (Again, this reminds us of Baba Ali's self­
representation as an entrepreneur). The parent, a “cardiologist”, complains that he 
would like the mosque to teach his son culture rather than Islam.
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Figure 8.4. Asalumu Alikom, brother, I just listened to your talk and I would like 
to work with you. Here is my card.
In line with some of Baba Ali's videos (see section 6.3.2. Involving the 
audience), in the video referred to above, “my culture”, Baba Ali holds a dialogue 
with an ethnic parent. One salient point is how Baba Ali aligns himself to the 
Muslim youth, speaking on behalf of them. This leads to the assumption that Baba 
Ali is specifically targeting Muslim youth in his video-blogs.
Example 8.15.
Baba Ali: With all the respect, it is your culture. Your son may view it in a 
very different way than you view it. Have you really thought about talking 
to him to the Islamic angle regarding listening to your parents?
Cardiologist: It does matter what Islam says. It matters culture. I have 
CARDS. I have many cards (staring at the camera).
Baba Ali: Well, that seems to a problem, because why should he care about 
what your culture says. Kids today who are finding Islam are caring more 
about what Islam says...I often go to the masjid and see the same thing over 
and over again; I find cultural parents who have problems with their kids.
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Sometimes the conflict is a result o f their kids growing up in this country, 
and therefore they have a completely different culture than their parents; 
and sometimes the conflict is because the parents are cultural and the kids 
are religious and this is quite too common; either way, the parents who want 
their culture with their dear life, hoping that (opening his arms and looking 
upwards) one day, my child will become cultural, like me, remember back 
hom e. What they cannot realize is that their kids care less about back home 
(pointing with his thumb towards the back o f his shoulder), because they 
are not back home and they are not planning to go back home, because this 
(pointing with his thumb fingers) is home.
In the above example, first-generation immigrants are described as being in 
a rift with their kids, as shown in “parents are cultural; kids are religious” . The 
expressions “this is far too common” and “over and over again” present the inter- 
generational gap between parents and kids as a common problem, which seems to 
be the case in light o f research on Muslim youth in the West (e.g. Cesari, 2003; and 
Mandaville, 2001: 131-136 see below for further elaboration). In addition, Baba 
Ali draws on his personal experience to give legitimacy to his claim about the 
prevalence o f the problem: “I often go to the mosque and I see the same thing over 
and over again” ; employing personal experience as an argumentative strategy is 
also employed by Yusuf Estes and Baba Ali.




A lot o f youth are now returning back to Islam and what I said in this video 
is very clear for them. I hope one day, it becomes just clear for many o f our 
parents as w ell. Do you know what I am saying?
“Dialogicality” seems to be one important aspect in the above excerpt; which 
following up on Bakhtin (1984:6) can be defined as the expression o f “plurality of 
independent and unmerged voices and consciousnesses, a genuine polyphony o f 
fully valid voices” . This shows in Baba Ali's statement, “they are not planning to 
go back home, because this (pointing with his thumb fingers) is home”; in other 
words, as Baba Ali refers to the US/West as “home”, he is apparently responding to 
voices that represent Muslims in the West as non-belonging (e.g. Baker et al 2013; 
Wodak et al 2013; Wodak, 2015). He, therefore, seems to be addressing “other” 
voices that hold opposite views to what he believes in (Bakhtin ibid.).
The comments following the YouTube video lend support to Baba A li’s 
claims about “ethnic Islam” . Since this is one important topic in literature on 
Muslims in the West (see Cesari 2003; M andaville 2003; 2007), I choose below to 
substantiate my analysis o f Baba Ali's discourse on ethnic Islam, by exploring 
users' comments following the YouTube video which can give us some useful 
insights into commenters' view on the issue. Upon examining the YouTube 
comments following his video “my culture” two patterns emerge in the comments: 
a) expression o f agreement that some parents are concerned with culture and are 
out o f touch with their kids and b) negotiation o f Baba Ali's stance on culture and 
religion. Here are some examples.
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Example 8.17.
jixalfx 10 months ago
Fantastic video! I completely agree with you. I'm 22 years old and I notice 
many o f the older people in my family and extended family act more 
culturally than Islamically. I don't like many aspects o f my Asian culture 
that seems to have stemmed from religions before Islam (polytheism 
perhaps). I also really don't care about 'back home' either, they fail to 
understand that?
Read more Show less (4) Likes
In the above comment, “jixalfx”, 22 years old, aligns with the stance taken by 
Baba Ali in rejecting the conflation between culture and Islam as shown in “I 
completely agree with you” and in the emotive verbs “I don't like many aspects o f 
my Asian culture”. In line with Baba Ali's stance, the parents are represented as 
being out o f touch with their children; as shown in the use o f the verb “fail to 
understand”, negatively predicating parents. I f  the above example shows an 
alignment with Baba A li’s stance, other users negotiate and redefine the meaning 
o f culture that Baba Ali criticizes.
Example 8.18.
Mohiuddin23 10 months ago
This is a brilliant video! With all due respect... with our immigration o f 
Muslims to the West, we have a new phenomenon o f young Muslims who 
rediscover their religion. But in doing that, they deny the culture o f their 
parents deeming it "un-islamic" in aims o f following a "pure Islam." You 
then have these cliche slogans o f "Deen over Culture." Islam does not
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overlook culture. Culture has many benefits, it is a sign o f God. It is the 
medium through which humans experience and express themselves in the 
world. Without culture, we are robots without context. Culture is essential to 
being truly human. People who reject culture end up lacking substance. 
Religion is the gardener o f culture - it removes the weeds, prunes some 
plants, and waters the fruitful tress. It is the measure, but doesn't replace 
culture. Similarly, we need to recognize the differences between the 
blameworthy dunya and the dunya that allows us to gain proximity to Allah, 
such as following a certain career path to help humanity?
Read more Show less 
Example 8.19. 
jixalfx 10 months ago 
That was a brilliant analogy.?
Example 8.20.
Mazzy Ali 5 months ago
A lot o f cultural customs are backward and conflict with Islam. 
Personally, I reject culture so that my Islamic beliefs and cultural 
practices don't get mixed up, which is what I believe happened to my 
parents. Hence there (sic) lack o f Islamic knowledge?
Example 8.21.
Mohiuddin23 5 months ago
Well that's why we should be aspirants to increase in Prophetic 
knowledge insha Allah?
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In Example 8.18., Mohiuddin23 expresses his appreciation o f the video 
through his use o f the exclamatory expression “this is a brilliant video” . He 
negotiates Baba Ali's stance on culture through using two metaphors in which both 
Islam and culture are positively predicated. Using gardening as a source domain, 
Mohiuddin2 compares Islam to a gardener and culture to a garden, i.e. “religion is 
the gardener o f culture - it removes the weeds, prunes some plants, and waters the 
fruitful tress. It is the measure, but doesn't replace culture” . One salient aspect is 
how the commenter represents an imagined community o f Muslims as he uses the 
collective pronoun “we”, positioning him self as a critic who analyzes social 
problems and offers solutions; he advises Muslims to identify aspects o f life that 
will make Muslims closer to God. This substantiates my earlier remarks that new 
media platforms are enabling some Muslims to re-imagine a global Muslim 
community. The negotiation o f the meaning o f culture reminds us o f the debate I 
have taken up in Chapter 4 in which I discussed the emergence o f a virtual public 
sphere on the Internet where views and counter-views can be contested and 
negotiated.
Indeed, there are four replies to Mohiuddin23 analysis o f culture; “jixalfx”, 
for instance, expresses his positive stance towards “M ohiuddin23” as he states 
“that was a brilliant analogy”; “Mazzy A li”, however, seems to disagree with 
“M ohiuddin23” in which he argues that “a lot o f cultural customs are backward 




In Chapter 7 , 1 explored the representation o f Islam and the West and in this 
Chapter, I have extended the analysis to the discourse topics, narratives and the 
discursive strategies employed in televangelists' sermons. As I have demonstrated 
earlier, by invoking particular topics and discourses, each televangelist creates 
particular representations; some o f which are common among the three 
televangelists.
To illustrate the above, through invoking the topics on the Black Death (in 
Europe) and Muslim civilisation in Spain, Yusuf Estes creates a discursive 
dichotomy between Islam and the West; both constructed in the text as two rigid 
entities that are in a state o f conflict. In the previous chapter (Chapter 7), I 
elaborated on Estes' use o f nominalization and predication strategies, through 
which the West is represented as an entity attacking Muslims. This chapter has 
further demonstrated that the topics Estes invokes can be perceived as realizations 
o f the discursive strategy o f the positive representation o f Us and the negative 
representation o f them; since Estes creates a stark contrast between Islam, linked to 
civilisation and Europe, associated with disease and Black Death. Furthermore, by 
creating topics on the conversion o f celebrities to Islam, Yusuf Estes represents 
Islam as an “attractive” religion. Thus, proselytization -here- seems to be a “field 
o f action” related to Estes' sermon. This also shows in Estes' self-representation on 
his websites (see Chapter 6) in which he publishes posts about conversion stories, 
including the story o f his conversion to Islam.
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Hamza Yusuf creates an inter-discursive fabric, intended to bring about 
change o f political attitudes towards George Bush's government. However, Hamza 
Yusuf seems to include a more inclusive boundary for Us that includes 
Americans/M uslims/Believers o f Abrahamic faith/humans. Note, for example, the 
recurrent use o f the word “planet” in his sermons; for example, “we don't want a 
planet to disintegrate into more war” (Hamza Yusufs sermon, “changing the tide: 
Islam in America”). This also shows in the sermon being examined in the study “A 
message to humanity” in which the problems o f Aids in Africa and joblessness, 
rather global problems, are used as examples to subvert the representation o f Islam 
as a threat.
As for Baba Ali, like Hamza Yusuf, he attempts to create public opinion 
about Islam/Muslims. Most salient here is the use o f argumentation strategies to 
back up his claims that Islam does not support terrorism, including the use o f topos 
o f number, abuse, and his claim that there is a “true” Islam that some Muslims are 
not able to attain. I have pointed out that these topoi are not rather specific to Baba 
Ali's discourse but are recurrent among the three televangelists, which gives 
further empirical insights into the discussion in Chapter 2 (section 2.3. politico- 
tainment) on televangelism being part o f an Islamic popular culture. Thus, despite 
the differences between the three televangelists in terms o f age and style, there are 
arguments and shades o f meanings that are recurrent in their discourses.
To recapitulate, the three televangelists appear to have different objectives. 
Yusuf Estes highlights the misrepresentations that Muslims and converts may face; 
thus serving his missionary agenda. Baba Ali is interested in changing attitudes
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towards “ethnic Islam” through naming and identifying inter-generational gap as a 
problem facing Muslim youth. Hamza Yusuf, however, is more focused on the 
political level in which he attempts to create oppositional discourse against George 
Bush's policies, by alluding to injustices in Guantanamo Bay and calling for 
addressing the Palestinian cause.
The following chapter takes us to another important aspect in relation to the 
construction o f Muslim identities, i.e. the religious and historical eras each 
televangelist recontextualizes and invokes.
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Chapter 9: How is history (religious and non-religious references)
recontextualized in Muslim televangelists’ discourse?
One identity-constituency aspect is the use o f history (Heer et al 2008:7). As 
the authors argue, “identity in the sense o f self-identification is not only realized in 
the “name” o f the collective but also in its history-in the narrative that it produces” 
(ibid.). History-in turn- is constituted o f “interpretation and reinterpretation o f the 
past” and is subject to “hegemonic” narratives (ibid. p. xiii).
It is worth noting that one characteristic aspect o f televangelists' sermons is 
that it is a discursive space in which many historical/religious references (e.g. 
characters and eras) are invoked. Broadly speaking, as an argumentation strategy, 
history is invoked in televangelists’ sermons based on the following condition: 
“because history teaches that specific actions have specific consequences, one 
should perform or omit a specific action in a specific situation (allegedly) 
comparable with the historical example referred to” (Wodak, 2001: 76; also see 
Forchtner, 2014). What distinguishes between the discourses o f the three 
televangelists', however, is the degree o f inclusivity towards particular 
eras/historical references. Most specific to Hamza Yusufs discourse is the use o f 
historical references that span many eras including the M iddle Ages, the 
Enlightenment, Ottoman history and American histories. Baba Ali's sermons, 
feature historical references to World World II and Muslim civilization in Baghdad 
(see below). In addition, religious references (e.g. texts and Q ur’anic allusions) are 
re-contextualized in televangelists' sermons, including Biblical references and 
allusions.
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As I will explain below, the re-contextualisation o f historical references 
serves two functions: a) creating a distinct representation o f Islam (vis-a-vis the 
West); b) creating a common history for Us, Muslims, through highlighting 
particular historical eras, which are thus represented as part o f “our history” . As for 
the use o f religious references, they serve two functions: a) giving legitimacy to 
the claims made by the speaker by virtue o f the authority most Muslims attribute to 
the Qur'an and the Prophet's sayings and b) representing Islam (i.e. those religious 
references) as a dynamic entity that is capable o f seeing through the contemporary 
problems o f Muslims and offering solutions.
9.1. Use of historical references in televangelists’ sermons
As indicated earlier, one historical era that is invoked by Yusuf Estes is the 
M uslim civilization in Spain, which serves to highlight the supremacy o f Islam in 
the M iddle Ages.
Like Yusuf Estes, the sermons by Baba Ali feature a reference to Muslim 
civilization. In his sermon “the pursuit” o f cleanliness, Baba Ali discusses the 
importance o f cleanliness in which he draws upon the Muslim civilization that 
grew in Baghdad.
Example 9.1.
When Europe was going through the dark ages, people were not taking 
showers; they were filthy; at the same time, the Muslim umma was in its 
golden ages and many Muslims were taking Islam seriously. The people 
were clean and bathed regularly? What do you think soap and atir (scent)
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came from? During the time o f Haron El-Rasheed, they were washing the 
streets o f Baghdad with soap and water. That is clean. But these days, 
because you wanna be clean, you are looked upon as being strange. As a 
practising Muslim, cleanliness is very important.
The above example bears a reference to the Golden Age o f Islam, which 
refers to the scientific, cultural and intellectual flourishing that occurred during the 
reign o f the Abbasid Empire in which Baghdad in Iraq became a Centre o f a 
“civilization which drew heavily on the foundations laid by Greece, Byzantium 
and Persia” (Bennison, 2009: 5). One main aspect- according to Estes and Ali- is 
that when Europe was in the Dark Ages, Muslim scholars were able to create a 
flourishing scientific and cultural traditions.
In the above representations o f Muslim civilizations by Estes (who referred 
to Muslim Spain) and Baba Ali (who referred to Abbasid Iraq), one aspect that is 
overlooked is that Muslim civilizations relied on the assimilation between Muslim 
Jewish and Christian scholars. One consequence o f the above omission is that a 
fallacious representation o f Muslim civilizations are given, which are imagined to 
be an exclusively “Muslim endeavor” and in which Europe is imagined to be a 
monolithic entity that Muslims “surpassed”. Moreover, both Baba Ali and Yusuf 
Estes give a simplistic account o f the Muslim civilizations. What is never 
mentioned, for example is the role o f translation, which allowed, inter alia, Muslim 
and Jewish scholars in Baghdad and Andalusia to translate, critique and build up 
on scholarly work from Greece, Byzantium and Persia (see Bennison, 2009: 5-7).
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Like Yusuf Estes and Baba Ali, the Muslim civilization is re-imagined by 
Hamza Yusuf (see section 6.2.2 o f the thesis). Unlike Yusuf Estes and Baba Ali, 
Hamza Yusuf re-imagines a wide spanning for the Muslim civilization that 
stretched to Muslim India and China, as indicated earlier (8.2.2. The contribution 
o f Islam to civilization).
In addition, Hamza Yusuf draws upon Muslim civilization as an 
argumentation strategy premised on the following condition: since Muslims 
contributed to the Western civilization in the past, they have the right to be 
assimilated in the West. Another variation o f this argument is that since Muslims 
have contributed to the Muslim civilization in the past, they should not be abused 
or accused. Other historical eras invoked by Hamza Yusuf include: the Ottoman 
history, the Enlightenment and the ratification o f the Constitution o f the United 
States o f America. This could be interpreted as an attempt by Yusuf to create an 
American Muslim identity in which American histories are considered to be 
equally important and binding, as Islamic histories.
To illustrate the above, on the topic o f the abuse o f detainees in 
Guantanamo Bay, Hamza Yusuf supports his claim about the unjust policies o f the 
the US government during Bush's era by referring to the M agna Carta as an 
important legal document European histories (see below).
Example 9.2.
I spent several hours with Michael Ratner, with Barbara Olshansky in the
Centre o f Constitutional Rights; we were seeing memos from the State
Department, from the department o f justice that was calling to put the
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detainees in the Guantanamo Bay so that they would not have any judicial 
review. This is against the Magna Carta; this is against the Medieval 
European document we as Westerns pride ourselves on; this is against the 
medieval doctrine; we are living in the twenty first century.
Historically speaking, the Magna Carta (Latin for Great Charter) is a 
document forced on King John, who ruled England from 1199 until his death in 
1216, by a group o f his subjects in an attempt to limit his power; the document is 
known in the English speaking world as an important document for setting the rule 
o f constitutional law in England and Europe (e.g. see British Library project:
70taking liberties ).
Another claim made in Hamza Yusufs sermon is that the ideals o f the 
United States o f America are rooted in "Islamic ideals". He refers to an edict of 
toleration issued in Transylvania, what is known now as Romania, under the 
suzerainty o f the Ottoman Empire:
Example 9.3.
Toleration is an Islamic gift to the West; and this can be historically 
proven, because the first edict o f toleration was the edict o f  Buda and it was 
done under the Ottoman Empire, under the suzerainty o f a Unitarian 
Transylvanian Prince.
70 Link to the project: http:/ywww.bl.tik/onlinegallerv/takingliberties/staritems/21niagnacarta.html 
Last accessed 2nd June 2015.
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In the above example, a historical incident is invoked that took place in 
1548 under the Ottoman ruling; the Catholic authorities asked the Pasha o f Buda to 
expel a preacher who was preaching Protestantism. The Pasha o f Buda, however, 
denied their request, and issued an edict o f toleration, which stated that:
Preachers o f the faith invented by Luther should be allowed to preach the 
Gospel everywhere to everybody, whoever wants to hear, freely and 
without fear, and that all Hungarians and Slavs (who indeed wish to do so) 
should be able to listen to and receive the word o f God without any danger 
(Greenwood and Harris, 2011).
A salient point to mention here is that, compared to Muslim Spain, 
frequently cited as the prime o f Muslim civilization in science, literature, art and 
culture, Ottoman history, for instance its multicultural policies, is rather 
underestimated and misrepresented (e.g. see Agoston and Masters, 2009: xxviii). 
As Yusuf recontextualizes the incident o f the Pasha o f Buda, he is setting the 
Ottoman history in a positive light, as part o f "our" Islamic history.
In the same vein, on the topic o f Islam had an impact on the Western 
tradition (Topic 14), Yusuf refers to Edward Pococke, an Orientalist and Arabic 
scholar who influenced the political theorist John Locke:
Example 9.4.
We have also clear evidence that John Locke, one o f the greatest political 
theorists in Western history was influenced by Edward Pococke who just 
happened to be the Professor o f Islamic and Arabic studies at Cambridge
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University. He convinced John Locke to abandon his Trinitarianism and 
embrace Unitarianism, to embrace the unity o f God.
In the above example, Hamza Yusuf refers to one important figure in 
European Enlightenment, Edward Pococke, being influenced by the Islamic 
tradition; this serves to back up Yusuf’s argument o f the impact o f Islam on 
Western traditions.
Another era that Hamza Yusuf recalls is the ratification o f the constitution 
o f the United States o f America in the eighteenth century. This era is invoked 
within Hamza Yusufs reference to the neo-conservative claim that the US is a 
Christian nation. He opposes this argument by inserting one quotation by Thomas 
Jefferson in support o f The Virginia Act for Establishing Religious Freedom 
(1786):
Example 9.5.
Jefferson wrote: it was proposed that the Lord, holy author o f our religion, 
be changed into our lord Jesus Christ, but the proposal was rejected by a 
great majority; this is in Virginia in the legislature, the proposal to replace 
God with our lord Jesus Christ was rejected by a great majority in proof 
that they meant to include within the mantel o f its protection, the Jew and 
the Gentile, the Christian and the Muhammadans, the Hindu and infidel of 
every denomination. And that is the basis o f this country.
By including references such as as the M agna Carta and the ratification o f 
the constitution o f United States o f America, Hamza Yusuf positions him self and
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his audiences as both, Muslims and Westerns, as indicated in “this is against the 
M agna Carta that we as Westerns pride ourselves on” .
Another reference made in the text is the atrocity o f the Holocaust. Yusuf 
refers to the Holocaust in the context o f recounting an incident o f non-Muslims 
handing out pamphlets in solidarity with American Muslims because -h e  says- the 
same type o f fear that led to the Holocaust is now being used against Muslims: 
Example 9.6.
This is what American people were saying because they know that the very 
fear that was created in Nazi Germany against the Jewish people that led to 
the horrific atrocity o f the Holocaust is the same type o f fear that is being 
used to cast the eye o f suspicion upon righteous women, upon virtuous 
women who don’t look very different than the nuns that are revered and 
respected in this culture.
There are two points worth noting in the above quotation. By re- 
contextualizing the Holocaust in the contemporary context o f Muslims, Hamza 
Yusuf is in a way dramatizing the context o f Muslims in the post 9-11 context and 
relativising its meaning as the extermination o f nearly 6 million Jews (e.g. Rossel, 
1992: 16-17). Yet, by describing the Holocaust as a "horrific atrocity", he is 
revealing an ideological position towards the Holocaust that Muslims by 
implication should adopt.
Related to the above excerpt is one article Yusuf wrote, mediated on the 
Internet in many websites, giving reasons why Holocaust denial undermines Islam
326
when it has set rules-long ago- for verifying knowledge. Rejection o f anti-semitism 
is rather a salient point in Yusufs sermons; as he attempts to defy anti-semitic 
rhetoric in some Muslim contexts (e.g. see KhosraviNik (2010) on anti-semitism in 
the political rhetoric of Ahmadinejad).
9.2. Use of religious references
In addition to the use o f historical references, religious references are 
recontextualized in televangelists’ sermons, which includes Qur'anic references 
and references to Prophet's sayings. One function o f the use o f religious references 
is to relate televangelists' sermons to the religious realm; another function o f the 
use o f religious references is to back up the claims made by each televangelist; 
hence, religious references are employed as a persuasive device.
Looking into Yusuf Estes' sermon “Why the West needs Islam”, one claim 
that Yusuf Estes makes is that Muslims in the post 9-11 context are facing 
hardships. Estes draws upon one Qur'anic verse in Arabic, A1 Ankabuut [29:4], 
which states that affliction accompanies belief; the verse reads:
Do men imagine that they will be left (at ease) because they say, we 
believe, and will not be tested with affliction? (A1 Ankabuut 29:4; Pictal's 
translation).
It is worth noting that the above verse was revealed to the Prophet in the 
city o f Mecca where the Prophet and his followers faced opposition at the hands o f
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Quraysh, the powerful clan in Mecca (e.g. see Encyclopedia o f Islam: 11). 
Recalling a verse about the hardships facing Muslims serves to reflect on the 
context o f Muslims that Estes represents, i.e. being “attacked” and 
“misrepresented” .
Another claim made by Estes is that Islam is about content. To support his 
claim, Estes draws on a Qur'anic verse. It states:
(And) lo! those who believe and do good works are the best o f created 
beings [98:8] Their reward is with their Lord: Gardens o f Eden underneath 
which rivers flow, wherein they dwell forever. Allah hath pleasure in them 
and they have pleasure in Him. This is (in store) for him who feareth 
his Lord [98:9].
Only part o f the verse is recited in Arabic, i.e. "radiya Allah 3anhom wa 
rado 3aneh" (Allah hath pleasure in them and they have pleasure in Him) to 
support his claim that Islam is about content. By re-contextualizing the verse, Estes 
is sending a message o f hope as he highlights the misrepresentation facing 
Muslims. This reminds us again o f the rise o f "therapeutic" religion or feel-good 
religion which aims to provide the individual with ontological security (Miller 
2004: 86).
As for Hamza Yusufs sermon, religious references include Qur'anic texts 
and Prophet's sayings. One function o f the recontextualisation o f religious 
references is to support the claims made by Hamza Yusuf. For instance, as Hamza
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Yusuf calls upon his audiences to denounce terrorism, he supports his claim 
through a Q ur’anic reference.
Example 9.7.
And for that reason, the sanctity o f life, we decreed upon (the people o f 
Israel) and by extension upon the M uslims, that anyone who kills a soul, 
without just cause, or brigandry in the earth, terrorism, that is as if  they have
killed all hum anity Every soul is sacred, and this has to be reestablished
on the earth, once again the teaching of Abraham Alih El Salam (Peace be 
upon him).
The above quotation by Yusuf is an explanation o f the meanings o f one 
verse in Surat al Maaidah: verse 32; it states that:
On that account: We ordained for the Children o f Israel that if  any one 
slew a person—unless it be for murder or for spreading m ischief in the 
land- -it would be as if  he slew the whole people: And if  any one saved a 
life, it would be as if  he saved the life o f the whole people. Then 
although there came to them Our Apostles with Clear Signs, yet, even 
after that, many o f them continued to commit excesses in the land (Surat 
al Maaidah: verse 32- Yusuf Ali translation).
As Hamza Yusuf recontextualizes the above verse, he expounds on its 
meanings, foregrounding "and by extension upon Muslims"; to emphasize that 
Islam denounces terrorism. It is worth noting that the meanings in the above verse 
are not specific to the Qur'an but occur in the Talmud, i.e. the rabbinic texts that 
draw on the Hebrew Bible. For instance, the Babylonian Talmud, Folio 37a reads:
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For this reason was man created alone, to teach thee that whoever destroys 
a single soul o f Israel, scripture imputes (guilt) to him as though he had 
destroyed a complete world and whoever preserves a single soul o f Israel, 
scripture ascribes (merit) to him as though he had preserved a complete 
world.
The choice o f a religious text that has similar meanings in Islamic and 
Judaic tradition seems in line with Yusuf’s argument that Abrahamic faith shares 
the sanctity o f life. As I pointed out earlier (see 8.2.1. Islam, an Abrahamic 
tradition), the Muslim identity that Hamza Yusuf is attempting to construct is one 
in which Muslims are not represented as distinct from Jews and Christians but 
rather as having common values among them.
In another instance, on the topic o f the U.S. cannot wage a war on Islam, 
Yusuf invokes-in Arabic- one text from Surat Al Balad:
I do call to witness this City. And thou art a freeman o f this City (Yusuf
Ali's translation)
The above reference to the verse is followed by an explanation in English where 
Hamza Yusuf states:
Example 9.8.
I swear an oath by this land and you are a lawful citizen to this land.
According to exegesis (e.g. see Abd alrahman, 1973), one meaning o f the 
Qur'anic verse is as an assertion to the Prophet and his companions that they would 
finally dwell in Makkah, where -fo r long- they suffered oppression. As the verse is
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recontextualised- Yusuf appropriates the meanings o f the verse: he changes the 
word "city" used in the Qur'anic reference to the generic word "land"; in addition, 
he appropriates "freeman to the city" to a "lawful citizen to this land", a rather 
modem concept. In other words, the meanings o f the Qur'an are re-interpreted in 
light o f the contemporary era, rendering the meanings o f the Qur'an applicable to 
the contemporary times.
Other examples o f religious re-contextualisation include the Prophet's 
sayings. To illustrate, Hamza Yusuf supports his claim that religion is not the 
reason for extremism through quoting a saying by Prophet Mohamed.
Example 9.9.
Every soul is sacred. And that is why our prophet salla Allah 3alih waslam  
(Peace be upon him) warned us: "beware o f extremism in religion, in 
religion because it is extremism in religion that destroyed the peoples 
before you". He would not warn us if  it was not a serious threat to the 
Muslim community.
The use o f direct quotation in the above example gives a vivid presentation 
o f the Prophet (see Semino and Short, 2004: 55 on the use o f direct quotation). In 
addition, the recontextualisation o f the Prophet’s saying in the contemporary 
context o f terrorism/extremism sets the Prophet in a new light; he becomes a 
figure, albeit historical, capable o f enlightening Muslims about their contemporary 
problems.
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In another instance, in topic 17, Islam is innocent o f what it is done in its 
name, the speaker recontextualizes one saying by the prophet to support his 
argument:
Example 9.10.
We have only 500 hadith that are absolutely o f the status o f the Qur'an, and 
one o f them says, naha rasolo Allah salah allah alih wa salam 3an qatl el- 
nesa2 wal awlad, the Prophet o f God forbade the killing o f women and 
children (.) the prophet o f God forbade the killing o f women and children 
(.) the prophet o f God forbade the killing o f women and children.
The repetition o f the phrase “the prophet o f God forbade the killing o f 
women and children” acts as a persuasive device to emphasize the gravity o f 
killing in Islam. In this way, religious resources are represented as viable resources 
that can give an insight into Muslims' contemporary circumstances. Thus, like 
Yusuf Estes, Hamza Yusuf uses religious allusions (e.g. Qur'anic and Prophet's 
sayings) to give more authority to his claims and to relate religion to contemporary 
issues. There are differences, however, in the way religious references are re- 
contextualized in Baba Ali's videos.
First, instead o f using the term the Qur'an says or the Prophet says, a 
broader term “Islam teaches us” is used. To illustrate, in the video “arrogant 
people”, Baba Ali makes use o f an allusion to one saying by the Prophet: “Islam 
teaches us that a person with even a small amount o f arrogance in their heart won't 
enter paradise. So we must be humble, no matter how much success reaches us”, 
which is an allusion to a Prophet's saying.
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Second, one pattern that emerges in Baba Ali's videos is the appearance of 
religious reference on screen, either at the end o f Baba Ali's videos or in the 
middle. This could serve as visual emphasis and utilizes the possibility o f inserting 
graphic elements on YouTube. For example, in his video “racism and pride”, Baba 
Ali reads a letter o f a girl from the Middle East who complains that her father does 
not want to marry her to a man whom he believes is o f “lower class”. After 
delineating the problem. Baba Ali, then, addresses the problem:
Example 9.11.
For all the non-Muslims who watch my show, this sounds a little confusing 
but don't worry. I will make sense o f it a little bit. You see, before Islam, 
people used to be binded by their tribes and their countries, they hold this 
class system that categorize you; then Islam came to free us from this 
ignorant wav o f thinking. Sura 49, aya (verse) 14 (we hear the voice o f 
Baba Ali reading the verse that is now on screen) (figure 9.1.): “Oh, 
mankind, we have created you from a male and female and made you into 
nations and tribes, that you may know one another”. Unfortunately, many 
Muslims choose their culture over their religion; thus you see people who 
appear to be practising Muslims though the things they do have nothing to 
do with Islam. And this is what makes them backward and one o f the 
reasons why Muslims are in the conditions they are today. For all those who 
follow these ignorant rituals, here is a reminder just in case you forgot.
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'0 mankind! We have created you from a male 
and a female, and made you into nations and 
tribes, that you may know one another™'
Qur'an'49:11
Figure 9.1. Recontextualization of Q ur’anic references in Baba A li’s videos
The Qur'anic verse appears on the screen as Baba Ali recites it. A salient 
aspect- in the above example- is how the conflation between culture and religion is 
represented as one reason why Muslims are “backward” (see section 8.3.2. 
Discourse on “ethnic Islam”).
9.3. Conclusion
To conclude, one pattern that emerges in the discourse of the three 
televangelists is the use o f Qur'anic references and Prophet's sayings to give more 
legitimacy to their claims. Furthermore, through the recontextualization of 
religious references, Islam emerges as a viable entity that can guide Muslims 
through their contemporary problems and predicaments. This shows, for example, 
in Hamza Yusufs use o f a saying by the Prophet who enlightens Muslims about the
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contemporary problem of terrorism. It also shows in Yusuf Estes' reference to a 
Qur'anic verse in which the misrepresentation o f Islam/Muslims in mass media is 
linked to a Qur'anic verse that perceives hardships part o f the state o f belief; hence, 
Qur'anic references are represented as dynamic entities relevant to contemporary 
problems. As for Baba Ali, one recurrent phrase he uses is “Islam teaches us” in 
which Qur'anic allusions and Prophet's saying are weaved into the fabric o f his 
YouTube videos guiding Muslims in aspects related to manners and social 
relationships, for example, cleanliness, fair trade and marriage.
As for the use o f historical references, Hamza Yusuf, unlike Yusuf Estes and 
Baba Ali, opens up his discourses to many historical eras that are positively 
represented as part o f “our history”, including the Magna Carta in Europe, the 
history o f the Declaration o f Independence (1776) in the US and references to 
scholars in the Middle Ages that were influenced by the Muslim civilization (e.g. 
John Locke and Edward Pococke).
In addition, one common aspect between Yusuf Estes and Baba Ali is the 
use o f the Islamic civilization in Spain and Baghdad as a reference point in which 
Muslims were at an “advantage” compared to Europeans, a comparison that in my 
view is fallacious. This is because this representation abides by a mode o f thinking 
that perceives Islam and West as two (antagonistic) forces that were/are in 
competition, creating a dichotomy o f US/Muslims and Them/Europeans/Westerns.
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Chapter 10. Discussion and reflections
I started this study with a reference to my visit to an island in Hurghada in 
2003. Reflecting back on my PhD journey (long, mountaineering and 
adventurous!), the encounter with a young middle-class woman, a fan o f the 
Egyptian televangelist Amr Khaled, seems to have been the starting point o f my 
inquiry and curiosity about this phenomenon. Now, I can ask: What was happening 
to the world that I was not aware o f at that time, soaking the sunshine in Egypt? 
And how has televangelism developed since it first appeared in Egypt in the late 
1990s?
Well, “we are living in the twenty first century” . Now, from my vantage point 
here at Lancaster (you may like to imagine me, pondering, on a mountain now!), 
the 21st century implies: a) the widespread o f global media technologies b) the rise 
o f infotainment network society c) the advent o f web 2.0 and d) the rise o f the 
consumer societies (see Chapters 1-4 o f the thesis).
A question that I have explored in my PhD thesis is: what might be the 
broader dynamics this phenomenon relates to and what might it indicate about the 
representation o f religion online?
Therefore, let me first summarize the main theoretical cornerstones o f the 
thesis as I reflect on the above-mentioned questions.
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Chapter 1 has outlined the popularity o f televangelism and its hybridity, 
exploring the research context, the rationale behind the choice o f the Internet as a 
medium o f data collection and the criteria used in the choice o f three case studies 
and selected data.
In Chapter 2 , 1 focused on the characteristics o f Muslim televangelism as a 
phenomenon that is particularly popular among Muslim youth. I have argued that 
televangelism is a complex phenomenon that is sustained by media power and the 
contemporary media culture. Two theoretical frameworks account for the 
popularity o f this phenomenon, first, Giddens' (1984, pp. 95-110) “space-time” 
distanciation through which media outputs can be re-embedded in new contexts in 
different times and places; second, Kellner's conception (2003) o f “media 
spectacle” and the ability to seize massive audiences as a characteristic feature o f 
contemporary media culture. As I have demonstrated in Chapter 6, one aspect that 
Hamza Yusuf and Yusuf Estes highlight in their self-representation is their ability 
to attract wide audiences to their programmes. Note, for example, how the video­
edition o f Hamza Yusufs and Yusuf Estes' excerpts features long shots in which 
the camera pans to massive audiences attending the speech event. The ability to 
attract wide audiences is -likewise- echoed in Baba Ali's YouTube sermons; for 
example, as he starts one o f his YouTube videos, stating “sixty thousand views, are 
these people really watching?!”
In Chapter 3 , 1 moved on to explore the socio-historical context o f Muslims 
in the West, being the immediate audience o f televangelists' sermons. I have 
focused on the theoretical underpinnings o f “individual” and “collective” identities' 
construction and its relevance to the theorization o f Muslim identities' construction
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in the West. First, research (e.g. Wodak et al 2009) has postulated that collective 
identities are not a static phenomenon but are in a process o f change and 
transformation; hence, one impetus o f the present study has been to explore what 
patterns o f representations might be common among the three televangelists. 
Second, since identities are in a continuous process o f transformation and change, I 
have argued against the essentialization o f Muslim identities by attributing 
particular characteristics/features to Islam/Muslims. Thus, from the top o f an 
imaginary mountain, I would like now to say: “never say Muslim identity, rather 
identitieeeeeees” .
A thread o f discussion I have further pursued in chapter 3 is the impact of 
the processes o f globalization and new media technologies in providing platforms 
for the emergence o f “transnational” Islam. I have speculated that one reason o f the 
popularity o f the three case studies is that they fit into the processes o f 
“transnational” Islam relying on the easiness o f communication and the rise o f 
digital Islam. The latter allows Muslims to live and/or re-live aspects o f their 
religious experiences, for example, through listening to a YouTube sermon by a 
televangelist online or through downloading the call for prayers (adan) on their 
mobile phones.
Another important aspect I have drawn upon in this chapter is the specific 
context o f Muslim youth in the West. Using the UK as an example, an important 
point I have discussed is the dissatisfaction o f Muslim youth with the ethnic Islam 
o f their parents and the intellectual and social challenges they face as a result o f 
growing up in the UK. A feature o f this context is the call on a critical approach to 
Islamic traditions by scholars such as Amina Wadud (1999) and Sardar (2015).
338
The analysis o f televangelists' sermons has shown that these layers of 
contexts are-to different extents- echoed in televangelists' discourses; for example, 
a common discourse topic among the three televangelists is the misrepresentation 
o f Islam. There is also some sort o f critical engagement by Hamza Yusuf and Baba 
Ali. The former is critical o f George Bush's policies in the Middle East and of 
antisemitic rhetoric by some Muslims. The latter is critical o f cultural practices 
such as forced marriage and lack o f observance to personal behavior (e.g. 
cleanliness and fair trade).
Moving on to Chapter 4 “Religion and televangelism in cyberspace”, I have 
explored the rise o f religion on the Internet being an important medium through 
which televangelists' sermons are mediated and re-mediated. I have explored three 
main themes that are crucial to the understanding o f religion online, televangelism 
being one o f its manifestations: a) the debate as to whether the Internet can provide 
a virtual public sphere; b) contemporary manifestations o f religion online; c) the 
use o f online spaces by the three televangelists and their fans.
Firstly, I have argued that the Internet has become a platform for stance- 
making and the expression o f multiple views. Besides exploring relevant literature 
(e.g. Mosemghvdlishvili and Jansz 2013), the study has examined two up-to-date 
examples that show the diversity o f religious views online: the Vatican as an 
example o f traditional religious authority and Jewish Voice for Peace which has 
emerged as an important independent platform for the expression o f 
political/religious views in favor o f Palestinian rights during the war/conflict in 
Gaza (August 2014).
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Secondly, I have shown how the Internet has changed the expression o f 
religious faith online through online platforms such as Second Life in which 
worshipers can be avatars and have the flexibility to perform rituals at a time 
convenient to them. This points to an aspect related to televangelism; as users can 
view televangelists' sermons online asynchronously (at the time convenient to 
them).
Thirdly, chapter 4 has also explored the online spaces that televangelists 
use; for example, Facebook, YouTube and blogspots. It is worth noting here how 
televangelists' fans take an active role in popularizing their discourses through 
sharing their posts on Facebook or linking to their sermons in their blogs. Related 
to this is how Baba Ali has had a visibility on Kick Starter, an online space that is 
not traditionally associated with religion, projecting his identity as an entrepreneur 
(Chapter 6).
Fourthly, in the light o f the analysis o f the comments and posts by 
televangelists' fans, another finding of the study is that the widespread o f media 
technology appears to have made it possible for some Muslims to imagine or re- 
imagine a global Muslim community.
In Chapter 5, I have outlined the approaches I have employed in my 
investigation o f the phenomenon o f televangelism and in the analytical chapters 
(Chapters 6-9). Two approaches I have integrated are the DHA (e.g. Wodak, 2001, 
2011; and Wodak and Angouri, 2014) and the theory o f Visual Grammar (e.g. Van 
Leeuwen, 2011). To justify why the choice o f the DFIA is well-suited for the study,
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I have traced the historical development o f Islamic preaching in the light o f 
relevant literature on the homily (e.g. Gaffney, 2004 and Hirschkind, 2001; 2006), 
as its analysis, understanding and explanation also depends on an in-depth 
historical contextualization (Chapter 8 and 9). I have differentiated between 
televangelism aimed at the everyday life o f Muslims and the waaz genre that 
focuses on the themes o f death and the Day o f Judgment. Thus, I have explained 
that the choice o f the DHA, and its emphasis on the layers o f context surrounding 
discourse, apart from its theory on identity construction and its discourse theory, is 
well-suited for the examination o f Muslim televangelism as a complex 
phenomenon and for the analysis o f televangelists' sermons as a multi-modal field 
in which aspects o f the situational context such as dress code and gesture 
contribute to the process o f meaning-making. The DHA has also allowed for the 
examination o f the contemporary discourse topics the three televangelists allude to. 
In light o f the DHA, I was able to take up the challenging task o f deconstructing 
the meanings o f historical/religious references in televangelists’ sermons and the 
meanings o f Qur'anic and biblical references/texts, besides the examination o f 
televangelists' use o f rhetorical and argumentation strategies relevant to identities' 
construction.
Having provided an explanatory framework o f the phenomenon o f 
televangelism and the development o f the study, in the following, I summarize 
some answers to the research questions.
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10.1. Answers to Research Questions
How do three of the Muslim televangelists popular in the West represent their 
identities and construct their authorities? What discursive and multi-modal 
strategies they draw upon?
In Chapter 6, I have examined the self-presentation strategies o f the three 
televangelists. I was able to observe that in their sermons, televangelists construct 
multiple identities, drawing on many modes, including verbal language (e.g. 
choice o f topics), dramatic elements (e.g. use o f staging, dress codes and music) 
and camera techniques (e.g. reaction shots).
The analysis has revealed two types o f religious celebrities. On the one 
hand, Yusuf Estes and Hamza Yusuf construct their identities inter alia as 
preachers, a figure traditionally associated with authority (Gaffney 2004). One 
example o f Yusuf Estes' self-representation as a preacher is the sermon “Islam 
tomorrow” in which Estes' authority is enacted visually through a) occupying a 
higher position than his audience, and b) wearing a semi-traditional garb 
representing the “power dress code” traditionally associated with preachers and 
religious scholars. In other YouTube excerpts, Estes represents him self as a 
proselytizer. One example is a YouTube video by Estes that has attracted millions 
o f hits on YouTube in which Estes converted a young black man to Islam. As I 
have indicated in Chapter 6, a salient feature in Estes’ performance is the creation 
o f a spectacle in which the camera pans to huge audiences who are holding their 
mobiles and taking photos o f Estes and the new convert. I showed that many
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elements were integrated to render Estes' performance a dramatic one, including 
the use o f music-to signal the movement from one “organizational” frame to the 
next- graphic elements and gestures.
As for Hamza Yusuf, I have suggested that he constructs his identity, inter 
alia, as a preacher. His sermon “the danger o f heedlessness” is a case in point. It 
draws on the admonition genre or waaz as he discusses the topic o f heedlessness 
and the Day o f Judgment typical o f the waaz genre. As I have indicated in Chapter 
6 (section 6.2.2. Yusuf), the situational context proved to be important in 
constructing Yusufs identities. He wears a suit and a cloak; thus creating a hybrid 
“modem-traditional dress code” . The use o f Arabic terms in the sermon contributes 
to his representation as a learned scholar.
On other occasions, Hamza Yusuf presents him self as a public speaker. 
Unlike his dress code in “the danger o f heedlessness”, in his sermon “a message to 
humanity”, he wears a suit. On this occasion, the celebrity status o f Hamza Yusuf 
is visually constructed through the camera panning to huge audiences and reaction 
shots featuring young women o f multiple ethnicities pondering over the claims 
made by Yusuf. Unlike his sermon “the danger o f heedlessness” which aims at 
reminding the audience o f “reckoning” and remembering God, in his sermon “a 
message to humanity”, he converges towards political discourse as he invokes 
topics and sub-topics on US policies in the Middle East, problems o f Aids in 
Africa, unemployment in the US and the importance o f the recognition o f the 
Palestinian cause.
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M oving on to Baba Ali, I have illustrated that he gains his authority through 
his expression o f “informality” and “ordinariness” . This is constructed through 
multimodal means. In terms o f dress code and staging, Baba Ali sits on an arm 
chair (grey wall is his background) and wears casual clothes. Other strategies 
indicate his self-representation o f ordinariness such as the use o f slang and 
colloquial register (e.g. Oki dop; I love it!). Another important strategy o f Baba 
Ali' self-representation is his invitation to his audiences to take part in the creation 
o f his videos and/or rate and comment on them. The YouTube comments - 
following Baba Ali's comments- further endorse his expression o f ordinariness and 
his self-representation as a “funny” guy.
How is Islam and the West linguistically referred to and predicated in the 
sermons of the three televangelists?
In Chapter 7 o f the thesis, I have focused on the construction o f in-groups 
and out-groups in televangelists' sermons. This has entailed an examination o f the 
intended audience in televangelists' sermons and their representation o f 
Islam/Muslims. I have demonstrated that the three televangelists employ different 
degrees o f inclusivity in constructing in-groups and out-groups.
Firstly, one discursive strategy in Yusuf Estes' sermon is “calculated 
ambivalence” which can be taken to mean: “the fact that one utterance carries at 
least two more or less contradictory meanings, oriented towards at least two 
different audiences” (Wodak and Forchtner, 2014: 237). On the one hand, the West 
is anthropomorphized and animated as being an entity that is attacking Muslims
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and being antagonistic to it (describing it as “backward”). A negative 
representation o f the West is also given through associating the West with 
metaphors o f disease and racial inequality. On the other hand, this negative 
representation is contradicted through the use o f a) disclaimers that this negative 
representation does not apply to all people in the West b) the use o f the topos o f 
ignorance to justify that some people might represent Muslims/Islam out o f 
ignorance and c) the creation o f a sub-group o f people in the West “searching for 
the truth”. In this way, Estes draws on the strategy o f calculated ambivalence, 
constructing two ideological positions while apparently aiming to appeal to 
Western (non-Muslim) audiences.
Another discursive strategy I have identified relates to the different uses o f 
the pronoun “we” through which Estes represents him self as both an insider and 
outsider to the out-group, the West. He is an insider when he positions him self in a 
position o f knowing about problems in the West (e.g. “we still have problems in 
the West o f women holding high position”). He also represents him self as an 
outsider (to the West) by homogenizing and excluding it from the boundaries o f the 
in-group through negative predication (see Richardson, 2004: 75- 93).
Moving on to Hamza Yusufs sermon, I have outlined how it contrasts with 
Yusuf Estes' discourse in terms o f its ideological positioning. First, he positions 
him self as both Western and Muslim through the use o f personal narratives: “I was 
bom  in this country” and through the use o f perspectivisation strategies such as 
“we as Western”, “I would like to talk to you tonight in essence as Muslim and as 
American” . Second, Yusuf creates a parallel representation o f Islam and America;
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both are hijacked by a select group o f extremists (an out-group). Related to this is 
the use o f positive evaluative terms to describe Americans (e.g. in the heart o f the 
Americans is the love o f truth, love o f virtue). I have also indicated that the 
pronoun “we” in the case o f Hamza Yusuf has three referents: a) American 
Muslims b) Muslims c) humanity. Thus, he appears to offer a more inclusive 
approach to his representation o f the Muslim community which reminds us o f the 
conception o f the umma in Medina that included believers and non-believers in its 
boundaries o f solidarity.
Baba Ali, however, appears to evade the nexus o f Islam/West in his 
sermons. It appears that the mediation o f his sermons (exclusively) on YouTube 
has helped shape the audience he imagines and addresses. The pronoun “you” is 
commonly used in his sermons to mean two referents a) general use o f you (non- 
Muslims/M uslims) and b) specific referents to Muslims and c) specific referents to 
characters whom he criticizes (such as ethnic parents). This serves as a persuasive 
device to directly impact the viewer and could be interpreted as being related to the 
medium o f video-blogging on YouTube. The assumption here is that by blogging 
on YouTube we are imagining an individual viewer watching us unlike giving a 
sermon (or a speech) to co-present audiences.
In this way, the three televangelists differ in their representation of 
Islam/Muslims. However, one common aspect in the discourse o f the three 
televangelists is that they draw on content-related warrants in their representation 
o f Islam/Muslims (see below). These appear to have two interrelated functions: a) 
defending Islam against being a religion that supports terrorism; b) responding to
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content-related arguments used in some discriminatory rhetoric, for example by the 
far-right (see Wodak 2015). I list the content-related warrants used by the three 
televangelists:
1) Topos o f number
This content-related warrant relies on the conditional: since Muslims live in 
Europe in large numbers, Islam cannot teach terrorism (Baba Ali). Hamza Yusuf 
argues that because Muslims exist in large numbers, they have a responsibility to 
reconcile between Muslims and non-Muslims. Yusuf Estes argues that though 
Muslims live in Europe in large numbers, what matters is the behavior.
2) Topos o f abuse
This content-related warrant relies on the conditional: since there is a sub-group o f 
people that abuses Islam and the majority o f Muslims are peaceful, this sub-group 
cannot be taken to represent Muslims. Hence, Islam cannot be blamed.
3) Topos o f ignorance
This content-related warrant relies on the conditional: since some Muslims are 
ignorant about Islam, they cannot be held responsible for representing 
Islam/Muslims. This is used by Baba Ali as he points out that some Muslims are 
ignorant o f their religion (see 8.3. Analysis o f Baba Ali's videos). Another variation 
o f this argument is that since some non-Muslims are ignorant o f what Islam means, 
they cannot be held responsible for their beliefs. This topos is employed by Yusuf 
Estes and Hamza Yusuf who calls on Muslims to educate non-M uslims about Islam 
which presupposes non-Muslims' lack o f knowledge about Islam and its teachings.
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4) The notion o f “true” Islam
One assumption shared by the three televangelists is that there is an “essence” or 
“true” Islam that some Muslims have lost contact with. This functions as an 
argumentation strategy to justify why some Muslims have adopted practices that 
are un-Islamic e.g. terrorism and indiscriminate violence. In his sermon "Why the 
West needs Islam", Yusuf Estes reiterates that "we have deviated far away from 
true Islam". In his sermons, Hamza Yusuf repeatedly remarks: "we/Muslims have 
lost our moral high ground".
5) The claim o f the “responsible Muslim”
If  Muslims are misrepresented, then the solution that the three televangelists 
propose is that Muslims have a role (or degree o f agency) in correcting the 
misconceptions that some people have about Islam. Yusuf Estes suggests that after 
a non-M uslim deals with a Muslim then s/he should have a good/better notion 
about Islam, thus, instructing his audiences that they have a responsibility to 
educate non-Muslims about the religion. The same proposal/appeal is made by 
Hamza Yusuf who claims that Muslims have a responsibility to correct people's 
misinterpretation o f the religion. Baba Ali calls upon Muslims to practice Islam 
correctly, since in his view, this is the best way to counter the negative views about 
Islam.
Other topoi are used by Hamza Yusuf; for example, the topos o f rights/law 
as he points out addressing Muslims: “you should know, you are American, you 
have every right to be here”; the topos o f rights relies on the conditional: “ if a law
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or an otherwise codified norm prescribes or forbids a specif politico-administrative 
action, the action has to be performed or omitted” (Wodak 2001: 76). Hamza Yusuf 
subverts the topos o f culture used in discriminatory rhetoric to exclude particular 
groups (see Wodak and Boukala, 2014), for example, in his statement: “Islam did 
not divorce people, from its land, its culture, its tradition, whenever Islam went, in 
Muslim Spain, in China, it contributed to the inherent genius o f these people” .
What discourses and fields of actions do the three televangelists invoke in 
their discourses and to what effect?
In Chapter 8, I have investigated the discourse topics and fields o f actions 
that each televangelist invokes. Figure 10.1. below captures the main discourse 
topics and fields o f actions in the selected data o f the three televangelists.
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Islam is an Abrahamic 
Tradition
Criticism of George 
Bush's policies
Fields of action in Baba Ali's 
sermons: Creation of public opinion 
about Islam and against cultural 
practices such as forced marriage.
Fields of action in Yusuf Estes' 
sermon: Creation of public opinion 
about Islam through presenting Islam 
as an attractive religion.
Fields of action in Hamza Yusufs sermons: 
creation of public opinion about Islam; formation 
of attitudes against George Bush's policies in the 
Middle East.
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As can be seen in the above figure, Muslim civilization in the Middle Ages 
represents one common topic in the sermons o f the three televangelists. Hamza 
Yusuf re-imagines a wider geographical spanning o f the Muslim civilization that 
includes China, India and Spain. To Hamza Yusuf, the Muslim civilization rather 
acts as a discursive strategy that aims to legitimize the existence o f Islam/Muslims 
in the West; Muslims have contributed to Western civilization and as such should 
not be abused or accused (of terrorism). Yusuf Estes, however, imagines this 
civilization as exclusive to Muslims which is historically not true since the 
civilization in Spain was characterized by the intellectual engagement and 
assimilation o f Muslim, Jewish and Christian scholars, as discussed earlier (see 
9.1. Use o f historical references in televangelists' sermons). According to Yusuf 
Estes and Baba Ali, the Muslim civilization (in Spain and Baghdad respectively) is 
used to testify to the “supremacy” o f Islam in the Middle Ages, and ideologically 
speaking, this representation abides by a mode o f thinking in which Islam and the 
West are misconceived as two (monolithic) entities that are in rivalry.
Misrepresentation o f Islam is another main topic in the discourse o f the 
three televangelists. Baba Ali's YouTube videos “Muslim while flying” and 
“randomly checked at the airport” create un-real scenarios o f Muslims who face 
troubles in the airport, for acting shady in an airport or incidentally saying “the 
food was a bomb!” . Yusuf Estes creates a mental image o f Muslim/Muslims who 
are being “attacked” by the West. Hamza Yusuf refers to misrepresentation o f 
Islam in his sermon “Changing the tide: Islam in America” , in which he employs a 
metaphor o f  “the Muslim community” under “siege” in his reference to the 
misrepresentation o f Islam in mass media. This finding confirms other research
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(e.g. van Zoonen, Vis and Mihelj 2010 and El Nawawy and Khamis, 2009) which 
has pointed out that misrepresentation o f Islam is a common topic on YouTube 
videos about Islam (see Chapter 4), which further asserts that Islamophobia and 
anti-Muslim discourse are problems facing Muslims, particularly in the West.
One common field o f action among the three televangelists is the formation 
o f public opinion and attitudes towards Islam. Yusuf Estes presents Islam in a 
positive light through relating it to narratives o f celebrities' conversion. Hamza 
Yusuf presents Islam in a positive light by alluding to the Muslim civilization that 
stretched across many geographical areas and that paved the way for the Western 
one. Baba Ali- like the other televangelists- employs argumentative strategies in 
which he gives legitimacy to Islam through the use o f the topos o f number, abuse 
and ignorance, discussed earlier.
Both Hamza Yusuf and Baba Ali appear to be aimed at raising awareness o f 
(political and) social problems. Hamza Yusuf, for example, addresses sub-topics on 
Guantanamo Bay, Palestine and Africa to bring about change in the political views 
o f his audience.
Baba Ali appears to be focused on the family domain and personal 
relationships; for example, as he talks on behalf o f Muslim youth addressing 
parents that they should be aware that young Muslims do not understand their 
“cultural” practices and are not leaving their home countries (see 8.3.2. Discourse 
on “ethnic Islam”).
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Thus, in light o f the above, we can conclude that the three televangelists 
are-in varied ways- addressing the socio-historical contexts o f Muslims. Despite 
their different ideological positions, the three aim to form public opinion towards 
public opinion towards Islam/Muslims. Baba Ali also addresses issues that appear 
to be problematic to young Muslims such as inter-generational gaps and the 
redefinition o f the meanings/role o f culture in Muslim practices, as discussed in 
Chapter 2. Hamza Yusuf converges towards political rhetoric by opposing the 
practices o f George Bush in the Middle East.
What historical eras (religious and non-religious) do televangelists invoke in 
their sermons and to what effects?
As I have pointed out earlier (Chapter 9), history is an identity-constitutive 
element (see Heer et al 2008). Thus, by exploring the religious and historical 
references used by each televangelist, I aimed to find out the religious and 
historical references each televangelist considers authoritative and binding.
The analysis o f televangelists' sermons has demonstrated that the three 
televangelists draw on Qur'anic references and the Prophet's sayings to give 
legitimacy to their claims. One assumption common among the three televangelists 
is that the Qur'an and Prophet's sayings can guide Muslims and instruct them on 
their contemporary problems. For example, Yusuf Estes links the misrepresentation 
o f Islam to a Qur'anic verse that points out that hardships accompany belief. 
Hamza Yusuf substantiates the topos o f right (You are American, you have every 
right to be here) with a Qur'anic verse that promises M ohamed that he would be
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able to stay in Mecca after the hardships he had witnessed. Thus, religion is 
presented as a force capable o f enlightening Muslims on contemporary issues 
related to them, providing them with ontological security and meanings o f 
reconciliation.
The re-contextualization o f Qur'anic verses that belong to the Meccan era, 
in which Muslims suffered oppression, is a common aspect I have identified in the 
sermons o f Estes and Yusuf. This could be interpreted as giving a conciliatory note 
to Muslims, in the context o f the rise o f Islamophobia. A plausible meaning o f the 
recontextualization o f meanings from the Meccan era is that: if  Muslims (as a 
historical community) have faced hardships in the past and were able to overcome 
them, then they are most likely to do so in contemporary times. In this way, 
religious references are reinterpreted and gain new meanings in televangelists' 
sermon, i.e. as being relevant and applicable to their contemporary contexts.
As I have mentioned above, historical eras invoked by the three 
televangelists are the Middle Ages in which Muslim civilization flourished in 
Andalusia and Baghdad. We can, however, revive our understanding o f this era in 
light o f televangelists' representation. First, one criticism that could be leveled to 
televangelists' representation o f this era is that it adopts a narrow view on the 
Muslim civilization-fallaciously imagined- as exclusive to Muslims. An example 
o f multi-cultural engagement in Muslim civilization is M aimonides, one o f the 
prominent theologians in Andalusia whose work in philosophy and theology was 
influenced by and influenced other great Medieval scholars such as Averroes, 
Avicenna and Al-Farabi (e.g. see Stroumsa 2009, pp. 73-80).
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Moreover, I would like to point out that Hamza Yusuf, in comparison to 
Yusuf Estes and Baba Ali, invokes American/European historical references as 
being important to his self-representation and to his representation o f 
Islam/Muslims. This can be detected in perspectivisation strategies such as “this is 
against the M agna Carta that we as Westerns pride ourselves on” and in other 
references made to the American constitution and the founders o f the United 
States. This is a different form o f recontextualisation than the one used by Yusuf 
Estes who -likewise- invokes figures that are important in the history o f the United 
States (M alcolm X and Martin Luther King). Yet these are re-contextualized within 
the discursive strategy o f the positive representation o f Us and the negative 
representation o f Them (the West). In other words, in both cases, Yusuf and Estes 
use historical figures as a topos o f authority to give legitimacy to their claims, 
though with different ideological outcomes, namely creation o f the West as an out­
group in the case o f Yusuf Estes and the creation o f the West/America as an in­
group in the case o f Hamza Yusuf.
In what ways there might be patterns of conformity of representation between 
the three selected televangelists?
As I have indicated earlier, one aspect that is common among the three 
televangelists is the appeal to the unity o f the Muslim community. This is obvious 
in Hamza Yusufs call on Muslims to denounce terrorism “in one voice” and in the 
visual images that precede Yusuf Estes' sermon in which Muslims are imagined to 
be in harmony and unified, including black and white people. It is also manifest in 
Baba Ali's criticism o f Muslims who are proud o f their own nations and his
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creation o f irreal scenarios in which Muslims make friends only if  they belong to 
the same country (e.g. his YouTube video “Muslims at work”). Appeal to unity is 
therefore a theme that runs through televangelists' sermons.
Another pattern o f conformity is that the three televangelists are -in varied 
ways- responding to the socio-historical context o f Muslims in the West. Hamza 
Yusuf subverts the topos o f Islam as a threat by pointing to more serious problems 
than Islamic fanatics such as Aids in Africa and unemployment. He also subverts 
the topos o f culture through making the claim that Islam has not changed the 
culture o f the communities it entered.
Baba Ali focuses on problems particularly relevant to Muslim youth such as 
the inter-generational gap and the discontent o f Muslim youth with the cultural 
practices o f their parents. This is reflected in the comments following his YouTube 
video “my culture” ; as some commenters have expressed their agreement with 
Baba Ali's stance on ethnic Islam. Other followers have negotiated the meanings of 
culture and religion, which again lends truth to the proposition o f the Internet as a 
virtual public spheres where views can be contested and negotiated.
Yusuf Estes responds to anti-Muslim discourse and Muslims' awareness o f 
misrepresentation (after 9/11) through engaging in the strategy o f the positive 
representation o f Us (Muslims) and the negative representation o f them 
(West/ems).
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In light of the above, we can assume that one o f the reasons o f the 
popularity o f the three televangelists is that is they have engaged with the socio- 
historical context o f Muslims in the West.
Related to the above is the use o f recurrent argumentation strategies by the 
three televangelists to give legitimacy to Islam/Muslims in the light o f the rise o f 
anti-Muslim discourse; for example, that Muslims are in the West in large 
numbers, that Muslims have contributed to Western civilization and that only a few 
M uslims abuse religion and thus cannot be representative o f all Muslims.
In addition, common to the representation o f the three televangelists is the 
invocation o f Qur'anic references and Prophet's sayings as binding and 
authoritative. Related to this is the invocation o f references (by Estes and Yusuf) 
from the era o f Mecca in which the Prophet and his companions suffered 
oppression.
Thus, despite the different styles o f the three televangelists and their 
different individual identities, some recurrent themes and argumentation strategies 
underlie their discourses.
Another salient point I would like to highlight is how the three 
televangelists assume Muslims (and their audiences broadly speaking) to be active 
receivers who can change attitudes. This is implied in the fields o f actions the three 
televangelists create in which they call upon their audiences, inter alia, to adopt 
particular attitudes to counter the assumptions communicated about Muslims in
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mass media. This is substantiated through a variety o f rhetorical tools such as the 
use o f rhetorical questions (e.g. “who hijacked my religion?”), imperatives (e.g. 
“think about it”), metaphors (e.g. “our community is under siege”) and parallelism 
(we (Muslims) reject indiscriminate killing whether it is an Israeli child , Russian 
child , we reject it).
10.2. Televangelism: The changing face of “religious discourse”
This study makes general claims about the representation o f religion 
(online) in the twenty first century. First, as I have demonstrated, televangelism is a 
complex phenomenon that can be contextualized in digital Islam, fragmentation of 
religious authority and increased mediation, among other aspects. The analysis of 
televangelists' online spaces, users' practice in Chapter 4 and the self­
representation strategies o f televangelists in Chapter 6 indicates that televangelists- 
invariably- draw on a variety o f multiple modes including the use o f graphic 
elements, camera techniques (e.g. long shots), songs, images, and music. This 
suggests that in a similar way to politico-tainment, discussed in Chapter 2, religion 
has gone down the route o f entertainment; it is thus, possible to coin the term 
“religio-tainm enf ’ to refer to the manifold manifestations o f the blurring between 
religion and entertainment that are emerging online (e.g. televangelism, religious 
songs, hip hop religious bands and stand-up comedy).
Moreover, contemporary media culture has helped shape televangelism. 
One aspect I have discussed earlier is how aspects o f media culture are reflected in 
the sermons o f the three televangelists, for example, in their ability to create
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spectacles and seize audiences. Televangelism also converges towards popular 
culture, for example through the use of sound bites (borrowed from journalism) as 
in Yusuf Estes' examined excerpts and the integrating o f advertisements or generic- 
features related to advertisements in the sermons o f Baba Ali and Yusuf Estes (e.g. 
imperatives and rhetorical questions). The study also identifies the convergence o f 
religious discourse to political rhetoric in Hamza Yusufs discourse. 10
Second, the study has demonstrated how the accessibility o f new media 
such as Facebook and blogspots has widened the circle o f individuals who can 
express their views and religious knowledge. For example, one practice that 
accompanies the reception o f televangelists' messages on new media is users' 
advertising their own Islamic online spaces; they aim to attract more “likes” or 
visibility through televangelists' online spaces (Chapter 4).
Third, the study attests to the development o f religious discourses online 
and the development o f televangelism as a specific media genre. Related to 
televangelism is the emergence o f religious celebrities who can navigate multiple 
discourses and construct multiple identities (Chapter 6). In addition, since the 
emergence o f Khaled in Egypt in the late 1990s, televangelism has now embraced 
different styles o f preaching and self-presentation strategies.
Another important aspect the study illustrates is that new media (e.g. 
blogspots and Facebook pages) has enabled some users to re-imagine cross- 
bordering (global) Muslim community not tied to specific ethnicities or localities, 
i.e. a virtual umma.
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From a discursive point o f view, the present study has substantiated the 
claim that televangelism constitutes an Islamic popular culture. Particular 
meanings and arguments are mediated and negotiated online (see answer to 
Research questions above), despite the fact that the three televangelists belong to 
different generations and have (different) multi-faceted individual identities.
10.3. Limitations of the Study
Below I indicate three limitations o f the study, which were due to space and 
time limitations.
Firstly, only a few sermons are examined for each televangelist. This is due 
to the constraints o f analyzing spoken data and the time and labor intensive 
transcription process. Since the sermons by Hamza Yusuf and Yusuf Estes are 
rather long (about an hour each), this has allowed for an examination o f one 
sermon for each televangelist. However, I have attempted to overcome this 
limitation through substantiating my analysis by watching, observing and taking 
notes o f televangelists' sermons and have supplemented my analysis with as much 
information as possible, by exploring televangelists' self-representation strategies 
and in identifying the discursive patterns relevant to Muslim identities' 
construction in their sermons.
Another limitation is related to the design o f the study. This study has 
examined the discursive and multi-modal strategies that the three televangelists 
draw upon in constructing identities for themselves and for their imagined Muslim
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communities. It has not involved interviews with the televangelists themselves, 
which might have been useful in exploring their intentionality o f employing 
particular discursive strategies (e.g. the positive representation o f America/West 
by Hamza Yusuf). Interviewing the three televangelists could have given further 
insights into the meanings o f being a “religious celebrity” in the contemporary era 
and the practices o f televangelists' fans.
Moreover, the study has not involved interviews with the audiences or 
doing ethnographic fieldwork on the reception o f televangelists' sermons. This 
might have given us more knowledge o f the reasons why particular televangelists 
appeal to them and in what ways and directions these televangelists are impacting 
and influencing their way o f life.
10.4. Contributions of the study
This study has been an innovative attempt to apply the Discourse Historical 
Approach, developed by Ruth Wodak and scholars at the Vienna School o f 
Linguistics, to religious discourse (see Wodak, 2001; 2009; 2011; 2015; Wodak 
and Reisigl, 2001; Wodak and Meyer, 2009). Broadly speaking, the study has 
challenged one (common) assumption about religious discourse: that religious 
discourse is rather irrational and unworthy o f critical engagement (see Davie, 
2007: 53). The study has clearly illustrated that contemporary religious discourse 
(has become) is a hybrid fabric that draws on many topics, religious and historical 
references and employs both formal and content-related argumentation strategies. I 
thus call for further application o f Critical Discourse Studies to religious discourse
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in its traditional and contemporary forms (e.g. exegesis, Qur'anic interpretations, 
hip hop (Islamic) lyrics and religious songs).
The study has also contributed to the understanding and analysis of 
televangelists' construction o f Muslim identities. This seems to be a neglected area 
o f research in the light o f the lack o f attention given to religious discourse in 
Critical Discourse Studies (Chilton, 2004: xi). Thus, this study thus feeds into the 
increasing body o f research on identities' constructions (e.g. see Wodak et al 2009 
on Austrian identities, Krzyzanowski (2010) on European identities and Unger 
(2013) on Scots' identities).
From a sociological perspective, the study has contributed to an in-depth 
understanding o f the complex phenomenon o f current televangelism. It has related 
this phenomenon to the many dimensions and aspects o f the twenty first century 
(e.g. rise o f infotainment consumer society, e-religion and the emergence o f new 
online platforms for expressing social/political views). The study further traces the 
development o f televangelism as a genre that embraces many different styles o f 
self-representation and preaching (e.g. serious and comedic styles as Hamza Yusuf 
vis-a-vis Baba Ali) and shows how the three televangelists are able to borrow 
elements from other genres such as journalism  (as in the use o f sound bites), 
advertisements (by Yusuf Estes and Baba Ali) and political rhetoric (Hamza 
Yusuf).
Furthermore, the study contributes to the understanding o f digitization (or 
more specifically digital Islam) and its role in societies (e.g. Bunt, 2009; and El
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Nawawy and Khamis, 2009). Indeed, digitization appears to be a crucial aspect to 
the popularity o f the three televangelists. In light o f relevant literature on politics 
(e.g. Wodak and Wright, 2007; and Wodak, 2015), I speculate that digitization will 
continue to extend its influence in our lives; and in my view, any attempts to create 
counter-views or to challenge racist discourses have to find their way to digital 
media.
10.5. Recommendations for future research
The study makes the following contributions to research in light o f the 
theoretical and analytical concepts o f the thesis which should be taken further.
Firstly, in Chapter 4 of the thesis, I have argued that the Internet has 
facilitated the creation o f a virtual public sphere as views and counter-views can be 
displayed. I agree with Dahlberg's (2001) proposition that technology could be 
developed which enhances critical deliberation and modifies the rules o f discourse 
online (or netiquette) so that it would encourage deliberation and rational-critical 
discourse.
Secondly, besides televangelism, other media genres have emerged, which 
are mediated and re-mediated online; for example, “hip hop” songs and “stand-up” 
comedy. Future studies should/could explore Muslim identities' construction in the 
above-mentioned genres, which would further insights into contemporary 
discourses on Islam, online.
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Thirdly, the continuing misrepresentation o f Islam calls for further critique 
o f anti-Muslim and xenophobic discourse (e.g. see Wodak, 2015; Baker et al 
2003).
Fourthly, in light o f the empirical data o f this study and research on Muslim 
youth in the West (e.g. see Cesari 2003; Gilliat-Ray 2010: 160-162; Mandaville 
2003; 2007; Rosowsky 2006; 2007; 2008; 2011) and the challenges they face in 
communicating with mosque imams, more (academic) attention could be given to 
Islamic education, including preachers’ education and training. To cite Rosowsky 
(2008:36) here, “there is a growing demand for the use o f English in the mosque” .
Another theme that emerges from the PhD study is the imagination o f the 
Muslim civilization. While the assimilation o f Jewish, Christian and Muslim 
scholars is already addressed in some scholarly literature on the Muslim 
civilizations in the Middle Ages (e.g. Lowney, 2005 and Menocal, 2002), there is 
a need to further “popularize” the inclusive nature o f the Muslim civilization, in 
non-academic discourse, since this is one aspect that is overlooked in 
televangelists' re-imagination o f Muslim civilization in Spain and Baghdad. This 
would allow for a more tolerant approach towards the representation o f non- 
M uslims in religious discourse.
364
List of References
Abdo, G. (2008) Mecca and main street: Muslim life in America after 9/11.
Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Abd alrahman, A. (1973) Al-Tafsir al-bayani l i ’l-Qur ’an al-karim. Dar al-m3arif: 
Cairo.
Adnan, A. H. M. (2010) Employing discourse, language and television media 
to reconstruct the image o f Islam: A case study o f Malaysia. Asian Social 
Science 6:6, 33-41
Agoston, G. and B. Masters (2009) Encyclopedia o f  the Ottoman Empire. USA: 
VB Hermitage.
Ali, M.M. Sep/Oct (2009) Thirty thousand attend ISNA's annual convention.
Washington Report on Middle East Affairs 28, 7, 54-55.
Allen, C. (2004) Endemically European or a European epidemic? Islamophobia 
in a post 9/11 Europe. In Greaves, R. et al (Eds.) Islam and the West post 
9/11. England: Ashgate
Anderson, B. (1983) Imagined communities. London: Verso.
Androutsopoulos, J. (2006) Introduction: Sociolinguistics and computer-
mediated communication. Journal o f  Sociolinguistics 10, 4, 419-438.
Angouri, J. and R. Wodak (2014) They became big in the shadow o f the crisis: 
The Greek success story and the rise o f the far-right. Discourse and Society 
25 (4) 540-565.
Arjomand, S. A. (2009) The Constitution o f Medina: A Socio-legal interpretation 
o f M uham m ad’s acts o f foundation o f the Umma. International Journal o f  
Middle Eastern Studies, 41, 555-575.
365
Asad, T., (1986) The Idea o f an Anthropology o f Islam. Georgetown University 
and Centre for Contemporary Arab Studies.Occasional Papers. 
Washington, D.C.: Centre for Contemporary Arab Studies,
Ayoub, M. M. and V. J. Cornell (2005) Q ur’an: Its role in Muslim practice and
nd
life. Encyclopedia o f  Religion , 2 ed., 11:7570-74. Farmington Hills, MI: 
Macmillan Reference.
Bonilla-Silva, E. (2014) Racism without racists: Color-blind racism and the
persistence o f racial inequality in America. Lanham: Rowman and 
Littlefield Publishers.
Baker et al (2008) A useful methodological synergy? Combining critical 
discourse analysis and corpus linguistics to examine discourses o f 
refugees and asylum seekers in the UK press. Discourse & Society 19:3, 
273-306
Baker et al (2013) Discourse analysis and media attitudes: The representation o f  
Islam in the British Press. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Bakhtin, M.M. (1984) Problems o f  D ostoevsky’s Poetics. Ed. and trans. Caryl 
Emerson. Minneapolis: University o f Minnesota Press
Bakhtin, M.M. (1979) Speech genres and other late essays. Austin: University of 
Texas Press.
Bardes et al (2009) American government and politics today: The essentials 
2008. Belmont, CA: Cengage Learning.
Barton, D. and C. Lee (2013) Language online: Investigating digital texts and  
practices. Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge.
Basch, L., Schiller, N. G. and C. Szanton Blanc (1994) Nations unbound:
Transnational projects, postcolonial predicaments and deterritorialized
nation-states. Amsterdam: Gordon & Breach.
Baym, N. K. (2003) Communication in online communities. In K. Christiansen 
and David Levinson (eds.) Encyclopedia o f  Community (Volume 3). 
Thousand Oaks, California: Sage. pp. 1015-1017.
366
Beck, U. (2011) Cosmopolitanism as imagined communities o f global risk
American Behavioral Scientist 2011 55: 10, 1346-1361
Becker, C. (2011). Muslims on the path o f the salaf al salih: Ritual dynamics in 
chat rooms and discussion forums. Information, Communication & Society, 
14(8), 1181-1203.
Bell, A. (1984) Language style as audience design, Language in Society, 13, 2, 
145-204.
Bennison, A. K. (2009) The Great caliphs: The Golden Age o f  the 'Abbasid 
Empire. United States: Yale University Press.
Berger, P. (1992) A fa r  glory: The quest fo r  fa ith  in an age o f  credulity. New 
York: Free Press.
Blackledge, A. (2005) Discourse and pow er in a multilingual world. Amsterdam: 
John Benjamins Publishing Company.
Billig, M. (1995) Banal nationalism. London: SAGE publications.
Boyd, D. (2008) Why youth love social network sites: The role o f networked 
publics in teenage social life. In Buckingham, D. (Ed). Youth, identity, and  
digital media. The John D. and Catherine T. M acArthur Foundation Series 
on Digital M edia and Learning. Cambridge, MA: The M IT Press, pp. 119- 
142.
Bourdieu, P. (1991) Language and Symbolic Power. Cambridge: Polity Press.
Bowen, (2010) Justifying Islamic pluralism: reflections from Indonesia and 
France. In Hirji, Z. (ed.) Muslim Diversity: Local Islam in gobal contexts. 
London; New York: I.B. Tauris Publishers, pp. 163- 183.
Bruce, S. (1990) Pray TV: Televangelism in America. London: Routledge
367
Bruce, S. (1996) Religion in the modern world: From cathedrals to cults. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Bunt, G. (2000) Virtually Islamic: Computer-mediated communication and cyber 
Islamic environments. Cardiff: University o f Wales Press.
Bunt, G. (2003) Islam in the Digital Age: E-jihad, online fatw as and cyber Islamic 
environments. London: Pluto Press.
Bunt, G. (2004) Rip. Bum. Pray: Islamic expression online. In Dawson, L. L. 
and D. E. Cowan (Eds.) Religion Online: Finding fa ith  on the Internet. 
London and New York: Routledge, pp. 123-134.
Bunt, G. (2009) IMuslims: Rewiring the house o f  Islam. Chapel Hill: University o f 
North Carolina Press.
Burgess, J. (2006) Hearing ordinary voices: Cultural studies, vernacular 
creativity and digital storytelling. Continuum: Journal o f  Media & 
Culture Studies Vol. 20, 2, 201-214
Burgress, J. (2007) Vernacular creativity and new media Unpublished Ph.D. 
Thesis. University o f Queensland.
Burgess, J. and J. Green. (2009) You Tube: Online video and participatory 
culture. Cambridge: Polity
Butler, J. (1990) Gender Trouble: Feminism and the subversion o f  identity. 
London and New York: Routledge.
Caldwell, C. (2009) Reflections on the revolution in Europe: Immigration, Islam  
and the West. London: Allen Lane
Calhoun, C. (1992) Introduction. In Calhoun, C (Ed.) Habermas and the public  
sphere. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, pp. 1-48.
Campbell, H. A. (2010) When religion meets new media. London: London: 
Routledge.
368
Campbell, H.A. (2012) Understanding the relationship between religion online 
and offline in a networked society, Journal o f  the American Academy o f  
Religion , 80(1), pp.64-93.
Campbell, H. (2013) Digital religion: Understanding religious practice in new 
media worlds. Abingdon: Routledge.
Carrette, J. and R. King (2005) Selling Spirituality: The silent takeover o f  
religion. Routledge: London and New York.
Castells, M. (1997a) The power o f  identity. Oxford: Blackwell Publishing.
Castells, M. (1997b) The rise o f  the network society. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
Cesari, J. (2003) Muslim Minorities in Europe: The silent revolution. In 
Esposito, J. and F. Burgat (eds.J, M odernizing Islam: Religion in the 
Public Sphere in the Middle East and in Europe, Rutgers University Press, 
pp. 251-269.
Cesari, J. (2007) Muslim identities in Europe: The snare o f exceptionalism. In 
Al-Azmeh, A. and E. Fokas (eds.) Islam in Europe: Diversity, identity 
and influence. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 49-67.
Cesari, J. (2009) Rarefied Islamophobia: W hen Americans duplicate the 
European cultural talk
http://www.religiondispatches.Org/books/l784/rarefied islamopho 
bia: w hen_americans_duplicate_the_european_cultural_talk/ Accessed 
4th April 2015
Cesari, J. (2010) Securitization o f Islam in Europe. In Cesari, J. (Ed.) Muslims in 
the West after 9/11: Religion, politics and law. London and New York: 
Routledge.
Chandler, D.L., (February, 2013), Hip Hop Hijabis Film Documents Rise O f
Muslim Female Hip-Hop Duo. Available at: 
http://hiDhopwired.com/2013/02/19/hip-hop-hiibabis-tilm-documents-rise- 
plight-of-muslim-female-hip-hop-duo-video/ Accessed 6th June 2015.
369
Charteris- Black, J. (2005) Politicians and rhetoric: The persuasive pow er o f  
metaphor Great Britain: Palgrave Macmillan.
Charteris-Black, J. (2014). Analyzing political speeches: Rhetoric, discourse and  
metaphor. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
Chapman, M., Naguib, S. and L. Woodhead (2012) God-change. In Woodhead, L. 
and R. Catto Religion and change in Modern Britain. New York: Routledge, 
pp. 173-195
Chilton, P. (2004) The role o f religion. In Analyzing political discourse: Theory 
and practice. London: Routledge, pp. 173-193.
Chilton, P. A. and C. Schaffner (1997) Discourse and politics. In van Dijk, T. A. 
(Ed.) Discourse as social interaction. Discourse studies: A multidisciplinary 
introduction. Volume 2 London: SAGE Publications Inc, pp. 206-230.
Cheong, P. H., Halavais, A., and K. Kwon (2008). The Chronicles o f me:
Understanding blogging as a religious practice, Journal o f  Media and  
Religion, 7(3), 107-131.
Chun, E. and K. Walters (2011) Orienting to Arab orientalisms: Language, race
and humor in a YouTube video. In Thurlow, C. and K. Mroczek Digital 
discourse: Language in the new media. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
pp. 251-276.
Chouliaraki, L. And N. Fairclough (1999) Discourse in late modernity: rethinking 
critical discourse analysis. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press
Cohen, R. (1997) Global Diasporas: An Introduction (2nd ed.). Great Britain:
UCL Press.
Cohen, R. (2008) Global Diasporas: An Introduction. New York: Routledge.
Compier, A. (2010) Let the Muslim be my master in outward things Al-Islam e 
Gazette. Available online at:
http://www.academia.edu/5454746/Abdul Haq Compier Let the Muslim 
be my M aster in Outward Things Let the Muslim be my M aster in
370
Outward Things. References to Islam in the Promotion o f Religious T 
olerance in Christian Europe Last accessed 30th July, 2015.
Comer, J. and D. Pels (eds.) (2003) Media and the restyling o f  politics. London: 
SAGE.
Couldry, N. (2000) The Place o f  media power: Pilgrims and witnesses o f  the media 
age. London: Routledge.
Couldry, N (2003 a) Media rituals: A critical approach. London; New York: 
Routledge.
Couldry, N. (2003 b) Television and the myth o f the mediated Centre: Time for a 
paradigm shift in television studies? Paper presented to M edia in 
Transition 3 conference, MIT, Boston, USA, 2-4 May 2003
Couldry, N. (2012a). Media, society, world: Social theory and digital media 
practice. Cambridge: Cambridge: Polity.
Crawley, M. (2006) Mr. Sorkin goes to Washington: Shaping the president on 
television's The West Wing. Jefferson, NC: McFarland and Company.
Dahlberg, L. (2001). Computer mediated communication and the public sphere: A 
critical analysis. Journal o f  Computer M ediated Communication, 7(1), 0-0. 
doi: 10.1111/j.l 083-6101.2001.tb00137.x
Davie, G. (2007) The Sociology o f  religion. London: SAGE.
Debord, G. (1967) Society o f  the spectacle, Detroit: Black and Red.
Decasa, G. C. (1999). The q u r’anic concept o f  umma and its function in Philippine 
Muslim society. Roma: Pontificia universita gregoriana.
Delanty, G., Wodak, R., & Jones, P. (2008). Identity, belonging, and migration. 
Liverpool: Liverpool: Liverpool University Press.
Denny, F.M. (1975) The meaning o f ummah in the Qur an. History o f  
Religions 15, 1, 34-70.
371
Echchaibi, N. (2011) From audio tapes to video blogs: the delocalization o f 
authority in Islam, Nations and Nationalism  17, 1, 25-44.
Eickelman, D.F. (1982) The study o f Islam in local contexts, Contributions to 
Asian studies 17, 1-16.
Eickelman, D. F. and J. W. Anderson (Eds.) (1999) New media in the Muslim  
world: The emerging public sphere. Bloomington: Indiana University 
Press.
El Naggar, S. (2012). Intertextuality and interdiscursivity in the discourse o f 
Muslim televangelists: the case study o f Hamza Yusuf, Critical 
Approaches to Discourse Analysis Across Disciplines, (5(1), 76-95.
El-Nawawy, M. and S. Khamis (2009) Islam dot com: Contemporary 
Islamic discourses in cyberspace. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
Engel, J. and R. Wodak (2012) '"Calculated Ambivalence” and Holocaust denial 
in Austria. In Wodak, R. and J. Richardson (eds.) Analyzing fascist 
discourse: European fascism  in talk and text. Routledge, pp. 73-96.
Esposito and Kalin (Eds.) (2009) The 500 most influential Muslims in the world. 
The Royal Islamic Strategic Studies Centre. Amman: Jordan.
Ezra, M. (ed.) (2013) The economic civil rights movement: African Americans 
and the struggle fo r  economic power. New York: Routledge.
Fairclough, N. (1995a) Critical Discourse Analysis: The critical study 
o f  language, Harlow: Longman.
Fairclough, N. (1995b) Media discourse. London and New York: E. Arnold.
Fairclough, N. (2003) Analyzing discourse: Textual analysis fo r  social
research. New York: Routledge.
Fairclough, N. (2006) Language and globalization. New York: Routledge
372
Fairclough, N. (2009) A dialectical-relational approach to critical discourse 
analysis. In Wodak, R. and M. Meyer (eds.) Methods fo r  Critical 
Discourse Analysis. London: SAGE, pp. 162-186.
Fairclough, N. L. and Wodak, R. (1997) Critical Discourse Analysis. In T. A. van 
Dijk (ed.) Discourse studies: A multidisciplinary introduction, Vol. 2. 
discourse as social interaction. London: Sage, pp. 258-84.
Fairak, A. and Rao, X Dai (2005) Universal practices across religions: Ecological 
perspectives o f Islam. Dialogue and Universalism  7-8, 65-72.
Faist, T. (2010) Diaspora and Transnationalism: What kind o f dance partners? In 
Baubock, R. and T. Faist (eds.) Diaspora and transnationalism: Concepts, 
theories and methods. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, pp. 9-34.
Fallaci, O. (2002) The rage and the pride. New York: Rizzoli
Featherstone, M. (1990) Global Culture: An Introduction. In Featherstone, M.
(ed.) Global culture: Nationalism, globalization and modernity. London: 
SAGE publications, pp. 1-14.
Featherstone, M. (2002) Islam encountering globalization: An introduction. In
Mohammadi, A. (ed.) Islam encountering globalization. New York: 
Routledge Curzon, pp. 1-13
Forchtner, B. (2011) Critique, the Discourse-Historical Approach and the 
Frankfurt School, Critical Discourse Studies, 8, 1, 1-14
Forchtner, B. (2014) The topos o f history as a teacher in pubic struggles over self 
and other represemtation. In Hart, C. and P. Cap (eds.) Contemporary 
Critical Discourse Studies. London: Bloomsbury, pp. 19-43.
Forchtner, B., M. Krzyzanowski and R. Wodak (2013) Mediatization, right- wing 
populism and political campaigning: The case o f the Austrian Freedom 
Party. In Ekstrom, M. and A. Tolson (eds.) Media talk and political 
elections in Europe and America, pp. 205-228.
Fowler, R. (1977) Linguistics and the novel. London: Methuen.
373
Frankl, R. (1987) Televangelism: The marketing o f  popular religion. The United 
States o f America: Southern Illinois University Press.
Fraser, N. (1992) Rethinking the public sphere. In Calhoun, C. (ed.) Habermas 
and the public sphere. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, pp. 109-42.
Friedman, J. (1990) Being in the world: Globalization and localization. In
Featherstone, M. (ed.) Global culture: Nationalism, globalization and  
modernity. London: SAGE publications, pp. 311-328.
Gaffney, P. D. (2004) Khutba. In Martin, R. C. (ed.) Encyclopedia o f  Islam and  
the Muslim world. Vol 1. New York: Granite Hill Publishers, pp. 394- 
396.
Geaves, R. (2007) A reassessment o f identity strategies amongst British South 
Asian Muslims. In Jstr. R. Hinnells (ed.) Religious reconstruction in South 
Asian Diasporas. Palgrave.
Geertz, C. (1973) The interpretation o f  cultures. New York: Basic Books.
Gelb, J. and M. L. Palley (2009) Women and politics around the world: A 
comparative history and survey. USA: ABC-CLIO
Georgiou, M. (2006) Diaspora, identity and the media: Diasporic transnationalism  
and mediated spatialities. New Jersey: Hampton Press Inc.
Ghazali, A. S. September (2004) ISNA convention ends with no presidential 
endorsement. American Muslim Perspectives, Archives:
http ://w w w .arch i ves__________________________________________________ H Y PER LIN K
http://www.archives2004.ghazali.net/html/isna convention 2004. Html. 
Last accessed: 6th June 2015.
Giddens, A. (1984) The constitution o f  society: Outline o f  the theory o f  
structuration. Berkely and Los Angeles: University o f California Press.
Giddens, A. (1990) The consequences o f  modernity. Cambridge, UK: Polity 
Press in association with Basil Blackwell, Oxford, UK.
374
Gilliat-Ray, S. (2010) Muslims in Britain: An introduction. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press.
Goffman, E. (1959) The presentation o f  s e lf  in everyday life. United States o f 
America: Penguin Books.
Goffman, E. (1974) Frame analysis: An essay on the organization o f  
experience. London: Harper and Row.
Gokariksel, B. and E. McLamey (2010) Muslim women, consumer capitalism, 
and the Islamic culture industry, Journal o f  Middle East Women's 
Studies, 6, 3, 1-18.
Graf, B. and J. Skovgaard-Petersen (Eds.) (2009) Global mufti: The phenomenon  
ofYusefAl-Qaradawi. London: C. Hurst
Greenwood, A. and M. W. Harris (2011) An Introduction to the Unitarian and  
Universalist Traditions. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Grillo, R. (2004) Islam and transnationalism, Journal o f  Ethnic and Migration 
Studies 30, 5: 861-878.
Gruber, H. (1991) Antisemitismus im Mediendiskurs: Die affare "Waldheim” 
in der Tagespresse, Wiesbaden and Opladen: Deutscher
Universitatsverlag/W estdeutscher Verlag.
Gruzd et al (2011) Imagining Twitter as an imagined community. American 
Behavioral Scientist, 55(10) 1294-1318
Gwilliam, S. The rise o f pop Islam in Britain. URL:
http://www.wm.edu/as/globalstudies/documents/european/Sarah 
%20Gwilliam% 20ESconf08.pdf Last accessed: 16 M ay 2015.
Habermas, J. (1989) The structural transformation o f  the public sphere.
Cambridge: MIT Press.
375
Habermas, J. (1992/1997) Between facts and norms: Contributions to a discourse 
theory o f  law and democracy. Cambridge: Polity.
Haddad, Y. Y. and J. I. Smith (eds.) (2002) Muslim minorities in the West: Visible 
and invisible. Lanham: Altamira Press.
Hafez, O.M. (1991) Turn-taking in Egyptian Arabic: Spontaneous speech vs. 
drama dialogue, Journal o f  Pragmatics 15: 59-81.
Hall, S. (1991) The Local and the global: Globalization and ethnicity. In King, 
A.D. (ed.) Culture, globalization and the world-system. London: 
Macmillan, pp. 19-39.
Hall, S. (1996) Who needs identity? In Hall, S. and Paul du Gay (eds.) 
Questions o f  cultural identity. London: SAGE publications, pp. 1-17.
Hall, S. (1997) The work o f representation. In S. Hall (Ed.) Representation:
Cultural representations and signifying practices. London: Sage, pp. 13-74.
Hallin, D. C. (2008) Neoliberalism, social movements and change in media 
systems in the late twentieth century. In Hesmondhalgh, D. and J. 
Toynbee (eds.) Media and social theory. London and New York: 
Routledge.
Hamzawy, A. and S. Grebowski (2010) From violence to moderation: A l-jam a‘a 
al-islamiya and al-jihad. Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for 
International Peace.
Harrell, R.S. (1957) The phonology o f  colloquial Egyptian Arabic. New York: 
American Council of Learned Societies.
Harrington, K., Litosseliti, L., Sauntson, H., and J. Sunderland (eds.) (2008). 
Gender and language research methodologies. Basingstoke: Palgrave 
Macmillan.
Hasan, H. (2009) The making o f public Islam: piety, agency, and
commodification on the landscape o f the Indonesian public sphere, 
Contemporary Islam, 3:229-250
376
Hawking, S. W. (1988) A b rie f history o f  time: from  the big bang to black holes: 
Toronto; New York : Bantam Books.
Hawking, S. W. (2010) The grand design. London: Bantam.
Heer, H., W. Manoschek, Poliak, A. and R. Wodak (2008) The Discursive 
construction o f  history: Remembering the Wehrmacht's war o f  annihilation. 
Basingstoke: Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
Helland, C. (2004) Popular religion and the World Wide Web: A match made 
in (cyber) heaven. In Dawson, L. L. and D. E. Cowan. Religion online: 
Finding fa ith  on the Internet. London and New York: Routledge, pp. 23- 
36.
Helland, C. (2007) Diaspora on the electronic frontier: Developing virtual 
connections with sacred homelands, Journal o f  Computer-Mediated 
Communication, 12: 956-976
Herring, S. C. (2004) Computer-mediated discourse analysis: An approach to
researching online communities. In Barab, S.A., Kling, R. and J. H. Gray 
(eds.) Designing fo r  virtual communities in the service o f  learning. 
Cambridge, U.K. and New York: Cambridge University Press, pp. 338-376.
Herring, S. C. (2008) Computer-mediated discourse. In Schifrin, D . , Tannen, D.
and H. E. Hamilton (eds.) The handbook o f  discourse analysis. Malden, 
MA: Blackwell, pp. 612-634.
Hewitt, N. (2003) The Cambridge companion to modern French culture. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Hinnells, J. R. (1997) The study o f diaspora religion. In Hinnells, J. R. (ed.) 
Handbook o f  living religions. London: Penguin Reference, pp. 682- 689.
Hinnells, J. (2010) The study o f diaspora religion. In Hinnells, J. R. (ed.) The 
Penguin handbook o f  the World's living religions. London: Penguin, 684- 
691.
377
Hirschkind, C. (2001) The ethics of listening: Cassette-sermon audition in 
contemporary Egypt. American Ethnologist, 28, 3, 623-649
Hirschkind, C. (2006) The Ethical soundscape: Cassette sermons and Islamic 
counterpublics. New York: Columbia University Press
Hirschkind, C. (2012) Experiments in devotion online: The YouTube
Khutba. Int. J. Middle East Studies, 44, 1,5-21.
Hoesterey, J. (2007) Aa Gym, Inside Indonesia Available at:
http://www.insideindonesia.org/aa-gvm. Last accessed 1st August 2015.
Hoesterey, J. (2008) Marketing morality: The rise, fall, and re-branding o f Aa
Gym. In Fealy, G. and S. White (Ed.) Expressing Islam: Religious life and  
politics in Indonesia. Singapore: Institute o f Southeast Asian Studies.
Holly, W. (2008) Tabloidization o f political communication in the public sphere. In 
Wodak, R. and V. Koller (eds.) Communication in the Public Sphere: 
Handbook o f  Applied Linguistics (Vol 4). Berlin: De Gruyter, pp. 317- 42.
Houellebecq, M. (2003) Platform. New York: Knopf.
Howard-Malverde, R. (1988) Words for our Lord o f Huanca: Discursive 
strategies in a Quechua sermon from southern Peru, Anthropological 
Linguistics, 40, 4, 570-595.
Howell, J. D. (2008) Modulations o f active piety: Professors and televangelists as 
promoters o f Indonesian Sufisme. In Fealy, G. and S. White. Expressing 
Islam: Religious life and politics in Indonesia. Institute o f Southeast Asian 
Studies, pp. 40-62.
Hutchings, T. (2011) Contemporary religious community and the online 
church, Communication and Society, 14, 8, 1118-1135.
378
Ibrahim, A. (2006) “Universal values and Muslim democracy” Journal o f  
Democracy, 2006, Vol. 17(3), pp.5-12.
Jaffe, A. (2005) Modernism and the culture o f  celebrity. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press.
Jacobs, S. (2007) Virtually sacred: The performance o f asynchronous cyber-rituals 
in online spaces, Journal o f  Computer-M ediated Communication, 12/3. 
http://icm c.indiana.edu/voll2/issue3/iacobs.html
Jacobson, J. (1997) Perceptions o f Britishness, Nations and Nationalism 3 (2), 
181-199.
Jenkins, H. (2006) Convergence culture: Where old and new media collide. New 
York: New York University Press.
Jones, Q. (1997) Virtual communities, virtual settlements and cyber-archaeology, 
Journal o f  Computer Mediated Communication, 5(3), n.pag.
Johnson, R.H. and Blair, J. A. (1983) Logical self-defense, 2nd ed. Toronto: 
M cGraw Hill Ryerson.
Keen, A. (2007) How today's Internet is killing our culture and assaulting our 
economy. Great Britain: Nicholas Brealey Publishing.
Kellner, D. (2003) Media spectacle. London and New York: Routledge
Kellner, D. (2010) Media spectacle and media events: Some critical reflections 
In Couldry, N. et al (eds.) Media events in a global age, pp. 76-92.
KhosraviNik, M. (2010) Actor descriptions, action attributions and 
argumentation: Towards a systematization o f CDA analytical categories in 
the representation o f social groups, Critical Discourse Studies, 7:1, 55- 
72.
KhosraviNik, M. (2010a). S e lf and other representation in discourse: A critical 
discourse analysis o f  the conflict over Iran's nuclear programme in the
379
British and Iranian newspapers. Unpublished PHD thesis. Lancaster 
University.
Kienpointner, M. (1996) Verniinftig argumentieren. Regeln and Techniken der 
Argumentation. Reinbek bei Hamburg: Rowohlt.
Kirkpatrick, D. (2010) The Facebook effect: The inside story o f  the company that 
is connecting the world. London: Virgin Books.
Krauss, R.M., Chen, Y. and R. F. Gottesman (2000) Lexical gesture and lexical 
access: A process model. In McNeill, D. (ed.) Language and gesture. 
Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, pp. 261-283.
Kress, G. and T. van Leeuwen (1996) Reading images: The grammar o f  visual 
design. London: Routledge.
Krzyzanowski, M. (2010) The discursive construction o f  European identities: a 
multi-level approach to discourse and identity in the transforming 
European Union. Frankfurt; Oxford : Peter Lang.
Kutscher, J. (2009) The politics o f virtual fa tw a  counseling in the 21 st century, 
Journal o f  Law and Technology, 3, 1, 33-50.
Kwak, H. et al (2010) What is Twitter, a social network or a news media? In 
Proceedings o f  the 19th World-Wide Web (WWW) conference. April 26-30, 
2010, Raleigh, North Carolina, USA. Available online at: 
http://www.eecs.wsu.edu/~assefaw/CptS580-06/papers/2010-www- 
twitter.pdf Last accessed: 30th July, 2015.
Le Baron, C. and J. Streeck (2000) Gestures, knowledge and the world. In 
McNeill, D. Language and gesture. Cambridge; New York: Cambridge 
University Press, pp. 118-138.
Lewis, P. (2007) Young, British and Muslim. New York: Continuum
380
Light, B., Griffiths, M., and Lincoln, S. (2012) Connect and create: young 
people, YouTube and graffiti communities, Continuum , 26(3), 343-355.
Lotfy, W. (2009) The phenomenon o f  televangelists. Cairo, Egypt: Dar El Ein
Lorenzo-Dus, N. and G. Blitvich (2013) Get involved! Communication and 
engagement in the 2008 Obama presidential e-campaign. In Ekstrom,
M. and A. Tolson (eds.) Media talk and political elections in Europe and  
Am erica , pp. 229-251.
Lowney, C. (2005) A Vanished world: Medieval Spain's Golden Age o f  
enlightenment. New York: Free Press
M andaville, P. (1999) Reimagining the Umma: Transnational spaces and the 
changing boundaries o f  Muslim political community. Aalborg: SPIRIT.
Mandaville, P. (2001) Reimagining Islam in diaspora: The politics o f
mediated community, International Communication Gazette, 63, 2-3: 
169-186.
Mandaville, P. (2001a) Transnational Muslim politics: Reimagining the umma.
New York: Routledge.
Mandaville, P. (2002) Reimagining the umma: Information technology and the 
changing boundaries o f political Islam. In M ohammadi, A. (ed.) Islam  
encountering globalization. New York: Richmond: Curzon, pp. 61-90.
M andaville, P. (2003) Towards a critical Islam: European Muslims and the 
changing boundaries o f transnational religious discourse. In Allievi, S. and 
J. Nielsen (eds.) Muslim networks and transnational communities in and  
across Europe. Leiden: Brill.
M andaville, P. (2007) Global political Islam. London: Routledge.
M andaville, P. (2009) Muslim transnational identity and state responses in Europe 
and the UK after 9/11: Political community, ideology and authority, Journal 
o f  Ethnic and Migration Studies, 35:3, 491-506.
381
Manovich, L. (2001) The language o f  new media. Massachusetts Institute o f 
Technology: Massachusetts.
Marshall, P. D. (2004) Celebrity and power: Fame in contemporary culture. 
United States: The University o f Minnesota Press.
Mayer, F. and J. Palmowski (2004) European identities and the EU -  The ties
that bind the peoples o f Europe, Journal o f  Common M arket Studies, 42, 3, 
pp. 573-98.
M cLoughlin, S. (2005) Migration, diaspora and transnationalism. In Hinnells, J.R. 
(ed.) The Routledge companion to the study o f  religions. New York: 
Routledge, pp. 526- 549.
Meer, N. (2010) Citizenship, identity and the politics o f  multicultural ism: The rise 
o f  Muslim consciousness. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
M enocal, M. R. (2002) The ornament o f  the world: How Muslims, Jews and
Christians created a culture o f  tolerance in M edieval Spain. U.S.: Little 
Brown.
Messinger, S. E., Sampson, H. and R. D. Towne (1975) Life as theater: Some notes 
on the dramaturgic approach to social reality. In Brissett, D. and C. Edgley 
Life as theatre: a dramaturgical sourcebook. Chicago: Aldine Publishing 
Company, pp. 32-42.
Metcalf, B. D. (1996) Introduction: Sacred words, sanctioned practice, new 
communities. In Metcalf, B. D. (ed.) Making Muslim space in North 
America and Europe. Berkeley: University o f California Press.
Miller, V. J. (2004) Consuming religion: Christian fa ith  and practice in a 
consumer culture. New York: Continuum
Mitten, R. (1992) The politics o f  antisemitic prejudice: The Waldheim 
phenomenon in Austria. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.
382
Mosemghvdlishvili, L. and J. Jansz (2013) Framing and praising Allah on 
YouTube: Exploring user-created videos about Islam and the motivations 
for producing them, New Media and Society , 15, 4, 482-500.
Myers, G. (2010a) Stance-taking and public discussion in blogs, Critical 
discourse studies 7, 4, 263-275
Myers, G. (2010b) The discourse o f  blogs and wikis. London: Continuum
Nadwi, A. H. (1993) Muslims in the west: The message and mission. Leicester. The 
Islamic Foundation.
Naphy, W. and A. Spicer (2004) Plague: Black death and pestilence in 
Europe. Great Britain: Tempus.
Nasr, S. H. (2002) The heart o f  Islam: Enduring values fo r  humanity. New York: 
Harper San Francisco
Netton, I. R. (1996) Seek Knowledge: Thought and Travel in the House o f  Islam. 
RoutledgeCurzon.
Page, R., Barton, D., Unger, J., and M. Zappavigna (2014) Researching language
and social media: a student guide. London: Routledge.
Palmer, A. (2005) Thought and consciousness presentation (literature). In Herman, 
D., Jahn, M. and Marie-Laure Ryan (eds.) Routledge encyclopedia o f  
narrative theory. London: Routledge, pp. 603- 607.
Paolillo, J. (2008) Structure and network in the YouTube core. In 41st Annual 
Hawaii International Conference on System Sciences (HICSS 2008) 7-10 
January, 2008, Waikoloa, Big Island, HI, USA. p. 156.
Papacharissi, Z. (2002) The virtual sphere: The internet as a public sphere. New
M edia and Society, 4, 1, 9-27.
Perelman, C. and L. Olbrechts-Tyteca (1969) The new rhetoric: A treatise on 
argumentation. Notre Dame: University o f Notre Dame Press.
383
Rahman, F. (1982) Islam and modernity: Transformation o f  an Intellectual 
tradition. Chicago, IL: University o f Chicago Press.
Reisigl, M. (2008) “Rhetoric o f political speeches” In Wodak, R. and V. Roller 
(eds.) Handbook o f  communication in the public sphere. Berlin: De Gruyter, 
pp. 243-269.
Reisigl, M. (2014) In Hart, C. and P. Cap (Eds.) Contemporary Critical 
Discourse Studies. London: Bloomsbury, pp. 67-96.
Reisigl, M. and R. Wodak (2001) Discourse and discrimination: Rhetorics o f  
racism and anti-semitism. London: Routledge.
Reisigl, M. and R. Wodak (2009) The Discourse Historical Approach. In Wodak, 
R. and M. Meyer (eds.) Methods o f  critical discourse analysis. London: 
SAGE pp. 87-121.
Ribiero, B. T. and S. M. Hoyle (2009) Frame analysis. In Brisard, F., Ostman, J. 
and J. Verschueren (eds.) Grammar, meaning and pragmatics. Amsterdam: 
John Benjamins Publishing Company.
Richardson, K. (2006) The dark arts o f good people: How popular culture 
negotiates spin in NBC's The West Wing, Journal o f  Sociolinguistics 10:52- 
69.
Richardson, J.E. (2004) Misrepresenting Islam: The racism and rhetoric o f  British 
broadsheet newspapers. Amsterdam: John Benjamins.
Richardson, J. E. and R. Wodak. (2009a) Recontextualizing fascist ideologies o f 
the past: Right-wing discourses on employment and nativism in Austria 
and the United Kingdom, Critical Discourse Studies, 6, 4, 251-267.
Richardson, J.E. and R. Wodak. (2009b) The impact o f visual racism: Visual 
arguments in political leaflets in Austrian and British far-right 
Parties, Controversia 6, 2, 45-67.
384
Riegert, K. (2007) The ideology o f The West Wing: The television show that wants 
to be real. In K. Riegert (ed.) Politicotainment: Television's take on the real. 
Bern: Peter Lang, pp. 213-36.
Rheingold, H. (1993) The virtual community. Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT 
Press.
Robertson, R. (1987a) Globalization and societal modernization: A note on Japan 
and Japanese religion, Sociological Analysis, 47(S) 35-43.
Robinson, F. (1993) Islam and the impact o f print, Modern Asian Studies, 27, 1, 
229-251.
Rockwell, D. and D. C. Giles (2009) Being a celebrity: A phenomenology of 
fame, Journal o f  Phenomenological Psychology, 40, 178-210
Rose, G. (2007) Visual methodologies: An introduction to the interpretation o f  
visual materials (2nd ed.). London: Sage.
Rosowsky, A. (2006) The role o f liturgical literacy in UK Muslim communities. In 
Omoniyi, T. and J. A. Fishman (eds.) Explorations in the Sociology o f  
Language and Religion. Amsterdam: John Benjamins, pp. 309-325.
Rosowsky, A. (2007) Qur'anic literacy: Its central role in the life o f UK Muslim 
communities. NALDIC Quarterly, 5(2), 44.
Rosowsky, A. (2008) Heavenly readings: Liturgical literacy in a multilingual 
context. M ultilingual matters: Clevedon.
Rosowsky, A. (2011) Heavenly Singing: the practice o f naat and nasheed  and its
possible contribution to reversing language shift among young Muslim 
multilinguals in the UK, International Journal o f  Sociology o f  Language, 
212, 135-148.
Rosowsky, A. (2012) Performance and Flow: the religious classical in translocal
385
and transnational linguistic repertoires, Journal o f  Sociolinguistics, 16, 5, 
613-637.
Rossel, S. (1992) The Holocaust: The World and the Jews 1933-1945. United 
States o f America: Behrman House.
Root, A. (2012) Beyond the soapbox: Facebook and the public sphere 
in Egypt, Cyber Orient, Vol. 6, Iss. 1. Available at 
http://www.cyberorient.net/article.do?articleId=7751 Last accessed 6th 
June 2015.
Rudolph, S. H. (1997) Introduction: Religion, states and transnational civil 
society. In Rudolph, S. H. and J. Piscatori (eds.) Transnational 
Religion and Fading States. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.
Salmon, M. (2012) Arguments from  analogy. Introduction to logic and critical 
thinking. Boston, USA: Cengage Learning, pp. 132-142
Safran, W. (1991) Diasporas in modem societies: Myths o f homeland and return, 
Diaspora, 1: 83-99.
Sardar, Z. (2015) Critical Muslim, Available online at:
http://ziauddinsardar.com/2013/07/critical-muslim/ Last accessed 6th June 
2015.
Sartawi, M. and G. Sammut (2012) Muslims in London: Negotiating British
M uslim identity: Everyday concerns o f practising, Culture and Psychology, 
18: 559.
Schiller, N. G., Basch, L. and C. Blanc-Szanton (eds.) (1992) Towards a 
transnational perspective on migration: Race, class, ethnicity, and  
nationalism reconsidered. New York: New York Academy o f Sciences.
Schmidt, R. and J. F. Kess. (1986) Television advertising and televangelism:
Discourse analysis o f  persuasive language. Amsterdam/Philadelphia: 
John Benjamins Publishing Company.
Schnurr, S. and O. Zayts (2013) I can't remember them ever not doing what I tell
386
them! Negotiating face and power relations in 'upwards' refusals in 
multicultural workplaces in Hong Kong, Intercultural Pragmatics, 10 (4), 
593 -6 1 6 .
Sen, A. (2006) Identity and violence: The illusion o f  destiny. New York:
Penguin Books.
Sharoff, S. and A. Secara (2007) Who is talking to whom? Linguistic cues for 
engaging with the audience, Co Design, 3, 1, 175-182.
Schmidt, G. (2005) The transnational umma- myth or reality? Examples from the 
western diasporas, The Muslim World, 95, 575-586.
Semino, E. (2004) Representing characters' speech and thought in narrative fiction: 
A Study o f England, England by Julian Barnes, Style, 38, 4, 428-451.
Semino, E. (2007) M ind Style 25 years on, Style, 41, 2, 153-203.
Semino, E. and M. Short (2004) Corpus stylistics: Speech, writing and thought 
presentation in a corpus o f  English writing. London and New York: 
Routledge.
Sisler, V. (2007) The Internet and the construction o f Islamic knowledge in Europe. 
Masaryk University, Journal o f  Law and Technology, Vol. 1, No. 2 ISSN 
1802-5943.
Smart, N. (1987) The importance o f diasporas. In Werblowsky, R. J. Z., Shaked, S., 
Shulman, D. D., and G. G. Stroumsa (1987) Gilgul: Essays on 
transformation, revolution and permanence in the history o f  religions. 
Leiden: Brill, pp. 288-95.
Smith, A. (1990) Towards a global culture. In Featherstone, M. (ed.) Global 
culture: Nationalism, globalization and modernity. London: SAGE
publications, pp. 171-192.
Street (2003) The celebrity politician: Political style and popular culture. In 
Comer, J. and D. Pels (eds.) Media and the restyling o f  politics. London: 
SAGE, pp. 85-98.
Strousmsa, S. (2009) Maimonides in his world: portrait o f  a Mediterranean 
thinker. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.
387
Swartz, M. (1999) Arabic rhetoric and the art o f the homily. In Hovannisian, R. G. 
and G. Sabagh (eds.) Religion and Culture in M edieval Islam. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, pp. 36-59.
Tannen, D. (2007) Talking voices: Repetition, dialogue and imagery in 
conversational discourse. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Thompson, J. B. (1995) The media and modernity. Oxford: Polity Press.
Thompson, G. (2000) Economic globalization. In Held, D. (ed.) A globalizing  
world: Culture, economics, politics. New York: Routledge.
Toulmin, S. (2003) The uses o f  argument. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Tolson, A. (2010) A new authenticity? Communicative practices on YouTube, 
Critical Discourse Studies, 7, 4, 277-289.
Triandafylliodou, A. and R. Wodak (2003) Conceptual and methodological 
questions in the study o f collective identities, Journal o f  Language and  
Politics 2, 2, 205-223.
Turner, B. S. (2007) Religious authority and the new media, Theory, Culture and  
Society, 24: 117- 134.
Unger, J. W. (2013) The discursive construction o f  the Scots language: Education, 
politics and everyday life (Discourse approaches to politics, society and 
culture; Vol. 51). Amsterdam: John Benjamins.
Van Dijk, T. (1995) On macrostructures, mental models and other inventions. A 
brief personal history of the Kintsch-Van Dijk Theory. In Weaver, C., 
Mannes, S. and C. R. Fletcher (eds.) Discourse comprehension. Essays in 
honor o f  Walter Kintsch. Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum, pp. 383-410.
Van Dijk, T. (2009) Critical Discourse Studies: A sociocognitive approach. In 
Wodak, R. and M. Meyer (eds.) Methods o f  Critical Discourse Analysis. 
London: SAGE, pp. 62-86.
388
Van Dijk, T. (1980) Macro structures: An interdisciplinary study o f  global 
structures in discourse interaction and cognition. Hillsdale, New Jersey: 
Lawrence Erlbaum Associates Publishers.
Van Bruinessen, M. (2003) Making and unmaking Muslim religious authority in 
Western Europe. Paper presented at the Fourth Mediterranean Social and 
Political Research Meeting, Florence and M ontecatini Terme, 19-23 March, 
Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies at the European University 
Institute.
Van Eemeren, F. H. et al (1996) Fundamentals o f  argumentation theory: A 
handbook o f  historical backgrounds and contemporary developments. 
Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum.
Van Leeuwen, T. (2005) Introducing social semiotics. New York: Routledge.
Van Leeuwen, T. (2008) Discourse and practice: New tools fo r  critical discourse 
analysis. Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press.
Van Leeuwen, T. (2011) The language o f  color: An introduction. London: London: 
Routledge.
Van Zoonen, L. (2004) Imagining the Fan Democracy, European Journal o f  
Communication, 19, 39-52.
Van Zoonen, L. (2005) Entertaining the citizen: When politics and popular culture 
converge. New York: Rowman and Littlefield.
Van Zoonen, L., Vis, F. and S. Mihelj (2010) Performing citizenship on YouTube: 
activism, satire and online debate around the anti-Islam video Fitna, Critical 
Discourse Studies, 7:4, 249-262.
Vertovec, S. (2000) Religion and diaspora. In Working paper, Transnational 
Communities Programme, University o f Oxford, W PTC-01-01, Available at 
http://w w w .transcom m .ox.ac.uk/w orking% 20papers/V ertovec01.P D F  Accessed 
8th April 2015.
Vertovec, S. and R. Cohen (Eds.) (1999) Introduction. In Vertovec, S. and R. 
Cohen (eds.) Migration, diasporas and transnationalism. Cheltenham and 
Northampton: Edward Elgar Publishing Limited, pp. xiii- xviii.
389
Vorenberg, M. (2004) Final freedom: The Civil War, the abolition o f  slavery and  
the Thirteenth Amendment. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Wadud, A. (1999) Qur'an and woman: Reading the sacred text from  a woman's 
perspective. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Walton, D. (1992) The place o f  emotion in argument. Pennsylvania: The 
Pennsylvania State University Press Park.
Walton, D., Chris, R. and F. Macagno (2008) Argumentation schemes. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press.
Wamick, B. (2007) Rhetoric online: Persuasion and politics on the World Wide 
Web. New York: Peter Lang Publishing.
Werbner, P. (1996) Stamping the earth with the name o f Allah: Zikr and the 
Sacralizing o f space among British Muslims, Cultural Anthropology, 11:3: 
309-338.
Werbner, P. (2002) Imagined diasporas among M anchester Muslims: The public  
performance o f  Pakistani transnational identity politics. Oxford: Institute of 
Social and Cultural Anthropology, University o f Oxford.
Wise, L. Words from  the Heart: New Forms o f  Islamic Preaching in Egypt, Masters 
thesis, St Anthony’s College, University o f Oxford, 2003. Available at: 
http://users.ox.ac.uk/~metheses/W iseNoImages.pdf Last accessed 1st 
August 2015.
White, J. (1991) Martin Luther King, Jr., and the civil rights movement in 
America. England: British Association for American Studies.
Wodak, R. (2001) The Discourse-Historical Approach. In Wodak, R. and M. M eyer 
(eds.) Methods o f  critical discourse analysis. London: SAGE, pp. 63-94.
Wodak, R. (2008) Staging politics in television: Fiction and/or reality? In S., 
Habscheid and C. Knobloch (eds.) Discourses o f  unity: Creating scenarios 
o f  consensus in public and corporate communication. Berlin: De Gruyter, 
pp. 33-58.
Wodak, R. (2010) The glocalization o f politics in television: Fiction or reality? 
European Journal o f  Cultural Studies, 13 , 1 ,  43—62.
390
Wodak, R. (2011) The discourse o f  politics in action: Politics as usual. 
Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
Wodak, R. (2013) Anything Goes!- The haiderization o f Europe. In Wodak, R. et al 
Right wing populism in Europe: Politics and discourse. London: 
Bloomsbury, pp. 23-38.
Wodak, R. (2015) The politics o f  fear: What right-wing populist discourses mean. 
London: Sage.
Wodak, R., de Cillia, R., Reisigl, M. and K. Liebhart (1999) The discursive 
construction o f  national identity. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.
Wodak, R. and I. Wagner (2006) Performing success: identifying strategies o f self­
presentation in women's biographical narratives, Discourse and Society, 17, 
3 ,385-411 .
Wodak, R and S. Wright (2006) The European Union in cyberspace: M ultilingual 
democratic participation in a virtual public sphere? Journal o f  language and  
politics , 5, 2, 251-275.
Wodak, R. and V. Roller (eds.) (2008) Handbook o f  communication in the public  
sphere. Berlin: De Gruyter.
Wodak, R. and M. Meyer (2009) Critical Discourse Analysis: History, agenda, 
theory and methodology. In Wodak, R. and M. M eyer (eds.) Methods o f  
Critical Discourse Analysis. London: SAGE, pp. 1-34.
Wodak, R., Khosravinik, M., and B. Mral (eds.) (2013) Right-wing populism  in 
Europe: Politics and discourse. London: Bloomsbury.
Wodak, R. and B. Forchtner (2014) Embattled Vienna 1683/2010: Right-wing 
populism, collective memory and the fictionalization o f politics, Visual 
Communication, 13, 2, 231-354.
Wodak, R., and S. Boukala (2014) Talking about solidarity and security in the age 
o f crisis: The revival o f nationalism and protectionism in the European 
Union -  a Discourse Historical Approach. In Carta, C. and J. M orin (eds.) 
E U  foreign policy through the lens o f  discourse analysis. England and 
U.S.A.: Ashgate, pp. 171-190.
391
Woodhead, L., and P. Heelas (eds.) (2000) Religion in modern times: An  
interpretive anthology. Oxford: Blackwells.
Zayed, A. (2007) Patterns o f  contemporary religious discourses. Cairo, Egypt: Dar 
El Ein.
Zeghal, M. (2007) The “recentering” o f religious knowledge and discourse: The 
case o f al-Azhar in twentieth-century Egypt. In Hefner, R. W. and Zaman, 




T ranscript o f  H am za Y u su fs serm on: A m essage to hum anity
I want to say that I feel that the spirit here this year is much higher than last year and I think that is partly 
because w e have overcome som e o f  the traumas that w e experienced as a community in this country. And 
that's why tonight I would like to speak to you in the essence as Americans and as M uslims, and the reason I 
want to do that, is that I believe that the challenge for this community in the United States is to reconcile 
between these two aspects o f  our identity. I am a convert to Islam but I was also bom in this country; and I 
com e from a long line o f  people in this country that go back many many generations, and when I embraced 
Islam at the age o f  eighteen I had a serious breach with my identity as som ebody who was from this 
country. I went to the Muslim world, and I immersed m yself in another world for many many years and 
gained immense insight and also a modicum o f  knowledge o f  this religion and I continued to struggle with 
that, learning and acquiring more knowledge and as time has passed, I have realized that whenever Islam 
went, it did not divorce the people from their land, from their culture, and their traditions but rather it 
purified those people. It purified them and made them realize their own inherent genius; and this is one o f  
the greatest strength o f  this religion is that wherever it went, it enhances the natural genius o f  the people 
whether it went to India, whether it went to Africa, to Turkey, to Asia, even to Europe when it was in Spain, 
and in East Europe in Hungary, in Albania, it brought out the inherent genius o f  those people and som e o f  
the greatest contributions in our history have been from the M uslims, diverse contributions from Persia, 
from Muslim China, from Spain and these contributions have infused Western civilization with gifts that 
they had yet in these countries in both Europe and the United States, the majority o f  people had yet to 
recognize; an immense debt is owed to this religion and ultimately to the founder and the Prophet o f  this 
religion, sallah allah alih wa salam  because he is the source; Allah made him the source o f  these blessings. 
So I want to speak to you tonight, about a very important topic that I feel it is absolutely necessary that I 
speak about because I would not be true to what I am feeling inside. In Russia, a group o f  people took  
hostage, a school filled with children and that resulted in the death o f  several hundred people including 
around a hundred and seventy five children and this atrocity unfortunately was done once again in the name 
o f  our religion. And I feel that we as M uslims are suffering all over because o f  the acts o f  a handful o f  
people, and w e must in one voice condemn and completely reject the concept o f  indiscriminate killing in 
this religion. It is neither from the religion, nor is it sanctioned by the religion in any reading o f  our pre­
modern tradition.
It is a modern phenomenon and unfortunately, those practising it have learnt it from Marxism and from 
Asian philosophies that have the concept o f  the kamikaze. This is not our tradition. And w e must recognize 
that it is doing untold damage to Islam because w e cannot be so short-sighted that w e don't see the eyes o f  
history looking upon us as a community. And I feel that what happened in that school is more heinous than 
the destruction o f  the Church o f  the Sepulchre that occurred under the insane Fatimid ruler A1 Hakim Bi 
Amr Allah and w e suffer the fact that it is recorded in the history books, a blemish on the Muslim peoples as 
long as people read history. There are things occurring today that are a blemish upon this religion. We have 
distorted this pristine clarity that are our prophet gave us: lailoha ka naharoha. Its night is equal to its day in 
its clarity and its light; and that is why we have to reject it, whether it is an Israeli child, a Russian child, an 
Iraqi child, an American child, a Chinese child, it does not matter w ho it is. We must reject indiscriminate 
violence against innocence because blood is too precious.
And it is our lord that sanctified the blood o f  bani adam and for that reason, the sanctity o f  life, w e decreed 
upon (the people o f  Israel) and by extension upon the Muslims, that anyone who kills a soul, without just 
cause, or brigandry in the earth, terrorism, that is as if  they have killed all humanity, and this is what has had 
happened.
We don't count numbers. We don't say they killed three thousands o f  us or three thousands. We don't count 
numbers. Every soul is sacred, and this has to be re-established on the earth, once again the teaching o f  
Abraham {alih al salam). The Abrahamic faith shares the sanctity o f  life and the M uslims must assert their
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Abrahamic truth. We have to re-assert to the Abrahamic peoples that w e are the last extension o f  the 
Abrahamic truth; that's there is a God, and that he communicates with his creation and he calls them to his 
unity, and he calls them to the highest morality, known to human kind because those who are attacking 
religion, are attacking the best o f  humanity. It is the absence o f  religion in religious people that leads to 
these types o f  atrocity in the names o f  religion. It is not religion itself; it is the misuse the abuse and the 
assault on religion in the name o f  religion that leads to a hatred in the hearts o f  other people unjustly 
towards the highest truth that w e as human beings hold; and that is why our prophet salah allah alih waslam  
(Peace be upon him) warned us: “beware o f  extremism in religion, in religion because it is extremism in 
religion that destroyed the peoples before you”. He did not warn it i f  it was not a real and serious threat to 
the Muslim community. And so this is the issue o f  the age; this is the issue that the Republican Party is 
basing their entire platform on, basing an entire political platform in the most powerful military nation on 
the earth; it is based on the idea that Islamic fanatics are a threat to the security o f  this country and this must 
be condemned.
We have a society now that is facing social disintegration. We have the erosion o f  middle class in this 
country. We have hom eless people, w e have joblessness we have erosion in our schools o f  the standards o f  
education that were once the pride o f  this country that produced the scientists who are now imported from 
places like India and Pakistan. This is the reality. We have an entire continent o f  Africa that has had over 40  
m illion deaths by AIDS, tw ice as many people as died in the great plague o f  Europe, the black plague; 40 
m illion human beings and yet there is no funding for research into this plague that is afflicting the women  
o f  Africa in great numbers that w e are looking at a hundred million people that are facing death by the 
plague o f  Aids and yet we are spending five hundred billion dollars on a defense budget that is nine times 
greater than all o f  the defense budgets on this planet put together. That is o f  right I. It is against every 
principle upon what this country was based and this is the second extremism that I want to talk about. I 
believe that this country is being hijacked by a select group o f  extremists them selves. There is an extremist 
agenda in this country that is not in the best interest o f  the United States and it is for the goodness o f  people 
that every war that this country goes to is always done in the name o f  the highest ideals o f  this country 
because the hypocrites that use those ideals for their advantages, no because in the heart o f  the Americans is 
a love o f  truth, a love o f  justice and a love o f  liberty and they believe that those should be values and virtues 
that should be promoted throughout the world. So these people are being used. The hatred that is directed to 
this country is unjust; because the majority o f  people in this country; i f  they understood the issues as they 
should be understood, they would not only be ashamed o f  what is being done in their name, they would  
stand up in one voice and I believe this in my heart, and they would condemn and reject it.
I have never believed the presidential elections and I am not a politician nor am I interested in politics but I 
have to speak the truth, because I have never believed in my lifetim e that the presidential elections have any 
significance. I have never seen it as a significant event; but I spent several hours with Michael Ratner, with 
Barbara Olshansky in the Centre from constitutional rights. We were seeing mem os from the State 
Department, from the Department o f  Justice, that were calling to put the detainees in Guantanamo Bay so 
that they would not have any judicial review. So that they can be interrogated as they please; and this is 
against the Magna Carta; this is against the Medieval European document that w e as Westerners pride 
ourselves on; this is against the Medieval doctrine. We are living in the twenty first century. We are living in 
an age in which people in the West in the last 5oo hears have given their blood, sweat and tears so that their 
progeny, so that their offspring, might live free, might breathe the air o f  freedom, might be free from the 
persecution o f  unjust governments; and we have to reassert these ideals; too much blood have been shed on 
this planet, too much blood has been shed on this planet in order that w e might have rights and these rights 
are Islamic rights, they are Abrahamic rights, and they are American rights and if  you don't stand up for 
them, w e will suffer the fate o f  those who are not worthy o f  the rights they have been given as w e see them 
taken away from us. We have to stand up for our rights. You should know. You are Americans. You have 
every right to be here. You have every right to descend. You have every right to speak your truth.
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Don't be ashamed o f  being Muslims, don't be ashamed o f  being part o f  the religious tradition, that created 
the civilization o f  noble India, that created the civilization o f  Andalusia in Spain, that gave the world some 
o f  the greatest treasures that w e have, whether they be political, whether they be governmental, whether 
they be legal, whether they be philosophical, theological, and even artistic gems, even artistic gems. Don't 
be ashamed o f  your Islam, stand up fairly and bravely in the face o f  what is happening, stand up fairly and 
bravely and speak your truth because each one o f  you is a sovereign state onto yourself. God placed you on 
the earth and made you a khalif and you have every right to speak the truth, speak the truth even when it is 
bitter. I absolutely demand from all o f  us that w e must reject what is happening in the Muslim world, in our 
names and what is happening in the current administration in our name. We have to stand up; w e have to 
stand up with the people who are with us; and there are many people who are with us; don't think, when we 
were in N ew  York w e saw people handing out pamphlets, non-M uslim people, and one o f  the first principles 
they were saying: “don't let fear drive a wedge between Americans, stand up by your Muslim Americans”. 
This is what American people were saying because they know that the very fear that was created in the Nazi 
Germany against the Jewish people that led to the horrific atrocity o f  the Holocaust, is the same type o f  fear 
that is being used to cast the eye o f  suspicion upon righteous women, upon virtuous women upon chased 
wom en, who look no different than the nuns who are revered and respected, in this culture; it is also the 
men who are attempting to live according to the highest principle o f  religion, growing beards in the tradition 
o f  the prophets. If you see the picture o f  Jesus Christ, it has a man with a beard on it or Moses; the beard is 
nothing to shave out o f  fear, the beard is to wear with a pride o f  one who is emulating the best o f  creation 
sallah allah alih wa salam.
Assert your Islam in this day and in this time, and I want to bring...because the Arabs loved the deals and I 
want to bring som e o f  the deals o f  this country to show to you that those neo-conservatives, whether they 
are be secular or from religious group, that claimed that this country is a Christian country, that it was 
designed by people who wanted Christianity to be the law o f  the land, that they are not only dishonoring the 
founding father; they are telling a grave lie to the people o f  the United States o f  America.
In the ratification o f  the constitution o f  the United States, almost every state in this union had religious tests. 
In other words, in order to hold a public office you had to take a religious test, to see whether or not you 
were a Christian. The constitution refused to ratify these ideas and an amendment was not ratified in the 
constitution, when the ratification o f  the constitution o f  the states was debated, this was one o f  the major 
arguments and I would just like to read from Governor Johnson. When som ebody in North Carolina in 1788 
said:
If w e don't have a religious test, Muslims will one day possibly hold the highest public office in this 
country, the office o f  the president o f  the United States. This is what Governor Johnson said: 'It is 
apprehended that Jews, Muhammadans and pagans may one day hold office under the government o f  the 
United States. Those who are Muhammadans or any others who are not professors o f  the Christian religion 
can never be elected to the office o f  the president or any other high office, save under two cases, first, that 
people o f  America lay aside the Christian religion all together, and what is that telling you is that i f  a 
M uslim choose a Muslim government or a Muslim president in a Muslim land, they have the democratic 
right to do that, and so the question is not whether Islam can embrace democracy, the question is can 
democracy embrace Islam. That is the question. He said it may happen; this was the vision o f  these men. He 
said it may happen that the Americans lay aside Christianity, if  unfortunately the people would choose men 
such as they think like them. In other words, they would choose the ruler they want and that is their God 
given right, because the government is only valid based on the consent o f  the governed and then he said, 
that the second possible reason for choosing those people would be:
If somebody, another case, i f  any person o f  such description should not withstand their religion, in other 
words, even though they were Muslims, acquire the confidence and esteem o f  the people o f  America by 
their good conduct and practice o f  virtue, they may be elected, even though to the office o f  the president o f  
the United States.
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In other words, if  Americans wish to elect a Muslim, then the founding fathers, said they had every right to 
do that, and w e should feel proud to be in a country that w e are in a country that w e in 2004 we were in the 
minds o f  those men, because Thomas Jefferson said in the Virginia bill to establish religious freedom. 
Jefferson wrote: it was proposed that the lord, holly author o f  our religion, be changed into our lord Jesus 
Christ, but the proposal was rejected by a great majority. This is in Virginia in the legislature; the proposal 
to replace God with our lord Jesus Christ was rejected by a great majority in proof that they meant to 
include within the mantel o f  its protection, the Jew and the Gentile, the Christian and the Mohammedan, the 
Hindu and infidel o f  every denomination and that is the basis o f  this country: You are lawful citizen to this 
country. La oqsimo bihaza al balad, wa anta hellon lehaza el balad, I swear an oath by this land and you 
are an lawful citizen to this land.
The M uslims are here to stay and Pablo Canon said in a very profound essay if  this government thinks they 
can wage war on Islam like w e waged war on fascism or communism, or any other ideology, they have 
another thing coming, because Islam has been here for fourteen hundred years, and proved itself 
indestructible. Islam is indestructible. Islam is indestructible. Islam is indestructible, and that's what Pablo 
Canon had to say, a respectable republican. Islam is indestructible. So, I want all o f  you to recognize; so I 
want you all to recognize that this country has great ideals; these ideals are rooted in the Islamic ideals; 
these ideals are rooted in the Islamic ideals and toleration is an Islamic gift to the West; and this can be 
historically proven, because the first edict o f  toleration was the edict o f  Buda and it was done under the 
Ottoman Empire under the suzerainty o f  Ottoman Empire by a Unitarian Transylvanian Prince. We also 
have evidence, clear evidence that John Locke, one o f  the greatest political theorists in Western history was 
influenced by Edward Pococke who just happened to be the Professor o f  Islamic and Arabic studies at 
Cambridge University. He convinced John Locke to abandon his Trinitarianism and embrace Unitarianism, 
to embrace the unity o f  God.
So w e must see that Islam has given too much and tonight is about giving, the M uslims have given too 
much to civilization for them to be accused or abused, by those people who wish nothing but harm for this 
country, that's what they want and I w ill end on this note that I sincerely believe until the Palestinian issue is 
recognized as a festering soul on the body o f  this planet. Until the United States o f  America rises up to her 
responsibility, in addressing a grave crime against the people for over fifty years who have been suffering in 
humiliation in abject poverty, and have suffered at the hands o f  the current government, that could be called 
nothing less but a fascist government, nothing less but a fascist government, nothing less but a fascist 
government, that Palestine is the issue and w ell I hold no enmity in my heart for Jewish people; I hold no 
enmity in my heart for the children o f  Prophets, for the children o f  Jacobs because I know that their fathers 
would only wish them w ell, and I wish what their father w ishes for them. But I call on the Jewish people o f  
this country, to rise up and condemn the oppression that they see with their own eyes.
We as M uslims must abandon tribalism. We must abandon tribalism. We must reject the concept o f  
collective guilt. We must reject the concept o f  bani Islam. I did not join  a tribe. I joined what I believe is the 
religion o f  truth, and wherever that religion tells me to stand, I w ill stand with it, whether it is with the 
M uslims or against them. We cannot fall victims to tribal mentalities.
We have to reject in our hearts vengeance, revenge for the sake o f  pride. We have to reject this in our heart 
and begin to read the Qur'an, as it was clearly intended by the author whom w e believe is the lord o f  the 
world. When he said in the Qur'an again and again: “w e man 3afa we asalaha fa  agroho 31a allah. 3aqibo 
bemethil ma 3oqebtom bih wa I2n sabartom fahwa xairon lei sabireen”.That yes, you can address wrongs 
as you choose. But if  you show patience, i f  you are forbearing, that's better to you. If you forgive, that's 
better to you, and I was with the patient with Rachel Corrie who lost their beautiful daughter in Palestine, 
run over and crushed by a caterpillar, a caterpillar tractor built in the United States o f  America, and given as 
aid to Israel, and used as a weapon o f  destruction against the Palestinian pharmacists who had nothing to do 
with any violence against the state o f  Israel, but was punished for collective guilt which is a crime against 
every legal system on this planet. The idea that one holds the sin o f  another is alien to the Abrahamic 
tradition. The Qur'an says and it is reiterated in the bible, and the all N ew  Testament forms, la taziro
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wazeraton wezr okhra. N o soul bears the burden o f  another soul. The sins o f  all Palestinians who are having 
their trees uprooted, who are having their houses destroyed, nothing to do with anything other than gross 
injustice, and we reject it, just as we reject innocent Jews that are killed in the name o f  Islam. I reject it. I 
want to stand by the truth, that's where I want to be, and I want all o f  you to stand by the truth. And look 
into your heart, estafti qalbak wa law aftook el nas. Take a fatwa from your own heart, even if, people give 
you fatwa, you ask your own heart, that is what the Prophet would do. We have only 500 hadith that are 
absolutely o f  the status o f  the Qur'an, and one o f  them says, naha rasol Allah (salah allah 3alih wa salam) 
3an qatl elnesa2 wal awlad; the Prophet o f  God forbade the killing o f  women and children, the prophet o f  
God forbade the killing o f  women and children, the prophet o f  God forbade the killing o f  wom en and 
children.
We cannot see his name vilified. We will not allow his religion to be vilified for crime that has nothing to do 
with his religion and w e should say like he said when Khaled ibn el-Walid killed those prisoners unjustly: 
allahuma eni bare2 mema fa3 l Khaled. I am innocent o f  what Khalid did. I am innocent o f  what Khalid did. 
This is what he cried and this is we must cry. Islam is innocent o f  what is being done in its name. We reject 
it in the same way that the Christians now reject the gross intolerance, the crusades, the Christian crusades 
and any other pre-modem crime that was done in the name o f  Christianity, the m odem  Christians reject it 
and w e too must reject what is being done in the name o f  our religion, really with one voice and our ulama 
have im mense burden and I believe our ulama have failed to address this critical issue and 1 want them to 
address it. Because it must be seen for the crime that it is, it has to be seen for the crime that it is and I want 
to say Daniel Pipes put a test out on the Internet how to determine whether som ebody is a good Muslim or a 
bad Muslim, and I took that test and failed and I want to say to all o f  you I hope you fail that test too and I 
want to say to all o f  you. I hope you fail that test too, you don't want be a good Muslim in the eyes o f  Daniel 
Pipes and for anybody here who is representing him, I wish all the best for that man, I hope he is guided and 
looks into his heart and really reassess what he has been doing, but I really want to say that I want to be a 
good M uslim in the eyes o f  God and being a good Muslim in the eyes o f  God often means being 
condemned in the eyes o f  people, and so don't be ashamed.
Jesus Christ told his followers you will be persecuted in my name, in my name. Jesus Christ told his 
followers, the people o f  the world will hate you, and they will persecute you because people o f  truth are 
often hated and despised by people o f  falsehood. So don't be afraid o f  being hated and despised. May God 
strengthen this organization. May God strengthen all organization. May you go back to your community 
with a renewed spirit to strive even harder, and I would say Tariq Ramadan when he is refused, or not 
refused when his Visa is revoked, it is time to change administrations. And I want to say i f  the Republicans 
are closer to the truth I am with them, i f  the democrats are closer to the truth I am with them, but in this 
case, anything but Bush. Because this country has to send a message; this country has to send a m essage to 
the rest o f  the world, that the last four years were a mistake. Abo Gurayeb was a mistake. Abo Gurayeb does 
not represent the good people o f  the United States and Abo Gurayeb goes right to the top and just as like 
Truman said the box stops here. As salamo 3alikom.
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Appendix 2
Transcript of Yusuf Estes' sermon “Why the West needs Islam”?
It is great to be with you here again tonight. Mashallah. I like that. I was listening to the program and I was 
thinking what happens when people who are not Muslims hear about Islam in the media, websites, even you 
know from som e people who have contacts with som e Muslims and I was remembering what happened 
when I first had a chance to meet a Muslim. How many o f  you heard the story? You have heard it? I won't 
bother you with it. Do w e have anybody here who is a Muslim? Do w e have anybody who is not a Muslim  
yet? You already got a beard now. We have got to go. How about over here? (Audience laughs).
When people hear stories o f  what some Muslims do and this o f  course has to be exaggerated a little bit. 
Then w e find that there are pretty rotten stories that come around. And just the other day right here in 
Australia, I had the chance to interview some people. I like to do the man with the camera thing. And you 
listen to people responses. Some o f  them are hysterical. I remember one time I was asking som eone what do 
you know about Islam and he kept thinking and thinking and he said, Islam; is that a salad dressing? But 
you know, so you have things in-between and you have those who really have a bad notion about Islam. It is 
fair because i f  that’s all they know, that’s all they know. But it should be after som ebody is dealing with 
M uslims they should have a good impression o f  what all Islam is really about. But as you heard a few  
minutes ago, som e M uslims are pretty tough and not so good and that leaves a bad impression for all o f  us.
They do have and that’s according to the Catholic Church latest release, you already heard so I would not 
buy it with you again, according to them Islam is the largest religion in the world, that’s according to the 
Catholic Church, Islam is one o f  the largest religions in the world. We passed them up they said in the last 
senses. You look excited? If w e have one more or one less Muslim out o f  one and a half or two billion  
people. I can’t tell the difference. You can’t tell the difference. But it makes a lot o f  difference how the 
M uslims w e have behave, the axlak o f  Muslims is really what’s all about, the behavior, the manner, the way 
o f  the Muslims.
When we talk about the people o f  the West, the so-called West and the so-called East, so-called Middle 
East, there w ill always be cultural differences, and there is gonna be traditions that som e tribes and people 
have, that w ill separate them from the other people, but when w e talk about religion, most religions have 
som ething that’s kinda lean towards their area, for example, Hindus will obviously be basically from India, 
why? That’s really the name. It’s Hindustan, religions named after the place, Hinduism. Christianity is not 
exactly the same way, because it has believers from all populations around the world. Judaism, on the other 
hand, is pretty strict, if  you wanna be a real Jew you have to be born under the tribe o f  Juda. So the only 
way you can get it is to be a blood transfusion from somebody who is from there. And then Buddhism is just 
limited really to certain areas, som e people are attracted to it. But what about Islam? Islam claims to be for 
all places and all people and all times. This is the claim o f  Islam. Because I grew up with a Christian 
background I can really speak from the fifty forty years and tell you that, I definitely saw, whether they will 
ever admit it or not, prejudice because even today there are Christian churches for Chinese and Christian 
churches for Japanese. And we have Christian churches for black people and Christian churches for 
M exican people even though they speak English. But would it be strange to you and I i f  som ebody said Oh 
don’t go to that mosque because it’s for black people. Because any masjid in the world could have a black 
person as the imam or a white person or a yellow  person or any colored person w e would not think about it. 
Would we? All we think about is to recite the Qur'an correctly. That will be the main thing.
When M alcolm x was close to real Islam, when he came to real Islam, that was one o f  the things that struck 
him that he had gone for Hajj and he is amazed, he said I w ill pray next to a white person and blacks and 
browns and all colors. You know all together, he was amazed. He talked about it; one thing he talked about 
it when he did salah in a small masjid in Makkah, he said he noticed that the one leading probably from
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Africa, he was black and so he went to him after the prayer and said did you ever have a chance to be 
leading the prayer in front o f  these all white guys? He said the man looked at him and said what? What are 
you talking about? Because the stigma, the thing he grew up in his mentality, this was a big deal. You know, 
to try to find a chance to be up to with whity. That is what he talked about. And I watched. By the way I 
used to be white. (Audience laugh). I tried to keep a straight face I could not.
When I was real little I watched my cousins you know, and they were telling me something one time about 
colored. And I was thinking you know, color? At that time color was a big deal because m ovies were black 
and white but there was something new out called techno-color. It was a big deal: Tardeo, techno-color and 
Point Vista which was part o f  D isney the animal things, like the early version o f  animal planet Okay? So he 
was with his friends and he said w e gonna see some colors today, colored people and I was thinking wow. 
Like rainbows or something I may imagine. I had no idea what they were talking about until w e were going  
down to the beach and it had a big sign “no colored” and I was thinking why cannot you have color on the 
beach I don’t get it. This is 1940s. And it was so bad that people took it for granted and it was alright. Still 
little kids they don’t really see this because they start out innocent. We mentioned that last time, that when 
children are born, they are in a state o f  innocence, not in a state o f  guilt. You know, in Arabic, you have 
som ething that extends over into tribalism; it is called asadeyya, and this is worse than that, it is something 
horrible; so w e were now making a migration from up north to Texas. I remember that and in our way, we 
stopped in a place called Arkansas, when we stopped in the gas station, my dad told us, go and use the 
bathroom, w e gonna go, my sister went to the ladies, and I had demands and som eone said “colored”. I 
wanted to see what colored bathroom looked like inside. I can imagine, that’s gonna be something, and 
som eone told me , what did you go in that room for? I did not wanna tell him, you know, I used the 
bathroom, he said no, “that’s for colored”, I did not get it, but even though w e have through a lot in our 
countries and w e have seen buses taking children from the black area to the white area and from the white 
area to the black area, w e spend all o f  our security money to do it, all the reserves o f  security, they use it up 
for that, and in the 1690s it got really bad and w e went to the point where w e had, som e really serious 
violence, and when Martin Luther King Junior, was giving a speech, he said that he had a dream, and his 
dream was to see all children growing up together, going to school together, that was the dream he had and 
he said that. And right after that they assassinated him, they killed him, this is the kind o f  hatred that com es 
with that, for what? For the color o f  his skin, can you imagine that? You might think it’s over, w e don’t have 
that problem? No. What it does is that it goes deeper, hides its head down low, you know under the radar but 
it is still there. You doubt what I said, it extends beyond the white black thing it is also a man woman thing, 
you know in the West, they still have problems with women holding high position, believe that, how com e 
Hilary Clinton is out o f  the race? Because and watch what’s now happening to Obama when he goes against 
McCain; McCain is what? What color, you were white, you w ill see, I can be wrong, I was wrong before, 
w e will see.
The point I am trying to get really is how much the West needs to understand what true Islam is about, 
because it is the thing they claim to be looking for, the claim they are making when they make their big 
speeches, and pontificate us infinitum about the principles that they offer to the ignorant, you know, 
backward, third world countries. A white girl who was a Christian in Colorado, was talking to som eone and 
she got the notion that she needs to go save the Muslims in Africa, she joined som e peace group, whatever it 
was and went trips all over the way to Africa, and you know going from place to place, thinking she is 
going to save these people, and she had a good heart, don’t get me wrong, true they were poor, they literally 
made their houses, what they live in from whatever was available, palm trees and grass huts, things like this, 
but when she visited the village, the people would treat her like it was a festival and she thought “oh 
because I am American I am gonna give them civilization, I am going to save them and everything, that is 
why they were holding big celebrations when I com e”. And there was food a lot o f  food, more than she 
could eat and the people would say: “No. no. take more, take more, more food and more food”; so she goes 
to the next village, and again, all the food is there, eat, eat com e one, cucumbers, tomatoes, whatever, eat.
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A long the way, she was in one village and she cannot eat any more and she said I thought you guys, like 
poor over here, they said we are, our children are starving, she said, “there is food everywhere I go, there is 
plenty o f  food”; the guide said “mam it is because you are here, they are M uslims and they are taking 
everything they have in the village here because you are the guest”, because this is Islam, it is does not 
matter our conditions because our guests are first, she started crying, she said I did not com e over here to 
hurt these people; I thought I can help them, and after doing som e search, she realized they actually had 
more than she really did. Because she did not have the capacity to do what they were doing, to actually take 
food out o f  their children mouth, they were going house to house to have anything they get at all, have a 
cucumber, Ok, have half a tomato, Ok, give it to us, what do you have over here? Hay? A piece o f  bread. 
And they were literately taking everything they had, so that she would not feel uncomfortable and insisted 
that she would eat it.
Many o f  you know exactly what I am talking about, but there are a lot o f  people in the world today who  
don’t have clue about that, they don’t understand that, by the way this lady made shahada, put on hijab and 
went back to Colorado, telling people about Islam, o f  course they got this typical, whoever goes to Islam, 
they have som ething to say about it, and in her case, she probably got malaria and she has been crazy ever 
since (audience laugh).
When Cassius Clay, that was 50 years ago, he was a boxer, number one on top and everybody is looking, 
w ow  Cassius Clay, who is this guy? Amazing he accepted Islam and changed his name to Muhammad Ali, 
you know what did they say? Too many shots to the head, there were a jazz singer that Elton John was 
jealous of, he was glad when he became a Muslim, and he never said I never had any competition after he 
got out o f  the business, who is he talking about? Cat Stevens. I think he was Greek Orthodox or something, 
I don’t remember, but he was Christian at least by name, when he entered Islam, all the people that used to 
love him, because he has got a great voice, even today he has got great voice, and very creative with his 
music, but as soon as he became a Muslim, you know what they said, because he had been to the hospital, 
too many drugs, look at that, these are the kind o f  things that people say and it means they have to try to 
explain, what do you have to explain? If somebody decided they don’t be a Republic, they wanna be a 
democrat; that is in my country; why do you have to explain something, what can it be it’s just a choice; 
why is that you have to make excuse? And they do. You should hear som e o f  the things that people said 
even about me and my family when we came to Islam. These were harder, they had to really com e up with 
som ething because hey, everybody knew us, everybody knew what w e were all about. Each time som ebody 
goes to Islam, you will see there will be resistance, they are gonna be heavy resistance. When I came to 
Islam, I got into Islam, and some o f  my relatives were telling me “stay away from those M uslim s”, and I 
could not explain because I was the one who called my family to Christianity to start with, so when I got to 
Islam and I came back, they were like “Oh you know w e can’t listen to you anymore”. I said: “I found the 
next step up, com e on, go up”. Something happened; a very bad experience happened, with som e M uslims, 
they did som ething really bad, which in fact I am not gonna tell the story because, it is that bad. Still, it was 
only a couple and it was not certainly not representative o f  Islam, it was som e bad people, so and again they 
com e to me and said “see..see w e told you now com e on back and be with us”. I said for what? I came in 
Islam, not for you, not for them. I came to Islam because it is the only thing that makes any sense. Islam is 
the only thing that offers proof for everything it says and there is nothing illogical, one stays one, hello, one 
equals one, end o f  the story, no more explanation after that, as for Jesus, being the son o f  God, it is simple, 
but he was a miracle, a creation o f  human being, just like Adam and Eve.
So when som ething like this happens and somebody com es into Islam, should it be that they got a real easy  
road because i f  you get to the right way, why would it be difficult, it should be real simple, i f  you take that 
logic, then it should happen that all Muslims should be in good shape all the time, it should be according to 
that logic that M uslims should never had any hard time, they will always be in a good way, makes sense? 
One o f  the places I am supposed to go speak coming up in July, sent me som ething that I read yesterday, 
they do a conference, may be one in their whole life, they put it together, they bring speakers in, they give  
you a title or something, I remember one time, they said, “coming to Islam, what can I do with that?” Is that
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the name o f  the speech? “Oh”, I said, “what can I do with that?” In their case, they wanted me to talk about 
the happy prophets, prophets, the happy people, something like this. What? What do you say? Is that like a 
cartoon? Okay? “The happy prophets are coming on”, you know. Content. That is what w e decided was a 
better word. That Allah talks about believers, radia allahu 3anhom wa rado 3anh, people are pleased with 
Allah and Allah was pleased with them. Pleased or content, but not happy. I don’t mean you that can’t be 
happy and be a Muslim but what I am saying is that prophets specially are gonna be the ones that suffer the 
most, and this is why because they are getting huge reward for what they doing, and Allah tells us in the 
Qur'an, this is in chapter 29, in El 3ankabot or spider, a3ozo bellah min el shaytan el rajeem, do human 
beings think they gonna be left alone because they said “w e believe?” And they were putting on to fitna, big 
trial, calamity, difficulty, squeeze you, you know, because Allah continues he did the same thing to the 
people before you, to show you who are the truthful and who are the liars, because if  you are really true, 
you believe in Allah, and you want to do something about it, Okay, go ahead and try, and you might say, 
why? Why would that be a difficulty? Part o f  that is to understand what the real purpose o f  life is? Part o f  
that is to understand w hose your creator really is. To understand that w ill be then to understand your role in 
all o f  this and then, you would find out what you are supposed to be doing, and that is where the rub comes, 
not the rub in Arabic, rub in English, the problem you gonna have is that you would soon realize, that you 
can’t do what you wanted to do, that is w e are here to do what he wants us to do, and if  we understood that, 
then there a lot o f  things we have to give up, you narrow your options down to be a real M uslim, and a lot 
o f  people don’t want do that; they don’t want give up, their desires, their lust, their personal goals, and that’s 
where the problem comes. They are not attacking Islam: they are attacking faith.
So if  som ebody is attacking you as a Muslim, i f  somebody is even attacking Islam in front o f  you, realize 
that it is not really you, it is not us as a whole, the problem is they are responding to something they don’t 
wanna accept, they don’t wanna to accept it because it will mean they have to give up all the stuff they are 
doing, you follow  me, that is the problem.
In the west, for the most part, not everybody, by the way it is wrong to sum up and say everybody is like 
this in there, is not that wrong, like if  somebody said that about us, no, w e are human beings, w e have 
different ideas, hopes and goals, true, for the most part, Muslims are good, and for the most part, Muslims 
are follow ing Islam and doing a pretty good job, but there are som e stinkers out there, true. In the same 
case, when you look to the west, it is wrong to say, all the West is like this, because they are not, there are 
good people there, and there are also human beings; they have goals, they have desires, they have things 
they are trying to do as well; and there are some who are looking, searching for the truth and they would 
love to know som e o f  the things you w ill take for granted every day. I am pretty sure I am right when I say 
this; that many o f  the people in the West would love to hear about it, until they found out it is Islam, simply 
because o f  the pre-conceived notion o f  Islam and Muslims, but i f  they know how beautiful is this deen, this 
way and how it solves so many o f  the problems they have, they will be very happy with it, so by now I 
should give you som e example on that, I made my statement so I really could quit but I would like to give 
you som e examples o f  that.
One exam ple is when I hear people, I wanna show you something, how is the reverse o f  everything, this is 
just like turning a subject upside down and turning at it again. Somebody com es to us and attacks us, I 
mentioned that last night, and they say what a dumb thing, so backward. What is this thing about right hand, 
left hand? What is that all about? Come on. Cause w e shake hands with this. We don’t know som ebody to 
give us left hand, do we? This is very bad, somebody gave you your left hand; what do w e use this hand for, 
besides shaking hands? What do w e use this hand for? Eating? Do w e eat with this hand? How do w e eat? 
Imagine som ebody who is putting his left hand? Ha ha. How is that? Why? Because you are backward you 
don’t know your left hand, from your right, hahaha. Even I heard one say: “how you gonna deal with, a 
sociably acceptable environment, I wanna say that right, and eat in a decent restaurant with utensils”? This 
sounds like a primitive cave man, right (audience laughs).
Because when you pick up your meat, don’t you pick up the knife with this hand and pick up the fork with 
this hand? Ya? You cut the meat, you put that in your mouth? What is the matter with you? That’s so
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backward, even that, now check this out, there is a reason we do this because this hand w e keep it clean, 
because this hand w e use to clean ourselves after the toilet, “oh, how backward, don’t you use paper?” 
(audience laughs). The United States navy did a study, in the navy you got people in the boat you can’t get 
in touch with other people out there. And what they did, they had people washing their hands before and 
after their meals, on another ship, they ran the same test, and had these guys not wash their hands, before 
and after the meals, to see what will happen, totally and completely no doubt about it, the ones washing  
their hands, before and after, had the least amount o f  sicknesses being passed around, o f  course, w e know  
that well nowadays, because o f  the studies they have done, and how many times, people are getting this 
hepatitis, hepatitis B, I think , they get from fast food places, the guy went to the bathroom and com e back, 
he does not wash his hands, the next thing, you will see an outbreak o f  all this all over the w hole city, and 
everybody that ate there, got it. So now they have these signs that all em ployees must watch their hands, 
things like that. Another time, a woman who works for an insurance company, she did an independent study, 
she works in a big corporation, they had so many em ployees, taking o ff  time, being sick, being ill, and they 
asked her to com e in and do a study; she went into every floor o f  building and everything around, and did a 
laboratory test, and she would put this material, dust, on the telephones, on the keyboard, and then she 
would com e back and collect it up later and they found fecal matter on the telephones, on the keyboards, on 
the fax machine, along with other germs as well, because people want care o f  washing them selves after they 
go to the toilet, so they insist em ployees wash hands and it makes a huge difference; you w on ’t believe that 
this happens? How does this work in the left hand, right hand? How does that com e in? We gonna 
understand this subject a little bit more to get it for you. If, w e are now talking about the toilet paper thing, 
i f  and I wanna ask you, You M uslims, don’t have dogs, but in the West, everybody has got a dog, and ask 
them, have you picked up the paper this morning? You go through the grass, you put it up and then you say, 
oh, has som ebody walked with their dog right here? Look at this. Ah, you got it on you. So what you gonna 
do? You gonna turn the newspaper off, you gonna go to the house and wash the newspaper off, which one? 
So for the dog you are washing but for you are using paper. N ow  you are getting a clue; you are starting to 
get a clue, because what happens when a person washes them selves and this is what actually M uslims are 
doing; they wash them selves totally with water as i f  you are going to the bathtub or something, and the 
difference is tremendous because after washing, this hand is a lot cleaner than you think.
N ow  I want to take you back thousand years, the big scientists scholars o f  the time, were in Andalusia in 
Spain and these people were M uslims and they were using the principles taught by Muhammad, 3alih el 
salat wal salam, four hundred years before them, and they were analyzing these things, being philosophical 
about these things; people like Ibn Senna, Ibn Rushd and other people; they are still today mentioned in the 
medical books, history books, you w ill find, that they were doing amazing things for them, for their time, so 
much time that at the time o f  the Black Plague in Europe, the people were dying like flies; so far they could  
not bear them, they w ould carry them on wagons, bodies on wagons, and it was so bad, that everybody was 
there, finding their disease, something was killing them, they call it the black death or the black plague. You 
can read about it in encyclopedia, read about it, but these people used to send their children to Spain, 
because that’s the real higher learning was; they sent them to Spain, but they found something amazing, 
even though som e o f  the students came down, with these diseases, it was only the students that came from 
Europe but none o f  the locals got it, Why? And these came to know that it was because o f  this, cleaning this 
hand and only eating with this hand, and this hand for anything dirty and still washing it anyway. The 
difference is that they were able to go back and saw the problem in Europe and that was the end o f  the black 
plague after they understood it. By the way, you w on’t find that mentioned in the history books, as there is 
no reason to mention that, is it? Especially because there is a connection to Islam, I wanna share another 
one with you think about this. I was coming home one night from a program very late at night, driving back; 
my w ife let me drive, I put my head on the steering wheel, I was so tired, I put my head back up, my little 
daughter was with me, she said, daddy “wake up, daddy wake up”. I said I cannot. I am exhausted. I want 
pull over, and she tuned the radio on really loud. I like to listen to talk shows and the first thing that came 
out, it was the beginning o f  a sentence, a man’s voice said, “always sit down when you eat or drink”, ah, he
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said: “never stand up when you eat or drink”. What is this? What is this guy talking about? You know, this 
is Sunna, al rasul sallah allah ali wa salam, said “sit down when you eat or drink, don’t stand up”, and I 
was thinking “what’s this?”. He began explaining the damage that goes starting at the neck and going to 
down and he starts explaining all the problems and all the operations that could be avoided if  people just sit 
down when they sit or drink. I mean I was awake when I was listening to that, but now you got a problem, 
because now if  you realized all what he said and understood the problem, all the damage done to your body, 
so now you gonna sit down, when you eat or drink. Are you doing it for Islam for Allah or are you doing it 
for your health? Makes sense? M oo years ago, som ebody is giving you advise, you make fun o f  it until you 
say w ow  it really works. I am probably having a lucky guess, ha? It surprises me that the M uslims don’t 
pick up on this faster. I see people who are not M uslims see things happen, then com e to Islam, there is 
another example. I used to be in a hotel, and I happen to be waiting for a customer in a store once, and I was 
just walking around, and he had something in the toothpaste department, health toothpaste o f  som e kind, 
and the claim on this toothpaste is that it has the only substance on earth that can remove black and tartar 
from your teeth without damaging the enamel; it improves the gums, and cleans the gums all the way down 
into your stomach, and it mentioned the ingredients, som e technical terms that I still can’t pronounce, but it 
says it com es from siwak, ha? From what? miswak and he showed the stick, on there and it was trimmed 
about and I saw it, that was a miswak stick and I turned it over and I read Dr Muhammad's toothpaste, 4 
dollars 75 cent for this small and you still have to go and buy a toothbrush, or i f  you are using the real 
miswak, instead o f  getting one or two percent, that’s what was on there, you get a hundred percent, i f  you 
use the tooth stick that prophet sallah allah alih wa salam  used and you find people say oh that’s tacky, you 
carry your stick with you, oh, (audience laugh) But even today you see one o f  the brothers that are using it 
today, what does their teeth look like? Let us go back to the guy cutting his stakes, go back and read Emily 
post, you know who is Emily post, go back and check the people who tell you about proper manners, the 
proper manners is, yes, you pick up the knife with the right hand, you pick up the fork with the left, you cut 
the stake and you lay the knife down, and you cut up the fork with the right and you eat it with the right. So 
this goes back to the time when they were getting over the problem o f  the black plague, hello.
So often w e are taking criticisms from ignorant people and then adding more ignorance on top o f  it and 
rejecting that is really intelligence. I am saying not only the West needs Islam, I am saying M uslims need 
Islam, yes or no? We deviated far away, far away from the real Islam, it is not just in the eating, in the health 
and taking care o f  our bodies, but it is also in the way w e treat each other, and that is much worse, because 
it is an important aspect o f  Islam, because after your correct relationship with your lord the next close  
important thing is your correct relationship with the people and if  it sucks, what are you all about? How are 
you a good Muslim i f  no body like you? How? How is that work? Even the enem ies o f  the Prophet had 
respect for him, som e o f  his enemies had respect for him, yes or no? And when I find M uslims who don’t 
have respect for their scholars or teachers I wonder what is really going on? What is this? Where is the 
proper behavior? The things that we notice is bad treatment to parents in most o f  these programs, and that’s 
not new, that did not just happen last week, that has been going on since 1930s, for there was television. 
Judaism, Christianity and Islam forbid that, they forbid that and back in order, in all three o f  the 
monotheistic religions that the parents are so high that they are mentioned in the commandment in this 
priority, after god, almighty Allah, worship him alone and keep away from falsehood, worshiping according 
to his own rule; that is number one in the commandment, number 5 in the commandments is how do you 
treat your parents, it com es before number six, which is “don’t kill”; it is exactly the same order in the 
Qur'an, no difference, so regardless o f  what your take is, in what religion, in which book, all o f  us need to 
look back and think what are w e doing? How can w e possibly treat our elders as w e do today? How can you 
even make jokes? It is not acceptable that you put down your mother, to put down your father, to talk about 
your elders, your teachers, regardless o f  their religious affiliation, regardless o f  their political minds, they 
are your parents, and you have to give them that dignity, am I wrong or right?
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They want me to talk about how the West needs Islam, I am saying all o f  us need it, I am saying it is not 
som ething o f  an obscure area; I am saying if  you are human being how can you live without Islam? And 
most people on the earth have things in their life about Islam and they don’t know it; is that true or false? It 
is true. Think about it. If somebody is w illing to put som e other body ahead o f  their needs, is not that a 
teaching in Islam? If somebody wanted to sacrifice them selves to help som ebody else? Is not this Islam? If 
som ebody is going to feed the people in need or take care o f  the orphan, the traveler, is not that part o f  
Islam, and may be they don’t have the right beliefs but how about the actions? And w e find there are many 
people who would like to do something good; they have an idea, how about this, instead o f  cutting them 
down to the level o f  Okay, because you don’t believe (unclear), how about emphasize the good things that 
people do and encourage them to do more. I mentioned something yesterday but I w ill mention it again, 
som etim es w e find people o f  the other faiths who hang around the M uslims, and even to the extent that they 
like what they see, they like what they hear, they feel good when they are with you because you don’t drink 
alcohol; you don’t smoke cigarette; you don’t play with drugs; you don’t chase after wom en, and as long as 
these things are in place; especially you don’t cut people down; you don’t make people som ebody feel like 
low; they feel good, they wanna be with you; to the extent that when they wanna do salah  they wanna pray; 
when you are fasting, they wanna fast with you, so you ask them. Do you want to becom e a Muslim? 
N o..But they are still doing som e good deeds, ya. And then we com e back to the same thing again, to 
remind them as much as your good deeds is your doing, how about this idea? How about enrolling in the 
program to get the benefits? How about sign up for the job so that you can get paid on pay day? Makes 
sense? If you gonna do these things any way, what is it to enter Islam? It is to say with conviction that there 
really is God; one God and you wanna worship him on his standards; that’s the first step, immediately to be 
follow ed by the second step to bear witness that Muhammad brought the message that I just said, that there 
is one God. What is so tough about this for somebody who already claims he believes in the monotheistic 
faith? And the answer com es, this is what I really grew up in, this is what I found my forefathers doing, I 
am committed to this because my father is this, my tradition is this and so on, Allah Subhano wa ta3la 
mentioned that in the Qur'an this is exactly the excuse that people use, but it is not a valid excuse, it is 
ignorance because if  you know that something is better for you than what you have? Why can’t you 
abandon that for what is better for you? Why not?
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Appendix 3
Transcript o f Baba A li’s YouTube videos
Who hijacked my religion?
Who hijacked my religion? Seriously, who hijacked my religion? I am watching TV and this guy is 
explaining Islam but he is talking non-sense. What religion is this guy talking about? N ot only he does not 
have any idea o f  what he is saying but he is saying “I am a M uslim”. Seriously, from where do they get 
these characters from? It is even funnier how they give him the title o f  “expert” (laughing). Just because 
you have read a book about Muslims, does not make you an expert. And don’t get me wrong. It is not just 
non-M uslim s they also confuse Muslims on TV. Som ehow they keep finding people who have little or no 
knowledge o f  the religion. They show them talking all crazy, talking about killing and murdering. It is not 
based on the actions o f  Islam. You hear all kinds o f  crazy stuff. And 1 am o f  serious thinking, o f  all the 
M uslims they can put on TV, they put these people on, com e on man. I don't recognize what you are talking 
about as Islam. It's like practising a totally different religion. Sometimes, they give the green light to 
extremists. Coincidence? I don't think so.
This is how they build a public opinion on a group o f  people but their hatred is based on ignorance. People 
are not born racist. Prejudice is something that is learnt; they don't necessarily com e out and say M uslims 
are terrorists but they do everything else so you can com e up with that opinion.
Look up at all those mumbo jumbo you see in the movies. In the m ovie, they can lie as much as they want 
because they can use the excuse it is only a movie. But have you ever noticed that all the bad guys in the 
m ovies these days are M uslims and their actors who play their roles, they don't do their homework. 
Som etim es, they show a Muslim praying and in the middle o f  his praying, he answers the phone or in the 
middle o f  his praying, he talks to somebody “joke”. Sometimes, you have the Muslim characters sleep with  
one o f  the wom en in the movie. Double joke. Who writes this stuff?
And how com e they show the main bad guy acting evil, they are playing the azan in the background. Hello, 
the azan has called for prayers. Coincidence? I don't think so.
They take a peaceful religion and they try to associate violence to it; no wonder the masses are confused  
about Islam.
People are often scared o f  things they don't understand and don't think w e are the only people who is victim  
o f  this propaganda; you remember the way Japanese were treated during World War II or the way African 
Americans are treated during the Civil Rights Movement. You get the picture. History continues to repeat 
itse lf and the way that stereotype is built is done in a very sneaky sneaky way.
You watch TV and you see images o f  black people stealing; I guess i f  you see it enough times, you assume 
that all black people steal or all Hispanic people cross the border to steal your jobs or all white people are 
trash or w om en are inferior to men and the false list o f  stereotypes goes on and on; these tactics are not 
new; it is the same tricks over and over again but this time they are building a stereotype o f  the Muslims; 
they are associating the word “M uslim” with the word “terrorist” but the word Muslim and terrorist is an 
oxymoron; you know, when you put words next to each other that have opposite meanings; it is like saying  
“definite maybe” or “that's a loud silence”, “same difference”, “exact estimate”. You get the picture . The 
word Muslim terrorist does not make sense. The word “M uslim” means one who submits to God. The word
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“terrorist” means som eone who submits to terror. So how one who submits to God spreads terror? It does 
not make sense.
How com e when non-Muslim commits a crime, he is merely committing a crime but when som ebody is 
comm itting a crime, their religion is never been mentioned?
They take verses out o f  the Qur'an out o f  context to serve their own purpose. Think not that I came to send 
peace but a sword. Does that sound violent to you? Does that sound like it is taken out o f  context?
That's not from the Qur'an; that's from the bible, Matthew 10:34. You see, you can put that trick on any 
religion. Do you know what I am saying?
I live in a country where the majority o f  people are Christian but you won't hear the term Christian terrorist 
if  a Christian commits a crime; that is because it is common knowledge that Christianity does not teach 
terrorism.
But since the average person lacks the average knowledge o f  other religions; they are easily fooled to 
believe what is told to them; they are the ones who based their opinion based on what they see on TV and if  
you repeat a lie enough times, people take it as truth. Just imagine if  the TV was your teacher. You probably 
think Islam is the religion o f  fanatics; that Muslims have no connection with reason or rationality but in 
reality that's the exact opposite.
When you study Islam, you see that it encourages thought. It advises men to think and reflect. It promotes 
peace and tranquility. But there are people out there who do actions that Islam forbids in the name o f  Islam, 
abusing this beautiful religion, to promote their own agenda and the media loves this type o f  people. So 
many times, they find these people o f  bad apples which is usually people who don't understand Islam. They 
wait till they get emotional and they throw them on TV, ratings baby, ratings, they don't care about the truth. 
The only thing they care about is the numbers. They wanna boost their ratings; increase their audience. So 
they can raise the price o f  their commercials and make the money.
If only w e practise Islam, the way it is supposed to be practised, these people would not have any foolish  
things to play with. You see, you can't judge an entire religion based on the actions o f  a few. I don't judge 
Christianity based on the actions o f  those who blow abortion clinics. By the way, what kind o f  life-m essage 
you are sending by blow ing up innocent people?
Let us clear all the confusion and make it really simple. A  religion should not be judged by its misguided 
followers; a religion should be judged by its teachings; here is a thought.
H ow about putting a practising Muslim on TV who knows what he is talking about. Have him explain 
Islam to the masses.
I f you are really interested in seeing what Islam teaches, go to your local Islamic Centre. What you hear 
might surprise you.
It is very different from what you see on TV or read on the newspapers. A bunch o f  people are trying to 
hijack my religion and I wanna it back.
Remember; so many enemies o f  the Islam ended up becoming Muslim when they saw Islam practised 
correctly; do you know what I am saying?
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At the end o f  the day, it does not make difference what the media shows or the newspaper say; a lot o f  
people judge actions not words; and if  you are a good Muslim enshallah, people wanna be like you.
Culture versus Islam
Many M uslims who come from overseas, they leave Islam back in their home country; I mean they bring 
their traditions, their cultures but their traditions have nothing to do with Islam. For example, the idea o f  a 
forced marriage where a woman gets married without her consent; Islam does not allow that; it is totally 
m essed up, man. Islam liberated people from this ignorant way o f  thinking; for som e M uslims, they love 
culture, more than they love Islam. And that's why they want to compromise religion for the sake o f  their 
culture. Joke. Now, I am not saying that all cultures are bad. There's a lot o f  great things w e can learn from 
different cultures. There's tasty food, beautiful artwork, rich languages and so much more; you know, one o f  
the things that confuse a non-Muslim is when they see a Muslim take part o f  Islam, part o f  their culture, put 
it all together and label the whole thing Islam. Not only you are giving Islam a bad name, you are confusing  
everybody; you know, i f  you add or subtract anything from Islam, it is not Islam anymore and there are so 
many M uslim s who would like to customize Islam just to meet their desires. Desires. Alhamdullah, I found 
Islam before I met these types o f  Muslims. Alhamdullah. As a convert, I can tell you that Islam is a very 
beautiful religion. This is why I feel bad for a child who grows up in the family where Islam is not given to 
them properly. You know, what I am talking about, the parents who purposely teach only parts o f  Islam, the 
parts that benefit them. The child grows up, misunderstanding Islam because he sees his parents 
comprom ising it, you know what I am talking about man. How about a father who occasionally closes his 
liquor store so that he can go to his jummah prayers. Oh brother, it is not halal to have business, over the 
jummah. Bro, it is a liquor store. Your business is not even halal. How about a mother who tells her 
daughter to put on hijab at the masjid stairs but tells her to take it o ff  for the interview. What is up with that? 
That's why the kids are all confused. They can't tell the difference between what's culture and what's Islam 
and you don't take it seriously until the day you wake up; the day you wake up and you find that your kids 
are not kids anymore. They are teenagers. That's when you start losing your hair. Your daughter starts 
asking you questions about having a boyfriend and what type o f  plastic surgery you are “cool with” dad. 
You freak out and tell her to go and talk to her mom. But then, you find your son talk about tattoos and what 
parts o f  his body, he wants to get pierced. But you try to talk to him but since, you never talk to him, you 
lost the channels o f  communication a long time ago. Basically, you have no idea what the boy is saying 
anymore. It goes som ething like this. Yoyyoyou pops. I wanna go down to play som e bball; so when my 
hom ies call me, tell him to call me on my cell. I w ill catch you latest. What? What are you saying? Where 
are you going? I loves to hang out and chill pop but gotta go pps and the other day when I told you to keep 
it to the deal, you gotta keep it on the hush hush baby, anyways, I would like to study, I have got to go. Pace 
out. Later, Pops. What are saying? Where are you going? N ow, you are really worried and you don't know  
what to do. But it gets worse. You find that those kids have those not so Islamic pictures on their myspace 
account. N ow  you son has chosen the career o f  a gangster rapper for him self, and your daughter s wants to 
be a part-time model and a part-time feminist. Actually, her w hole feminist movement is because o f  you. 
You see, throughout her life, she has been watching the way, you unjustly treated her mother. You got your 
back home mentality where you thought you are the king and she is your slave. And since you did not treat 
your w ife properly, the way Islam teaches you to do so, your daughter is now rebelling against you and your 
backward way o f  thinking; you see, Islam teaches us that the best o f  you is the best who is best to his w ife 
but apparently, you don't take that part o f  Islam, seriously and now you are paying for it. And right when 
you think your relationship with your daughter can't get any worse, you hear those words that wanna make 
you cringe; but I love him. At this point you start to panic. You look at your w ife and say: “What are we 
gonna do? What are w e going to do?” You see, you brought all this drama upon yourself because you did
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not teach your kids Islam. Instead, you were raised with customs that conflicts with the teachings o f  Islam. 
As little kids, they follow  these cuts but guess what, they are adults now and they are thinking on their own. 
Because they see the errors and the backward customs that they were raised with. Here is a reality check for 
you. Many kids have no intention to practise the culture o f  their parents; so they picked their own culture; 
so instead o f  picking your own culture, they decided to pick up their own. By the way, don't you wish, you 
should have told them about Islam, right about now. You see in this new culture that your kids picked up; it 
is cool to be rebellious; so, they don't listen to you and since, you never gave a role model, and you were 
never role models for them, they have decided to pick up their own role models. People they can look up to, 
people they can imitate; society teaches them what is cool or not; everything from the way they dress to the 
way they act, even the slang they use. How are you pops. I would like to put on som e bling bling. Now, you 
tried everything you can as a last resort. You dropped o ff  your kids at the Sunday class. You know, the 
w eekly Sunday class for the kids at the masjid, the one you never took them to; but your kids do give these 
classes a chance; everything goes one ear and out o f  the other. N ow  your kids think you are hypocrite 
because you tell them to do something that you don't do yourself. If you were praying, fasting, doing the 
things that you tell your children to do, maybe they would have done it. It is som eone telling you don't be a 
smoker (coughing and doing the gesture o f  holding a cigarette) , it w ill kill you. How do you respect that? 
So many kids go away from Islam because Islam was not presented correctly to them. They get taught the 
modified version where parents mix their culture with Islam and package the w hole thing under the label o f  
Islam and they see the errors in this culture. Yes, parents have rights in Islam but your children have rights 
to. If you know Islam, teach it to your kids, don't just tell them about how to be a good M uslim. Be a role 
model. This means you have to do it too. If w e practise Islam the way the Prophet sallah alia 3alih wa 
salam  taught us to practise it, we would not be in this mess, but as long as w e love our customs more than 
w e love Allah suhano wa ta3ala, w e will continue to suffer. You know what I am saying? This is Ali, 
reminding you just in case you forgot.
Notes:
For the transcription o f  Arabic excerpts, the present study uses the morpho-phonemictranscription system  
adapted from Harrell (1957), Hafez (1991) and IPA. It includes twelve vow el sym bols and twenty-four 
consonant sym bols. This includes six short vowels:
/a/ as in ka3b (heel),
/a/ as in harb (war), (arii?a (way), koora (ball)
/i/ as in nisiit (I forgot), kalbi bonni (my dog is brown)
/e / as in fehem (he understood), mejja (one hundred), fekr (thought)
/o/as in jorb (drink n.)
/u/ as in musiiqa (m usic)
and six long vow els, their length shown by doubling the symbol:
/aa1 as in gaari (current), saa3a (hour), faat (he passed)
/aa/  as in gaari (m y neighbor), faar (m ouse)
/ii/ as in diin(religion), Jwiila (long), xamsiin (fifty)
/ee / as in deen (debt),
/oo / as in Joo{ (one o f  the two halves o f  a match), koora (ball)
/uu/ as in Juut (kick the ball), fuul (beans), 3ala (uul (right away)
The consonant sym bols are those o f  IPA; /b/, /t/, /d/, /k/, /g/, /m/, /n/, /l/, /f/, /v/, /s/,
/z/, /}/, /$/, /h/, Av/ and /j/ have similar values to those used in transcribing English sounds. The follow ing  
are specific to Arabic:/
111 as in?aam (he rose), no?(a (point),?awwel (first)
/q/ as in qawi (strong), qanuun (law)
/r/ as in wara (behind)
408
/xJ as in xamsiin (fifty), xaaf (he was frightened) 
/r / as in tar(eja (covering)
/h/as in wahda (one)
73/ as in 3ard (width)
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